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
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
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












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
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T H E  
C O N T E N T S

O F T H E  
S E C O N D V O L U M E.

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CHAPTER VI.

View of the EASTERN Nations politically connected with GREECE.

SECT. I. *Of Lydia; the Asiatic Grecian Commonwealths; Scythia; Assyria; Persia. Reduction of the Asian Greeks under the Persian Dominion by Cyrus.* - I

SECT. II. *Accession of Cambyfes to the Throne of Persia. Acquisition of Tyre and Conquest of Egypt by the Persians. Accession of Darius. Constitution of the Persian Empire; Persian Religion.* - 24

SECT. III. *Conquest of Thrace, and Invasion of European Scythia by Darius. Submission of Macedonia to the Persians.* A 2

## CONTENTS.

*sian Empire. State of the Ægean Islands, and History of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos. Situation of the Grecian People under the Persian Dominion.* - 35

## CHAPTER VII.

Continuation of the History of GREECE during the Reign of Darius King of PERSIA.

SECT. I. *Immediate Causes of the Wars between Greece and Persia. Persian Expedition against Naxos. Revolt of the Asian Greeks against the Persian Government.* - - - - 47

SECT. II. *Affairs of Athens. Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians, Bœotians, and Eubœans. The Athenians assist the Ionians against Persia. All the Asiatic Grecian States again reduced under the Persian dominion. History of the Athenian Colony in the Thracian Chersonese. Liberal Administration of the conquered Provinces under the Persian dominion.* - - - - 57

SECT. III. *First Persian Armament against Greece under Mardonius: proceeds no farther than Macedonia. The Grecian Cities summoned by heralds to acknowledge subjection to the Persian Empire. Internal Feuds in Greece: Banishment of Demaratus king of Lacedæmon: Affairs of Argos: Banishment and restoration of Cleomenes king of Lacedæmon: Death of Cleomenes: War of Athens and Ægina.* - - - - 78

SECT. IV. *Second Persian Armament against Greece under Datis and Artaphernes: reduces the Islands of the Ægean: invades Attica. Battle of Marathon.* - 99

SECT. V. *Growing Ambition of Athens. Effects of Party-spirit at Athens. Extraordinary honors to the memory of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Impeachment and death of Miltiades.* - - - - 106

## CHAPTER

# CONTENTS.

## CHAPTER VIII.

Affairs of GREECE from the Accession of XERXES to the Throne of PERSIA till the Conclusion of the first Campaign of that Monarch's Expedition against GREECE.

SECT. I. *Accession of Xerxes to the Throne of Persia. Immense Preparations of the Court of Persia for Conquest in Europe. Assembly of the Army at Sardis, and of the Fleet in the Hellespont. March of the Army. Muster of the Army. Arrival of the Army and Fleet at Therme in Macedonia.* - - - 112

SECT. II. *State of Greece at the time of the Invasion under Xerxes. Themistocles. Responses of the Delphian Oracle concerning the Invasion. Measures for forming a confederacy of Grecian Commonwealths. Disunion among the Greeks. Assembly of Deputies from the confederated Commonwealths at Corinth. The Defence of Thessaly given up by the Confederates. Measures for defending the Pass of Thermopylæ.* - - - 125

SECT. III. *The Grecian Army takes its Station at Thermopylæ; the Fleet at Artemisium. Responses of the Delphian Oracle. The Persian Fleet proceeds to Sepias; the Army to Thermopylæ. Numbers of the Persian Forces. Storm and Shipwreck at Sepias. Battle of Thermopylæ.* - - - 146

SECT. IV. *Numbers of the Grecian Fleet. Sea-fights off Artemisium. Retreat of the Grecian Fleet. March of the Persian Army toward Athens. Attempt against Delphi.* - - - 164

SECT. V. *Unsteady Counsels of the Grecian Confederacy. The Athenians, deserted by the Peloponnesians, remove their families from Attica. Aristides. Ostracism. Athens taken by the Persians. Artemisia. Ancient man-*



## CONTENTS.

<i>ner of Naval Action. Battle of Salamis. Return of Xerxes into Asia.</i>	181
--	-----

### CHAPTER IX.

**Affairs of GREECE from the Battle of SALAMIS to the Conclusion of the PERSIAN Invasion.**

<b>SECT. I.</b> <i>Return of the Athenians to their Country. Measures of the Grecian Fleet. Dedication to the Gods for the Victory at Salamis. Honors paid to Themistocles. Revolt of Chalcidicæ from the Persians. Siege of Potidæa by Artabazus.</i>	206
--	-----

<b>SECT. II.</b> <i>Preparations for the Campaign. Speeches of Alexander King of Macedonia, of the Lacedæmonian Ambassador, and of the Athenian Minister in the Athenian Assembly. The Athenians a second time quit Attica. Zeal of the Athenian People for the Prosecution of the Persian War.</i>	213
---	-----

<b>SECT. III.</b> <i>Campaign in Bæotia. Battle of Platæa. Punishment of Thebes.</i>	223
--	-----

<b>SECT. IV.</b> <i>Measures of the Grecian Fleet. Battle of Mycalæ. Conclusion of that called by Grecian Writers the Persian or Median War.</i>	255
--	-----

### CHAPTER X.

**View of the People of the Western Countries politically connected with the GREEKS, and of the Grecian Settlements in SICILY and ITALY.**

<b>SECT. I.</b> <i>Of Carthage. Of Sicily: Agrigentum: Phalaris: Syracuse: Gelon: Invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians: Battle of Himera.</i>	264
--	-----

SECT.

## CONTENTS.

**SECT. II.** *Of Italy: Tuscany: Rome: Latium: Sybaris:  
Crotona: Pythagoras: Thurium: Paestum: Cuma:  
Campania: Lucania.* " " 285

## CHAPTER XI.

**Affairs of GREECE** from the Conclusion of that commonly called the **PERSIAN WAR** to the Establishment of Security for the Greeks against the Barbarians by the Successes of **CIMON**.

**SECT. I.** *State of the known World at the time of the Retreat of Xerxes from Greece. Dedications, Festivals, and Monuments in Greece, occasioned by the Victories over the Persians. Restoration of Athens: Jealousy of the Peloponnesians: Administration of Themistocles: Parties at Athens: Banishment of Themistocles.* 313

**SECT. II.** *War prosecuted against Persia under Pausanias and Aristides. Treason of Pausanias: Athens head of a new confederacy composed of the Greeks of the Ægean Islands, Asia Minor, and Thrace.* " 338

**SECT. III.** *Administration of Cimon. Death of Xerxes, and accession of Artaxerxes to the Persian Throne. Successes of the confederate arms under Cimon: Battle of the Eurymedon.* " " " " 349

**SECT. IV.** *Intrigues and death of Pausanias. Prosecution and flight of Themistocles: his reception at the Persian court: his death.* " " 359

## CHAPTER XII.

**Affairs of GREECE**, from the Establishment of its Security against **PERSIA**, to the **TRUCE** for Thirty Years between **ATHENS** and **LACEDÆMON**.

**SECT. I.** *Athens the seat of Science and Arts. Extension of the power of Athens: Jealousy of Lacedæmon. Earthquake*

## CONTENTS.

<i>quake at Lacedæmon: Revolt of the Helots: Assistance sent from Athens to Lacedæmon: Renunciation of the Lacedæmonian confederacy by the Athenians. War of Argos and Mycenæ.</i>	<i>- - -</i> 375
<b>SECT. II.</b> <i>Change of administration at Athens and banishment of Cimon. Renunciation of the Peloponnesian confederacy by Megara, and accession to the Athenian. Difficulties of the new Athenian administration: Epialtes; Pericles; depression of the court of Areiopagus: Expedition to Egypt. War in Greece; Siege of Ægina; relief of Megara by Myronides. Long walls of Athens built.</i>	391
<b>SECT. III.</b> <i>War between Doris and Phocis, leads to hostilities between Athens and Lacedæmon; battle of Tanagra. Affairs of Bœotia: battle of Œnophyta: successes of the Athenians under Myronides. Ægina taken. Successes of the Athenians under Tolmides: Messenians established in Naupactus. Conclusion of the Egyptian expedition. War in Thessaly. Expedition under Pericles to the western coast of Greece.</i>	<i>- -</i> 406
<b>SECT. IV.</b> <i>Change in the Athenian administration, and Recall of Cimon: Truce of five years with Peloponnesus. Expedition to Cyprus under Cimon; death of Cimon. Contention of parties in Athens, and change in the administration. Sacred war.</i>	<i>- -</i> 418
<b>SECT. V.</b> <i>Athens at the summit of its greatness; weak through the imperfection of its constitution: Attempt of Pericles to improve the constitution. Revolt in Bœotia; battle of Coroneia: revolt of Eubœa: revolt of Megara: Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians: Truce for thirty years.</i>	<i>- - -</i> 426

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THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
GREECE.

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CHAPTER VI.

View of the Nations politically connected  
with GREECE.

SECTION I.

*View of the Nations politically connected with Greece:*

*Lydia: Asiatic Grecian Commonwealths: Scythia:*

*Assyria: Persia. Reduction of the Asian Greeks*

*under the Persian Dominion by Cyrus.*

**A**S the affairs of Greece now become essentially connected with those of that powerful empire which, by rapid conquest, had united under one dominion almost the whole of the civilized world, it will be necessary to take a short survey of the state of things in the sur-

VOL. II.

B

rounding

CHAP.  
VI.

rounding nations ; and particularly in those of the vast continent of Asia, whose transactions with the little country of Greece furnish some of the most remarkable and important events in the political history of mankind.

We have already observed that riches and arts were earlier known in Asia Minor than in Greece. Before the Trojan war, that country whence Pelops came, by some called Phrygia, by others Lydia, was famed among the Greeks for wealth. In Lydia, the mountain Tmolus antiently abounded with gold, which the torrent-river Pactolus brought down from the craggy summits, so that a rude people might easily collect it. Hence, at the foot of Tmolus, on the banks of the Pactolus, the town of Sardis early rose to importance, and became the capital of Lydia. Gold, to which all nations of the old world, even in their rudest ages, seem almost instinctively to have attributed a mysterious value, while the original Americans, of any people known to have long possessed it, have alone given it an estimation nearly proportioned to its intrinsic worth ; gold has not always those pernicious effects which speculative philosophers have been fond of attributing to it. Gold was, to the Lydians, the spring of industry, of knowledge, we may add of virtue, if it be truly said that virtue consists in action. Undoubtedly it was also the spring of vice ; for so things are constituted in this world, that there almost only can be active virtue where is vice. The Lydians, as we have heretofore

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 93.  
Strab.  
l. xiii.  
p. 265.

SECT.  
I.

heretofore had occasion to remark, appear to have derived their origin from the same hords who peopled Greece. Their laws and manners, to the time of Herodotus, were almost the same with those of the Greeks; and that historian mentions some circumstances in the progress of society in which they preceded neighbouring nations. They were the first people known to the Greeks to have exercised retail trades<sup>1</sup>, and the first who struck coins of gold and silver. Coins are singularly adapted to convey to late ages and distant countries exact information of the progress of art and fine taste; and the extant coins of the Lydian kings, the oldest known to exist, exhibit remarkable proofs of the elegant taste and excellent workmanship of their early era.

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 35,  
74, 93, &c  
94.

In all countries the arts of peace and war have flourished together. While the people of Lydia through industry were growing rich, the monarchs extended their dominion eastward as far as the river Halys. The small republics of the Grecian colonies could not be safe in the neighbourhood of such a potentate. What ac-

<sup>1</sup> Πρώτοι Κάπηλοι ἱγίνοντο. Herod. l. i. c. 94. We must not expect perfect correspondence, in terms of this kind, between different languages, in distant countries, and widely distant ages: but we find Κάπηλος very nearly defined, by Plato, a Shopkeeper (1). He is put in opposition to the Ἐμπορος, who travelled to deal, and who, according to the extent of his dealings, would be, in modern terms, either a merchant or a pedlar. In another place Plato distinguishes the Κάπηλος, as one who bought to sell, from the ἀντιπωλὴς, who sold his own manufacture or produce (2).

(1) Plat. de Rep. t. ii. p. 371.

(2) Plat. Polit. t. ii. p. 260.

CHAP.  
VI.

cidental weakness of the Asiatic princes had allowed those adventurers, mostly driven by violence from their settlements in Greece, to appropriate a territory on the Asiatic shore four hundred miles in length, eminent for richness of soil and beauty of climate, so little were letters known or practised and so deficient tradition, we are wholly without information. Those adventurers however were of the most polished Greeks of their age, Ionians from Athens, Æolians from Thebes and from the capitals of the Pelopid and Neleid kings. They knew how to profit from a rich settlement acquired. The improvements of Lydia would become theirs. Alone possessing ports and shipping, maritime commerce was exclusively theirs. Accordingly we find that, in science and the fine arts, Ionia became the mistress of Greece; and in extent of maritime communication, the colonies far exceeded the mother-country. But while flourishing each by itself, the Asiatic Grecian states, jealous of their separate independency, had scarcely any political connection with the mother-country, and little with one another; tho' some of them maintained intimate friendly intercourse with the distant sister-colonies of Sicily and Italy. The several cities, indeed, of each people, Æolian, Ionian, and Dorian, maintained a union in religion: they had their common sacrifices; but the Ionians alone, induced apparently by the pressure of the neighbouring monarchy of Lydia, took occasion from the Panionian sacrifice to establish a meeting for  
common

common consultation concerning their political interests. The Panionian assembly, however, being but a meeting of ministers of independent states, wanted authority to enforce its own resolutions, and the political connection produced by it remained extremely imperfect.

SECT.  
I.

The first attempt of a Lydian monarch to reduce the Grecian states, of which we have any information, was under Gyges, supposed to have reigned soon after the age of Lycurgus. Deficient as their political connection was, he found among them probably a knowledge of war, as well as a republican spirit of bravery, which the Asiatics in general did not possess; for he failed in his attempts upon Miletus and Smyrna, but he took Colophon. The weight, however, of the Lydian kingdom, perseveringly exerted, was too great for any of those little commonwealths to resist: Ardyës, son of Gyges, took Miletus and Prienë.

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 14.

There are some parts of the world whose inhabitants, from earliest history, have differed from all others in circumstances and manners, which they have preserved unaltered through hundreds of generations. Of these the people of that vast country called SCYTHIA by the Greeks, and by the moderns Tartary, are particularly remarkable. The description that Justin, after Trogus Pompeius, gives of the Scythians, is equally just, as far as our knowledge goes, for all former and for all following ages. They wander over, rather than possess, a country



CHAP.  
VI.

Justin. l.iii.  
c. 2.  
Herodot.  
l. iv.  
Strab.  
l. viii.

of immense extent. Exercising no tillage, they claim no property in land : they hold in abhorrence and scorn the confinement of a fixed habitation ; roaming perpetually, with their families and herds, from pasture to pasture over their boundless wilderness. In this vagabond life, not to steal from one another is almost their only law. Their desires commonly go no farther than for food, which their herds supply, and for clothing, which the extreme cold of their climate makes peculiarly necessary. For the whole extent of their country being far removed from the balmy influence of the ocean ; and, tho' mostly plain, yet of extraordinary height above the level of the ocean ; being bounded even on the south by mountains mostly covered with snow, while the tract northward is a continent of snow, their winters are of a severity unknown under the same latitude in other parts of the globe<sup>2</sup>. Nature has therefore supplied the brute animals of those regions with a peculiar warmth of covering. To man is only given

<sup>2</sup> Herodotus' exact acquaintance with the Scythian climate, and his lively description of it, both deserve notice : *Δυσχίμας δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ καταλιχθεῖσα πᾶσα χώρα ἔστω δὴ τί ἐστὶ· ἔνθα τοὺς μὲν ὀκτὼ τῶν μηνῶν ἀφόρητος ὥσος γίνεται κρυμὸς, ἐν ταῖσι ὕδαρ ἐκχίας, πηλὸν οὐ ποιήσας· πῦρ δὲ ἀνακαίει ποιήσας πηλόν. Ἡ δὲ θάλασσα πήγνυται, καὶ βόσκι πῶρος πᾶς ὁ Κιμμέριος· καὶ ἐκ τῆς κρυτάλλου οἱ ἐντὸς τάφρου Σκύθαι κακοικημένοι κρατέυονται, καὶ πᾶς ἐμάξας ἐπιλάουσιν πύρρῃ εἰς τοὺς Σκύθους. Ὅτῳ μὲν δὴ τοὺς ἑκτὼ μῆνας διατελεῖ χειμὼν ἐπὶ τοὺς δ' ἐπιλοίπλους τέσσαρας ψύχια αὐτοῖσι ἐστὶ. κ. τ. ε.* Herodot. l. iv. c. 28. See also Strabo, b. vii. p. 307. In the mild climate of our own island we do not readily learn to conceive the severity of continental winters, even in the most desirable latitudes, where the surface is elevated and the ocean distant. All modern accounts of the countries around the Euxine testify to the justness of Herodotus' description of the Scythian winter.

## HISTORY OF GREECE.

7

SECT.  
I.

ability to wrest such boons from the inferior creation. The ingenuity of the antient Scythians went thus far. Necessity drove them to the use of those furs for clothing which are become so extensively an article of useless, perhaps often pernicious luxury in milder climates<sup>3</sup>. Such a country, with such inhabitants, would little invite the ambition of others. But the Scythians, instinctively fond of wandering, were likely to be inspired with a desire to wander among the possessions of their more settled neighbours. And tho their manner of life is little above that of brutes, yet it has always been that of gregarious brutes: they migrate in such multitudes that their progression is scarcely resistible. War was moreover singularly their delight; and mercy and human kindness were totally alien to their warfare. Scalping was practised by them nearly as by the American Indians: none could claim his share of plunder who had not an enemy's head to present to his chief. The scalp then became the warrior's favorite ornament for his own person, and that of his horse: the number he possessed decided his reputation and his rank. Without this testimonial of military merit none could be admitted to their principal feasts; where, as among our Scandinavian ancestors,

Herodot.  
l. iv.  
c. 64, 65.

<sup>3</sup> England is perhaps of all countries in the northern temperate zone that in which furs are least used. It is, indeed, the country in the world in which precaution of any kind against changes in the atmosphere is least known; in few countries less is necessary, yet, perhaps from a peculiar fondness for exercise in the air and a consequent impatience under confinement within-doors, which the people of some other countries not only bear but like, those changes are nowhere more the subject of conversation and complaint.

CHAP.  
VI.

probably their descendants, the skulls of slain enemies were the drinking-cups. It is perhaps well for the historian's credit that we are assured, by unquestionable testimony, of the existence of such practices among later people<sup>4</sup>.

Thrice, in very early times, these ferocious vagabonds are said to have overrun Asia. But their irruptions had more the effect of a swarm of locusts, an inundation, or a hurricane, than of an expedition devised and conducted by the reason of men. While Ardyës reigned in Lydia there happened a migration from those rugged climates. A Scythian hord drove before them a Cimmerian hord, apparently of not very dissimilar manners. The conquerors, pursuing eastward, entered Media, and overwhelmed that rich and powerful kingdom. The

Herodot.

li. c. 15.

&amp; l. iv.

c. 1.

Ol. 36.2.

B.C.635.

N.

Ol. 39.1.

B.C.624.

B.

<sup>4</sup> This sketch, of so singular a portion of mankind, was penned before the author had seen the finished picture of the same people, by the masterly hand of the historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. It has been observed by more than one great historian, that every book should be as complete as possible within itself, and should never refer for anything material to other books (1). Sensible of the truth of this remark, the author has found himself under peculiar difficulty in the necessity of giving some account of the Scythians. He scrupled the transcription of a long passage from a history not only in the hands, but fresh in the memory of all Europe. The whole would indeed have been beyond his purpose; the selection of parts hazardous; and any appearance of a competition preposterous. He has therefore risked his original sketch, principally translated from Justin and Herodotus, which he hopes will be found not absolutely incompetent for its purpose; and it will certainly be imputed as credit to those two writers, that this sketch, as far as it goes, accords very completely with the elaborate account of the historian first mentioned, who so singularly unites the liveliest manner with the most laborious diligence.

(1) Hume's Hist. of England, Appendix II. and Padre de Paolo Hist. Conc. Trid.

Cimmerians

Cimmerians had avoided them by taking a more westerly course; and, in their flight, little less terrible to the nations among whom they came, than the Scythians had been to themselves, they overran Asia Minor. Sardis fell their prey; the citadel only withstanding them. Most of the Grecian cities suffered. But the plague was transitory. It came, it destroyed, it vanished; and things resumed nearly their former situation.

SECT.  
I.

The power of the Lydian monarchy was however shaken. Some of the Grecian states, Miletus particularly, appear to have recovered independency; for we find Sadyattes, son of Ardyës, toward the end of his reign, engaged in war with the Milesians. It was continued or renewed by his son Halyattes. Miletus was then the richest and most populous of the Asiatic Grecian cities. None of the greater powers having directed their attention to maritime affairs, the naval force of the little Grecian states gave them consequence; and that of Miletus was superior to any other. The Lydian monarch had none to oppose to it, except what he might command from his subject Greeks. The Milesians therefore commanding the sea, a blockade by land was little efficacious; and any

Ol. 50.<sup>3</sup>  
B.C. 580.  
N.  
Ol. 39. 4.  
B.C. 621.  
B.  
Herodot.  
l. i. c. 17.

<sup>3</sup> The space of only three years, allowed by Dr. Blair, between the Scythian irruption and the Milesian war, is inconsistent with the narration of Herodotus. Newton has not marked the date of the Milesian war; but according to other circumstances which he has marked, it might have begun about the fiftieth Olympiad, where Herodotus's account would nearly bring it.

CHAP.  
VI.

other mode of siege was at that time little known. The manner therefore in which the Lydian monarch carried on the war was thus. Marching into the Milesian territory a little before harvest, with all military pomp, to the sound of various musical instruments, he cut down all the corn, and destroyed all the vines, olives, and other valuable trees; sparing the buildings, that the people might have the better means of cultivating fresh harvests for him to carry off or destroy. The Milesians, venturing to take the field for the protection of their property, suffered two considerable defeats. The war however continued eleven years, from its commencement under Sadyattes, and the Milesians still obstinately defended themselves. In the twelfth year, Halyattes, being seized with a dangerous illness, was agitated with superstitious fear on account of the accidental burning of a temple of Minerva by his ravaging troops; and the Milesians, making advantage of this circumstance, procured a peace.

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 26,  
& seq.

Croesus son of Halyattes still advanced the power of the Lydian monarchy. He made all the Asian Greeks tributary; and, excepting Lycia and Cilicia, was master of the whole of Asia Minor, as far as the Halys. He was an able and virtuous prince, not less generally beloved than feared; so that the Asian Greeks, finding their condition far from worse for their subjection to such a monarch, who allowed them the enjoyment of their own laws and constitution, with the whole internal regulation of their little common-

commonwealths, became attached to him as subjects to their legal hereditary sovereign<sup>6</sup>. There had long been intercourse between Lydia and the continent of Greece. Sardis, as a mart, was an

SECT.  
I.

<sup>6</sup> This appears from the tenor of Herodotus' narration, and receives confirmation from Thucydides, who says that the Ionians flourished greatly and were very powerful till they were reduced by Cyrus, after he had conquered Croesus (1). Pindar's concise but emphatical eulogy speaks also strongly to the same purpose. The passage is remarkable:

————— Ὀπισθέμρωτες ἀνέχμα δέξας  
Ὅϊον ἀπωχόμενοι ἀνδρῶν δάματα μακάρι,  
καὶ λόγιοι καὶ αἰδοῖς·  
Οὐ ΦΘΙΝΕΙ ΚΡΟΙΣΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΦΡΩΝ ΑΡΕΤΑ.  
Τὸν δὲ ταύρω χαλχίῳ καυτῆρα, πηλὴα ῥοῖοι,  
Ἐχθρὰ Φάλαριν κατέχει πατὴρ φάρις·  
Οὐδὲ μιν φόβου γγῆς ὑποβόλαι κωκυλίας  
Μαλθακὰν πάιδαν ὀλέροισι δέχονται.  
Ἐὺ δὲ παθεῖν το πρῶτον ἄθλων·  
Ἐὺ δ' ἀκύνειν δευτέρα μῶις.  
Ἀμφοτέροισι δ' ἀνὴρ  
Ὅς' ἂν ἐγκύρῃ καὶ ἔλῃ,  
Στίφαςαν ὕψιστον δίδεσται.

Pindar. Pyth. I.

When in the mouldring urn the monarch lies,  
His fame in lively characters remains;  
Or graved in monumental histories,  
Or deck'd and painted in Aonian strains.

Thus fresh and fragrant and immortal blooms  
The virtue, CROESUS, of thy gentle mind:  
While fate to infamy and hatred dooms  
Sicilia's tyrant, scorn of human kind;  
Whose ruthless bosom swell'd with cruel pride,  
When, in his brazen bull, the broiling wretches died.

Him therefore nor in sweet society  
The generous youth conversing ever name,  
Nor with the harp's delightful melody  
Mingle his odious inharmonious fame.

(1) Thucyd. l. i. c. 16.

The

C H A P.  
VI.

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 29.

an object for all nations within reach. Superstition chiefly led the Lydians to Greece: the reputation of the Delphian oracle was high among them, and many presents from Lydian monarchs were, in the time of Herodotus, principal ornaments of its shrine. Gyges king of Lydia, that writer says, was the first foreigner, excepting only Midas, son of Gordias king of Phrygia, who ever sent a present thither. Cræsus seems to have equalled in superstition any of his predecessors, tho otherwise highly liberal. He appears to have been partial to the Greeks, and he encouraged men of genius and learning of that nation in his court<sup>7</sup>. But he was not without a considerable share of ambition. Being master of the whole western coast of Asia Minor, with all its shipping, he had the means of becoming a more formidable naval power

The first, the greatest bliss on man conferr'd,  
Is in the acts of virtue to excel;  
The second to obtain their high reward,  
The soul-exalting praise of doing well.  
Who both these lots attains is blest indeed,  
Since fortune here below can give no richer meed.

WEST'S TRANSLATION.

In Pindar's youth the fame of Cræsus was recent. The selection of him therefore as an example of a virtuous and beneficent prince, fittest to be named in opposition to a detested tyrant, is strong testimony.

<sup>7</sup> The first three lines of the quotation from Pindar in the foregoing note, being introductory to the mention of Cræsus, appear to indicate that the Grecian poets, as well as the sophists mentioned by Herodotus, were not without a due share of that prince's favor; if indeed the historian did not mean to include poets under the term sophist. It should follow that, if pure Greek was not the common language of Sardis, it was however familiarly understood in Cræsus's court.

than

than had yet been known in the world. Already the islands trembled for their independency; and Greece itself was not without apprehension, when events in another quarter called all the attention of the Lydian monarch.

SECT.  
I.

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 27.

Tho accounts of the countries about the river Euphrates go farther into antiquity than those of any other upon earth, yet we scarcely know when there was not a large and polished empire there. Of other countries which have possessed science, arts, and letters, we learn whence science, arts, and particularly whence letters have come to them; but no trace appears of their existence in any other country prior to their flourishing in CHALDÆA. However also the wonders of BABYLON may have been exaggerated by some writers, we have yet sufficient testimony to its having been a city of extraordinary magnitude, populousness, wealth, and magnificence, when scarcely elsewhere in the world a city existed. The ASSYRIAN EMPIRE, of which it was the metropolis, by a revolt of the northern provinces became divided. Babylon remained the capital of the southern part, still called Assyria: the northern formed an extensive kingdom under the name of MEDIA. To the south of Media, and east of Assyria, was a mountainous tract called PERSIA; so inferior to the surrounding countries in riches and populousness, that hitherto it had been of little weight or consideration. But, during the reign of Cræsus in Lydia, a prince of extraordinary abilities, named Cyrus, arose among the Persians. Those hardy moun-



CHAP.  
VI.Orme's  
Hist. of  
Indoſtan.

mountaineers had the ſame ſuperiority over the enervated inhabitants of the rich Aſiatic plains, which is ſtill obſerved in the ſultry climates of the eaſt; tho, in Europe, the difference in ſtrength and courage, between the inhabitants of mountains and of plains, is only to be found in the imagination of ſpeculative writers. Cyrus became maſter of Media, according to ſome accounts by inheritance from his mother, according to others by arms. He was ſucceſsful in war againſt Aſſyria, and threatened the intire conqueſt of that empire. Cræſus was alarmed at his growing power and fame. It was obvious policy to ſupport the Aſſyrian monarch, and endeavour to hold the balance between him and the Perſian. Yet either the attempt or the neglect might be fatal; and human wiſdom could only decide upon the probability. Anxious for ſurer grounds, and full of the ſuperſtition of his age, he tried all the more celebrated oracles known to the Greeks for advice and information. He was ſo liberal in preſents to Delphi, that the Delphians paſſed a decree granting to the king and people of Lydia precedency in the conſultation of the oracle\*, with privilege for any Lydian to become at pleaſure a Delphian citizen. Such preference to a foreigner, in a buſineſs which muſt have been under the controul of the Amphictyonic council, proves ſtrongly the reſpect of the Greeks for Cræſus.

\* Προμαχίην καὶ ἀγγελίην καὶ προεδρίην. Herodot. l. i. c. 54. What precifely theſe privileges and honors were, may be difficult to determine.

and

and perhaps their fear of him. Yet the managers of the oracle, always provident of its reputation, could by no means be induced to prophesy any success to him in a war with Persia. To all his interrogatories on the subject they gave answers so dubious and elusive, that, whatsoever part he might take, and whatsoever might be the event, the credit of the oracle would be safe. The unhappy prince, after much hesitation, at length determined upon war. He led his army into those provinces beyond the river Halys which had formed part of the Median monarchy. Cyrus immediately quitted his Assyrian foes to march against Croesus. One great battle decided the fate of Lydia. Cyrus was victorious, and marching immediately to Sardis, made Croesus prisoner, and his kingdom a province of the Persian empire.

SECT.  
I.

Ol. 57.1.  
B.C. 544.  
N.  
Ol. 58.1.  
B.C. 548.  
B.

While the issue of the war remained yet uncertain, Cyrus had endeavoured to gain the Grecian cities in Asia Minor; but they adhered to their engagements with the Lydian king. The full success therefore of the Persian arms could not but be highly alarming to them. Immediately the Ionians sent to offer submission, upon the same terms on which they had been subject to Croesus. The Milesians alone were admitted to so much favor. The others were told that, having refused those terms when offered, they must abide the consequences. Such a reply from such a potentate was indeed dreadful. Each city set to repair and improve its fortifications. The Panionian assembly was summoned.

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 141.

But

CHAP.  
VI.

But a comparison of their own force with that of the Persian monarchy affording no reasonable hope that they should of themselves be able to withstand the threatened danger, in this extremity they turned their thoughts to their parent states; with little expectation, however, that even these either would or could protect them. An embassy was sent to Lacedæmon, as the leading state of Greece. But it was never the character of the Spartan government to be forward in hazardous enterprize. The Ionians could obtain no promise of assistance; but some Spartans were appointed to accompany them in their return, to inquire into the truth of the alarming accounts given of the Persian power, and endeavour to learn the farther designs of the conquering monarch. The Spartan ministers went to the Persian court at Sardis; and the account given, with his usual simplicity, by Herodotus, of what passed at an audience to which Cyrus admitted them, marks just the contempt which might be expected, in the conqueror of Asia, for the little republics of Greece. A republic, indeed, was probably a new idea to him. He told the Spartans, 'That he could not be afraid of people who had squares in the middle of their towns, in which they met to swear and deceive one another;' alluding to the agora, which was, in most of the Grecian cities, the place equally for the common market and the general assembly: and he concluded with a threat, 'That it might come to their turn to lament their own subjection, and they had better

Herodot.  
Li. c. 152,  
253.

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ter not interfere in his concerns with the Ionians.' The war with Assyria was an object of other importance. Marching therefore himself eastward, he left the Greeks to his lieutenants.

SECT.  
I.

It was a practice of this great prince to leave a considerable share in the administration of conquered countries in the hands of natives.

Herodot.  
l. iii. c. 15.

He committed a high office at Sardis to Pactyas,

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 153.

a Lydian, who took a very early opportunity

to show himself unworthy of the trust reposed

in him. Cyrus was scarcely gone, when he managed

a revolt, became master of the town of

Sardis, and besieged the Persian governor in the

citadel. Cyrus did not think even this a cir-

cumstance to require the intermission of his

march against Assyria. He detached a part on-

ly of his army against the rebel, who appears to

have been very unequal to the greatness of his

attempt; for, according to Herodotus, without

any farther effort, he fled to the Grecian town of

Cuma, where probably he had claims of hospi-

tility. The Persian general sent to demand

him. The Cumæans, between fear of the venge-

ance of so mighty a potentate, and unwill-

ingness to incur the disgrace of betraying a re-

ceived suppliant, which they expected would

also draw on them the anger of the gods, were

greatly at a loss. The neighbouring oracle of

Apollo at Branchidæ, then in high repute among

the Asian Greeks, was their resource. This

story, also related by Herodotus with a simpli-

city evincing truth, while it characterizes both

CHAP.  
VI.

the religion and the politics of the times, affords a remarkable specimen of the subjects upon which oracles were consulted, and of the subtuges of the managers to preserve their credit. The question of the Cumæans was not a little distressing. To advise any opposition to the Persian power would have put the credit of the oracle to the highest risk. But to betray an admitted suppliant was held among the Greeks, in no less a measure, offensive to the gods and infamous among men. This, however, the oracle unwarily directed. Aristodicus, a man eminent among the citizens of Cuma, whether influenced by party-views, or by friendship for Paçtyas, or by honest indignation at the unworthy deed intended by his fellowcitizens, publicly declared his doubt of the answer reported from the oracle, and insisted that the prayer should be repeated to the god; and persons of unquestionable credit commissioned to bring the response. He prevailed, and was himself appointed of the number. The answer was still as before, That the Cumæans should deliver up Paçtyas. Aristodicus, not thus satisfied, searching round the temple, purposely disturbed some nests of sparrows and other birds, which in that situation, according to the tenets of Grecian superstition, were under the particular protection of the deity of the place. A voice was presently heard from the inmost recess of the building, ‘O most unholy of men! how darest thou thus violate my suppliants!’ Aristodicus replied, ‘O sovereign power! dost thou thus protect

'protect thy suppliants, yet commandest the Cumæans to give up their suppliant?' 'Yes,' returned the voice, 'I command it: that so you, the sooner perishing, may no more consult oracles about betraying suppliants.' This reply answered the purpose both of the oracle and of Aristodicus, but not so of the Cumæans. The credit of the oracle, not only for truth, but in some measure for justice also, was saved; but the Cumæans, fearing equal destruction whether they betrayed Pactyas or attempted his protection, sought to avoid the danger by a middle course, and furnished him with means of escaping to Mitylenë in Lesbos. There it was hoped he might be safe: for as the Persians were utterly unconvertant in marine affairs, and no maritime state was yet added to their dominion, the Grecian islands were thought in no immediate danger. But the Mitylenæans, equally regardless of their honor, and fearless of divine vengeance, only considered how they might most profit by the conjuncture. They entered into a negotiation to deliver up Pactyas for a stipulated price. His Cumæan friends, informed of this, farther assisted him with means of escaping to Chios. But the Chians, no less infamously mercenary than the Mitylenæans, for a small tract of land on the continent over-against their island, sold him to the Persian; and, to execute their agreement, scrupled not to violate the sanctuary of Minerva, the tutelary goddess of their state, to which he had fled as a sure asylum.

CHAP.  
VI.Herodot.  
l. i. c. 161.Herodot.  
l. i. c. 163.Ol. 60. 2.  
B.C. 539.  
B.

The Persian general, meanwhile, overran the rich vales of the Mæander and of Magnesia, and gave the plunder to his soldiers. He took the town of Prienë, and sold all the inhabitants for slaves. He was proceeding thus violently to execute his commission for subduing the Grecian possessions, when sickness stopped his course, and death soon followed. Harpagus, his successor in command, began his administration with the siege of Phocæa. The Phocæans had been remarkable for their early and successful application to maritime affairs. They, first of the Greeks, undertook long voyages, and made known to their fellowcountrymen the shores of the Adriatic, and the coasts of Tuscany and Spain. Becoming rich by commerce, they had fortified their town, which was large, in a manner superior to what was then common. But the Persian force, directed by the skill of Harpagus, was too great for them to resist. This general made his approaches in a method analogous to that now in use; with just the difference which the fortification and arms of his age required. No weapons of that time could prevent him from breaking ground near the town ditch: to his trenches he added a lofty rampart; and, as he approached, he filled the ditch, and then formed a mound against the town wall, upon which his people might mount for storming. The Phocæans, hard pressed, obtained a truce for a day, upon pretence of considering about a capitulation. They made use of it for flight: putting their families and most valuable effects aboard

aboard their vessels, they escaped to Chios. The Persian took possession of an empty town.

SECT.  
I.

All that the Phocæans wanted was a seaport and security: the rest their activity would supply. They desired, therefore, to buy the little islands called *Ænussæ*, lying between Chios and the main; but the Chians, jealous of an interference in trade, refused to sell them. About twenty years before, the Phocæans had founded the town of Alalia, in Corsica, and thither they determined to direct their course. But, in their way, actuated by that spirit of revenge which naturally imbibed war, when death, slavery, or expatriation were the only alternatives to the vanquished, they suddenly turned upon Phocæa; and, probably finding the Persian garrison both weak and unprepared, they put the whole to the sword, tho' without any hope or thought of holding the place. After this useless massacre, imprecating solemn curses on any of their number who should desert their expedition, and all taking an oath never to return to Phocæa, they steered for Corsica. More than half, notwithstanding, stimulated by regret for their native country, and dread of their new undertaking, returned. How they made their peace with the Persian we are not informed. Of the rest, after various chances, a part settled the town of Hyela, afterward called Helea, and Velia, in Italy. But the fairer fortune of the larger part seems not to have been known in Greece in Herodotus's time: they founded Massilia, now Marseille, in Gaul. A barren

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 163.  
& Strab.  
l. vi. p. 532.  
Pausan.  
l. x. c. 8.  
Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 13.  
Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 68. c. ii.  
Strab. l. iv.  
p. 179.



CHAP.  
VI.



Thucyd.  
ubi sup.  
Strab. l. iv.  
p. 180, 184.

Strab. l. liii.  
p. 159.

territory there gave small temptation for the rapine of neighbouring barbarians. A port singularly commodious for vessels adapted to the navigation of the Mediterranean, afforded that opportunity, which the Greeks desired, for communication with all the world, beyond the ability of barbarians to interrupt. Thus Massilia became a rich and powerful maritime commonwealth. Its naval victory over the Carthaginians, reported by Thucydides, proves its early strength. The Grecian names Antipolis, Nicæa, Monœcus (now Antibes, Nice, Monaco) eastward, and Agatha (now Agde), Aphrodision, Emporeion, Hemeroscopeion (called by the Romans Dianium) westward in Gaul, and far southward on the coast of Spain, mark the extent of its maritime dependencies. The neglect of the admirable harbour of Toulon, with the labors afterward of the Romans to make Forum Julii, now Frejus, a naval arsenal, mark the difference between antient and modern navigation.

The Teians, next attacked by Harpagus, followed the example of Phocæa. Sailing to Thrace, they founded the town of Abdera. The other Asian Greeks, finding their walls would not inable them singly to resist the Persian power, resolved together to try the event of a battle. Being defeated, they submitted to the conqueror on his own terms, which seem to have been milder than might have been expected from the former Persian general. Harpagus proceeded from Ionia through Lycia into Caria, and brought the

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the whole of Asia Minor under the Persian dominion.

SECT.  
I.

Cyrus, meanwhile, was no less successful in greater enterprize in Upper Asia. By that siege of Babylon, famous equally in profane and sacred history, he became master of Assyria. Having thus acquired a dominion far more extensive than had before been known in the world, the wisdom of his remaining years was employed to model the many nations which owned subjection to him into one regular empire. We are, however, far from having that certain and complete information concerning the transactions of this great prince, either in war or peace, that we might wish; but upon the whole it appears that his laws and political institutions were directed by a superiority of genius equal to that which guided him to conquest; and, what principally makes the want of an authentic history of him to be regretted, he stands singular among the many conquerors by whom it has been the fate of that large and rich portion of the world to be overrun, as a benefactor to mankind; as a father to all his people, to the conquered scarcely less than to his fellowconquerors<sup>9</sup>.

Ol. 60.3.  
B.C. 538.  
N. and B.

C 4

S E C-

<sup>9</sup> Æschylus, in his tragedy of the Persians, has borne testimony to the virtues of Cyrus in a short but emphatical panegyric:

Κῦρος, εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ,  
"Ἀρξας ἰθὺς πᾶσιν ἱρήτην φίλοις"  
Λυδῶν δὲ λαὸν καὶ Φρυγῶν ἐκτίσατο,  
Ἰωνίαν τε πᾶσαν ἤλασεν βίᾳ.  
Θεὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἤκθηρεν, ὡς εὐφρων ἴφρ.

p. 262. edit. H. Steph.

This

CHAP.  
VI.

## SECTION II.

*Accession of Cambyfes to the throne of Persia. Acquisition of Tyre and Conquest of Egypt by the Persians. Accession of Darius. Constitution of the Persian Empire: Persian Religion.*

Ol. 62. 4.  
B.C. 529.  
N. and B.

CYRUS was succeeded in this great empire by his son Cambyfes; whose temper, which led him to emulate his father rather in military than in civil virtues, gave occasion to all neighbouring nations to dread the force of which he was become absolute disposer. His first object was the conquest of EGYPT. That country, as we have before observed, had been, from times of highest antiquity, a populous, well-regulated, wealthy, and polished kingdom. Divided from all surrounding nations by natural boundaries of singular strength, it had been little exposed to foreign invasion. Yet the Egyptian monarchs had always been of great political consequence. They interfered frequently in the affairs of Arabia and Palestine. This led to transactions, in war and in peace, with Assyria. But a vast desert divided the two monarchies; and the countries disputed by their arms were mostly far distant from the seat of government of either. Egypt

Strab.  
l. xvii.  
p. 819.

This passage strongly indicates that the strange story told by Herodotus of the death of Cyrus, if ever heard of, was not commonly received in Greece in the poet's time; and tho, as far as I have observed, unnoticed by modern writers, should add considerable weight to the opinions which give the preference to Xenophon's more probable account. Herodotus indeed prefaces his narrative with a confession that it was dubious, and that he had only selected it from among various contradictory reports.

itself,

SECT.  
II.

itself, therefore, in a peace seldom interrupted, cultivated science and arts; and under Amasis, cotemporary with Cyrus, so flourished in riches and population that, according to Herodotus, it contained twenty thousand towns. We have sufficient assurance that some of those towns were of extraordinary size and magnificence. Even in its present miserable state, suffering, as it has been for centuries, under a kind of constitutional anarchy, Egypt is still wonderfully populous, abounding in towns and villages; and Cairo is said to have above seven hundred thousand inhabitants. In that age Egypt was the school of Greece: those who desired to improve themselves in knowledge went to Egypt; and a Greek derived reputation from the meer circumstance of having been in that polished country.

Herodot.  
l. ii. c. 177

About a century before the reign of Amasis, a civil war in Egypt had given occasion to the establishment of a Grecian colony there. On a failure of the antient royal line, twelve chiefs had divided the sovereignty. One of them, Psammitichus, pressed by the rest, engaged in his service some piratical Grecian adventurers from Ionia and Caria; and with their assistance became monarch of Egypt. This is the first instance recorded of that practice, not less common afterward among the Greeks than since among the Swiss, of letting their valor and skill in arms for hire. Psammitichus thought it prudent to retain for his support those by whom he had acquired his throne. He settled his auxiliary

Herodot.  
l. ii. c. 152Herodot.  
l. ii. c. 154

Greeks

CH. P.  
VI.

Greeks on some lands which he gave them, near the sea, on each side of the Pelusian, or easternmost branch of the Nile, and he encouraged their commerce with their mother-country. Hence the communication between Egypt and Greece became familiar, and thus first any accurate knowledge of Egypt came to the Greeks. Probably the ancient constitution of the country suffered by this revolution. The power of the great families would be reduced; some of them perhaps extinguished: and a monarch who reigned by an army of foreign mercenaries, could scarcely exist but through the maintenance of absolute dominion. The scepter of Psammitichus, thus supported, descended to his posterity. But Apries, his great-grandson, was dethroned, and Amasis, a private Egyptian, acquired the sovereignty.

Herodot.  
l. ii. c. 162.

In Egypt, all persons being strictly confined by law to the profession of their ancestors, all the descendants of the Grecian mercenaries were born soldiers. Amasis imitated and extended the policy of Psammitichus. He removed the Grecian families to Memphis, his capital, and formed from them his body-guard. He greatly encouraged the resort of Greeks to Egypt, allotted the town and territory of Naucratis, near the mouth of the Canobian, the westernmost branch of the Nile, for their residence and possession, and even allowed them to build temples, and to have their processions and other religious ceremonies after the manner of their own country. Most of the Asian Greeks had accordingly temples there: of the people of Old Greece, the Æginetans only

Herodot.  
l. ii. c. 170.

are

are mentioned. But farther to cultivate a general interest through the Greek nation, when the temple of Delphi was burnt, Amasis made a large present to the Amphictyons, toward its restoration.

SECT.  
II.

This able prince died at a very advanced age, during the preparations in Persia for the invasion of his country. He was succeeded by his son Psammenitus, who seems to have suffered for want of his father's advantage of having been bred in a private station. Through some mismanagement, apparently, in those who guided his councils, Phanes, a Halicarnassian, of considerable abilities and high in command in the Grecian troops, took disgust at the Egyptian service, and went over to the Persian. The approach to Egypt from Asia with a large army, from the nature of the intervening country, even without an enemy to oppose, is extremely difficult. The Persians were utterly unversed in marine affairs; but they had absolute command of whatever the Asian Greeks could supply. Tyre, moreover, originally a colony from Sidon, but risen to a superiority, both in commerce and political consequence, above the parent city, so as to become the first maritime power in the world, was under his dominion. It had been subdued about fifty years before, by Nabuchodonosor king of Assyria. The Tyrians therefore gladly passed under the sovereignty of Persia, and seem to have obtained favourable terms. The Cyprian Greeks had also sought safety by voluntary submission; and all these people contributed

Herodot.  
l. iii. c. 4.

Herodot.  
l. ii. c. 2.

Herodot.  
l. iii. c. 19.

CHAP.  
VI.

Herodot.  
1. iii. c. 4.  
& seq.

tributed to form the fleet and army which were to go against Egypt. Yet all the formidable force that the Persian monarch could raise might have failed, but for the exact knowledge of the country, and the approaches to it, which Phanes brought to him. The army must pass through a part of the Desert Arabia. Under the direction of Phanes, the friendship of an independent Arabian chief, such as yet hold that country in defiance of all the power of Turkey, was purchased; and through his assistance the troops were supplied with provisions, and, what was still more difficult, with water<sup>10</sup>. Thus a most formidable obstacle was overcome without loss, and the army met the fleet before Pelusium, on the easternmost branch of the Nile, which, in the greatest part of its course, washes the edge of the desert. That key of Egypt was taken after a short siege. Psammenitus was soon after defeated in a great battle; and the whole country quickly submitted to the conqueror. The neighbouring Africans, and among the rest the Greeks of Cyrenë and Barca, sent offers of submission and tribute, which were accepted.

Herodot.  
1. iii. c. 13.

Herodot.  
1. iii. c. 17.

Cambyfes, flushed with success beyond expectation, would immediately proceed to farther

<sup>10</sup> In describing this country and its people, little known to the Greeks in general, who from all their settlements made the passage to Egypt by sea, Herodotus gives one strong instance, among many, of the accuracy as well as the extent of his information, and of his fidelity in reporting it. To the correctness of his account of Egypt, one of the most intelligent and accurate of modern travellers, Volney, who investigated that country as far as its modern state would permit, has given repeated testimony.

conquest. Herodotus says that he proposed at the same time to make war upon the Ethiopians, Ammonians, and Carthaginians. Carthage was a colony from Tyre; and emulating the mother-country in commerce, was become equal, or superior, in naval power. But the Tyrians showed such extreme aversion to assist in a war against those whom they termed their children, that Cambyfes was persuaded to desist from that enterprize. He chose to go in person against Ethiopia. Without seeing an enemy, he lost more than half his army in the desert, and returned. His conduct, ever since the conquest of Egypt, had been that of a merciless and frantic tyrant, his wildness often approaching to madness. He is said to have died, in the eighth year of his reign, of an accidental wound from his own sword. The Grecian accounts however of these distant transactions, especially of those not by their nature of very public notoriety, are probably not very exact. A Magian, we are told, usurped the Persian throne, pretending to be the younger son of Cyrus escaped from assassination, by which, at the command of Cambyfes, the real prince had perished. It will not be necessary to repeat here the well-known story of the conspiracy of the seven chiefs, the death of the usurper, and the elevation of Darius to the throne by the neighing of his horse. It suffices for our purpose that Darius, said to be of the royal family of Persia, but not descended from Cyrus, became sovereign of the empire<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>11</sup>Æschylus, in his tragedy of the Persians, gives a more numerous catalogue than Herodotus, whose account has been generally followed.



CHAP.  
VII.

Æschyl.  
Perf. Plat.  
de Leg.  
l. iii. p. 694.  
t. ii. &  
Epist. vii.  
p. 332.  
t. iii.

This prince was a successor not unworthy of that great monarch. His principal object seems to have been to complete and improve the plan traced by Cyrus for the administration of his vast dominion. What we ought to attribute to one, and what to the other, we cannot now tell; nor do we learn with the accuracy that we might wish, the particulars of the system finally established. But many circumstances contribute to show, that upon the whole it was directed with admirable wisdom; inasmuch that those nations, to whom despotic government seems congenial, have perhaps never since been so happy as under Persian rule. We find that the whole empire was divided into large provinces, called satrapies, each under the superintendency of a great officer intitled satrap, to whom all governors of towns and smaller districts were responsible; but without being dependent on him for their appointment or removal, which were immediate from the monarch. Thus the superior and inferior governors were each a check upon the other. That the affairs of the empire might be administered with regularity and certain dispatch, and that information might constantly and speedily pass between the capital and the remotest provinces, an establishment was made, imperfectly resembling the modern post: the business of go-

lowed. Probably among the names reported by Æschylus, are those of pretenders who never were acknowledged sovereigns of the empire (1). Thucydides, on the contrary, omitting all mention of the usurpation, speaks of Darius as reigning next after Cambyfes (2).

(1) See Plat. on Legist. b. iii. p. 695. v. ii. (2) Thucyd. l. i. c. 14.

vernment alone was its object, without any regard to commercial intercourse, or the convenience of individuals. This appears, however, to have been the first model of that institution which now, through the liberal system of European politics, and the ascendant which Europe has acquired in the affairs of the world, extends communication so wonderfully over the globe. The Persian laws were probably few and simple; more in the nature of fundamental maxims than of a finished system of jurisprudence. The provinces indeed seem to have been generally allowed, for their interior administration, each to retain its own municipal law. Thus that inflexible rule, that the Persian law was never in any point to be altered, might be a salutary restraint upon despotism, upon the caprice of the prince, and upon the tyranny or avarice of his officers, without preventing intirely the adapting of practice to changes of times and circumstances. Darius regulated the revenue of his empire, composed of the richest kingdoms in the world. In apportioning the imposts and directing their collection, he is said to have shown great abilities and great moderation; yet so difficult is it for rulers to avoid censure whenever private convenience must yield in the least to public necessity, the Persians, forming a comparison of their three first emperors, called Cyrus the father, Cambyfes the master, Darius the broker of the empire. Master, it must be observed, among the antients implied the

Herodot.  
l. iii. c. 89.  
Plutarch.  
Apophth.

## HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP.  
VI.

the relation, not, as with us, to hired servants; but to slaves <sup>12</sup>.

The Persians were by nothing more remarkably or more honorably distinguished from surrounding nations, and particularly from the

<sup>12</sup> Æschylus, throughout his tragedy of the Persians, bears most honorable testimony to the character and administration of Darius; particularly in the chorus, p. 166.

Ω πόποι, ἦ μεγάλας  
Ἀγαθῶς τε πολισσινόμου βιοτῶς  
Ἐπικύρσαμεν ἑὸν ὄ γεραιὸς  
Πανταρχῆς, ἀκάνης,  
Ἄμαχος βασιλεὺς ἰσθῆιος  
Δαρῆιος ἄρχε χώρας.  
Πρῶτα μὲν εὐδοκίμου  
Στρατιᾶς ἀπεφαινόμεθ', ἥδ' ἐπὶ νόμι-  
μα τὰ σύγγραμμα πάντ' ἐπιύθνηον. κ. τ. λ.

Plato's testimony is not less favorable, and scarcely less emphatically expressed, "Ἐδεξε τε (ὁ Δαρῆιος) παράδειγμα οἷον χρῆ τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ βασιλῆα τὸν ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι. Epist. p. 332. t. 3. Ed. Serr. See also his Menexenus, p. 239. t. ii. and his third Dialogue on Legislation, p. 694.

Herodotus has undertaken to give an account, in some detail, of the produce of the Persian taxes: on what authority we are not informed. But we know that it is even now, with all the freedom of communication through modern Europe, extremely difficult to acquire information, at all approaching to exactness, of the revenue, and, still more, of the resources of neighbouring states. Mr. Richardson, in his Dissertation on the Languages, &c. of the East, has observed that the revenue of Persia, according to Herodotus's account, was very unequal to the expences of such an expedition as that attributed to Xerxes; and therefore, he says, Herodotus must stand convicted of falsehood in one case or the other. Unprejudiced persons will have little difficulty to choose their belief. The principal circumstances of the expedition fell necessarily under the eyes of thousands. The revenue could be known to very few, and the resources probably to none. Yet a very acute inquirer into antient politics has observed, that valuable information is derived from Herodotus's account of the Persian revenue. See Gibbon's History of the Roman Empire, v. 1. c. 8. note i. & v. 2. c. 24.

Greeks,

Greeks, than by their Religion. It were beyond the purpose of a Grecian history to enlarge upon the theology of Zoroaster, which, as a most ingenious and indefatigable inquirer has observed, 'was darkly comprehended by foreigners, and even by the far greater number of his disciples.'

Gibbon's  
Hist of  
the Roman  
Empire,  
vol. i. c. 8.

It were equally beyond our object here to discuss the much-disputed questions, When Zoroaster lived, and whether he was really the founder of the religion, the author of its sublime precepts and enlarged view of the divine nature, or only the regulator of the Magian worship, and institutor of the innumerable ceremonies with which it was incumbered and disgraced. It may however be proper to advert briefly to the strong contrast between the Persian religion and the Greek, which, as the same able writer remarks, was such that it could not escape the most careless observer. It appears to have struck forcibly the inquisitive mind of Herodotus, who, with all the prejudices of polytheism about him, has in a few words marked it so accurately that, after every subsequent account of antient authors, and every discussion of modern, very nice distinction is necessary to convict him of any error. 'These,' says Herodotus, 'I have found to be the tenets of the Persians. They hold it unlawful to erect images, temples, and altars, and impute to folly such practices in others: because, as it appears to me, they do not, like the Greeks, think the gods of the same nature or from the same origin with men. The summits of mountains they esteem the places most proper for sacrifice to

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 132,  
132.

CHAP.  
VI.

‘ the supreme Deity ; and the whole circle of the  
 ‘ heavens they call God. They sacrifice besides  
 ‘ to the sun, the moon, the earth, fire, water, and  
 ‘ the winds. In addressing the deity it is forbid-  
 ‘ den to petition for blessings to themselves indi-  
 ‘ vidually ; the prayer must extend to the whole  
 ‘ Persian nation.’ Such are the religious tenets  
 which have always been attributed to the Per-  
 sians. But the Persians themselves, of every  
 age, as the historian of the Roman empire pro-  
 ceeds to observe, have denied that they extend  
 divine honors beyond the One Supreme Being,  
 and have explained the equivocal conduct which  
 has given occasion to strangers continually to  
 charge them with polytheism : ‘ The elements,  
 ‘ and more particularly Fire, Light, and the Sun,  
 ‘ were the objects of their religious reverence,  
 ‘ because they considered them as the purest  
 ‘ symbols, the noblest productions, and the most  
 ‘ powerful agents of the Divine Power and  
 ‘ Nature.’

Gibbon's  
 Hist. vol. i.  
 c. 8.

SECTION

## SECTION III.

*Conquest of Thrace, and Invasion of European Scythia by Darius. Submission of Macedonia to the Persian Empire. State of the Ægean Islands, and History of Polycrates tyrant of Samos. Situation of the Grecian People under the Persian Dominion.*

THE great states which had hitherto swayed the politics of the civilized world, and balanced one another, were Assyria, Media, Lydia, Egypt. Armenia had also sometimes been of consequence; and Tyre, with a territory of small extent, yet respectable through wealth acquired by commerce, and naval strength, the consequence of commerce, like the Dutch in modern times, had been usually courted by the greatest monarchs. Carthage was already a rising power, but distant. Greece was yet of little political consideration. Separated into so many small independent states, often hostile to each other, and never united by any political tie that could be lasting, each by itself, among the transactions of great nations, appeared utterly insignificant. Assyria, Media, Lydia, Armenia, Egypt, Tyre, with all their dependencies, were now united under one vast empire. There appeared thus in the world scarcely an object for the Persian arms; and it might be expected that a prince, wise like Darius, yet not particularly endowed with the genius of a conqueror, would remain satisfied with such dominions, without desiring more, or

D 2                      fearing

CHAP.  
VI.

fearing that any foreign power could make them less.

But such is the nature of man, that prosperity itself creates disquiet. Peace, internal and external, is not always within the power of the wisest prince; the choice of evils only is left to him; and tho despotic chief of a state the most dreaded by neighbouring nations, he may be under a necessity to make war. Thus it seems to have been with Darius. The Persians had been accustomed to respect in their sovereigns, first their right of inheritance, then their character as conquerors. Ambitious spirits, long used to military activity, could ill bear rest: and the gains of conquest would not soon be forgotten by the greedy. All circumstances therefore considered, it may have been much more a matter of necessity than of choice for Darius to seek for a war to wage.

Thucyd.  
l. ii. c. 97.

Of all the nations surrounding the Persian empire, the wild people of the frozen regions of Scythia could alone be esteemed formidable to it. Darius resolved to lead an army against them by the western side of the Euxine sea. The pretence for the war was the invasion of Asia by that people, above a hundred years before, when they overran Media. But if we may guess at the real inducement to undertake this expensive and hazardous expedition, seemingly without necessity as without allurements, it was to lead as far from home as possible the restless spirits of the nation; and by a rough and unprofitable warfare, to make their wishes and desires revert, and become fixed

on

on the peaceable enjoymēt of those rich homes which the valor and fortune of their fathers had acquired for them. An immense army was collected. The Asian Greeks formed a naval force to attend it. They were ordered to the mouth of the Danube. All the nations as far as that river submitted without resistance. Darius crossed it: but when engaged in the vast wilderness beyond, tho no enemy appeared capable of opposing his force, want of subsistence soon obliged him to retire toward more cultivated regions. Then the Scythians, collecting their strength, pressed upon his rear. Like the modern Tartars they fought mostly on horseback: like them also, daring and skilful skirmishers, but incapable of order, they defeated an enemy in detail, continually harrassing and cutting off detached parties, without ever coming to a general engagement; to which, on account of their quick motion, and total disincumbrance from baggage and magazines, it was impossible to force them. Herodotus's account of this expedition exactly resembles what has been experienced in the same part of the world several times within the present century. The Persian cavalry, he tells us, shrunk from the impetuosity of the Scythian charge; yet the Scythians could make no impression upon the compact body of the Persian foot. A retreat, however, through such a country, in presence of a superior cavalry, was highly difficult and hazardous. After great sufferings and much loss, the Persians reached the Danube. Having put that river between them-

SECT.  
III.Herodot.  
l. iv. c. 49  
& seq.



CHAP. VI. selves and the enemy, the march was continued quietly to the Hellespont. Leaving a large force there under Megabazus, Darius proceeded to Sardis.<sup>2</sup> It

<sup>2</sup> Herodotus's account of this expedition affords remarkable proof both of his propensity to relate wonderful stories which he had heard, and of his honest scruple to invent what he had not heard, and at the same time it adds powerfully to the instances before occurring, that he often had information of distant countries and distant transactions beyond what, for his age and circumstances, might be expected. Nothing can be more improbable and inconsistent, not to say impossible, than his story of the Persian monarch's cruelty to Megabazus and his sons. All the most authenticated circumstances of the life of Darius mark him as a politic prince, yet of singular humanity. But that execution, as it stands reported by Herodotus, appears scarcely less absurd in its impolicy than abominable for its cruelty. Yet that about the time of Darius's march for Scythia, there may have been executions in Persia in a family of rank, is by no means impossible: and while the policy of a despotic government would conceal the real circumstances of the crime, perhaps also forbidding conversation upon it, the absurd tale, which Herodotus has transmitted to posterity, might pass in whispers as far as Asia Minor. The closet-conversations between the Persian monarch and his brother, together with other circumstances of private communication which the historian has undertaken to detail, must be otherwise considered. A propensity to the dramatic manner appears strong in all very ancient history, and particularly in the oriental. It is indeed still observable in the narration of uneducated people in the most polished countries. This was not so far obsolete among the Greeks, after the age of Herodotus, but that the judicious and exact Thucydides thought it necessary to diversify his narrative by the frequent introduction of speeches; which he has used as a vehicle of political discussion of highest advantage to his history. But tho he bears with the critics the principal credit of this management, it appears that the design was not original with him: he found the example already set by Herodotus; of which a very valuable specimen occurs in the debate of the Persian chiefs concerning the form of government to be established after the death of the Magian usurper: certainly not the less valuable from the circumstance that, evidently not the sentiments of Persians confined to a despotic court, but the result of extensive observation by a Greek among various governments, is there related.

It has been common, among later historians, to speak of the event of this expedition as highly disgraceful to Darius; seemingly with as little reason as the virtues, and even the wisdom of the savage Scythians have been extolled. Certainly his reputation and consequence among nations were not sunk by it<sup>14</sup>. On his return, the Ionian and Æolian Greeks vied in paying court to him. The force left under Megabates sufficed to extend the Persian dominion westward. All was subdued as far as Macedonia; and Amyntas, king of that country, acknowledged subjection to the Persian monarch by the delivery of earth and water. The Grecian islands also began to feel the overbearing influence of the Persian power. The history of Samos, which had been acquired in the reign of Cambyses, as it

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 13.  
Plat.  
Menex.  
p. 239. t. ii.

related. The pretended debate in the cabinet of Xerxes concerning the expedition into Greece, considered as an exposition of the state of Greece at the time, is also well worthy attention. But the account which Herodotus has left us of so singular a people as the Scythians, so little generally known to the Greeks, when we find it confirmed by all subsequent testimony, and at length by the deep and acute researches of the historian of the Roman empire, cannot but do him great credit. It has been a kind of fashion, to which Plutarch principally has given vogue, to sneer at his authority. An attentive examination of his narrative, and a careful comparison of it with all the ancient writers nearest to him in age, convinced me of its merit. His place in ancient history can be supplied by no other author; and it has therefore been highly satisfactory to me to find him so well stand the test of Mr. Gibbon's very extensive and very trying enquiries.

<sup>14</sup> The testimonies of Æschylus and Plato to this point are still stronger than that of Herodotus. See the chorus quoted in note <sup>12</sup> p. 32 of this volume, and Plato's third Dialogue on Legislation, p. 695, t. ii.

CHAP.  
VI.

Herodot.  
l. iii. c. 39,  
& seq.  
Strab.  
l. xiv.  
p. 637,  
638.

tends to explain the state of those islands and seas, may deserve some detail.

Polycrates, a private citizen of Samos, had, in conjunction with his two brothers, made himself master of the government. Procuring then the death of one, and the banishment of the other brother, he remained monarch of the island. He seems to have been the Machiavel of his time, with the advantage of possessing the means to prove the merit of his theory by practice. It is said to have been his favorite maxim, that by avoiding to injure he gained nothing, but by repairing injuries he conciliated friends. With a hundred trireme galleys in constant pay, he exercised universal piracy in the Grecian seas; but he cultivated the friendship of Amasis king of Egypt; who being, like himself, both a man of abilities and an usurper, would naturally incline to the connection. He acquired possession of many of the smaller islands of the Ægean, and of several towns on the continent of Asia Minor. In a war with the Milesians, defeating their allies the Lesbians in a sea-fight, he destroyed or took the whole fleet; and so little consideration had he for the Grecian name, the prisoners were made slaves, and the ditch surrounding the walls of Samos in Herodotus's time was formed by their labor. Little, however, as he cared for justice or humanity, he studied elegance in luxury. He encouraged arts and learning, which were already beginning to flourish among the Asian Greeks, and the Poet Anacreon was his constant guest. But the philosopher Pythagoras avoided

avoided such patronage : after passing some time in Egypt and Babylon, finding his country still oppressed by the tyranny of Polycrates, Pythagoras is said to have finally quitted Samos, and settled at Crotona in Italy.

Polycrates at length began to be remarked for a prosperity which, among many trying circumstances, in no one instance had ever failed him. This very prosperity is said to have lost him the friendship of the king of Egypt. The anecdote, considered relatively to the history of the human mind, is remarkable. Amasis thought it in the nature of things that the tide of human affairs must unfailingly, sooner or later, bring a violent reverse of fortune ; and in this belief he advised Polycrates to seek some loss, which might appease that disposition, apparent in the gods, disposers of worldly things, to envy human happiness<sup>15</sup>. Polycrates, whether believing with his royal friend, or merely humoring popular prejudice, determined to follow the advice. He had a remarkable seal, highly valued, an emerald cut by Theodorus a celebrated Samian artist. This seal he threw into the sea. A few days after, a fish of uncommon size being brought to him for a present, the seal was found in its belly. Polycrates, supposing this must be esteemed a manifest declaration of divine favor, wrote a particular account of it to Amasis ;

SECT.  
III.

Herodot.  
l. iii. c. 121.  
Isocr.  
Busr.  
encom.  
Strab.  
l. xiv.  
p. 638.

Herodot.  
l. iii.  
c. 40, 41.  
Strab.  
l. xiv.  
p. 637,  
638.

Herodot.  
& Strab.  
ut sup.

<sup>15</sup> Εμοὶ δὲ αἱ σοὶ μεγάλα ἰσχυρία δοκᾷ ἀρέσκειν, τοῦ θένος ἱππευμάτων ὡς ἐν φιδωπείῳ. Epistle from Amasis to Polycrates in Herodot. b. iii. c. 40.

whose

CHAP.  
VI.

whose superstition on the contrary led him to so different a theory, that he sent a herald formally to renounce friendship and hospitality with one whom he thought marked for peculiar vengeance by the gods. Whether the circumstances of this story be simply true, or whether so deep a politician as Polycrates might think it worth while to impose the belief of the more extraordinary of them on a superstitious people, for the purpose of confirming the idea that he was peculiarly favored by the deity (an idea of high political importance in that age), or whether we suppose the whole a fiction, which is not likely, it assists at least to characterize the age in which it was written, and many following ages, in which it was thought worth repeating and animadverting upon.

A deep stroke of policy, which occurs next in the history of Polycrates, perfectly accords with his general character. He feared sedition among the Samians. Cambyfes was then collecting a naval force from the Asian Greeks for his Egyptian expedition. Polycrates sent privately to desire that the Persian monarch would require, from him also, a contribution of force to the armament. Such a request was not likely to be denied: the requisition was made; and Polycrates in consequence manned forty trireme galleys with those whom he thought most inclined and most able to give him disturbance. He had determined that they should never return to Samos; but, after the conquest of Egypt, failing in intrigue to procure their detention

Herodot.  
l. iii. c. 44,  
2 seq.

detention by the Persians, he opposed them with open hostility. Thus excluded from their country, they applied to Lacedæmon for assistance. The Spartan government, always disposed to interfere in the internal quarrels of neighbouring states, received them favorably. Some old piracies of the Samians were a farther pretence for war, and induced the Corinthians to join in it. The united force of Lacedæmon and Corinth besieged Samos forty days without making any progress, and then returned to Peloponnesus. The expelled Samians, thus deserted, had again their fortune to seek; and piracy was the resource on which they determined. The island of Siphnus, small and otherwise of little value, had gold and silver mines, by which its inhabitants became remarkable among the Greeks for riches. The Samians went thither and desired to borrow ten talents, about two thousand five hundred pounds sterling. Being refused, they debarked, and began to plunder the country. The Siphnians, giving them battle, were defeated; and, in retreating to their town, a large body was cut off. A treaty was then proposed, and the Siphnians bought the departure of the Samians at the price of a hundred talents, nearly twenty-five thousand pounds. These freebooters then sailed to Crete, and seizing a territory, founded the town of Cydonia, where they prospered greatly for five years; but in the sixth, quarrelling with the Æginetans, more powerful pirates than themselves, they were defeated in a sea-fight. The Æginetans then landed

**CHAP.** landed in Crete; and, being joined by the  
**VI.** Cretans in attacking the Samian town, they took  
 it, and reduced all the inhabitants to slavery.

Such being the state of the Grecian islands and Grecian seas, and such the mutual treatment of the Greeks among one another, we shall the less wonder at what they experienced from the Persians. The ambition of Polycrates was not inferior to his abilities. He is supposed to have aimed at no less than the command of all the islands of the Ægean, together with all Æolia and Ionia. His power, particularly his naval power, his known talents, and his suspected views, probably all gave umbrage to Oroetes satrap of Sardis. What other cause of offence there was, Herodotus confesses that he could not certainly learn. The Persian invited him to his court. Polycrates went with a large retinue. He was immediately arrested, and put to death by a public crucifixion; esteemed the most ignominious, as it was the most cruel of all usual modes of execution. His subjects appear to have submitted without resistance to the satrap's authority.

Herodot.  
 l. iii.  
 Thucyd.  
 l. i. c. 23.  
 Strab.  
 l. xiv.  
 p. 637, 638.

Ol. 64. 3.  
 B.C. 522.  
 B.

Samos thus was, except Cyprus, the first Grecian island brought under the Persian dominion. But, after the return of Darius from Scythia, Lesbos, Chios, and other islands on the Asiatic coast were, some voluntarily, others by compulsion, added to his vast empire. Tyrants in general, and all who aimed at tyranny, no unwillingly submitted to a supremacy which either placed them above their fellowcitizens, or secured

secured the superiority obtained. It was a common policy of the Persians, which we find practised by the great Cyrus, and perhaps not less advantageous than liberal, to appoint the son of the conquered prince, or some other principal person of the country itself, to be governor of the conquered country; always however under the superintending controul of a Persian satrap. Most of the Grecian towns were therefore left to their own magistrates and laws; some citizen presiding as governor, whom in that elevated situation the Greeks always intitled Tyrant. Thus Coës the Mitylenæan, for services in the Scythian expedition, was raised to the tyranny of Mitylenë. Darius, having settled the administration of Asia Minor, and of his new acquisitions in Europe, committed the superintendency of the whole to his brother Artaphernes, and returned to Susa his capital.

Probably the principal purposes of the Scythian expedition were accomplished<sup>16</sup>. The ambitious spirits among the Persians had been diverted from domestic disturbance. If the army suffered in the Scythian wilds, yet a large extent of valuable country, inhabited by different nations, was nevertheless added to the empire. New honors and new employments were thus brought within the monarch's disposal. And the acquisition was perhaps not the less valuable

SECT.  
III.

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 154.  
l. iii. c. 15.

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 2.

<sup>16</sup> This seems a conclusion warranted by the whole narration of Herodotus. The testimonies last referred to of Æschylus and Plato speak still more strongly to the same purpose.

from



**CHAP.**  
**VI.** from the circumstance that both the people of the newly acquired territory, and the people still unsubdued bordering on it, were in disposition restless and fierce; and therefore likely to furnish employment for those whom the prince, himself safe in his distant capital, might wish to employ.

## CHAPTER VII.

Continuation of the History of GREECE during the Reign of DARIUS King of PERSIA.

## SECTION I.

*Immediate Causes of the Wars between Greece and Persia. Persian Expedition against Naxos. Revolt of the Asian Greeks against the Persian Government.*

THE Persian dominion now extended over a large portion of the Grecian people, and bordered on Greece itself. The Asiatic colonies indeed, natural and almost necessary objects for Persian ambition, could scarcely by any possibility have avoided falling under its overwhelming power: but Greece, separated from all the world by lofty mountains and dangerous seas, had little to attract the notice of the mighty monarch who lived at Susa; while the nearer provinces of India presented a far more tempting field for his arms; and the Scythians, who ranged the long extent of his northern frontier, from the borders of China to the borders of Germany, might still be deemed formidable neighbours. Had therefore inactivity been in the temper of its people, Greece might have lain long in obscurity, peaceful, free, and unregarded.

Thucyd.  
l. ii. c. 97.

CHAP.  
VII.

regarded. But inactivity was in the temper neither of the people nor of the governments of Greece. Touching upon the Persian provinces, to clash was thus scarcely avoidable; and some transactions, at first seemingly insignificant among the concerns of a vast empire, led shortly to those wars, which, by events contrary to all human expectation and foresight, raised the Grecian name to the summit of military glory; and giving thus a new and powerful spring to the temper and genius of the people, contributed greatly to those astonishing exertions of the mind in every path of science and of art, which have made the Greeks of this and the next age the principal ornaments of the history of mankind. To borrow therefore the words of a great man, who has treated Grecian history, tho' briefly, yet with superior penetration and judgement, 'I shall not hold it any impertinency to be large in unfolding every circumstance of so great a business as gave fire to those wars, which never could be thoroughly quenched until in the ruin of this great Persian monarchy.'

\* Sir Walter Raleigh's History of the World, book iii. c. 5. sect. 7. It is to be regretted that this extraordinary man, who by that union of characters, common among the antients, but almost singular in modern ages, soldier, seaman, statesman, scholar, poet, and philosopher, was so peculiarly qualified to unfold antient history to modern apprehension, should have allowed himself so little scope for the affairs of Greece and Rome. His superior manner of treating them, has not escaped the observation of Mr. Hume, as may be seen in his History of England, in the Appendix to the reign of James the First.

Among

S E C T.  
I.Herodot.  
l. v. c. 11,  
& seq.

Among the Grecian governors under the Persian dominion, Histæus tyrant of Miletus was eminent for abilities, and for favor with the Persian king. He had rendered considerable services in the Scythian expedition; and, as a reward, had obtained a grant of a territory on the river Strymon in Thrace, where he proposed to plant a colony. The mines of gold and silver in that country, and the shiptimber, with which it abounded, made it a great object for the Greeks; while, in the extent of the Persian empire, to give away a corner of a newly acquired province, was a trifle for the prince's bounty; nor would the circumstances of the spot, in themselves, be thought worth inquiry. But the busy temper of the Greeks, their forms of government, so new to the Persians, and particularly their skill in naval affairs, which gave them importance with their conquerors, were likely to excite jealousy. The settlement therefore was scarcely begun, when it was suggested that Histæus, by means of his colony, so favorably situated both for acquisition of wealth and increase of naval power, might raise himself into a situation to assert independency. Miletus, where he governed, was in riches and population the first of the Asiatic Grecian cities: his influence was extensive among the others; and should he acquire the command of the whole maritime force of the Asian Greeks, it might not be easy to reduce him. Quietly, therefore, and without apparent injury, to obviate any such project, it was pretended that Darius greatly

Vol. II.

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desired

CHAP.  
VII.

desired his advice and assistance at Susa. There any honors might be paid him, without risk of his acquiring means to assume more than it was thought proper to give. Histæus, flattered by the distinction, gladly consented to attend the king. His Thracian settlement meanwhile remained to him; and completely to prove that only favor was intended, the government of Miletus, during his absence, was committed to his kinsman Aristagoras.

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 28,  
& seq.

About the time of this arrangement, a contest of factions in Naxos, one of the most populous and flourishing islands of the Ægean, came to extremity; and the democratical party prevailing, all the men of principal rank and property were expelled. In these untoward circumstances they applied to the new governor of Miletus, as the person of greatest power and influence among the Asian Greeks; and Aristagoras, thinking the opportunity commodious for adding Naxos to his own command, received them favorably. He told them, that indeed the force under his immediate authority was unequal to the reduction of those who now held their island; for he was informed they were eight thousand strong in regular heavy-armed foot, and had many galleys: but that his interest was good with Artaphernes the Persian satrap, brother of the great king; and with his assistance, who commanded so great a force by sea and land, what they desired might easily be effected. The expelled Naxians, for the sake of recovering their own possessions, and revenging themselves

selves on their opponents, readily consented to guide a Persian army against a Grecian island. Artaphernes approved the proposal for the expedition. The winter was consumed in preparing two hundred trireme galleys, and a competent land force, and Megabates, of the blood royal of Persia, was, in conjunction with Aristagoras, appointed to the command. To deceive the Naxians, it was reported that the armament was intended for the Hellespont; and accordingly, when the fleet sailed in the spring, its course was first directed that way; but it stopped at Chios, to wait for a northerly wind, which would carry it in one day and a night to Naxos.

For the antient galleys of war, as we have before observed, an open beach, upon which they might be hauled, served as a port; and as their scanty width and depth afforded little convenient shelter for the numerous complement, which the antient mode both of navigation and of naval action required, the crews, for health as well as for convenience, were at every opportunity incamped or quartered ashore<sup>2</sup>; a guard only, proportioned to the exigency of the situation, being mounted on every ship. It happened that Megabates, visiting the fleet, found a Grecian galley without its guard. Incensed at such dangerous neglect of discipline, he sent for the captain; and with the haughty and undistin-

<sup>2</sup> This we learn not only from Herodotus, but from many very explicit passages of Thucydides, which will occur to notice in the sequel.

CHAP.  
VII.

guishing imperiousness of a modern Turkish bashaw, immediately ordered him to be tied in his own cabin, with his head out of the window<sup>3</sup>. Information was presently carried to Aristagoras; who hastened to Megabates, and begged that a man in such a command, and his friend, might not be so opprobriously treated. The Persian refused to relax; upon which Aristagoras went himself and set the captain free. Megabates was of course violently offended. Aristagoras, far from making any submission, insisted that the whole business of the expedition was committed to his direction. With such dissension between the leaders, affairs were not likely to be well conducted. Megabates, according to Herodotus, as soon as night came on, sent a vessel to Naxos to give information of the object of the armament. The Naxians, in consequence, who had apprehended nothing from a force professedly designed for the Hellespont, and known to have begun its course northward, immediately drove their cattle, brought all their moveables into the city, and made every preparation for vigorous defence. The fleet at length arrived. The disappointment was great on finding the inhabitants prepared; yet siege was laid to the city of the same name with the island. The defence was however so well main-

<sup>3</sup> Διὰ θαλάμης διόλου τῆς νῆος. Herodot. l. v. c. 33. 'Vincire trajectum per thalamium navis, id est foramen per quod infirmi remi extant.' Vers. edit. Wesseling. I do not know that I can support the different interpretation which I have given; but it is here of little consequence.

SECT.  
I.

tained that, after four months, little progress was made. The sums allowed by Artaphernes being then consumed, and much besides from the private fortune of Aristagoras, it became necessary to quit the enterprize. Fortifying therefore a post within the island, in which the Naxian refugees might maintain themselves, the armament, which had suffered considerably, returned to the continent.

Aristagoras now found himself very critically situated. Sure of the enmity of Megabates, and reasonably fearing the displeasure of Artaphernes, he expected deprivation of his command at Miletus as the least evil that could ensue. The distress in his private affairs therefore, from his great expences on the expedition, added to the loss of his credit at the satrap's court, the disappointment of all his former hopes, and apprehension of still worse consequences, made him desperate. His credit was yet high, not only in Miletus but through all the Asiatic Grecian cities, and the idea arose of exciting a general revolt of them against the Persian government. In this crisis a messenger came to him from Histæus at Susa. That chief, highly uneasy under all the honors he received at the Persian court, while he found himself really an exile and a slave, began to see it was intended that his banishment from his native country should be perpetual. In revolving therefore the circumstances which might possibly obtain him the means of returning, none appeared so likely to be efficacious as a revolt in Ionia; and he deter-

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 35.



CHAP.  
VII.

mined upon the dangerous measure of endeavouring to excite one, hoping that he should infallibly be among those who would be employed to quell it. To convey to Aristagoras his wishes on a subject so hazardous to communicate upon, he is said to have caused the head of a trusty slave to be shaved, and to have written with an indelible stain on the skin; and not till the hair was sufficiently grown again he dispatched the slave to Miletus. The wavering resolution of Aristagoras was thus determined. He founded the principal Milesians, and found them well disposed to his purpose. He then called them together, and made his proposal in form. The restoration of republican government was the lure: Aristagoras offered to resign the tyranny. Of the persons whom he had assembled, Hecataeus the historian, remarkable as one of the earliest Grecian prose writers whose works had any reputation with posterity, but from whom nothing remains to us is said alone to have dissuaded the revolt; arguing from the extreme disproportion of any force they could possibly collect and maintain, to that of the Persian empire. Not prevailing, he then recommended particular attention to their marine; for the command of the sea, he said, alone could give them a chance for success. But the revenues of their state, he observed, were very unequal to such an object; and he therefore advised the application of the treasures in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ, otherwise a ready prey for the enemy, to that important purpose. The other chiefs scrupled

Herodot.  
i. v. c. 36.

S E C T.  
I.

pled what the vulgar would esteem sacrilege; but upon the whole their measures appear to have been vigorous and wise. Aristagoras immediately resigned the supreme command, and republican government was reëstablished in Miletus. The Grecian forces, returned from Naxos, lay still incamped at Myus, under the command mostly of the tyrants of the several cities. Iatragoras, a man of influence, under commission from the new Milesian government, hastening thither, arrested most of those commanders, and sending them to their several cities, delivered them to the party adverse to the existing government. In general they were banished, but Coës, who had been raised by Darius to the tyranny of Mitylenë, was put to death. Thus, through a general restoration of republican government, all Ionia and Æolia were presently engaged in the revolt.

Aristagoras left nothing unattempted which might contribute to the success of the very hazardous enterprize in which he had engaged himself and his country. He undertook an embassy to Greece, with the hope of gaining the parent states to the cause of the colonies. Going first to Lacedæmon, he endeavoured to rouse the Spartans by urging the shame which redounded to all Greece, and especially to the leading state, from the miserable subjection of a Grecian people. He magnified the wealth, and made light of the military force of the Persian empire. He animadverted upon the inferiority of Asiatic courage, of Asiatic arms, and of the Asiatic manner of fighting. He drew an alluring picture of the great and glorious field

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 38.

CHAP.  
VII.

which Asia offered for the exercise of that military virtue, in which the Spartans so greatly excelled all other people; and he observed how much more worthy it was of their ambition than the scanty frontier, for which they had been so long contending with their neighbours, the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argians, whose nearer approach to them in valor and discipline yet made success more doubtful. He concluded with mentioning no less than the conquest of Asia, and the plunder of Susa itself, as attainable objects for the Spartan arms. But the cautious government of Lacedæmon, wholly directed by a few aged men, was not yet ripe for such allurements. Aristagoras was asked how far it was from Miletus to Susa? He answered incautiously, 'A three months journey.' Nothing more was wanting to procure him a firm denial. It was replied, that he could not seriously call himself a friend to the Spartans, who wanted to lead them on a military expedition to the distance of a three months journey; and he was commanded to leave Lacedæmon. Finding that he could avail nothing publicly, he is said to have attempted to gain king Cleomenes by bribes; but failing in this also, he passed to Athens.

## SECTION II.

SECT.  
II.

*Affairs of Athens. Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians, Boeotians, and Eubæans. The Athenians assist the Ionians against Persia. All the Asiatic Grecian States again reduced under the Persian dominion. History of the Athenian Colony in the Thracian Chersonese. Liberal Administration of the conquered Provinces under the Persian dominion.*

WE left the Athenians just restored to nominal liberty, but in no flourishing circumstances. By turns distracted with domestic faction, pressed by the tyranny of Lacedæmon, and urged by the apprehension of a most formidable attack with which Cleomenes threatened them, they had, by their ambassadors at Sardis, submitted to the humiliation of acknowledging subjection to the Persian king, in hope of obtaining his powerful protection. The conduct of those ambassadors, we are told, was strongly reprobated on their return; and it does not appear that any Persian assistance was either given, or farther desired. Yet the danger which hung over Athens might have justified a treaty for protection upon almost any terms. Cleomenes was bent upon revenge. He collected forces from all Peloponnesus, not informing the allies what was his object. At the head of a large army he landed at Eleusis. At the same time, according to previous agreement, the Thebans, by a sudden

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 73.

c. 74. &amp; seq.

CHAP.  
VII.

a sudden attack, took Œnoë and Hysæ, Attic boroughs bordering on Bœotia, while the Chalcidians of Eubœa also invaded Attica on their side. It is the common effect of public danger and public misfortune to bring forward great characters, and to excite even ordinary men to great exertion. No individual among the Athenians is particularly noticed by history upon this occasion; but the administration of the commonwealth appears to have been wise and spirited. Neglecting, for the present, the Thebans and Eubœans, the Athenian leaders directed their whole force against the Peloponnesians, the more formidable enemy. A battle, upon which the fate of Athens depended, was on the point of being fought, when the Corinthians, angry that they had not been previously consulted concerning the object of the armament, ashamed to be made the tools of the revenge of Cleomenes and the ambition of Sparta, and otherwise little desirous to ruin Athens, withdrew their forces. Demaratus, king of Sparta, dissatisfied with his colleague, and willing to preserve his interest with the Corinthians, retreated with them. These examples sufficed for the other Peloponnesian allies: all withdrew: and Cleomenes was thus reduced to the necessity of hastily, and not without shame, retiring with the small force remaining under his command. The Athenians immediately turned against their other enemies. They overtook the Bœotian army at the Euripus, retreating to join the Chalcidians, who had withdrawn into Eubœa. They  
defeated

defeated it; took seven hundred prisoners; and, crossing the Euripus the same day, gained a second victory over the Chalcidians, so complete that they became masters of a tract in Eubœa sufficient to divide among four thousand families of their fellowcountrymen, whom they established as a colony there. The Athenian treasury was enriched by the ransom of the prisoners, at two minæ, about eight pounds sterling, a head.

SECT.  
II.

Overagainst Athens, on the southern side of the Saronic gulph, lies the little barren island of Ægina, formerly subject to the neighbouring little state of Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, which was itself originally but a member of the Argian commonwealth. This island, or rather rock, was a convenient resort for seafaring people, whether merchants or pirates; and, between the two, growing populous and wealthy, had not only shaken off its dependency upon Epidaurus, but was become one of the principal naval powers of Greece<sup>4</sup>. Some old causes of enmity subsisted between Ægina and Athens. The Thebans, therefore, anxious for revenge against the Athenians, but unable, since the defection of their allies, to prosecute it by their own arms, endeavoured to ingage the Æginetans in their confederacy; and, with the help of an unintelligible response from the Delphian oracle, they succeeded. Those islanders surpri-

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 83.  
Chandler's Travels in  
Greece,  
c. 3 & 4.

<sup>4</sup> Setting aside the unfavorable part of the Æginetan character, Ægina was the Jersey and Guernsey of the Grecian seas.

CHAP.  
VII.

zed and plundered the port of Phalerum, and extended their ravages along a considerable tract of the Attic coast. The Athenians, who had hitherto applied themselves little to naval war, were without means for immediate revenge, and weightier matters soon required their attention.

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 90,  
& seq.

Cleomenes was not of a temper to rest under the disappointment and disgrace of his late miscarriage. He left nothing untried to excite a fresh league against Athens. In the Spartan senate he asserted, that when he was besieged in the Athenian citadel, the archives of the republic being then open to him, he had discovered the collusion of the Delphian priests with the Alcmaeonids, in regard to the pretended responses of the god, commanding the Lacedaemonians to give liberty to Athens. He urged that the Spartan government had therefore acted not less unjustly and irreligiously than imprudently in expelling Hippias; to whom they were bound equally by the sacred laws of hospitality and by the political interest of their country; nor could they do their duty to gods or men otherwise than by restoring him. The Spartan government, already jealous of Athens, consented that Hippias should be invited into Peloponnesus. But his late failure had taught Cleomenes that the forces of the allies were not absolutely at his disposal; and that he must have some deference for the ruling powers in the cities whose troops he would employ. A convention of deputies from those cities was therefore

fore summoned to Lacædemon; among whom the measure was found so generally unpopular, and the Corinthian deputy particularly condemned it in such strong terms, that Cleomenes thought proper to desist from urging his design farther.

SECT.  
II

Hippias, disappointed of the hope thus held out to him, found yet resources in his private character, and the long established reputation of his family. Returning to Sigeium he received invitations from Amyntas king of Macedonia, and from the Thessalians; the former offering Anthemus, the others Iolcus, for places of settlement for himself and his partizans. But he had views which induced him to prefer his residence in Asia.

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 94.

We have now seen Persia attracting the attention of the Greeks of Asia and the islands; much as a tremendous enemy, but sometimes too as a valuable friend. We have seen the democracy itself of Athens setting the example, among the states of Old Greece, of soliciting Persian protection. Will then the liberal spirit of patriotism and equal government justify the prejudices of Athenian faction, and doom Hippias to peculiar execration, because at length he also, with many of his fellowcitizens, despairing of other means for ever returning to their native country, applied to Artaphernes at Sardis? The resort of Greeks from various parts to the satrap's court and capital, some with political, some with mercantile views, was such that the Athenian government would not be likely to remain



CHAP. VII. remain uninformed of what publicly passed there concerning them. Hippias found the attention which his rank and character might claim.

Herodot. l. v. c. 96. The Athenian government, reasonably apprehensive of the consequences, sent to request that Artaphernes would not countenance their banished citizens. The Persian prince gave for his final answer to their ambassadors, 'That if the Athenians would be safe they must receive Hippias.' The return of these ambassadors put Athens in a ferment. Universal indignation, not without a great mixture of alarm, was excited. It was at this critical moment that Aristagoras arrived from Sparta, to solicit assistance to the Ionian confederacy against the oppression of Persia. Being introduced into the assembly of the people, he repeated those arguments which at Lacedæmon had been unavailing: He added, that Miletus, as an Athenian colony, might reasonably claim assistance in its distress from a parent state so powerful. He omitted nothing that could flatter, allure, or excite commiseration; and having, as Herodotus observes, everything at stake, there was nothing that he was not ready to promise; and he prevailed. Twenty ships were voted to assist the Ionians; and these ships, adds the historian, were the beginning of evils to Greeks and barbarians.

Ol. 70. 1.<sup>5</sup> The administration of Artaphernes appears to have been negligent and weak. The Athenian

Herodot. l. v. c. 99, & seq.

<sup>5</sup> Blair has placed the beginning of the Ionian revolt four years earlier, clearly in opposition to the account of Herodotus; which

nian ships arrived at Miletus, with five added by the Eretrians of Eubœa. The combined fleet sailed to Ephesus; and by a bold stroke to profit from the Persian remissness, the land forces debarking, marched directly to Sardis, distant about sixty miles. So totally was Artaphernes unprepared for suppressing the revolt, and so little even for his own security, tho he had a considerable force with him, he immediately abandoned the town, and shut himself within the castle. The town was of course in universal tumult: the Grecian troops entered unopposed: plunder became their object, and in the confusion presently a house was set on fire. For security in frequent earthquakes, to which that country is subject, light materials were preferred, as for the same reason they continue to this day to be, for the construction of dwellings. Most of the houses of the wealthy capital of Lesser Asia were merely frames of timber with pannels of reed: and tho some had their walls of brick, yet the roofs were universally of thatch. The flame spread rapidly

is the authority here preferred, as it has been also by Dodwell, for his *Annales Thucydidei*. Herodotus expressly says, that the war lasted but six years (1). From the end of it he very clearly marks three to the second year of the satrapy of Mardonius (2); and it does not appear that more than one passed afterward before Mardonius was superseded by Artaphernes and Datis (3), who immediately proceeded on the expedition against Greece, which Blair, with all other chronologers, places 490 years before the Christian era.

(1) b. vi. c. 18.

(2) c. 31. 43. &amp; 46.

(3) c. 94.

through

CHAP.  
VII.

through a town so built. The inhabitants, Persians as well as Lydians, before without order or compact, solicitous every one for his own, were thus driven to assemble in the agora, and in the course of the torrent Pactolus which ran through the middle of it. Accident and necessity having collected them, they found themselves strong enough to attempt defence. The Greeks, stopped by the flames in their career of plunder, their principal object, and finding a large body of men to engage, whose numbers were continually increasing, amid the hesitation of disappointment hastily determined to retire to mount Tmolus; whence, in the night, they prosecuted their retreat toward their ships. News of the transaction was quickly conveyed through the provinces within the river Halys. Troops hastened from all parts to Sardis; and the Persians, not yet accustomed to yield, marched immediately to meet the enemy, and found them under the walls of Ephesus. A battle ensued, in which the Greeks were intirely defeated; many of their principal officers were killed, and those of the survivors who avoided captivity, dispersed to their several cities. The Athenians, after this misfortune, recalled their ships; and, tho strongly solicited, would no more take part in the war.

Herodot.  
l. v. c. 103.

The Ionians, nevertheless, continued to prosecute vigorous measures. Wisely avoiding farther attempts by land, they confined their offensive operations to the sea. Their fleet sailed first to the Hellespont, and brought Byzantium, with the

S E C T.  
II.

the other Grecian towns on the Propontis, under their subjection or into their alliance. Then directing their course southward, they were equally successful with most of the Carian cities. About the same time Onesilus king of Salamis in Cyprus, in pursuit of his own views of ambition, had persuaded all that island to revolt against the Persians, except the city of Amathus, to which he laid siege. Receiving information that a Phenician fleet was bringing a Persian army to its relief, he sent to desire alliance with the Ionians, and assistance from their navy, as in a common cause. The Ionians, without long deliberation, determined to accept the alliance offered, and to send the assistance desired. The enemy had, however, landed their army before the Ionian fleet arrived; and on the same day, it is said, two battles were fought; between the Persians and Cyprians by land, and between the Ionians and Phenicians at sea. In the seafight the Greeks were victorious, the Samians particularly distinguishing themselves; but by land they were defeated: Onesilus was killed, and the Persians quickly recovered the whole island.

Herodot.  
l. 5. c. 104.

But while victory thus attended the fleet of Ionia, the country was totally exposed to the superior land-force of the enemy. The Persian general Daurises, leading an army to the Hellespont, took the four towns Abydus, Percotë, Lampascus, and Pæsus, in as many days. Then, informed that the Carians had joined in the revolt, he marched southward, and defeated

Herodot.  
l. 5. c. 106,  
& seq.

CHAP.  
VII.

that people in a great battle. The routed troops, joined by the Ionian army, ventured and lost a second battle, in which the Ionians principally suffered. But Heracleides of Mylassa, general of the Carians, was one of those superior men who, acquiring wisdom from misfortune, can profit even from a defeat. The Persian army proceeded, with that careless confidence which victory is apt to inspire, as if nothing remained but to take possession of the Carian towns. A mountainous tract was to be passed. Heracleides, well acquainted with the country, silently preoccupied the defiles. The Persians, intangled among the mountains, were attacked by surprise: Daurises fell, with many officers of high rank, and his army was completely defeated.

But the resources of a vast empire enabled the Persians to act in too many places at once for the Ionians to oppose them with any prospect of final success. When Daurises marched toward Caria, Hymeas had turned from the Propontis toward the Hellespont, and quickly recovered all the northern part of Æolia. At the same time Artaphernes himself, leading an army to the confines of Æolia and Ionia, took Cuma and Clazomenæ. Then assembling the bodies which had hitherto been acting separately, it became evidently his design to form the siege of Miletus, the head of the rebellion, by taking which he might finish the war. Aristagoras saw the gathering storm, and could see no means of withstanding it. Herodotus accuses him of pusillanimity,

Herodot.  
1.5. c. 123,  
& seq.

SECT.  
II.

fillanimity, apparently without reason. Aristagoras knew that, however others might make their peace, there could be no pardon for him; and when he could no longer assist his country in the unequal contest into which he had led it, his presence might only inflame the enemy's revenge. He determined, therefore, to quit Miletus. He communicated this resolution to his fellowcitizens, and waiting to see Pythagoras, a man high in rank and esteem among them, appointed to the chief command in his room, he sailed, with as many as chose to follow his fortune, to that territory on the river Strymon in Thrace, which Darius had given to Histæus. Under his able management this colony was prospering when he was killed in besieging a Thracian town.

Histæus, meanwhile, had obtained his release from his honorable imprisonment in the Persian court: Darius sent him to Sardis to assist in quelling the rebellion. But the Persian officers there, better informed than the ministers at Susa, were not disposed to trust him; and Histæus, finding himself suspected, fled by night into Ionia, and passed to Chios. The Ionians, however, were not generally well inclined to him: some viewing in him the former tyrant, others the author of their present calamities and danger. His fellowcitizens the Milesians absolutely refused him admission into their town: but he found more favor at Mitylenë, where he obtained a loan of eight ships, with which he sailed to Byzantium. Apparently he had previous

Heródot.  
l. 5. c. 106,  
107. l. 6.  
c. 1, & seq.

C. H. A. P.  
VII.



connection with the ruling party there. From that advantageous station he carried on piratical hostility against Greeks and barbarians, seizing the vessels of all states with which he had not some friendly engagement.

Ol. 71.  $\frac{1}{4}$ .  
B.C. 493.  
Dodw.  
ann. Th.  
Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 6,  
& seq.

It was now the sixth year of the war, when the Persian army sat down before Miletus. To assist its operations, which otherwise might have been ineffectual, a large fleet was collected, chiefly from Phenicia; but Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt contributed. On the other side, the Panionian assembly was summoned, to deliberate on measures to be taken in circumstances so critical. It was there determined not to oppose the Persian army in the field; but to leave Miletus to its own defence by land, while every possible exertion should be made to increase their force at sea; and it was ordered that all the ships of war, which every state of the confederacy could furnish, should assemble at Ladë, a small island overagainst the port of Miletus, and try the event of a naval engagement<sup>6</sup>. The enumeration, given by Herodotus, of the trireme galleys sent by each state, is probably not unfounded, and may show in some degree the comparative strength of the Ionian

<sup>6</sup> The site of Miletus has now long ceased to be maritime, and Ladë to be an island. The bay on which that city stood has been gradually filled with the sand brought down by the river Latmus, and Ladë is an eminence in a plain. See Chandler's Travels in Asia Minor, or rather the Voyage Pittoresque de la Grece par M. de Choiseuil Gouffier. Myus, near the mouth of the Mæander, underwent earlier the same fate. Pausan. l. 7. c. 2.

S E C T.  
II.

cities. From Miletus came eighty, Priēnē twelve, Myus three, Teos seventeen, Chios a hundred, Erythræ eight, Phocæa, weak since its capture by Harpagus and the emigration of its people, only three, Lesbos seventy, and Samos sixty; the whole making three hundred and fifty-three. This indeed appears a very great naval force for those little states to assemble and maintain; the ordinary complement for a trireme galley in that age, or very shortly after, being two hundred men. The crews of the Ionian fleet would thus be above seventy thousand. The number of the enemy's ships was much greater; Herodotus says it amounted to six hundred. Yet the Persian leaders had so little confidence in an armament of which little or no part was Persian, that they feared to risk a naval engagement. But command of the sea was absolutely necessary to their final success by land. They had with them most of the Ionian and Æolian tyrants, who had been expelled from their several cities at the beginning of the revolt, and through these they endeavoured to practise separately upon the squadron of each state. They promised complete pardon, both for themselves and their fellowcitizens, to any who would quit the confederacy; and their threats were indeed terrible to those who should persevere in it. The men, they said, should be reduced to slavery, the boys should be made eunuchs; the virgins should be carried into Bactria, and their towns and territories should be given to others. Neither the offered favor,

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 184.



CHAP.  
VII.

however, nor the threats were at first regarded. But disunion in command, the common defect of confederacies, prevailed in the Grecian fleet. A general relaxation of discipline ensued; and at length the Samian leaders foreseeing nothing but ruin to the cause in which they were engaged, began to listen to the proposals made to them from *Æaces* the expelled tyrant of their island. Weighing the resources of their confederacy against those of the Persian empire, as *Herodotus* says for them, they judged that the contention on their part must in the end prove vain; since, should they, with all their disadvantage in numbers, prevail in the approaching action, still another fleet would unfailingly soon be raised against them. Urged by these considerations, they privately concluded a treaty.

The Persian leaders then no longer scrupled to quit the port and risk an engagement. The Grecian fleet advancing to meet them, the Samian commander gave the signal to his squadron to set their sails. This clearly indicated intention to fly; for the ancients in action used oars only. The captains of eleven galleys disobeyed the signal, and stood the battle; the rest sailed away. The line of battle of a fleet, among the ancients, was that alone which in our sea-phrase is called the line of battle abreast: they met prow opposed to prow<sup>1</sup>. The station of the Samians had been in the extreme of one wing. The Les-

<sup>1</sup> *Ἰσχυρὴ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τοῖς πλοῖσις ἀπέναντι.*

*Xenoph. Lac. Polit. c. 11.*

bians, next in the line, disconcerted by the unexpected exposure of their flank, as well as by the alarming desertion of their allies, presently fled. The Chians remained firm; and, fighting with the most determined bravery against unequal numbers, suffered greatly. Even in their defeat, however, it appeared that, tho the Phenician ships still excelled in swiftness, and their seamen in skill as mariners, yet the Greeks were advancing to a superiority in naval action above other nations. The Phocæan commander Dionysius, having with his three galleys taken three of the enemy's, when he found the battle irrecoverably lost, and the Ionian affairs consequently desperate, would return no more to Phocæa; but, directing his course to the coast of Phenicia, made prize of a number of merchant-ships. Having thus enriched himself and his crews, he sailed to Sicily to enjoy himself there; and thence, as necessity or thirst of gain impelled, he exercised piracy against the Carthaginians and Tuscans.

The Persians now, masters of the sea, pressed the siege of Miletus, and at length succeeded in an assault. Most of the men within the place were killed: the rest, with the women and children, were led to Susa; testimonies to the greatness of the diligence of his officers, and examples of terror to other conquered provinces. Darius however, according to the honorable testimony borne him by Herodotus, did them no other ill<sup>s</sup> than to settle them at Ampæ on the Eu-

1 ——— *καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο ποιεῖται.* Herodot. l. 6. c. 209.

CHAP.  
VII.



phrates, near where that river discharges itself into the Persian gulph. The rich vale of Miletus was divided among Persians; Carians were established in the mountainous part of its territory. *Æces*, in reward for his service, was restored to the tyranny of Samos; but a large proportion of the Samian people emigrated to Sicily. In the time of Herodotus, when other revolutions had restored authority to the party adverse to tyranny and Persia, there stood a column in the agora of the city of Samos, with an inscription in honor of the eleven captains who had bravely fought in the common cause, at the risk of punishment for disobedience to their immediate commander.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 26.

*Histiæus*, on the reduction of Miletus, moved from Byzantium to Lesbos, where he seems to have had great interest. Thence, according to Herodotus, he carried on a piratical war, against the Greeks no less than against the Persians, in a manner which, notwithstanding numberless instances of extreme readiness in the Greeks at all times to make petty war among one another, appears rather unaccountable. At length, landing on the coast of Asia Minor for plunder, he was made prisoner by the Persian general Harpagus; and being sent to Sardis was there crucified.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 31,  
32.  
Ol. 71. 4.  
B C. 493.

The Persian fleet wintered at Miletus. Sailing in spring, the islands Chios, Lesbos, Tenedos, immediately submitted. The army at the same time proceeded against the Ionian towns; and the generals, far otherwise disposed than their master, executed the full vengeance which they had threatened: the handsomest Grecian boys were made eunuchs,

eunuchs, the most beautiful girls were carried off; the towns, and, as the Grecian writers particularly observe, without sparing the temples, were burnt.

SECT.  
II.

After the reduction of the islands the fleet failed to the Hellespont. All on the Asiatic side was already subject to the Persians, and nothing on the European shore now stood against them. Devastation was spread by sword and fire. The Byzantians and Chalcedonians best avoided the storm, flying betimes with their most valuable effects, and planting the territory of Mesambria, far within the Euxine sea. The Phœnicians burnt the empty towns; and then returning to the Hellespont, all the Thracian Chersonese immediately submitted, except the town of Cardia.

Herodot.,  
l. 6. c. 33.

This peninsula, often called, by way of eminence, simply the Chersonese, had been planted by a colony of Athenians, whose history is not unimportant among the transactions of Greece and Persia. During the tyranny of Peisistratus at Athens, the Doloncian Thracians, antient inhabitants of the Chersonese, pressed in war by the Apfinthians, sent their chiefs to ask advice of the god of Delphi. The oracle directed them to invite into their country, to found a colony there, the first person who, after their quitting the temple, should ask them to the rites of hospitality. The Doloncians, directing their journey homeward, passed through Phocis and Bœotia without receiving any invitation. Turning then into Attica, their way led them by the house of Miltiades

Herodot.,  
l. 6. c. 34,  
& seq.

CHAP.  
VII.

Miltiades son of Cypselus. That Athenian happening to be in his portico, and seeing men pass in a foreign dress and carrying spears, accosted them, and offered refreshment. They accepted the invitation; and being hospitably entertained, they related the oracular response which they had received. Miltiades was of a very ancient, honorable and wealthy family of Attica. Herodotus mentions, as a circumstance to ascertain its eminence, that it was a family accustomed to keep a chariot with four horses; probably meaning, as the critics have explained it, that the family of Miltiades had been accustomed to contend at the Olympian festival in the race of chariots with four horses; which certainly implied considerable wealth in a country like Attica, little naturally adapted to breeding and keeping horses. Miltiades, himself popular and ambitious, was not well with the faction of Peisistratus; and thence was the more prepared to accept the invitation of the Thracians. Collecting therefore a number of Athenians, either disposed to his interest, or averse to the prevailing power, all of whom Peisistratus would gladly see depart from Athens, he established his colony, and was raised to the tyranny of the Chersonese. Dying childless, his authority passed, as a part of his estate, to his nephew Stefagoras, son of Cimon his brother by the mother. Stefagoras also died childless. His younger brother Miltiades was then at Athens, in favor with Hippias and Hipparchus<sup>9</sup>; who, whether with any idea of

<sup>9</sup> The Peisistratids, Herodot. l. 6. c. 39.

SECT.  
II.

legal claim of authority of the mother-country over the colony, or merely to extend their own power, sent young Miltiades, at the same time to collect his inheritance, and to take upon him the public administration of the affairs of the Chersonese. It appears that the young chief carried his authority with a high hand: he kept a body of five hundred guards in constant pay: to strengthen his interest in the country, he married Hegesipylë, daughter of Olórus a Thracian prince; and Tyrant of the Chersonese is the title of Miltiades among all the earlier Greek historians<sup>10</sup>.

Such was the state of things when Darius led his army into Europe. Miltiades then, yielding to a power which he certainly was unable to resist, followed the Persian monarch's orders on the Scythian expedition. He is celebrated for having proposed among the Grecian chiefs to destroy the bridge over the Danube, which had been intrusted to their care, while Darius was in Scythia; hoping that so the prince and his army, between famine and the Scythian sword, might perish, and the Grecian states might thus be delivered from the Persian power. How far this proposal, certainly perfidious, can be justified upon Grecian principles either of philosophy or of patriotism, may be difficult to determine. We may however credit the assertion of Herodotus

Herodot.,  
l. 6. c. 137.  
Corn. Nep.,  
v. Miltiad.

<sup>10</sup> Chersonesi. omnes illos quos habitarat annos, perpetuam obtinuerat dominationem, Tyrannusque fuerat appellatus. Corn. Nep. vit. Milt. The biographer adds SED JUSTUS, and proceeds to explain the early Grecian sense of the term TYRANT.

and

CHAP.  
VII.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 40.  
& Plu-  
tarch. de  
sera Num.  
Vind.

and Nepos, that interest more than integrity induced the other Grecian tyrants to oppose it : for they esteemed the supremacy of Persia the best security, to their own authority against the democratical disposition of their people. Herodotus reports that an army of Scythians, bent upon revenging the Persian invasion, obliged Miltiades to fly the Chersonese. According to the same historian, however, he must have been popular in his government, at least among the Thracians, since, on the departure of the Scythians, they recalled him. We are not told that he took any active part in the Ionian revolt ; but his flight from the Chersonese, after the defeat of the Grecian fleet off Miletus, shows that he knew himself obnoxious to the Persians. Putting his effects aboard five trireme galleys, he steered for Athens. The Phenician fleet pursued him, and took one of his galleys commanded by his eldest son. Here again Herodotus bears very honorable testimony to Darius. The son of Miltiades, as a prisoner of rank and consequence, was sent to receive his doom at Susa. But instead of punishment as a rebel, which his captors expected, Darius was liberal of favor to him, giving him an estate and a Persian lady for his wife, by whom he had a family which became numbered among the Persians. If Herodotus had authority for this anecdote, it may, together with the treatment of the captive Milesians, justify the opinion which he advances, that Darius would have pardoned even Histæus, had he not been prevented by the jealous haste of his officers,

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 30.

officers, who executed that unfortunate, but apparently little meritorious chief, without waiting for orders from the king. SECT.  
II.

From the same impartial historian however we learn, that the superintendency of the Persian government over the conquered people was, in general, correspondent to the disposition of the monarch, liberal and mild. The first vengeance for the rebellion being over, the Ionians remaining in the country became again objects of care and protection. No mark of enmity was shown during the rest of that year, but very beneficial regulations, says the historian, were made <sup>11</sup>. Deputies from the cities were assembled, to advise about the means of keeping the peace of the country, and it was required of the several administrations to pledge themselves to one another that they would abstain from that piratical, thieving and murdering kind of petty war, to which the Greeks at all times and in all parts were strongly addicted; and that all controversies between cities, as between individuals, should be determined by regular course of law <sup>12</sup>. It behoved Artaphernes then, for his own sake, to provide for the regular payment of the tribute to the Persian empire. But no new burthen was laid upon the conquered people; and to obviate that oppression which might arise from partiality, whether in the king's officers, or in the

<sup>11</sup> — οὐδὲν ἐς τοῦτο φέρον, ἀλλὰ χρήματα κάτα.

Herodot. l. 6. c. 42.

<sup>12</sup> — ἵνα δασίδικοι εἶεν, καὶ μὴ ἀλλήλους φέροιν τε καὶ ἄγουν.

Herodot. ibid.



CHAP.  
VII.

municipal governments, the whole country was carefully surveyed, and the extent of every state taken in the Persian measure of parasangs. The tribute, really but a kind of quit-rent for lands not originally belonging to the Greeks, was then equitably assessed on all; and to the historian's age the Ionians continued to profit from this beneficial arrangement.

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## SECTION III.

*First Persian Armament against Greece under Mardonius: proceeds no farther than Macedonia. The Grecian Cities summoned by heralds to acknowledge subjection to the Persian Empire. Internal Feuds in Greece: Banishment of Demaratus king of Lacedæmon: Affairs of Argos: Banishment and restoration of Cleomenes king of Lacedæmon: Death of Cleomenes: War of Athens and Ægina.*

OL. 72. 1. IN the second spring after the reduction of  
B.C. 492. Miletus, a great change was made in the admi-  
Herodot. nistration of the provinces bordering on the  
L. 6. c. 43. Grecian seas. Artaphernes was recalled, with most of the principal officers of his satrapy, and Mardonius, a young man of highest rank, who had lately married a daughter of Darius, was sent to take that great and important command.

He

He led with him a very numerous army. On the coast of Cilicia he met a large fleet attending his orders; and, going aboard, he sailed to Ionia, leaving the army to be conducted by the generals under him, to the Hellespont. Revenge against Athens and Eretria for the insult at Sardis, was the avowed purpose of this formidable armament. But considering all the best information remaining to us of the character of Darius and of the circumstances of the times, it appears highly probable that the same necessity for employing restless spirits, which had urged the Scythian expedition, was the principal motive also to the permission of this enterprize. Mardonius seems to have been naturally disposed to extraordinary things. Arriving in Ionia, he deposed all the tyrants, and, apparently with the view to acquire popularity among a people whose willing service might be important, he established democratical government in every Grecian city; a measure so opposite to the general policy of Persia, that Herodotus speaks of it as a wonder next to incredible among the people of European Greece. Collecting then, from the Ionians and Æolians, a considerable addition to his forces, both of sea and land, he proceeded to the Hellespont, and passed into Europe. Excepting some wild hords of Thracian mountaineers, all to the confines of Greece already acknowleged subjection to Persia. Macedonia had formerly bought its peace by submitting to the humiliating ceremony of the delivery of earth and water.

Tribute

SECT.  
III.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 44.  
Plat.  
Menex.  
p. 240. t. 2.  
ed. Serran.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 44.  
& l. 7.  
c. 108.

CHAP.  
VII.

Tribute being now demanded; the Macedonian prince feared to refuse. But the elements and the barbarians, this time, stopped the progress of the Persian arms. The fleet, assailed by a storm, in doubling the promontory of Athos, lost no less than three hundred vessels, and, it was reported, twenty thousand men. In a sudden attack from the Brygian Thracians, the army suffered considerably, and Mardonius himself was wounded. The march could not be safely prosecuted without subduing that people. This was effected; but the season was then so far advanced, and the fleet so shattered, that it was judged expedient for the whole armament to return to winter in Asia.

Ol. 72. 2.  
B.C. 491.  
Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 46,  
& seq.

The first object in the next spring was the little island of Thasus, formerly the seat of the principal Phenician factory in the *Ægean* sea; barren in its soil, but rich by its gold mines, and still more by those which its inhabitants possessed on the neighbouring continent of Thrace. To secure themselves, rather than to offend others, the Thasians had lately employed a part of their wealth in building ships of war, and improving the fortifications of their town. An order came to them, in the name of the Persian king, to raze their fortifications, and to send all their ships of war to the Persian naval arsenal at Abdera. They obeyed. Then heralds were sent into Greece, demanding of every city acknowledgement of subjection to Darius by the delivery of earth and water. Many towns

towns on the continent obeyed, and most of the islands<sup>13</sup>.

SECT.  
III.

Greece was at this time so divided by internal feuds, that had its united force born a nearer proportion to that of the Persian empire, still its circumstances would have seemed to invite the ambition of a powerful neighbour. The Theſſalians, who should have guarded the northern frontier, and the Phocians, occupying the center of the country, bore toward each other a hatred so sharpened by the hostilities of successive generations, that no interest could induce them to coalesce. The Thebans, and with them almost all Bœotia, careless of an independency adverse to peace, and little producing any happiness, submitted even zealously to the Persian commands. Athens, at declared war with Ægina, still nourished animosity against Lacedæmon; while, within Peloponnesus, the ancient enmity of Lacedæmon and Argos had been revived and heightened by late events.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 30.

It is an old observation, which the history of nations gives frequent occasion to repeat, that circumstances in themselves the most trifling often produce the greatest events. The ancient enmity between Athens and Ægina, said to have originated about a wooden statue, appears to have contributed not a little to lead the

Herodot.  
l. 5. c. 82,  
& l. 6.  
c. 49.

<sup>13</sup> Herodotus says ALL; but he afterward excepts the little islands of Seriphos, Siphnos, and Melos (1). Apparently he should also have excepted Eubœa and Crete; or at least most of their towns.

(1) b. 7. c. 46.

CHAP.  
VII.

Herodot.  
l. 7.  
c. 133.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 50.

Athenians to that determined opposition to Persia, and to that alliance of their state with Lacedæmon, which together, in saving Greece from subjection, gave the Grecian people to be what they afterward became. As soon as it was known at Athens that the Æginetans had acknowledged themselves subjects to Persia, ministers were sent to Sparta to accuse them as traitors to Greece. It was the character of the Spartan government to be cautious in enterprize, but unshaken in principle, firm in resolve, and immoveable by danger: Independency on any foreign state was the great object of all its singular institutions; and far from bowing to a superior power, it had for some time been not unsuccessfully aspiring to dominion over others. The haughty demand of Persia therefore could not but find at Lacedæmon a determined refusal. Both there and at Athens the public indignation vented itself in barbarian inhumanity; the Persian heralds being with ignominy and scoffing put to death; at one place thrown into a pit, at the other into a well, and told there to take their earth and water. But the power of that vast empire was so really formidable, and in general opinion so nearly irresistible, that to find Athens heartily disposed to alliance in opposition to it, would be esteemed by the Lacedæmonians a circumstance the more fortunate, as the late enmity between the two commonwealths had been extreme. The Athenian ambassadors were accordingly very favorably received at Lacedæmon. Cleomenes, vehement in all his undertakings,

SECT.  
III.

takings, went himself to Ægina, intending to seize the persons of those who had been forward in leading the people of that island to the obnoxious measure. He was opposed and prevented in his purpose; but not without a remarkable acknowledgement of the authority of the Spartan state. It was replied to him, 'that he came meerly as an individual; the Æginetan people would have obeyed a regular order from the Lacedæmonian government.'

But the dissensions of the Grecian republics among one another were not more adverse to the general defence against a foreign enemy, than the spirit of party which divided each internally. Lacedæmon itself was violently distracted. The two kings, Demaratus and Cleomenes, had been long at variance. The former endeavoured to excite the leading men against his colleague, absent on public service. The latter, on his return, no longer keeping any measure, asserted that Demaratus was illegitimately born; and encouraging Leotychidas, the next in succession of the Procleid family, to claim the crown against him, supported the pretension with all his interest. The legitimacy of Demaratus's birth was brought into real doubt; and where the judgement of men could not decide, recourse was had to the Delphian oracle. Herodotus, who is not scrupulous of speaking freely of oracles, tells, upon this occasion, a very circumstantial story of bribery practised by Cleomenes to procure a response from the Pythones favorable to his views; and the report indeed appears to have

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 51,  
& seq.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 66.

Pausan.  
l. 3. c. 4.

CHAP.  
VII.

found general credit in Greece. Demaratus, in consequence of that response, was immediately deposed. Finding then his situation irksome, and perhaps unsafe in Sparta, he retired to the island of Zacynthus; and being there still persecuted by Cleomenes, he fled to the Persian court. Cleomenes, now unopposed in his measures, went, accompanied by Leotychidas, to Ægina; and such was the authority which reputation had acquired to their state, the Æginetan government, generally haughty enough through presumption in its naval force and the security of its insular situation, submitted implicitly to their commands. Ten of the principal men of the island were arrested and sent to Athens, there to remain pledges of the fidelity of the Æginetan people to the Grecian cause.

The early historian, from whom almost alone we have any authentic detail of occurrences in this age, has so little regarded the order of events in his narration, that we are at a loss to assign to what he has left on the affairs of Argos, of some importance in the consideration of the state of Greece, its just situation in all points in the series of Grecian history. At a period of his reign not specified, Cleomenes led a Lacedæmonian army into Argolis, surprized the Argians in their camp, and routed them with great slaughter. The fugitives took refuge in a consecrated wood, surrounding a temple. Such sacred groves, frequent in Greece, were generally held in the most scrupulous veneration. Cleomenes himself hesitated at the profanation

Herodot.  
1. 6. c. 74,  
& seq.

fanation which he meditated. But conformably to the superstition derived from ages before Homer, he regarded only the affront to the gods, considered as unconnected with any crime against man, about which he had no scruple. Alluring some of the Argians therefore from their asylum, with a promise of ransom, he put them directly to the sword; and when his treachery was discovered, and he could allure no more, passion overbearing superstition, he set fire to the grove, and thus the rest were destroyed. Between the battle and the massacre, so large a portion of the Argian people perished, that the slaves rose upon the scanty remainder, overpowered them, and for some years commanded the city. The sons however of those slain by the Lacedæmonians, whether humanely spared, or by whatever good fortune escaping, when they had in sufficient number attained manhood, expelled the usurpers. These nevertheless possessing themselves of Tiryns, a negotiation ensued, and a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded. From the tenor of Herodotus' account the new citizens of Tiryns seem to have deserved a better than their final fate. War being renewed against them, they were put to the sword, driven into exile, or again reduced to slavery.

It was supposed that Cleomenes, after the destruction of the Argian army, might have taken the city, but his wild fancy led him another way<sup>14</sup>. Sending home the greater part of his

G 3

forces,

<sup>14</sup> A romantic story is told by later writers of a poetess, Telephilla, who, at the head of the women, boys and old men of Argos,



CHAP.  
VII.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 82.

forces, he went, attended by a chosen escort, to the celebrated temple of Juno, near Mycenæ, to sacrifice there. The high priest of the temple remonstrated that the holy institutes forbade such intrusion of a stranger. Cleomenes, in the extravagance of his indignation, that he, of the blood of Hercules, king and priest, should be so denied, caused the high priest to be scourged by his attending Helots, performed the sacrifice, and then returned to Sparta. The party in opposition to him there were loud in complaint, not of his violation of the laws of war and of nations, but of his omission to attack Argos, which they imputed to corruption. A story, however, of a miraculous effusion from the breast of the statue of the god whose grove Cleomenes burnt, which, it was insisted, was an omen clearly indicating that Argos was not to be taken, sufficed to stop the clamor. But after the expulsion of Demaratus the friends of that prince procured evidence so convincing of the corruption by which the oracle from Delphi had been obtained which occasioned his dethronement, that Cleomenes in alarm fled into Thessaly. The contest of factions however gave him opportunity soon to return into Peloponnesus, and in Arcadia he found or formed a party so strong that he proposed to excite

Argos, repelled the assault of the Lacedæmonians (1). Had such a story had any credit in Herodotus' age, he was not of a temper to leave it unnoticed.

(1) Pausan. l. 2. c. 20. Polyæn. Strat. l. 7. c. 33.

war against his country. Fortunately his party in Lacedæmon regaining the superiority, prevented that evil by procuring his recall to his throne.

SECT.  
III.

That wildness of Cleomenes, which had often approached frenzy, at length became lasting madness, and he was put under confinement. In this situation, obtaining a sword from a Helot, appointed to guard him, he deliberately cut himself piecemeal. The superstition of all Greece took an interest in this shocking deed. It was very generally attributed to the vengeance of the deity; but for different crimes, according to the various feelings and prejudices of the people of different states. With the Athenians, the injury done to a temple and its sacred precinct, in the invasion of Attica, was the offensive impiety: the Argians, most reasonably, ascribed the divine wrath to the treacherous massacre of their troops; but, more confidently, to those offences, in the general opinion of the age, more apt to excite divine indignation; the burning of the sacred grove, and the affront done to their protecting deity Juno, in performing sacrifice contrary to the sacred institute, and in the injurious indignity to her priest. The other Greeks, less anxious about these injuries and offences to particular people and their peculiar deities, held the sacrilegious collusion with the Pythoness, which ruined his colleague Demaratus, to have been that, among the many atrocious acts of Cleomenes, which most called for the vengeance of the powers above. But

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 75.  
Pausan.  
l. 3. c. 4.  
Plutarch.  
Apoph.  
Lac.

CHAP.  
VII.

the Lacedæmonians, with whom, according to a common principle of Grecian patriotism, any breach of their own institutions was a greater enormity than the grossest violation of laws, human and divine, affecting other states only, imputed the fatal frenzy to meer drunkenness; a vice highly reprobated and rarely seen at Sparta, but to which Cleomenes was addicted.

These circumstances will not be deemed unworthy objects of history, when considered as they tend to mark the state of Greece, and the temper of its people, at that important period, when her little commonwealths were first assailed by the tremendous might of Persia. With the same view a petty war which ensued between Athens and Ægina will deserve attention. The reader should cast his eye upon the map, and see there what Ægina is: Ægina was a formidable foe to Athens. Its rulers, having made their peace with Leotyichidas so as to obtain his mediation with the Athenian government, were still denied the restoration of their hostages. Bent therefore upon revenge, they intercepted a large galley, in which many Athenians of rank were going to an annual religious festival at Delos. But Ægina, like all other Grecian states, had its factions. The oligarchal now prevailed; and Nicodromus, a considerable man of the opposite party, had found it prudent to retire from his country. The present opportunity particularly invited to connect his interest with that of Athens, always disposed to favor democracy. A plan of surprize was concerted with

Herodot.  
1. 6 c. 85,  
& seq.

SECT.  
III.

with the Athenian administration, and Nicodromus, who had many friends in the island, made himself master of that called the old town of Ægina. But the Athenians, not possessing a naval force sufficient to cope with the Æginetan fleet, had applied to Corinth, then in close alliance with them, for a loan of twenty ships. These arrived a day too late;—the whole project failed; and Nicodromus, with many of his adherents, embarking, fled to Attica. The Athenians allotted them a settlement near the promontory Sunium; whence they made continual assaults and depredations upon the Æginetans of the island. The prevailing party in Ægina meanwhile vented revenge against the remaining persons of the opposite faction, so shocking that in these times it appears hardly credible; yet one circumstance only, of particular affront to a goddess, seems to have struck either the Greeks of that age, or the historian in the next, as any peculiar enormity. Seven hundred citizens were led out at once to execution. One of them freeing himself from his bonds, fled to a temple of Ceres, and laid fast hold on the gate. His pursuers endeavoured to pull him away; but, his strength baffling them, they chopped off his hands, and, thus mangled, led him to suffer death with his fellows. The Æginetans were soon after defeated in a naval engagement. The Athenians then landed on the island, and the Æginetans from Sunium were not likely to be advocates for mercy to their fellowcountrymen. Of a thousand

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 85,  
& seq. &  
Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 45.

C. H. A. P. VII. thousand Argians who had come to assist the Æginetans of the island, the greater part were slain. Still, with their shattered navy, the Æginetans attacked the Athenian fleet by surprize and took four galleys.

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## SECTION IV.

*Second Persian Armament against Greece under Datis and Artaphernes: reduces the Islands of the Ægean: invades Attica. Battle of Marathon.*

Ol. 72. 3. SUCH was the virulence of enmity among  
 B.C. 490. the Greeks toward one another, at the very time when the great storm was approaching from the East, which threatened a final period to that independency of their little republics, whence arose incitement and licence for those horrid violences. The small success of Mardonius, in his expedition, had probably afforded means for intrigue to take effect to his disadvantage in the court of Susa. He was recalled, and the command at Sardis was given to Artaphernes, son of the late satrap of that name, with whom was joined Datis, a Median nobleman, probably of greater experience. These generals also, leading a land-force from the interior

Herodot.  
 l. 6. c. 94,  
 & seq.  
 Plat.  
 Menex.  
 p. 240. t. 2.  
 & de Leg.  
 l. 3.  
 p. 698. t. 2.

terior provinces, met the fleet on the coast of Cilicia. The conquest of Greece being the object, it was determined to avoid the circuitous march by Thrace and Macedonia. A sufficiency of transports having been collected, the whole army, cavalry as well as infantry, were embarked, and coasted Asia Minor as far as Samos. Thither the Ionian and Æolian troops and vessels were summoned. All being assembled, the generals directed their course across the Ægean sea, first to Naxos. The inhabitants of that island, notwithstanding their former successful defence, dared not abide this formidable armament: quitting their city they fled to their mountains. The Persians burnt the town, with its temples: the few Naxians who fell into their hands were made slaves. The fleet proceeded to the neighbouring islands, receiving their submission, and taking everywhere the children of the principal families for hostages. No opposition was found till they arrived at Carystus in Eubœa. The Carystians, with more spirit than prudence, declared they would neither join in hostilities against their neighbours and fellowcountrymen, nor give hostages. Waste of their lands, and siege laid to their town, soon obliged them to comply with whatsoever the Persian generals chose to command.

The storm now approached Eretria. Punishment to that city was one of the declared objects of the armament. Little hope therefore could be entertained of good terms for the community,

SECT.  
IV.

Herod.  
1. 6.  
c. 100, 101.

CHAP.  
VII.

munity. In this desperate situation of public affairs, temptation was strong for individuals to endeavour, by whatsoever means, to secure themselves. While therefore a deputation was sent by public authority to request assistance from Athens, many of the citizens were for flying to the mountains; others were disposed to betray the city to the enemy; some of them thinking, perhaps not unreasonably, that beside gaining for themselves favorable terms, they might even lessen the horrors of capture to the city at large, by preventing the shock of arms, and the further irritation of an irresistible foe. The Athenians so far complied with the request made to them, as to direct that the four thousand colonists, lately sent from Athens into Eubœa, should assist in the defence of Eretria. The aid would have been important, had the Eretrians been united in council and prepared for a siege; or had there been any reasonable prospect of farther relief from the rest of Greece. But Æschines son of Nothion, one of the principal citizens, seeing defence hopeless, advised the colonists, by a timely retreat, to reserve themselves for the protection of their native country, which would next be attacked; and which, if saved, might still afford, possibly even to the Eretrians, a refuge from Persian oppression. The colonists accordingly crossed to Oropus, and arrived safe in Attica. The Persians soon appeared off the Eretrian coast. The little seaport towns of Chœreas and Ægilia were immediately abandoned, and there the  
army

army debarked. Among the Eretrians, the resolution had finally prevailed to defend the city. During six days the Persian assaults were vigorously opposed. On the seventh the place was betrayed by two of the principal citizens. The temples were plundered and burnt: the inhabitants were condemned to slavery.

SECT.  
IV.

The Persian generals allowed but a few days rest to their forces, before they crossed into Attica; having Hippias, formerly tyrant of that country, now of advanced age, it being the twentieth year from his expulsion, for their guide and counsellor. In this alarming situation of Greece, no measures had been concerted for general security. The Asian Greeks had been first subdued. The Persian dominion then extended itself into Europe, as far as the confines of Thessaly. All the islands had now fallen. Eubœa, which might be reckoned an appurtenance of the Grecian main, was conquered. The Persian army passed the narrow channel which separates them, and still no league for common defence seems even to have been proposed. On the capture of Eretria, a messenger was sent from Athens to Lacedæmon with the news, and a request for assistance. The Lacedæmonians readily promised their utmost help; but their laws and their religion, they said, forbade them to march before the full moon, of which it wanted five days. As things now stood indeed, probability of successful opposition was so small, that perhaps we ought not to impute to any base or unreasonable selfishness

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 102.  
Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 59.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 106.  
Strab. l. 9.  
p. 399.



CHAP.  
VII.

selfishness the caution of the Lacedæmonian government, tho we should believe that policy or irresolution, more than religion, detained their army. The messenger however, Pheidippides, a runner by profession, having performed his journey with extraordinary speed, related a story on his return, which might be not unavailing to inspire confidence into the Athenian populace. As he was going, he said, over the Parthenian mountain, above Tégea in Arcadia, the god Pan called to him by name. He stopped in obedience to the voice; when it proceeded, commanding him to tell the Athenians, ‘ That they were wrong in paying no worship to a deity so well disposed to them, who had often served them, and intended them farther favor.’ The worship of the god Pan was in consequence introduced at Athens.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 103,  
& seq.

There was fortunately at this time, among the principal Athenians, a man qualified both by genius and experience to take the lead on a momentous occasion, Miltiades, the expelled chief of the Chersonese. Miltiades had not, immediately on his retreat to Athens, found it a place of secure refuge: a prosecution was commenced against him for the crime of tyranny<sup>23</sup>. In another season, however indefinite the crime, and however inapplicable every existing law to any act of the accused, a popular

<sup>23</sup> Ὑπὸ διαστήσει αὐτὸν ἀγωγόντι, ἰδὼν τὴν τυραννίδα τῆς ἐν Χερσονήσῳ. Herodot. l. 6. c. 104.

assembly might have pronounced condemnation. S E C T.  
IV.  
 In the present crisis he was not only acquitted, }  
 but, after the common manner of the tide of popular favor, raised by the voice of the people to be one of the ten commanders in chief of the army<sup>16</sup>. Immediate assistance from Sparta being denied, it became a question with the ten generals, whether the bold step should be ventured of meeting the enemy in the field; or whether their whole diligence should be applied to prepare for a siege. It happened that opinions were equally divided; in which case, by ancient custom, the polemarch archon was to be called in to give the casting vote. Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 109. The argument attributed by Herodotus to Miltiades upon this occasion, not only tends very much to explain both the politics and the temper of the times, but accounts satisfactorily why that able commander, contrary to every common principle of defensive war, was for risking at once a decisive engagement with an enemy in number so very superior. ‘It depends upon you,’ said Miltiades in a conference with the polemarch Callimachus, ‘either to reduce Athens to slavery, or, by establishing her freedom, to leave an eternal memory of yourself among men, more glorious than even Harmodius and Aristogeiton have acquired. For never before, since the Athenians were a people, did a danger like the present threaten

<sup>16</sup> Στρατηγός, Ἀθηναίων ἀπιδέχθη, αἰρεθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου. Herodot. l. 6. c. 104.

‘ them.

CHAP. VII.

‘ them.’ If, yielding to the Persians, they are delivered into the power of Hippias, let it be thought what their sufferings will be: but if they conquer, Athens will become the first city of Greece. Should they then, by your decision, be debarred from presently engaging the enemy, I well know that faction will be dividing the minds of our citizens; and a party among them will not scruple to make terms with the Persians, to the destruction of the rest. But if we engage before any corrupt disposition prevails, the gods only dispensing equal favor, we are able to conquer.’ The polemarch yielded to this argument.

The Persians had now, for two or three generations, been accustomed to almost uninterrupted success in war. They had many times engaged the Greeks of Asia and Cyprus; and tho the accounts come to us from Grecian historians only, yet we read of no considerable defeat they had ever suffered, except once in Caria; when, by the abilities of Heracleides of Mylassa, their general Daurises was surprized among defiles. The army under Datis and Artaphernes therefore advanced toward Athens, confident of superiority to all opposition in the field. Herodotus does not mention their numbers. According to Cornelius Nepos, they were a hundred thousand effective foot, and ten thousand horse; a very large force to be transported by sea from Asia: yet Plato, meaning probably to include the seamen and the various multitude

Corn. Nep.  
v. Miltiad.

Plat.  
Menex.

multitude of attendants upon Asiatic troops, calls the whole armament five hundred thousand; and Trogus Pompeius, according to his epitomizer Justin, did not scruple to add a hundred thousand more. Herodotus has not ventured either to report the numbers which the Athenians brought into the field: he only says that they were very inferior to the Persians; and later writers have not less contradicted probability in diminishing the Grecian than in exaggerating the Persian force. According to Nepos and Pausanias, the Athenians were only nine thousand, and the Plataeans, joining them with the whole strength of their little commonwealth, added only one thousand. But sufficient assurance remains to us, that Attica was capable of raising a greater force, and upon such an emergency it would exert its utmost<sup>17</sup>. The genius of Miltiades however, rather

S E C T  
IV.

Justin.  
l. 2. c. 9.

Corn. Nep.  
v. Miltiad.  
Pausan.  
l. 10. c. 26.

VOL. II.

H

ther

<sup>17</sup> Pausanias says that the battle of Marathon was the first occasion upon which the Athenians admitted slaves to military service (1); meaning probably to service with the freemen in the heavy infantry; because it appears from Herodotus to have been the ordinary practice to make slaves do duty as light troops. It seems a necessary inference, what we might otherwise indeed naturally suppose, that the utmost strength of Athens was exerted upon that occasion. But eleven years after, at the battle of Plataea, when the immediate danger to the Athenian people was much less pressing, and when a considerable part of their force was serving aboard the fleet, the Athenian troops in the confederate army were eight thousand heavy foot, attended by an equal number of light-armed slaves (2). Indeed at the time of the battle of Marathon, the accession to the Athenian forces from

(1) L. 1. c. 32.

(2) Herodot. l. 9. c. 28, 29.

CHAP.  
VII.

Herodot.  
1.6. c. 110.  
Plutarch.  
Aristid.

ther than the strength of Athens, appears upon this occasion the shining instrument in the hand of Providence for the preservation of Greece. It was no season for ceremony : abilities, wherever they were conspicuous, would of course have the lead. Of the nine colleagues of Miltiades five gave up their days of command to him ; and by their means he had the majority of votes among the ten. Thus the extreme inconveniences, to which the Athenian system lay open, were in a great degree obviated ; and the unity, indispensable to the advantageous conduct of military business, was established. Miltiades, to his other advantages, joined that of having served with the Persians. He knew the composition of their armies, the temper of their troops, and the ordinary system of their generals. The Greeks, whose dependence was on their heavy-armed foot, formed in the deep order of the phalanx, usually began an engagement with a few discharges of missile weapons, and then presently came to close fight with their long spears. The Persians made more use of the bow, and less of the spear ;

the colonists lately returned from Eubœa, would, according to Herodotus, be scarcely less than four thousand men. The same author informs us that the inhabitants of the little island of Naxos, after the expulsion of a powerful party, formed no less than eight thousand regular heavy-armed foot (3). Upon the whole we cannot suppose the regular Grecian forces at Marathon fewer than fourteen or fifteen thousand, and the light-armed, slaves and others, would be at least an equal, and probably a much greater number.

(3) Herodot. 1. 5. c. 30.

which

which with them was shorter than the Grecian spear, and they depended much upon their cavalry, of which the Greeks (excepting the Thessalians) from the nature of their country could have little. The defensive armour also of the Persian infantry was inferior to the Grecian. Herodotus has marked the difference in a speech of Aristagoras the Milesian to the Lacedæmonian assembly: 'The Persians go to battle,' he says, 'carrying bows and short spears, and wearing stockings and turbans.' The Greeks carried long spears and swords, and wore greaves and helmets".

Herodot.  
l. 5. c. 49.

The Persian generals, guided by Hippias, had chosen their place of debarkation on the eastern coast of Attica, near Marathon. There on landing they were at once in a plain in which cavalry might act; and the way to Athens, between the

Herod. l. 6.  
c. 102, 107.  
Thucyd.  
l. 4. c. 58.  
Pausan.  
l. 1. c. 32.  
Wheler's  
Jour. into  
Greece,  
b. 6.  
Chandler's  
Travels in  
Greece,  
c. 34. and  
foli.

Æschylus, who is said himself to have fought at Marathon, at Salamis, and at Platæa, adverts in several passages of his tragedy of The Persians to this difference of weapons. The chorus speaking of Xerxes says:

Ἐπάγει δουρικλυτοῖς αὖ-  
δράσι τοξόδαμνον Ἀρηί.

p. 129. ed. H. Steph.

Afterward the characteristical weapons are put for the nations who bore them:

Πότερ' αὖ τοξου ῥῆμα τοῖς ἡκῶν;  
Ἢ δορυκράνου  
Ἀόγης ισχύς κινεράται;

p. 131.

and, still farther, Atossa asking concerning the Athenians;

Πότερ' ἄγε, τοξοὺς αἰχμὴ διὰ χερὸς γὰρ τοῖς περὶ;

the chorus answers:

Ὅδαμνός ἔγχεσ' αὖ σαυτὰ, καὶ φερσὸν ἐπὶ σάγαι.

p. 137.

CHAP.  
VII.6 Octob.  
Ann.Thu.

mountains Pentelicus and Brilessus, was less difficult than any other across the heights which at some distance surround that city. The intire command which they possessed of the sea, made it necessary for Miltiades to wait for intelligence where they would make their descent. They had thus landed their whole force without molestation, and were already in possession of the plain, when the Athenian army appeared upon the hills above. But this plain was narrow: pressed between the sea eastward, and the hills westward, and closed at each extremity, on the north by a marsh, on the south by the hills verging round and meeting the sea. Miltiades, on view of the ground and of the enemy, determined to attack. The first object, in engaging Asiatic armies, was to resist or to render useless their numerous and excellent cavalry; the next to prevent them from profiting by their superior skill in the use of missile weapons. The former might have been obtained by waiting among the hills: but there the heavy-armed Greeks would have been helpless against the Persian archers; whose fleet, whose numbers, and whose weapons would enable them to attack on any side, or on all sides, or, avoiding a battle, to proceed to Athens. It was in a plain only that they could be forced to that mode of engagement in which the Greeks had greater practice, and for which their arms were superiorly adapted; and the narrow plain of Marathon was peculiarly favorable. Confined however as the ground was, the Athenian numbers were still insufficient to form a line equal to that of the enemy,

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 111.

SECT.  
IV.

enemy, and in all points competently strong. Deciding therefore instantly his choice of difficulties, Miltiades extended his front by weakening his center. Daring valor indeed, guided by a discernment capable of profiting from every momentary opportunity, could alone balance the many disadvantages of his circumstances. Finding then his troops animated as he wished, he issued a sudden order to lay aside missile weapons, to advance running down the hill, and engage at once in close fight. The order was obeyed with the utmost alacrity. The Persians, more accustomed to give than to receive the attack, beheld, at first, with a disposition to ridicule, this, as it appeared, mad onset. The effect of the shock however proved the wisdom with which it had been concerted. The Asiatic horse, formidable in champain countries by their rapid evolutions, but in this confined plain incumbered with their own numerous infantry, were at a loss how to act <sup>19</sup>. Of the infantry, that of proper Persia almost alone had reputation for close fight. The rest, accustomed chiefly to the use of missile weapons, were, by the rapidity of the Athenian charge, not less disconcerted than the horse. The contest was however long. The Persian infantry, successors of those troops who, under the great Cyrus, had conquered Asia, being posted

<sup>19</sup> No account is given by Herodorus of anything done by the Persian horse, tho he speaks of it as numerous. The detail however which he afterward gives of actions of the Persian cavalry previous to the battle of Platæa, together with every description of the field of Marathon, sufficiently accounts for their inaction or inefficacy there.



CHAP.  
VII.

in the center of their army, stood the vehemence of the onset, broke the weak part of the Athenian line, and pursued far into the country. The Athenians, after great efforts, put both the enemy's wings to flight; and had the prudence not to follow. Joining then their divided forces, they met the conquering center of the Persian army, returning weary from pursuit; defeated it, followed to the shore, and amid the confusion of embarkation made great slaughter. They took seven galleys. The Persians lost in all six thousand four hundred men. Of the Athenians, only one hundred and ninety-two fell; but among them were the polemarch Callimachus, Stefileos one of the ten generals, Cynægeirus, brother of the poet Æschylus, and other men of rank, who had been earnest to set an example of valor on this trying occasion. The highest praise of valor was however very equally earned by the whole army, whose just eulogy will perhaps best be estimated from an observation of the original historian: 'The Athenians who fought at Marathon,' says Herodotus, 'were the first among the Greeks known to have used running, for the purpose of coming at once to close fight; and they were the first who withstood (in the field) even the sight of the Median dress, and of the men who wear it; for hitherto the very name of Medes and Persians had been a terror to the Greeks<sup>29</sup>.'

<sup>29</sup> Those honest confessions of Herodotus, which have given so much offence to Plutarch, we find all more or less confirmed by the

Such is the account given of this celebrated day by that historian, who lived near enough to the time to have conversed with eyewitnesses<sup>21</sup>. It is modest throughout, and bears general marks both of authentic information and of honest veracity. The small proportion of the Athenian slain perhaps appears least consistent with the other circumstances. Yet it is countenanced by authentic accounts of various battles in different ages, and particularly by those in our own history, of Crecy, Poitiers, and above all, of Agincourt. When indeed the whole front of the soldier was covered with defensive armour, slaughter seldom could be great, but among broken troops, or in pursuit. We are however told that a part of the Athenian army was broken. If it might be allowed to the historian at all to wander from positive authority, the known abilities of Miltiades, and his acquaintance with the temper and formation of the Persian army, added to the circumstances of the action, would

the elder writers of highest authority. Thus Plato: *Ἄς δὲ γινώμηναι διδουλωμένοι ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἦσαν· οὗτω πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μάχιστα γένετα καταδουλωμένη ἢ ἡ Περσῶν ἀρχή.* Menexen. p. 249.

<sup>21</sup> There are two expressions in his sixth book (1) which have been understood by some to import that he had himself conversed with Epizelus son of Cuphagoras, who had been deprived of his eyesight, according to his own account, in a very extraordinary manner, during the action at Marathon; but the critics seem to have determined that those expressions mean no more than that the historian had heard the account of Epizelus reported by others (2). But Herodotus, having been born, according to the chronologers, only six years after the battle of Marathon, might very possibly have conversed with persons present at it.

(1) c. 117. (2) See note 14. p. 493. of Wesseling's edition.

CHAP.  
VII.

almost warrant a conjecture that the flight of his weak center was intended; purposely to lead the flower of the enemy's forces out of the battle, and fatigue them with unprofitable pursuit. The deep order in which the antients fought, would perhaps make such a stratagem not too hazardous for daring prudence, under urgent necessity of risking much. Writers who have followed Herodotus, in describing this memorable day, have abounded with evident fiction, as well as with fulsome panegyric of the Athenians, and absurd obloquy on their enemy<sup>22</sup>.

Still, however, after the defeat at Marathon, the Persian armament was very formidable; nor was Athens, immediately by its glorious victory, delivered from the danger of that subversion with which it had been threatened. The Persian commander, doubling Cape Sunium, coasted the southern shore of Attica, not without hope of carrying the city by a sudden assault. But the Athenians had a general equal to his arduous office. Aware of what might be the enemy's intention, Miltiades made a rapid march with a large part of his forces; and when the Persians arrived off the port of Phalerum, they saw an Athenian army incamped on the hill of Cynosarges which overlooks it. They cast anchor;

<sup>22</sup> The extravagance of Justin's tale may lessen our regret for the loss of the great work which he has epitomized. Had Herodotus, among all his muses, given one romance so absurd as Justin's account of this battle, he might have deserved some portion of the abuse with which calumny has singularly loaded him. Among later authors the concise narrative of Cornelius Nepos is by far most deserving attention,

but,

but, without attempting anything, weighed again and steered for Asia. They carried with them their Eretrian prisoners, who were conducted to the great king at Susa. The humane Darius settled them on an estate his private property, at Ardericca in the province of Cissia, about twenty-four miles from his capital; where their posterity, for centuries, retained characteristical marks of a European origin.

SECT.  
IV.

c. 119.

Herodot.  
ibid. &  
Philostrat.  
vit. Apoll.

On the next day after the battle, a body of two thousand Lacedæmonian auxiliaries arrived. They had marched instantly after the fall of the moon, and had so pressed their way, that they are said to have reached Athens in three days after leaving Sparta, tho' great part of the road was over a mountainous country, and the computed distance at least a hundred and twenty English miles<sup>23</sup>. Disappointed, both for themselves and for their commonwealth, to have so missed their share in an action which could not but reflect uncommon glory on those who had partaken in it, they would however proceed to the field, to view the slain of that enemy who now for the first time had come from so far to attack Greece, and whom report made universally so formidable. Having gratified their curiosity, they returned to Lacedæmon, not without bestowing those praises which Athenian valor had so fairly earned. Tho' the force thus sent so late, was apparently very small, both for the urgency

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 120,  
Isocr.  
Paneg.  
p. 120. 1. 27

<sup>23</sup> The distance, according to Isocrates, was twelve hundred Grecian stadia, which, at eight stadia to the mile would be a hundred and fifty miles, at ten stadia, a hundred and twenty.

CHAP.  
VII.

of the occasion and for the ability of Lacedæmon, yet the pretence of religion, and the zeal shown in the rapidity of the march, were accepted as excuses; and it does not appear that the Athenians at the time, or their orators or writers afterward, imputed any blame to the Lacedæmonian government or people.

## SECTION V.

*Growing Ambition of Athens. Effects of Party-spirit at Athens. Extraordinary honors to the memory of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Impeachment and death of Miltiades.*

IT is particularly in the nature of democratical government for ambition to grow with success. No sooner were the Athenians delivered by the victory of Marathon from impending destruction, than they began to meditate conquest. Almost all the islands of the Ægean were obnoxious for their ready submission to the Persian summons; and some even for their exertions in the Persian cause. Miltiades was sent with seventy ships to exact fines from them for their delinquency; and, as far as might be, using the newly-acquired naval power, in imitation of the practice of Lacedæmon on the continent, to reduce them under the authority, or at least the influence of the

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 132,  
& seq.  
Corn. Nep.  
v. Miltiad.

the Athenian government. . Paros resisting, siege was laid to its principal town; but in twenty-six days no impression was made. Miltiades then, himself dangerously wounded, led back his armament to Athens, without having effected anything, according to Herodotus, but the ravage of that one island.

SECT.  
V.

Athens has been accused of black ingratitude and gross injustice for the treatment of this great man which immediately followed. It has been endeavoured, on the other hand, by the zealous partizans of democratical rule, to justify his doom on those severe principles of patriotism which deny all rights to individuals, where but a suspicion of public interest interferes. But whoever will take the pains to connect the desultory but honest narration of Herodotus, may find, and everything remaining from Thucydides, Xenophon, Isocrates and all the orators any way relative to the subject, will confirm it, that neither ingratitude, nor patriotism, decided the majority in the Athenian assembly upon this occasion; party-spirit was still the great mover of their politics.

It has been said by Herodotus, and repeated by Thucydides, that, not Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as the vulgar in their time believed, but the Alcmaeonid faction delivered Athens from the tyranny of the Peisistratids. But a party which had so long directed the affairs of the commonwealth, and so wisely, so virtuously, and so beneficially as that of the Peisistratids, would be too firmly and extensively rooted to be at once annihilated

Herod. ii.  
l. 6. c. 123.  
Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 20,  
& l. 6.  
c. 53, &  
59.

CHAP.  
VII.

annihilated by the expulsion of its chiefs. The Alcmaeonids had beyond all things to dread the reflux of popularity toward that party; and it seems therefore to have been a studied policy to hold out the names of Harmodius and Aristogeiton to public esteem, while nothing was left untried to brand the memory of the Peisistratid administration. Hence the very extraordinary honors paid to the memory of the assassins of Hipparchus: hence the mere revenge of a private quarrel elevated to the dignity of tyrannicide and assertion of public liberty. The celebration of the deed by songs was made a regular part of the ceremony of the great festival of Panathenæa. The custom was introduced, even at private entertainments, always to sing the song of Harmodius and Aristogeiton<sup>24</sup>. Statues of the patriots, made by the ablest artists, at the public expence and of the most costly materials, were erected in different places of greatest resort in the city<sup>25</sup>. It was forbidden, by a particular law, to give their names to slaves. Obsequies were appointed to be periodically performed to their memory, under the direction of the polemarch archon. Particular honors, privileges, and emoluments were decreed to their families. And to conclude all, in terror to future invaders of

<sup>24</sup> This song, the most ancient composition of its kind extant, may be seen, with an elegant Latin translation, in Bishop Lowth's Lectures on Hebrew Poetry; and an elegant English translation, in which the turn of expression of the original has been very happily imitated, is among the poems of Mr. Pyc.

<sup>25</sup> The laborious Meursius, in his *Peisistratus*, has collected accounts of many of these statues from various ancient authors.

public liberty, but principally in terror to the living enemies of the Alcmaeonid party, promises were held out, by public authority, that future sufferers in the cause of freedom (for by that sacred name the Alcmaeonids described their own cause) should be equally honored with Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Attention to these circumstances, as effects of party, is necessary for understanding, in any degree, the domestic politics of the Athenian commonwealth.

The glory of Miltiades, diminishing the consequence, excited the envy of the Alcmaeonids. Herodotus mentions a report that they had gone so far as to hold a traitorous correspondence with the Persians under Datis and Artaphernes, and communicated intelligence to them by signals. He professes indeed that he thought this incredible; and the circulation of such a report may perhaps best be considered as one among innumerable proofs how busy, and how virulent, in calumny faction was at Athens<sup>26</sup>. On the other hand, the ill will of the Alcmaeonids to Miltiades did not remain dubious. The security of the commonwealth, which that great man's abilities had procured, had made those abilities less immediately necessary; and his failure at Paros afforded means of ruining him with a fickle mul-

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 121.

<sup>26</sup> Narratam sibi, vel ab aliis scripto mandatam, Atheniensium quorundam, suspicionem tot argumentis repellit Herodotus, ut in his etiam vexandis modum excessisse videatur Plutarchus: de Herod. Malign. Valcken. not. ap. Wessel. Herodot. l. 6. c. 121. Plutarch has indeed throughout that treatise exceeded all measure of reason, and little regarded argument.

titude,



CHAP.  
VII.

Herodot.  
1.6. c. 131,  
& 136.  
Corn.  
Nep. v.  
Miltiad.

titude, possessed of despotic authority. Xanthippus, one of the principal men of Athens, who had married a niece of Megacles, the great opponent of Peisistratus and chief of the house of Alcmaeon, conducted a capital accusation against him. When Miltiades was to answer before the people, he was so ill from his wound as to be unable to rise from his bed. In his bed therefore he was brought into the assembly, where he lay, a melancholy spectacle, while his cause was pleaded by his friends. He was acquitted of capital offence, but condemned in a fine of fifty talents, above twelve thousand pounds sterling; and being unable immediately to pay such a sum, it was proposed by his opponents, and actually ordered by the assembly, that he should be carried, ill as he was, to the common prison. But the prytanis, whose office it was to execute the severe injunction, indignant at the unworthy treatment of a man to whom his country owed so much, had the courage to disobey. Within a few days, a mortification in the wounded limb brought Miltiades to his end; yet the fine, rigorously exacted from his family, was paid by his son Cimon<sup>27</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, and Justin, all affirm, that Miltiades was thrown into the common prison, and died there; and they add some circumstances to improve the story. On such a concurrence of authority, I thought myself warranted to report the simple circumstance (tho Herodotus had omitted mention of it) that Miltiades died in prison. But looking into Bayle's Dictionary, in the article Cimon, I found this passage: 'Herodote, parlant du proces de Miltiade, ne dit rien, ni de la prison du pere, ni de la prison du fils; & il insinue clairement que Miltiade ne fut point emprisonné;' and a little farther this quotation

quotation from Plato: Μιλτιάδης δὲ, τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι, ἐν τῷ βάρεϊ ἔκειτο ἑμβάλειν ἐψιφίσαντο· καὶ, ἐν μὲν διὰ τὸν πρότατον, ἐκτίσιν αὖ (1).

SECT.  
V.

Upon reconsidering the matter, I entirely agree with the learned and ingenious critic that it is clearly implied in the account of Herodotus, that neither Miltiades nor Cimon was imprisoned (2); and Plato's testimony so confirms this, that I do not hesitate to reject the reports of the later writers. Bayle translates βάρεϊον, I think properly, le Cachot. Originally that word is said to have been the name of a deep pit in Attica, which, in early times, was used as a place for capital punishment, by throwing criminals headlong upon sharp stakes fixed at the bottom. That cruel mode of execution was, we are told, by the advice of an oracle (3), afterward disused, and the pit was filled; the name nevertheless remaining apparently as a common term for a dungeon.

(1) Plat. Gorg. (2) h. h. c. 136. (3) Schol. in Plat. Aristoph. v. 431.

# HISTORY OF GREECE.

## CHAPTER VIII.

The History of GREECE from the Accession of XERXES to the Throne of PERSIA till the Conclusion of the first Campaign of that Monarch's Expedition against GREECE.

### SECTION I.

*Accession of Xerxes to the Throne of Persia. Immense Preparations of the Court of Persia for Conquest in Europe. Assembly of the Army at Sardis, and of the Fleet in the Hellespont. March of the Army. Muster of the Army. Arrival of the Army and Fleet at Thermē in Macedonia.*

**H**ERODOTUS relates some anecdotes attributing to Darius an acrimonious resentment against Athens, very repugnant to his general character, as it stands marked by authors of highest credit, and even by what that historian himself has reported, evidently on better authority. Asia, he adds, was agitated for three years by preparations for a second expedition into Greece, to revenge the disgrace of Marathon. Prudence, perhaps, not less than honor,

Æschyl.  
Pers.  
Plato.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 1,  
& seq.

honor, would require the attempt; but three years could not be necessary to the resources of the Persian empire for such a purpose; and more important objects in the mean time called the attention of its rulers. Egypt revolted; and a dangerous dispute, about the right of succession to the throne, arose between the sons of Darius. That monarch had the satisfaction to see the succession amicably settled in favor of Xerxes, his son by Atossa daughter of Cyrus, in preference to elder sons by a former marriage: but he died soon after, leaving Egypt to be recovered, and Greece to be punished, by his successor. The former object was accomplished in the second year of the reign of Xerxes: the other seems to have been for some time neglected.

Ol 73.4.  
B.C. 485.  
Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 7.

But the Persians had not yet forgotten the character, which their fathers had supported, of a warlike and conquering people. They were not accustomed to insults within their dominion like that of the burning of Sardis; and still less to defeats in the field like that of Marathon. We cannot suppose Herodotus often well informed of intrigues about the person of the great king; but we may believe what he puts as a remark into the mouth of Xerxes, 'that it had not been the custom of the Persians to be quiet.' Nor is it to be doubted but there would be men about that prince ready to encourage an idea, natural enough to a youth inheriting such immense power from a race of conquerors, that it became him also to be a con-

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 8.  
sect. 1.

CHAP.  
VIII.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 8.  
f. 3. &  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. The-  
mist.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 20.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 1,  
& seq.

queror, that it became him still to enlarge the bounds of his vast empire, and to emulate the military fame of Darius, of Cambyfes, and even of the great Cyrus<sup>1</sup>. To punish Athens and to conquer Greece were therefore small objects; nor does what Herodotus has suggested appear improbable, that the ardent ambition of the youthful monarch, and some among his counsellors, might look as far as the Western Ocean, howsoever little its shores or the intermediate nations were known to them, for the term of their career of glory. Four years, it is said, were employed in preparations. An army was collected, greater than the world ever saw, either before or since. The commanders, on the western frontier of the empire, had had opportunity of observing, that the most formidable land-force could not secure maritime provinces against insults by sea; and, still more, that the conquest of maritime states would be in vain attempted without naval power. Every seaport therefore, in the whole winding length of coast from Macedonia to the Libyan Syrtes,

<sup>1</sup> This is the motive also alledged by Æschylus, in the person of Atossa, for the expedition of Xerxes. Speaking to the shade of Darius she says:

Ταῦτα τοῖς κακοῖς ὁμιλῶν ἀνδράσιν διδάσκειται  
Θούριος Περσῆς· λέγουσιν δ' ὡς σὺ μὲν μέγαν τέκνους  
Πλουτοῖν ἐκτίσω σὺν αἰχμῇ, τὸν δ' ἀνανδρίας ὑπο  
"κνδον αἰχμαλίζειν, πατρῶον δ' ὄλβον οὐδὲν ἀνέχαιμι.  
Τοιά δ' ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ὀνείδη πολλαῖς κλύωε κακῶν,  
Τῇ δ' ἐβούλευσεν κλέυθον καὶ σφάτευσ' ἐφ' Ἑλλάδα.

p. 161. edit. H. Steph.

S E C T.  
I.

was ordered to prepare ships and to impress mariners. A prodigious work was undertaken, for the purpose of making the navigation secure, from the Asiatic along the European coast, and to prevent all risk of future disasters, like that of the fleet under Mardonius. It was no less than to form a canal, navigable for the largest galleys, across the isthmus which joins Athos to the continent of Thrace. A fleet was assembled in the Hellespont, and, under the command of Bubares, son of Megabazus, the crews were employed on the work. Herodotus supposes meer ostentation to have been the motive to this undertaking; because, he says, less labor would have carried the fleet over land, from one sea to the other; yet it seems no rash conjecture that deep policy may have prompted it. To cross the *Ægean*, even now, with all the modern improvements in navigation, is singularly dangerous. To double the cape of Athos is still more formidable. If, therefore, the object was to add the countries west of the *Ægean* sea to the Persian dominion, it was of no small consequence to lessen the danger and delays of the passage for a fleet<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, to facilitate the

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 41.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 12. c. 2.

I 2

commu-

<sup>2</sup> Scarcely any circumstance of the expedition of Xerxes is more strongly supported by historical testimony than the making of the canal of Athos. The informed and exact Thucydides, who had property in Thrace, lived part of his time upon that property, and held at one time an important command there, speaks of the canal of Athos, made by the king of Persia, with perfect confidence.

CHAP.  
VIII.

communication by land, a bridge was laid over the river Strymon. Magazines meanwhile were formed all along the coast as far as Macedonia; chiefly in the towns of the Grecian colonies now subject to Persia.

Ol. 74.<sup>2</sup>.  
B.C. 481.  
Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 26.

At length, the levies being completed, the forces from all the eastern and southern provinces were assembled at Citali in Cappadocia. Thither the monarch himself went to take the command. He marched immediately to Sardis; where the land-force from the west of Asia Minor joined him. Thence herakls were sent into Greece, to all the cities except Athens and Lacedæmon; where, in violation of the

confidence (1). Plato, Isocrates, and Lysias (2), all mention it as an undoubted circumstance; the latter adding that it was, in his time, still a subject of wonder and of common conversation. Diodorus relates the fact not less positively than Herodotus. That part of Strabo which described Thrace is unfortunately lost; but the canal of Xerxes remains confidently mentioned in the epitome of his work. The place was moreover so surrounded with Grecian settlements, that it seems impossible for such a report, if unfounded, to have held any credit. At the very time of the expedition of Xerxes there were no fewer than five Grecian towns on the peninsula itself of Athos, one even on the isthmus, situate, as Thucydides particularly mentions, close to the canal, and many on the adjacent coasts (3). Yet Juvenal has chosen the story of this canal for an exemplification of the Grecian disposition to lie; and a traveller who two centuries ago visited, or thought he visited the place, asserts that he could find no vestige of the work (4). For myself I must own that I cannot consider the sarcasm of a satirist wanting to say a smart thing, or such negative evidence as that of the modern traveller, of any weight against the concurring testimonies of the writers above quoted.

(1) Thucyd. l. 4. c. 109.

(2) Plat. de Leg. l. 3. p. 699. & 2. Isocrat. Paneg. p. 222. t. 2. Lys. or. funeb.

(3) Herodot. l. 7. c. 22. Thucyd. l. 4. c. 109. Excerpt. ex Strab. l. 7.

(4) Bellon. Singul. Rer. Obser. p. 78.

law of nations, even of that age, the Persian heralds sent in the reign of Darius had been cruelly put to death. Earth and water were demanded in token of subjection; and, according to the oriental custom, orders were given to prepare entertainment for the king against his arrival. Xerxes wintered at Sardis. Meanwhile a work, scarcely inferior to the canal of Athos, was prepared in the Hellespont. Two bridges of boats were extended, from near Abydus on the Asiatic, to near Sestos on the European shore. The width is seven furlongs. The bridges were contrived, one to resist the current, which is always strong from the Propontis, the other to withstand the winds, which are often violent from the Ægean sea; so that each protected the other.

SECT.  
I.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 33.  
Plat. de  
Leg. l. 3.  
p. 699. t. 2.  
Strab.  
l. 13.  
p. 591.

Early in spring the army moved. For so vast a multitude one principal difficulty was so to direct the march that water might not fail. Several rivers of some name were found unequal to the supply; and among them the celebrated stream of Scamander, in its course across the Trojan plain, was exhausted. Seven days and nights were employed unintermittingly, in passing the bridges of the Hellespont. The march was then continued through the Chersonese. The fleet, which had been assembled in the Hellespont, was at the same time ordered to proceed along the coast westward. The land and sea forces met again at Doriscus near the mouth of the Hebrus, where Darius, on his return from his Scythian expedition, had esta-

Ol. 74.  
B.C. 480.  
Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 37,  
& seq.



CHAP.  
VIII.

lished a Persian garrison. Both the country and the coast there were favorable for the review of so immense an armament, and there accordingly the monarch reviewed his forces both of sea and land.

There, too, Herodotus tells us, the army was mustered. Later ancient writers have taken upon them to differ from him concerning its strength; but we may best believe the simple honesty of the original historian, who, in describing the manner of the muster, sufficiently shows that even the Persian generals themselves knew not how to ascertain the numbers under their command. Indeed those who know how difficult it is, amid all the accuracy of division and the minuteness of detail in modern European armies, and comparatively handfuls of men, to acquire exact information of effective numbers, will little expect it among the almost countless bands, of various languages and widely differing customs, which composed the military multitude under Xerxes. Herodotus reckons in it no less than twenty-nine nations, from Scythia north to Ethiopia south, and from India east to Thrace and Libya west. To acquire a foundation for guessing the total effective strength, without an attempt to ascertain the detail, the method taken by the Persian generals, he says, was this: Ten thousand men, being counted, were formed in a circle as close as possible. A fence was then raised around them. They were dismissed, and all the army in turn passed into this inclosure, till the whole was thus

Herodot.  
b. 7. c. 60.

S E C T.  
I.

thus counted by tens of thousands. According to this muster, such as it was, the historian says the infantry alone amounted to one million seven hundred thousand fighting men; but he expressly declares, that no one ever undertook to give an account of the detail<sup>3</sup>. The cavalry he makes only eighty thousand; by no means an improbable number, and likely to have been better ascertained. Arabian camel-riders and African charioteers he computes at twenty thousand. Horses, mules, asses, oxen, and camels, for the baggage, were besides innumerable.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 87.

Of the fleet he gives a more particular account. The trireme galleys of war amounted to twelve hundred and seven; and his distribution, which may show the comparative naval strength of different nations at the time, makes the total appear scarcely beyond probability. Three hundred were furnished by the Phenicians with the Syrians of Palestine; two hundred by Egypt; one hundred and fifty by Cyprus; Cilicia sent one hundred; Pamphylia thirty; Lycia fifty; Caria seventy: thirty were provided by the Dorian Greeks of Asia, one hundred by the Ionians, sixty by the Æolians, seventeen by the islands, and by the Hellespontine towns one hundred. The average complement of men to each trireme galley he reckons at two hundred. The crews of the whole fleet would thus amount to two hundred and forty-

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 89.

<sup>3</sup> "Ὅσοι μὲν τῶν ἑκατοῖ παρῆχον πλῆθους ἀριθμὸν, οὐκ ἔχον ἔπειτα τὸ ἀκριβές· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται πρὸς οὐδαμῶν ἀνθρώπων. l. vii. c. 60.

CHAP.  
VIII.

one thousand four hundred. But, over-and-above the ordinary crew, there were thirty Persians or Medes or Sacians in each galley. These would make an addition of thirty-six thousand two hundred and ten men. The Phenician ships, he says, were the best sailers, and among those the Sidonian excelled. Beside these, the transports, some for infantry, some particularly fitted for cavalry, storeships, some of vast burden, together with smaller vessels of various sorts and for various purposes attending the fleet, would not easily be numbered. He reckons them, by a gross calculation, at three thousand, and their average crews at eighty men: the amount of their crews would thus be two hundred and forty thousand; and the number of men in the fleet, all together, five hundred and seventeen thousand six hundred and ten.

Of this extraordinary expedition naturally many anecdotes would be remembered and propagated; many true, many false, mistaken, or exaggerated. Among those related by Herodotus, some appear perfectly probable; some concern circumstances of which he could hardly have had authentic information; and some are utterly inconsistent with the characters to whom they refer. Among the latter I should reckon the ridiculous punishment of the Hellepont by stripes and chains, together with executions equally impolitic as inhuman, and repugnant to what we learn on best authority of the manners of the Persians. But the account which that historian gives of the march of the army,

and

Herodot.  
1. 7. c. 35.  
& 39.

and of the attending motions of the fleet, is clear and consistent beyond what might be expected. The march was continued from Doriscus in three columns. One, under Mardonius and Masistes, kept along the coast, the fleet nearly accompanying it. Another, under Trintæchmes and Gergis, proceeded far within land. Xerxes himself led the third between the other two, Smerdomenes and Megabyzus commanding under him. They passed the Samothracian towns, the most westerly of which was Mesambria on the river Lissus, on whose opposite bank was Stryma, a town belonging to the islanders of Thasus. This river did not suffice for the consumption of the army. Maronæa, Dicæa, Abdera, Grecian colonies, lay next on the road. Everywhere the commands to prepare for the reception of the monarch and his army had been zealously executed. Beside vast magazines of corn, meat, and forage for the troops, many of the cities, emulous to court favor, or anxious to avert wrath, had prepared, with a sumptuousness proportioned to their hopes and fears rather than to their revenues, for the reception of the king and his court. Wherever the halt of the royal train had been announced, a superb pavilion was erected, adorned with the most costly furniture. Many cities provided even vessels of gold and silver for the table. The rapacious attendants of the Persian court spared nothing: in the morning, when the army marched, all was carried off.

This

SECT.  
I.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 127.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 108,  
& seq.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 118,  
& seq.

CHAP. VIII. This eastern stile of robbery gave occasion for a saying of Megacreon of Abdera, which Herodotus has recorded as having become popular, ' That the Abderites ought to go with their wives in procession to their temples, and pray to the gods always equally to avert half the evils that threatened : for upon the present occasion their most grateful thanks were due for the favor shown in disposing Xerxes to eat but once a-day ; since, if he had chosen to dine on the morrow as he had supped over night, there would have been an end of Abdera.'

Herodot.  
1. 7. c. 108.  
& 110.  
Diod. Sic.  
1. 37. c. 3.

Not contented with their forces, already innumerable, the Persians continued everywhere on their march to press men. The youth, equally Grecian and Thracian, were compelled to join either the army or the navy. Yet, according to Herodotus, the Thracians preserved such veneration for the soil which this enormous armament had trodden, that to his time they avoided breaking or sowing it. He does not account for this particularity ; but perhaps the Persians favored the Thracians against the Greeks ; all whose establishments on that coast were incroachments upon Thracian ground. From Abdera the division under Xerxes proceeded to Eion (a Grecian town on the river Strymon, with a Persian garrison, established there by Darius) and thence by Argilus and Stageirus to Acanthus, all Grecian settlements. In the neighbourhood of Acanthus the three divisions met ;

met; and there Artachæas, a Persian of high rank, related to the royal family, and in great favor with Xerxes, died. The few words in which Herodotus describes his funeral, contribute to show the extensiveness, and to connect from remotest antiquity the history, of those artificial mounds, numerous in our own country, as in many other parts of the world. The whole army, he says, heaped the mound which formed the sepulchral monument of Artachæas \*. After this solemn ceremony

\* *Ἐντυβόχοις δὲ πᾶσα ἡ στρατιή.* l. vii. c. 127. Homer gives a corresponding description of the sepulchral barrow raised by the Grecian army under Agamemnon in honor of the heroes who fell before Troy.

Ἀμφ' αὐτοῖσι δ' ἔπειτα μέγαν καὶ ἀμέμονα τύμβον  
 χεύαμεν Ἀργείων ἱερὸς γράτος ἀνχμητῶν,  
 Ἀκτὴ ἰὼι περὺχομένη ἰὼι πλάτῃ Ἑλλασπόντῃ·  
 ὧς κεν τηλεφάνης ἐκ ποσσέφιν ἀνδράσιν ἔμν  
 τοῖς οἱ πῦν γιγνάσσι, καὶ δὲ μετόπισθεν ἴσονται·

Odyss. l. xxiv. v. 24.

Now all the sons of warlike Greece surround  
 The destin'd tomb, and cast a mighty mound.  
 High on the shore the growing hill we raise,  
 That wide th' extended Hellespont surveys:  
 Where all, from age to age, who pass the coast,  
 May point Achilles' tomb

Pope's Odyss. b. xxiv. v. 104.

The concluding words of the line, 'and hail the mighty ghost,' are an addition of the translator, not warranted by Homer, in this or any other passage of his works.

The custom of forming these sepulchral barrows, long lost over the greater part of Europe, is yet preserved in Spain. 'By the road-side,' says Townsend, 'are seen wooden crosses, to mark the spot where some unhappy traveller lost his life. The passengers think it a work of piety to cast a stone upon the  
 'monumental

CHAP.  
VIII.

mony the march was continued westward, with the country called Chalcidicē, full of Grecian settlements, on the left. The fleet, which had met the army at Acanthus, proceeded thence through the canal of Athos, and round the peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallene into the bay of Thermē; pressing ships and seamen at all the Grecian towns on the coast. The army, arriving soon after, occupied with its incampment the whole extent of the Macedonian shore, from Thermē and the borders of Mygdonia, to the river Haliacmon near the borders of Theffaly.

‘monumental heap.—Whatever may have been the origin of this practice, it is general over Spain.’—Journey through Spain, vol. i. p. 200.

SECTION

## SECTION II.

SECT.  
II.

*State of Greece at the time of the Invasion under Xerxes. Themistocles. Responses of the Delphian Oracle concerning the Invasion. Measures for forming a confederacy of Grecian Commonwealths. Disunion among the Greeks. Assembly of Deputies from the confederated Commonwealths at Corinth. The Defence of Thessaly given up by the Confederates. Measures for defending the Pass of Thermopylae.*

THE Greeks had long had intelligence of the immense preparations making in Asia; professedly for the punishment of Athens, but evidently enough with more extensive views of conquest: Yet still, as on the former invasion, no measures were concerted in common for the general defence of the country. On the contrary, many of the small republics readily and even zealously made the demanded acknowledgement of subjection to the great king, by the delivery of earth and water<sup>1</sup>. Nor will this ap-

<sup>1</sup> Οὐτὶς βουλομένην τῶν πολλῶν ἀντάπαισθαι τῶν πείλων, Μηδίζοντων δὲ φρεσὶν (1). This is in a great degree confirmed by Thucydides: Σπάρτην ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Πέρσῃ δυνάμει ἀνιτάξασθαι (2). But still more by Plato: Πολλὰ δὲ λέγουσιν ἂν τίς τὰ τότε γινόμενα περὶ ἐκείνους τὸν πόλεμον, τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδαμῶς ἰσχυρότερα ἂν κατηγοροῦν οὐδ' αὖ ἀμύνασθαι τῇ γι' Ἑλλάδα λέγον, ὁρῶνς ἂν λέγουσιν· ἀλλ' ἐν μὴ τό τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τό τε ἡμῶν τῆς ἐπιούσας δουλείας, σκεδὼν ἂν ἦδη πάντ' ἦν μεμιγμένα. 4. τ. 1 (3).

(1) Herodot. l. 7. c. 138.

(2) Thucyd. l. 3. c. 56. . :

(3) Plat. de leg. l. 3. p. 692. l. 1.

pear



CHAP.  
VIII.

the enemy by sea. What then would have followed may be readily conceived. The fortified lines proposed by the Peloponnesians across the Corinthian isthmus would have been nugatory. For the Persian, having it in his choice where to make his attack by sea, would have subdued the several states one by one; and the Lacedæmonians at last, reduced to their single strength, would have had no alternative but to die gloriously, or submit to a power which they could no longer withstand; so that all Greece must inevitably have fallen under the Persian yoke. Whoever therefore shall say that the Athenians preserved Greece, will not err from the truth: for, to whichsoever party they joined themselves, that must preponderate. Their resolution then being decided by their zeal for Grecian independency, THEY excited to energy those Grecian states which had not yet submitted to Persia; and THEY, next under the gods, repelled the invasion.

This testimony in favor of Athens appears upon the whole not less true than honorable. But as the business of history is neither panegyric nor satire, but to form a just estimate of the conduct and characters of men, it will be proper, as we have adverted to the circumstances which might apologize for those Greeks who yielded on the first summons, to advert also to the circumstances which led the Athenians to such determined and animated opposition to the Persian power. Nor is the investigation difficult.

S E C T.  
II.

cult. The burning of Sardis first, then their treatment of the Persian heralds, and finally their victory at Marathon, had made the Athenians so peculiarly obnoxious that, in submitting, they could little hope for favorable terms. Tho, moreover, Hippias was now dead, yet the Peisistratid party still existed; and the court of the satrap of Sardis was the common resort of Grecian refugees; of whom some, richer or more aspiring, or of rank to introduce them to consideration, carried their intrigues as far as the monarch's court at Susa. Among these Herodotus names some Thessalian princes, some of the Peisistratids, and more particularly Demaratus, the banished king of Sparta, who had received a most liberal provision from the generosity of the late Persian monarch, Darius. All would expect to profit from the success of the Persian arms in Greece; to which indeed many looked as the only circumstance that could ever restore them to their country; while, on the contrary, those who now led the affairs of the Athenian commonwealth must, on that very account, expect from it the more inevitable and deeper ruin. But the glorious day of Marathon would naturally give new energy to every Athenian mind. Extraordinary success easily excites among a people the presumption that nothing is too arduous for them. Now also, as on the invasion under Datis, there arose among the Athenians a leader born for the occasion. Themistocles was a man of birth less illustrious than those who had hitherto generally swayed the

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 3.  
& 6.Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 104.Corn. Nep.  
& Plutarch  
vit. Themist.

C H A P.  
VIII.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 143.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 144.  
Plut. vit.  
Themist.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 14.

Athenian counsels; but whom very extraordinary talents, joined with a general vehemence of temper, and a singular enthusiasm for glory, could not fail of raising, in a popular government, to the highest political eminence. We have observed how the war with the little island of Ægina had contributed to the former spirited opposition of Athens to Persia. It is the remark of Herodotus that, upon the present occasion also, Greece owed its preservation to that war; for it was that war which first obliged the Athenians to raise a marine. At Laureium, in Attica, was a very productive silver-mine, public property. But it had been determined, in the true spirit of democracy, that as the treasury was rich, the revenue from the mine, instead of being reserved for public service, should be divided among all the Athenian people for their private use. That enthusiastic ardor for a great object which, when genius feels, it can communicate, Themistocles communicated among the Athenian youth. While their minds were generally exasperated against the Æginetans, he procured a decree, which the graver and more experienced leading men had not dared even to propose, that no dividend should be made of the income from the mines till two hundred trireme galleys were built with it. The threatened invasion from the East had stopped the Æginetan war, and the galleys were now complete.

What Herodotus relates concerning the consultation of the Delphian oracle, in this tremendous

mendous crisis, tends much to mark the temper  
 and character of the times, which modern lan-  
 guage will more perfectly portray, the more  
 nearly it can imitate the expression of the origi-  
 nal. ‘Neither then,’ says the historian, con-  
 tinuing his panegyric of Athens, ‘did the  
 ‘alarming oracles from Delphi, however in-  
 ‘spiring terror, persuade the Athenians to de-  
 ‘sert the cause of Greece. For persons depu-  
 ‘ted by public authority to consult the god<sup>10</sup>,  
 ‘having performed the prescribed ceremonies,  
 ‘entered the temple; and, as they sat by the  
 ‘shrine, the Pythoness, whose name was Ari-  
 ‘stionica, prophesied thus: “Wretches, why sit  
 “ye there? Leave your houses and the lofty  
 “ramparts of your city, and fly to the farthest  
 “parts of the earth. For not the head shall  
 “remain firm, nor the body, nor the extreme  
 “feet; not therefore the hands, nor shall aught  
 “of the middle remain, but all shall pass unre-  
 “garded. For fire and keen Mars, urging the  
 “Syrian chariot, shall destroy. Nor yours  
 “alone, but many other strong towers shall he  
 “overthrow. Many temples of the immortal  
 “gods shall he give to the consuming fire.  
 “Even now they stand dropping sweat, and  
 “shaking with terror. Black blood flows over  
 “their highest roofs, foreseeing the necessities  
 “of wretchedness. Depart therefore from the  
 “sanctuary, and diffuse the mind in evils.”

 SECT.  
 II.

 Herodotus  
 l. 7. c. 139,  
 & seq.

<sup>10</sup> Θεορράπτος is their Grecian title, for which we have neither word, nor scarcely a proper phrase in English.

CHAP.  
VIII.

‘ The Athenian deputies were thrown into the  
 ‘ deepest consternation. Consulting with Timon  
 ‘ son of Androbulus, one of the principal Del-  
 ‘ phian citizens, he advised them to take the  
 ‘ symbols of suppliants, and go again to the  
 ‘ oracle. They did so, and addressed the shrine  
 ‘ thus : “ O sovereign power, prophesy to us  
 “ more propitiously for our country, regarding  
 “ these suppliant tokens which we bear ; or we  
 “ will not depart from the sanctuary, but re-  
 “ main here even until we die.” The prophetess  
 “ answered : “ Minerva is unable to appease  
 “ Olympian Jupiter, tho intreating with many  
 “ words and deep wisdom. Again, therefore,  
 “ I speak in adamantine terms. All else, within  
 “ Cecropian bounds and the recesses of divine  
 “ Cithæron, shall fall. The wooden wall alone  
 “ great Jupiter grants to Minerva to remain  
 “ inexpugnable, a refuge to you and your chil-  
 “ dren. Wait not, therefore, the approach of  
 “ horse or foot, an immense army, coming  
 “ from the continent ; but retreat, turning  
 “ the back, even tho they be close upon you.  
 “ O divine Salamis ! thou shalt lose the sons  
 “ of women, whether Ceres be scattered or  
 “ gathered ! ” ”

“ These two oracles, tho in verse in the original, fall remark-  
 ably into English almost word for word ; even the ambiguous ex-  
 pressions almost exactly corresponding in the two languages. It  
 is not every oracle reported by Greek authors that can be thus  
 literally rendered, or even rendered at all, in another language,  
 if indeed they bear any certain sense in the original. It has  
 therefore been a prudent practice of translators to give their re-  
 presentations of them in verse.

‘ Writing

‘ Writing down this answer, which appeared milder than the former, the deputies returned to Athens. Various opinions were held among the Athenian elders about the meaning of words which interested them so deeply. Some thought they directed the defence of the citadel, which having been antiently furrounded by a palisade, might be intended by the term wooden wall. Others insisted that the wooden wall could mean nothing but the fleet, upon which alone, therefore, the oracle encouraged them to depend : yet this construction seemed overthrown by the concluding sentence, which the diviners deemed to portend that, if the fleet ventured an engagement, it would be defeated off Salamis. They advised, therefore, by no means to risk any kind or degree of engagement, but to make use of the fleet for quitting, with their families and effects, a country which they could not defend, and to seek a settlement elsewhere.’

It was not likely that the prudent managers of the Delphian oracle would prophesy anything very favorable to Athens, so peculiarly devoted to Persian vengeance, when the innumerable forces of that mighty empire were already assembled at Sardis, while the little country of Greece was so unprepared and so disunited. Yet the consultation was probably a necessary compliance with popular prejudice ; and it depended then upon genius to interpret the response advantageously, after having perhaps suggested what might bear an advantageous interpretation.

CHAP.  
VIII.Herodot.  
ibid. &  
Plut. vit.  
Themist.

Themistocles was not at a loss upon this occasion. 'There was one emphatical word,' he said, 'which clearly proved the interpretation of the diviners to be wrong. For if the last sentence had been meant unfavorably to the Athenians, the oracle would scarcely have used the expression, 'O divine Salamis,' but rather, 'O wretched Salamis.' Defeat at sea was therefore portended not to them but to their enemies: the wooden wall unquestionably meant their fleet; and a naval engagement must save the country.' The Athenian multitude was predisposed to the character and sentiments of Themistocles. It was determined, in pursuance of his opinion, to put the whole strength of the commonwealth to the navy, to increase the number of ships as fast as possible, and, together with such other Greeks as could be persuaded to join them, to meet the enemy at sea.

Then at last measures were taken for forming a league among those Grecian states which, according to the historian's expression, were inclined to the better cause<sup>12</sup>. It was presently agreed that all enmities among themselves should cease: for many yet existed, and principally between Athens and Ægina. Information came that Xerxes was arrived at Sardis. Beside that his court was a common resort for refugee Greeks, many of his Ionian and Æolian subjects would be constantly about it, tho probably

<sup>12</sup> Ἑλλήνων τῶν τὸ ἀμείνων φρονούντων. Herodot. l. 7. c. 145.

very few of them ever near his person. Means S E C T.  
II.  
 were, however, thus open for the Greeks to pass with little suspicion, and easily to acquire information concerning all public transactions of the Persian government. To ascertain report, and to pry if possible more deeply into things, some confidential persons were sent to Sardis. They were apprehended as spies, and condemned to death: but the circumstances being reported to Xerxes, that prince, disapproving the rigid caution of his officers, directed that the spies should be carried round the whole army, and, after seeing everything, dismissed with passports to go where they pleased. Some ships about the same time, carrying corn from the Euxine for Ægina and Peloponnesus, were stopped by the Persian officers in the Hellespont. Xerxes directed that they should be suffered to proceed on their voyage: 'For,' said he, 'we are going to the same country, and the corn may be useful to us.' The appearance of magnanimity in this conduct is lessened by the immensity of the Persian armament, seemingly far overproportioned to its object; yet upon the whole the anecdotes are not unworthy of the son of Darius, and grandson of Cyrus. Analogous transactions may have happened among other people in other ages: a story similar to the former is related in Roman history. But in justice to Xerxes it ought not to be forgotten that he stands first on record for this treatment; generous at least, if we refuse to call it magnanimous, of enemies whose lives

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 146,  
147  
Polyæn.  
Stratag.  
l. 7. c. 15.  
Plutarch.  
Apophth.

Polyb.  
l. 15.  
p. 695.  
Liv. l. 30.  
c. 29.  
Frontin.  
l. 4. c. 7.



CHAP. were forfeited by the law of nations of all  
VIII. ages.

Herodot. The principal Grecian states whose resolu-  
1. 7. c. 145. tions remained yet doubtful, were Argos, Cor-  
Thucyd, cyra, Syracuse, and the Cretan cities. Ministers  
1. 1. c. 14. were sent to all, urging them to an alliance against  
Persia. Argos had not, with the power, lost all  
the pride of its antient preëminence among the  
Grecian states. Weak still from slaughter in  
Herodot. battle, and the massacre which followed, in the  
1. 6. c. 76, invasion under Cleomenes; nourishing, since  
& seq. those events, an increased animosity against  
1. 7. c. 148. Lacedæmon, and fearing worse oppression from  
& Isocrat. neighbouring Greeks than from the distant Per-  
Panathen. sian, the Argians applied to the Delphian ora-  
cle for advice, or perhaps, rather negotiated for  
a sanction to resolutions already taken. The  
response, evidently composed by a friend to the  
Argians, appears, as far as it can be under-  
Herodot. stood, to favor their antient pretension to supe-  
1. 7. c. 143, riority over all other Grecian states, and at the  
& seq. same time to direct them to enter into no league  
for common defence, but meerly to provide  
for their own security. They nevertheless re-  
ceived the ministers of the confederates with  
great civility; and having, in the oracular  
response, an excuse, which Grecian religion  
could not dispute, for refusing, if they chose  
it, to ingage in any league, they endea-  
voured to profit from the pressing necessity  
of the occasion for procuring advantageous  
terms as the price of their assistance. They  
required first that the Lacedæmonians should bind  
themselves

themselves to maintain peace with them for thirty years; and then they said that, the command among the Grecian states justly belonged to Argos, yet they would be contented to share it equally with Sparta. The Lacedæmonian deputies hesitated and gave an unsatisfactory answer. The Argians closed the conference with declaring, 'That the Spartan arrogance was intolerable; and they would rather be commanded by the barbarians than subject to Lacedæmon;' and they ordered the ministers to leave the Argian territory before sunset, on pain of being treated as enemies. This, says Herodotus, is what the Argians themselves say about these matters. Other reports less favorable to them were current in Greece. But after an account of these the historian adds: 'I do not undertake to vouch for these stories, nor for anything relating to the business, farther than credit is due to what the Argians themselves say. But this I know, that if all men were to bring their domestic disgraces together, for the purpose of exchanging with their neighbours, they would no sooner have inspected those of others than all would most willingly take back their own. Thus neither upon this occasion was the conduct of the Argians the most shameful<sup>13</sup>.'

<sup>13</sup> The testimony of Plato to the justice of this assertion (1) may suffice to turn upon Plutarch himself that charge of malignity which he has urged against Herodotus.

(1) De Leg. l. 3. p. 692. t. 2.

CHAP.  
VIII.

The ministers of the confederates were not more successful in Crete. Herodotus, from whom alone we have any detail of the political affairs of these times, was too nearly cotemporary to be totally unbiassed by the interest which persons yet living would have in the credit of the principal actors. He makes a handsome apology for the refusal of the Cretans to join in the confederacy. They were desirous, he says, of taking their share in the common defence of Greece, but an oracle forbade them. In regard to the Corcyræans he has not been scrupulous: he plainly accuses them of scandalous treachery to the Grecian cause, after having ingaged themselves to support it. Gelon tyrant of Syracuse was a very powerful prince, and his alliance would have been a great acquisition. But difficulties arose in accommodating his pretensions to command with those of the leading states of Greece. Partly absurd pride, partly perhaps reasonable jealousy, prevented them from immediately acceding to his terms; and in the mean time the invasion of Sicily by a Carthaginian army made his whole force necessary at home.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 153,  
& seq.

Corinth was the place appointed for the meeting of deputies from the confederated states, to consult about the conduct of the war. None among the Grecian people had been more forward to join the confederacy than the Thessalians. Intelligence arrived that the Persian army had crossed the Hellespont, and was directing its march westward. This decided that

Thessaly

S E C T.  
II.

Theffaly was the frontier to be first attacked. The Theffalians reasonably expected that a force would immediately be assembled; competent, as far as the strength of Greece would admit, for the defence of the passes into their country. Alarmed to find no measures taken for that purpose; they hastened a remonstrance to Corinth, urging that the strength of their province alone was utterly unequal to oppose the prodigious army which was coming against them; that it ought not to be expected they should sacrifice themselves with their families, for the sake of people who would not stir to assist them; that a powerful body must therefore without delay join them from the southern states; otherwise, however unwilling, they must necessarily endeavour to make terms with the enemy. This reasonable remonstrance roused the sluggish and hesitating counsels of the confederacy. A body of foot was embarked under the command of Evænetus, a Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian. They proceeded through the Euripus to Allus, a port of Theffalian Achaia; and then, marching across the country, occupied the valley of Tempë, between the mountains Olympus and Ossa, the only pass from Lower Macedonia into Theffaly. The infantry, from different states, amounted to ten thousand men. Theffaly was the only province of Greece that possessed any considerable strength of cavalry. The whole of the Theffalian horse joined the confederate infantry, and together they made  
a force

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 173.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 12. c. 22.

**CHAP. VIII.** a force competent to defend the pass against any numbers.

**Herodot.**

**L. 7. c. 173.**

But the Grecian army had not been many days incamped in Tempè, when confidential messengers arrived from Alexander son of Amyntas, a Macedonian man, as Herodotus in the simple language of his age calls him, the king of Macedonia by inheritance from a long race of ancestors claiming their descent from Hercules. The Macedonians represented that the invader's force by land and sea was immense : that there was another way into Thessaly, practicable for an army, from Upper Macedonia through Perrhæbia, to the town of Gonnus, so that in their station in Tempè they might be taken in the rear<sup>14</sup>; and if they would avoid being trodden under foot by their enemies, they would do well to retreat in time. The Grecian leaders, in pursuance of this advice, embarked their troops again, and returned to the Corinthian isthmus. A party seems before to have existed among the Thessalians disposed to the Persian interest. On the retreat of the

<sup>14</sup> Our geographical information concerning this country, tho much improved of very late years, is still very deficient. The able and indefatigable D'Anville seems to have been able to procure none of any value. His map, to which, in the want of another guide of any comparable reputation, I trusted for the former editions, is grossly incorrect. Some better information has been obtained through recent travellers, from which Barthelemi has profited. But since his work came out the modern geography of the countries round the Ægean has been very superiorly given, in a map compiled by De la Rochette, and published by Faden. With its assistance I have ventured to give the explanation in the text of a passage of Herodotus, in itself so far from clear, that translators and commentators, would they own the difficulty, might be excused their misconception of it.

confederate forces it became immediately the ruling party. The Theſſalians haſtened to make their ſubmiſſion to the Perſian monarch; they engaged even zealouſly in the cauſe, and their ſervices in the progreſs of the war were eminent <sup>15</sup>.

The Grecian confederacy, which remained to reſiſt the whole force of the Perſian empire, now conſiſted of a few little ſtates, whoſe united territories did not equal ſingle provinces of France, and the ſum of whoſe population in free ſubjects was conſiderably inferior to that of Yorkſhire in England. Nor was there, even among theſe, either a juſt unanimity, or any eſtabliſhed mode of general adminiſtration, which could command the conſtant and regular exertion of united ſtrength; which might have reſſeſſed the diſaffected party among the Theſſalians, and obviating thus the neceſſity for the precipitate retreat from Tempē, might have delayed or rendered very hazardous the march of the Perſian multitudes over the rough country northward of the Theſſalian plain.

The valuable aſſiſtance of Theſſaly being however loſt, the conſolation remained for the aſſembly at Corinth that, as their defence was now narrowed, their ſtrength, ſuch as it was, would be leſs divided; the fleet might more certainly coöperate with the army, and if the attack was to begin nearer the center of the confederacy,

<sup>15</sup> Ἐμύδισαν προθύμως, ἐνδὲ τι ἰνδοιαγῶς, ὥς τε ἐν τοῖσι πρὸ γυμνασίου  
ἐφάνοντο βασιλεῖ ἄνδρες ἰόντες χρησμώτατοι.

Herodot. l. 7. c. 174.

the

CHAP.  
VIII.

the pressure itself of danger might enforce that union in council without which all defence would be hopeless. The nature of their country, and of its surrounding seas, was a farther encouragement: the one everywhere mountainous, the other broken with innumerable islands and headlands, and subject to sudden storms, both were peculiarly favorable for defensive operations. The southern boundary of Thessaly, which now became their frontier, was advantageous beyond the rest. The ridge of *Œta*, which forms it, extends from sea to sea; everywhere impracticable for an army, or so nearly so, that the smallest force might successfully oppose the greatest. This ridge is crossed nearly at right-angles, by another scarcely less formidable; which, rising immediately from the Corinthian isthmus, stretches through the middle of Greece under various names, *Helicon*, *Parnassus*, *Pindus*, and, still in a northerly direction, shoots beyond Grecian bounds far among the barbarous nations. To enter Attica and Peloponnesus therefore, by the western side of the country, first *Pindus*, then *Œta*, then *Parnassus*, must be surmounted. On the eastern side *Œta* alone opposed itself. But here only one pass was known, where the ridge at its eastern extremity meets the sea. In former ages the *Phocians*, on the south of the mountains, more settled to husbandry than the *Thessalians*, who lived on the north, to prevent predatory incursions upon their lands, had seized the commanding fastnesses, and established a garrison there. Across the middle

Strab.  
l. 9. p. 418.  
& 428, 429.

Strab.  
ibid. &  
p. 434.

Hierodot.  
l. 7. c. 176.

The Country and Coasts  
around

**THERMOPYLÆ,**  
*from the Map of Greece by d'Anville,*  
assisted by the descriptions of  
**HERODOTUS & STRABO.**

*For the History of Greece*  
Vol. 1.<sup>st</sup> Page 142





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middle of the narrow, where was a width of SECT.  
II.  
about fifty feet nearly level, they had erected a wall; and, to strengthen the defence, they formed, on the Theſſalian ſide, an inundation from ſome hot ſprings which roſe near the foot of the mountain. Theſe circumſtances together acquired to the place the name of Thermopylæ, Hot-gates. A little north of Thermopylæ, the mountains ſo cloſed, and again, a little ſouthward, they ſo preſſed upon the ſea, as barely to admit the paſſage of a ſingle carriage. Nothing could be more commodious than this ſpot, for the ſmall force of the Greeks to make a ſtand againſt the immenſe army of Perſia. It had the farther extraordinary advantage that, near at hand, and within ready communication, was a ſecure road for a fleet; ſo landlocked as to favor that alſo againſt ſuperior numbers, yet affording means of retreat. Hither it was determined to ſend the whole naval force that could be collected, together with a body of troops ſufficient to defend the paſs.

But in the conduct even of this buſineſs we find the union of the confederated ſtates extremely defective. Jealous of one another, deſtitute of any ſufficient power extending over the whole, and fearing, not unreaſonably, the naval ſuperiority of the enemy, which might put it completely in his choice where, when, and how he would make his attacks, each little republic ſeems to have been anxious to reſerve its ſtrength for future contingencies. Lacedæmon again, as Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 206.  
in the former war, pretended religion as a hindrance.

CHAP.  
VIII.

Herodot.  
1.7. c. 202.  
Pausan.  
1.10. c. 20.

drance. The festival called Carneia was to be celebrated, immediately after which the whole force of the state should march against the enemy. Most of the Peloponnesian cities made similar excuses; and where no peculiar religious ceremony could be pleaded, the Olympian festival, whose period coincided with these events, was a common excuse for all who wanted one. Lacedæmon therefore sent only three hundred men; Corinth four hundred; Phlius two hundred; Mycenæ (at this time, tho an inconsiderable town, independent of Argos) sent eighty men. The mountaineers of Arcadia alone, unversed in the wiles of politics, and unable to estimate the danger to be expected from naval operations, honestly exerted their strength in the common cause. The cities of Tegea and Mantinea sent each five hundred soldiers: the other towns made the whole number of Arcadians two thousand one hundred and twenty. To these the little city of Thepiæ in Bœotia added no less than seven hundred: Thebes, ill-affected to the cause, gave only four hundred. The whole strength of Athens went to the naval armament. The other provinces without Peloponnesus had no large towns, and their inhabitants, less civilized, were little politically connected with the southern states. The assembly at Corinth was, however, not wanting either in industry or ingenuity, to persuade and encourage those nearest to the point of attack to use their utmost exertion against the invader. Ministers were sent through their towns and villages: 'The force,' they were told,

'now

Herodot.  
1.7. c. 203.

now marching for their protection, was only the advanced guard of a powerful army expected every day. That excessive fear of the Persian power which had so pervaded Greece, it was added, was absurd. For from the sea there was no cause for apprehension. The Athenians, Æginetans, and others who composed the allied fleet, were fully equal to the defence of the country on that side. Nor was it a god that was coming against them, but a man; and there neither was, nor ever would be a mortal in whose lot, from his very birth, evil was not mingled, and most in the lot of those of highest station. In the common course of things, therefore, their invader, a meer mortal, would be disappointed of his hope. Hearing these things, continues the historian, whose original and almost cotemporary pencil gives us the very lineaments of the age, the Opuntian Locrians marched with their whole force, and the Phocians sent a thousand men. Leonidas, one of the kings of Sparta, commanded in chief.

CHAP.  
VIII.

## SECTION III.

*The Grecian Army takes its Station at Thermopylæ; the Fleet at Artemisium. Responses of the Delphian Oracle. The Persian Fleet proceeds to Sepias; the Army to Thermopylæ. Numbers of the Persian Forces. Storm and Shipwreck at Sepias. Battle of Thermopylæ.*

Ol. 74. 4. XERXES halted several days at Thermē, to  
B.C. 480. refresh his troops, to acquire intelligence, and to collect guides capable of conducting his multitudes through the difficult country to which he was approaching. It was determined to proceed by Upper Macedonia into Theffaly; that road being more favorable than the shorter way by the valley of Tempē. By sea the Grecian coast was so near that the fleet remained in the bay of Thermē eleven days after the army had recommenced its march.

Herodot. l. 7. c. 127, 128, & 131. Summer was already advanced when intelligence reached the assembly at Corinth that Xerxes was arrived in Pieria. The forces under Leonidas then immediately marched to their station at Thermopylæ, and the fleet proceeded to the neighbouring road of Artemisium on the Eubœan coast. Hence three galleys, one of Trœzen, one of Ægina, the third Athenian, were sent off the island of Sciathus, to watch the motions of the enemy. Ten Persian galleys, also sent to explore, fell in with them. The Greeks immediately

SECT.  
III.

diately fled. The Træzenian ship and the Æginetan were taken with their crews. The Athenian captain ran his galley ashore near the mouth of the Peneius, and escaped by land with his people. The Persians took possession of the deserted vessel. Immediately signals by fire, from the heights of Sciathus, gave notice to the Greeks at Artemisium of the enemy's approach. So little firm were the leaders yet in their counsels, and so extremely apprehensive of the enemy's great superiority, that they immediately withdrew their fleet to Chalcis, proposing to defend the narrow pass of the Euripus<sup>16</sup>. Scouts were left on the heights at the northwestern end of Eubœa still to watch the enemy.

In this time, indeed, of extreme difficulty and danger to the Greeks, constant and equal prudence appears scarcely anywhere but among the managers of the Delphian oracle. The Delphian citizens, dreading, like the rest, the approaching invasion, consulted their god. The response directed them to pray to the winds; for these might be powerful assistants to Greece. This divine admonition was communicated among the confederate Greeks, and most thankfully received<sup>17</sup>. Another response was reported, directing the Athenians in particular to invoke their son-in-law. According to ancient tradition,

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 178.

l. 7. c. 189.

<sup>16</sup> Καταβροχθισαντες is the strong expression of Herodotus (1). In another place he adds the corroborating adverb διωγῶς.

<sup>17</sup> Καὶ σφι, διωγῶς καταβροχθισοσι τοὺς βάρβαροι, ἐξεγγέλαντες χάριν ἀδάκτου κατέβητο. Herodot. l. 7. c. 178.

(1) l. 7. c. 182.

CHAP.  
VIII.

Boreas god of the northwind, coming from Thrace, perhaps really a Thracian chief of that name, had married Oreithyia daughter of Erechtheus king of Attica. The prayers of the Athenians were therefore particularly directed to the northwind, with some confidence, at least among the vulgar, that they were not without peculiar interest with that deity. Those indeed who know the power of whistling, or of an eggshell upon the minds of English seamen at this day, may imagine what the incouragement of the Delphian oracle to expect assistance from Boreas and their princess Oreithyia, might do among the Athenians. The event, however, which soon followed, gave more solid ground of hope, and might naturally excite the recollection of the relation of Athens to the northwind, if it had not before been thought of.

The ten Persian galleys, after the capture of the Grecian vessels, proceeded in their business of exploring; but in passing between the island of Sciathus and the main, three of them struck upon a rock called Myrmex. The fleet, as we have observed, lay in the bay of Thermē eleven days after the king had recommenced his march. Upon intelligence from the exploring ships that the passage to the Grecian coast was clear of the enemy, and dangerous only from rocks, vessels were sent with stone to erect a mark on the Myrmex, and Pammon, a Greek of the island of Scyros (for Herodotus has been careful to record the traitor's name) was engaged to pilot the fleet through the channel of Sciathus. Proceed-  
ing

ing then from the bay of Thermē, one day brought them to the bay between the town of Casthanæa and the foreland of Sepias on the Thessalian coast.

SECT.  
III.

The army meanwhile had made its way through Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, and across Thessaly to the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, without opposition. Here Herodotus again enumerates the Persian forces by land and sea, with the addition acquired since the departure of the armament from Doriscus. This addition, he says, cannot be ascertained, but may be computed. The Greeks of Thrace and the adjacent islands furnished one hundred and twenty ships, whose crews would amount to about twenty-four thousand men. The land-force, from the various people of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, he estimates at three hundred thousand. The number of fighting men in the whole armament by sea and land would thus be two million six hundred forty-one thousand six hundred and ten. The attending multitude, he supposes, could not be fewer, but rather more. Reckoning them equal, the numbers under the command of Xerxes, which arrived without misfortune at Sepias and Thermopylæ, were five million two hundred eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty men, exclusive of women and eunuchs without number, and a vast train of incumbrances little known to European armies, but which in all ages have attended the Asiatic. Whatever exaggeration may be in this account, we shall in vain seek more authentic information

L. 7. c. 184.



CHAP.  
VIII.

from later writers. Herodotus's detail of the nations from which the armament was collected, and of the measures taken to provide for its subsistence, defective as the latter is, afford the best of any existing means for forming some idea, if not of its numbers, yet of its immensity. Exactness we cannot have, nor anything approaching it: but we know that Asia has often sent forth armies which appear next to prodigious; and every testimony makes it probable that the forces led by Xerxes against Greece were the most numerous ever assembled in the world.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 188,  
& seq.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 12.  
About the  
middle of  
July.  
Dodwell  
Annal.  
Thucyd.

The road of Casthanæa was open to the north and northeast winds; and so little spacious that an eighth division only of the vast fleet of Persia could be moored in one line against the shore: the other seven rode at anchor with their heads toward the sea. Such a situation could never be safe for the antient galleys, peculiarly fitted for a navigation where want of sea-room makes a storm most dangerous to the stoutest vessels. The night after their arrival was calm: but in the morning the wind freshened from the northeast<sup>18</sup>. In those seas, where storms are often very sudden and always very dangerous, the seaman, unacquainted with those great principles of navigation which direct a vessel over the globe,

<sup>18</sup> Herodotus calls the wind Apeliotes, but he says the people of the country called it the Hellespontine wind. The apeliotes, according to Stuart's account of the tower of the winds, yet remaining at Athens, was the east. But the Hellespont lay nearly north-east from Sepias: and the effects of the storm described by Herodotus show that the wind must have been some degrees northward of the east. I have said thus much on a subject, in itself of little

but which, in his narrow sphere of action, would be useless, is yet singularly attentive in observation of the weather, and singularly acute in prognostication of it. As soon as it was perceived in the Persian fleet that a violent storm was approaching, the division of galleys, next the shore, was drawn upon the beach. The rest were to provide for their safety as they could. According to Herodotus, they seem to have scattered to seek a port, or a safe and unoccupied beach, which to the ancients was a port. But the storm hastily grew excessive. Some of the vessels were stranded on the place: some were driven upon the Sepiad foreland; some against the cliffs of Pelion; some to the towns of Casthanæa and Melibœa. Three days the tempest lasted with unabated violence. The Persian commanders were in the utmost alarm; apprehensive not only for what might be lost, but also for what was yet safe on shore. The Thessalians were but very lately become friends and subjects: a reverse of fortune might shake their fidelity, and tempt them to hostilities. A rampart was therefore formed around the naval camp, chiefly from the ruins of the wrecked vessels.

consequence, principally because I would not be thought to controvert the authority of the tower of Andronicus Cyrrhestes, or of Mr. Stuart's account of it. But I will add that the accuracy in stating winds, usual with our seamen, was not common among the ancients; nor is it at this day in the Mediterranean, where generally winds are still named from the countries whence they blow, without any very exact reference to the points of the compass.

CHAP.  
VIII.

The simplicity with which Herodotus details the actions of men, often marks the genuine workings of human nature, both more faithfully, and with more animation, than the cautious and polished manner of writers of more artificial judgement. The dread, which pervaded the Grecian fleet on the approach of the Persian armament, may be imagined from the hasty, and apparently improvident, retreat from Artemisium, which must expose the land-force at Thermopylæ to certain destruction; since the fleet alone could secure it from being taken in the rear. The joy at the view of the rising tempest, and the consequent confidence in divine favor, would be proportional. The Athenian seamen did not now forget the god of the Thracian wind with his Attic princess. Immediately they set with great earnestness to sacrifices and prayers, requesting those deities 'to vindicate Attica, and bring destruction on the barbarian fleet, as they had formerly done at Athos.' Whether this really induced Boreas to fall upon the barbarians, says Herodotus, I cannot undertake to say<sup>19</sup>: but the Athenians assert it, and in consequence they have built a temple to him on the banks of the Ilissus. Whether indeed Herodotus believed the oracular admonition to have been promulgated before the event, appears dubious: his expressions imply suspicion. On the second day of the

<sup>19</sup> 'Εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα τοῖσι βαρβάροις ὀρμίσαι Βορρὴς ἐπέπεσε θυμὸν ἔχον ἰππῶν. Herodot. l. 7. c. 189.

storm,

storm, the destruction and distress, produced in the Persian fleet, became manifest to the Grecian scouts on the Eubœic heights, and they hastened to Chalcis with the intelligence. Immediately public thanks were returned, and libations poured to Neptune the deliverer: and in the confidence that now the Persian force would be no longer formidable, it was determined to reoccupy the former station at Artemisium.

The loss of the Persians was very great. It is not likely that the Greeks would ever have any correct account of it; but, according to the lowest report, four hundred galleys of war were sunk or destroyed. The loss of men could be computed only from that of vessels; and means were totally wanting to estimate the destruction of storeships and attending vessels. As soon as the weather was become moderate and the sea smooth, the Persian commanders, without waiting to collect the scattered remains of their fleet, hastened to leave so dangerous a station. Coasting Magnesia, they entered the Pagasæan gulph, better known afterward by the name of the Pelasgian. Fifteen galleys, of those dispersed by the storm, following some days after, fell in with the Grecian fleet, which had resumed its station off Artemisium; and, mistaking it for the Persian, all were taken. Among the prisoners were Sandoces governor of Cuma in Æolis, Aridolis tyrant of Alabandæ in Caria, and Penthylus commander of the Paphian squadron. Of twelve galleys which Paphos had furnished,

**C. H. A. P.**  
**VIII.**  
furnished, the one only in which the commander was taken, had survived the hurricane. This capture was very fortunate for the Greeks. Beside the loss to the enemy and the gain of so many ships of war to themselves, spirits were added to the multitude, and intelligence was acquired to the commanders. As soon as the prisoners had been examined before the principal officers of the fleet, they were sent to the assembly at Corinth.

The prospect of Grecian affairs was now brightened a little. If the fleet could oppose the enemy with but equal success, it might be hoped that the nature of the frontier would render the prodigious numbers of his army unavailing. To the south of Thessaly mount *Œta*, as we have observed, stretches across the country from sea to sea. North of *Thermopylæ*, and bordering upon the Malian bay, is a plain, in one part wide, in others very narrow, inclosed by high and impracticable mountains called the *Trachinian rocks*. The Persian army, moving in three divisions from Upper Macedonia, crossed the mountains by the passes indicated by Alexander, and proceeding by *Gonnus* through Thessaly, to the valley and town of *Anticyra*, there again met the sea. Crossing then the river *Spercheius*, it entered the Malian plain, and at the town of *Trachis*, in the widest part of it, the king fixed his head-quarters. Southward of this town the river *Asopus*, after washing for some way the foot of the mountain, which is a branch of *Œta*,

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 198.

c. 33.

Toward  
the end of  
July.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 200.

Ἄρα, enters a cleft of it, and the only road is by the course of that river. A little farther southward a small stream called the Phoenix, falling from the hills, meets the Asopus: and here masonry had been necessary to render the way passable for a single carriage<sup>20</sup>. The Asopus having made its course by the cleft, through the mountain-ridge, which is here narrow, enters a valley of some length, but little width, and presently discharges itself into the Malian bay. In this valley, and on the bank of the Asopus, was the town of Anthela, with the temple of Ceres, the temple of Amphiçtyon, and the place of meeting of the Amphiçtyonic assembly. Thermopylæ was a little beyond them, and less than two English miles from the junction of the Asopus and Phoenix. The Persian monarch commanded all to the north of the mountains: the Greeks under Leonidas held the pass.

Herodot.  
l. 7.  
c. 201.

A prince like Xerxes, wholly unexperienced in war, might expect, as Herodotus says of him, that the force under his orders was capable of anything against men, and almost against nature itself. According to that author, he waited four days in expectation that the Greeks would retreat from his irresistible numbers, and leave him an uninterrupted passage. And this, according to the same honest historian, would actually have happened, but for the superior

c. 207.

<sup>20</sup> That I imagine to be the sense of the phrase ἀμαζινοὶ γὰρ μὴν μόνον διδύμται. Herodot. l. 7. c. 200. See Weßeling's note.

CHAP.  
VIII.Plutarch.  
Apoph.  
Lac.

genius and unshaken courage of the Lacedæmonian king. It has been added that a herald was sent to Leonidas, commanding him in the name of Xerxes to come and deliver his arms; to which the Spartan prince answered with Laconic brevity, 'Come and take them.' But among the Persian generals there were probably men of experience and judgement, not incapable of informing their sovereign how useless his numbers would be in the pass of Thermopylæ. Numerous moreover as the Greeks were under his command, information might easily come to him of the divisions among those who opposed him, and of the disposition of some to retire. He might also be told that the Spartan king boasted his descent from the hero Hercules, who is said to have ended his mortal life on mount Cæta, and to whom, as a god, an altar stood dedicated in the valley of Anthela: but of these things the Persians would not be likely to make much account; and they could not be informed of the superior talents of Leonidas, who had never yet had opportunity for making them conspicuous. The credit due to Herodotus we continue always to find very nearly proportioned to his probable means of information. When those were good, he seldom or never relates absurd tales: when they have been deficient, he never scruples to report any rumor. Information of public orders to the Persian army might come to him; but the actions, and still more the passions, of Xerxes upon his throne, which he pretends to describe, would

would not be matters of common notoriety. Xerxes, we are told, on the fifth day after his arrival at Trachis, commanded the Medes and Cissians of his army alone to go and bring all the Greeks under Leonidas alive into his presence. The attack, made in consequence, is likely to have been ineffectual enough to disgrace those troops, in some degree, in the eyes of their unexperienced sovereign. The Persian guards, called the immortal band, followed in the attack. According to Herodotus, the efforts of this band were very spirited; and he accounts very candidly for their want of success. Their short spears were inefficacious, and their numbers useless, against the longer weapons of the Greeks, and on ground so confined. Their attacks were however renewed and varied in all the ways that their leaders could devise. Numbers fell, and no impression was made. The report, which the historian adds, is likely enough to have become afterward popular in Greece, that the Persian monarch leaped thrice from his throne as he anxiously viewed the conflict. From the description of the place, however, it seems impossible that his throne could have been within sight, and very little likely that he should himself have seen the action. The immortal band, after having suffered severely, was at length recalled, and the Persian generals were greatly at a loss. The attempt was however renewed the next day, in the hope that wounds, and the fatigue of repeated action, might weary the scanty numbers of the Greeks,

and

SECT.  
III.

Herodot.  
l. 7, c. 210.

c. 211.

c. 212.



CHAP.  
VIII.

and oblige them to quit their advantageous ground. But the little army of Leonidas was equal to its purpose; his reliefs were judiciously managed, and the second day's attack was unavailing like the former.

Among the various advantages, beyond estimation, which the Persian monarch possessed over the little Grecian confederacy, may be reckoned the means, almost unbounded, of rewarding those who would serve him. The hope of profiting from these, brought information of another pass over the mountain; circuitous indeed and difficult, but by which the Thessalians had sometimes entered Locris and Phocis for plunder, after the fortifying of Thermopylæ.

Herodot. 1.7. c. 213. In more settled times it had been neglected, but was not unknown among the neighbouring inhabitants, and Leonidas had appointed the Phocians, under his command, to the guard of it. The path began at the cleft in the mountain through which the Asopus has its channel. Hence, by a winding course, it ascended a hill, distinguished, by the name of Anopæa, from the heights of Cæta on one side, and the Trachinian rocks on the other. Holding then for some space along the top of the ridge, it descended directly to Alpeni, the first town of Locris. The resolution was immediately taken among the Persian generals to make an attempt this way. A strong detachment marched, about dusk, under the command of Hydarnes, and arrived, by daybreak, without opposition near the summit of Anopæa. Here the Phocian

c. 175.

c. 212 & 217.

c. 216.

c. 215.

cian

cian guard had its station. The oaks, with which the mountain was covered, had concealed the approach of the enemy. The Phocians, whose discipline, in general, was probably less cultivated than that of Lacedæmon or Athens, had neglected the necessary precautions of advanced guards and out-sentries. They were first alarmed by the noise of a multitude of men treading among the fallen leaves; which, as the weather was perfectly serene, they heard at some distance. Immediately they ran to arms. But, with the inconsiderateness of men surprised, imagining themselves the ultimate object of attack, instead of taking proper measures to fulfil the important purpose of their post, by preventing the passage of the enemy, they retreated on one side of the path; to gain more advantageous ground for defence. The judicious Hydarnes, leaving them to their desired security, continued his march, and, quickly descending the mountain, reached the plain unmolested.

The Persian army so abounded with Greeks, most of them involuntarily pressed, that deserters would not be wanting, to inform Leonidas of whatever could be generally known in the enemy's camp. That very night intelligence came, that a strong detachment was marched for the mountains. Early in the morning the scouts of the army<sup>21</sup> arrived, with information

Herodot.  
1.7. c. 219.  
Diod. Sic.  
1.11. c. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Ὁ ἡμεροσκόπος καταδραμόντις ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων. Herodot. 1.7. c. 219.

that

CHAP.  
VIII.

6. Aug.  
B.C. 480.  
Dodw.  
Ann. Thu.  
but it may  
have been  
some days  
earlier.

that the enemy had already passed the Phocian guard, and were descending toward the plain. Immediately a council of the Grecian commanders was held. Opinions were divided; some thinking it became them still to maintain their post; others, that the consequence of the attempt could be but a useless waste of lives, which ought by all means to be preserved for the future wants of their country. The debate ended in a general resolution to retreat with all speed to their respective cities, the Lacedæmonians and Bœotians only remaining. Herodotus mentions it as uncertain whether Leonidas dismissed the rest. The Thespians alone appear to have resolved voluntarily to abide the event with him: the Thebans he would not suffer to depart; keeping them as hostages, on account of the known disaffection of their city to the Grecian cause.

Herodot.  
1. 7. c. 220.

c. 164.

Leonidas himself determined, upon this great occasion, to exhibit to the world a memorable example of obedience to that law of Sparta, which forbade, under whatsoever disadvantage, to fly from an enemy. Considering the disposition, so widely prevailing among the Greeks, to fear the Persian power, and shrink before it, there appears not less true patriotic wisdom, than admirable magnanimity in that prince's conduct. The oracular response from Delphi, said to have declared that either Sparta or its king must fall, adds nothing to its lustre. Upon fair historical testimony it has been fully equal to the warm and abundant eulogies, which  
writers

writers of various ages and nations have vied in bestowing upon it. Animated by his example, every Lacedæmonian and Thespian under his command was resolved to die; but to die gloriously for himself, and, as far as possible, usefully for his country. To be surrounded being now unavoidable, the object was no longer to guard the pass, but to chuse the spot where, in sacrificing themselves, they might make the greatest destruction of the enemy. The narrow therefore, at the junction of the Phoenix and Asopus, was given up, and the little band was collected at the wall of Thermopylæ.

SECT.  
III.

The whole Persian army was under arms before sunrise, the king himself attending in solemn pomp to wait the appearance of the luminary above the horizon, for beginning the devotional ceremonies prescribed for that favorite hour of Persian religion. After these were concluded, the troops were dismissed to wait for orders. About the middle of the forenoon<sup>22</sup>, when it was supposed Hydarnes might be nearly arrived in the rear of the Greeks, a chosen body was commanded to advance to the assault in front. Leonidas now gave a loose to the fury of men prepared for death. Advancing before the wall, he attacked the Persians in the wider part of the valley, made great slaughter, and caused such confusion that, through want of

Herodot.  
I. 7. c. 223.  
& seq.

<sup>22</sup> ——— χρίεν ἐς ἀγέλης καὶ μάλα πολυάριθμοι. Herodot.  
I. vii. c. 223.

CHAP.  
VIII.

room for the ill-disciplined multitude, numbers were forced into the sea, and many expired under the pressure of their own people. Himself, fighting at the head of his band, fell early. The engagement was nevertheless continued, with advantage on the side of the Greeks, till Hydarnes came in sight in their rear. Then they retreated again to the narrow at the wall. The Thebans took this opportunity to beg mercy of the conquerors; but, in the very act of surrendering, many, through the confusion, were killed: the rest were made prisoners. The surviving Lacedæmonians and Thespians gained a hillock, where they fought surrounded, till they were slain to a man.

Such is the account given by Herodotus of this extraordinary and celebrated action. The circumstances might come authenticated to him through the Greeks who served with the Persians; and every anecdote that could be collected would no doubt be heard with eagerness, and preserved with care<sup>3</sup>. The names of all the three hundred Spartans were still upon

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 229,  
& seq.

<sup>3</sup> Some seem to have been invented after the age of Herodotus, as the annotator Valckenarius has justly observed, n. 92. p. 609, of Weffeling's Herodotus. The report of Diodorus, followed by Plutarch, Justin, and others, that Leonidas with his Spartans attacked the Persian camp by night, and penetrated to the royal tent, is inconsistent with the other circumstances, whether of place or time; nor does it seem too much to say that it is an absurd fiction. Indeed, most of the tales, the omission of which by Herodotus has so much excited the indignation of Plutarch, appear fitter for poetry or romance than history.

record

record in the historian's time. Two of them survived the battle, having been accidentally absent; Aristodemus, who was, with the prince's leave, for the recovery of his health, at Alpeni; and Pantites, sent on public business into Theffaly. It being, however, reported at Lacedæmon that Eurytus, who had also had leave from Leonidas to remain at Alpeni on account of sickness, nevertheless joined on the day of battle, and fell with his comrades; and that Pantites might have so hastened his return as to have shared in the glory of the day, both were dishonored. Pantites, in consequence, strangled himself: but Aristodemus, with greater fortitude, supported life; and was happy enough, in the sequel, to find opportunity for distinguishing his courage in the cause of his country, so that his memory has been transmitted with honor to posterity. The body of the Spartan king, as the same historian affirms, being discovered among the heaps of slain, was, by order of Xerxes, beheaded, and the trunk ignominiously exposed on a cross: but this, he adds, was contrary to the general principles and practice of the Persians, who were accustomed, beyond all other people, to honor military merit, even in their enemies. This observation, to the credit of the enemies, and in opposition to the prejudices of his country, proves not less the extensive information and just judgement than the candor of Herodotus; for every authentic ac-

S B C T.  
III.Herodot.  
1. 7. c. 224.

CHAP.  
VIII.

count marks the Persians for a people of liberal sentiments and polished manners, beyond almost any other in all antiquity.

## SECTION IV.

*Numbers of the Grecian Fleet. Sea-fights off Artemisium. Retreat of the Grecian Fleet. March of the Persian Army toward Athens. Attempt against Delphi.*

DURING this memorable scene at Thermopylæ, the hostile fleets had met in the neighbouring channel. The Persians wanted to force the passage between Eubœa and the main; for the double purpose of a safer navigation, and of attending more closely the motions of their army. The business, therefore, of the Grecian fleet, as Herodotus has observed, was, like that of the army, to defend the straits. It consisted of two hundred and seventy-one trireme galleys, with a few of those smaller vessels called penteconters. The penteconter, the vessel of Homer's age, had, like the modern row-boat, only one tier of oars, and its complement of rowers was from fifty to sixty. The trireme, it is generally supposed, had three tier of oars; by

Herodot.  
1. 8. c. 1.

by which it gained that swiftness, so important in the antient mode of naval action<sup>24</sup>. Its ordinary complement of rowers was, at the time of which we are treating, from a hundred and fifty to a hundred and sixty; beside whom it commonly carried forty soldiers, and sometimes more; but, on emergencies, particularly when boarded, the whole crew acted with arms. Of the triremes now in the Grecian fleet, no less than one hundred and twenty-seven were fur-

SECT.  
IV.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 15.  
l. 7. c. 184.  
& l. 8.  
c. 130.

<sup>24</sup> The arrangement of the rowers in the antient galleys of war, the triremes and quinqueremes, much disputed among the moderns, remains yet uncertain; but by far the most satisfactory conjectures upon the subject are those of General Melvill, of which an account is given in the Appendix to Governor Pownall's Treatise on the Study of Antiquities. Along the waist of the galley, according to the General's supposition, from a little above the water's edge, a gallery projected at an angle of about forty-five degrees. In this the upper rowers were disposed, checkered with the lower. Space for them being thus gained, partly by elevation, partly by lateral projection, those of the highest tier were not too much above the water to work their oars with effect. The General says he has been confirmed in his opinion that this was the real form of the antient galleys of war, by representations of them, tho' imperfect, in antient paintings and reliefs, which he has seen in Italy. He has not specified those paintings and reliefs. There are, in the collection at Portici, pictures of sea engagements, but so damaged that I was unable myself to discern the parts of the vessels, so as to judge at all whether they might confirm or confute the General's notions. The most perfect antient monument to the purpose that has fallen in my way, is a marble fragment of a bireme in high relief, preserved in the Vatican museum at Rome. It has the incorrectness usual in the representations of such objects by the antient sculptors, but it nevertheless, in my opinion, goes far to show that the General's notion is well founded. Winkelmann, in his treatise on this monument, has blundered, as might be expected of a closet critic, pretending to dissent on rowing without ever having had an oar in his hand.



CHAP.  
VIII.

nished by Athens, a very few years before unable to cope at sea with the inhabitants of the Æginetan rock; and more were still preparing in the Athenian ports. Forty were sent by Corinth; twenty by Megara: the Chalcidians of Eubœa manned twenty lent to them by the Athenians: Ægina sent eighteen; Sicyon twelve; Lacedæmon only ten; Epidaurus eight; Eretria seven; Troezen five; and the islands of Styros and Ceos each two. The Plataeans, an inland people, unacquainted with naval business, but zealously attached to Athens, served, with their best ability, in the Athenian fleet. To these triremes the Opuntian Locrians added five penteconters, and the Ceians two.

In an armament to which they contributed so much the largest proportion, the Athenians might seem justly to claim the chief command: yet, such was the reputation and influence which Lacedæmon held among the Greeks, the allies absolutely refused to serve under any but a Spartan commander. Eurybiades was therefore admiral of the fleet. Historians have, upon this occasion, justly applauded the moderation of the Athenian leaders, who patiently acquiesced under this decision; and, superior to little punctilio, continued with unabated zeal to prosecute the great purposes of the common cause. But the Athenian counsels were, at this time, directed by a man who could conceal unbounded desire of glory under the appearance of modesty; who, with a temper as pliable

as

Herodot.  
1 8. c. 2,  
& seq.

as his genius was penetrating, weighing the necessities of the times, and foreseeing the opportunities of ambition, could not only accommodate himself to all seasons and circumstances, but had skill to lead the froward populace of Athens to submit their passions to his opinion. Herodotus relates an anecdote of him, too remarkable, whencesoever the information was derived, and too characteristical to be omitted<sup>25</sup>. The Persian fleet, being collected after their late misfortune, appeared in the road of Aphetæ, at the mouth of the Pelasgian gulph, and opposite to Artemisium, at the distance of not more than ten miles, in far greater numbers than the Greeks had expected. The whole neighbouring country was at the same time filled with the immense multitude of their military host. Alarm spread on all sides, and the contagion reached the commanders of the Grecian squadrons; insomuch that it was proposed to retreat to the interior seas of Greece<sup>26</sup>. The Eubœans, who had engaged in the confederacy, being informed of this, were in the highest consternation. They sent immediately to Eurybiades, begging that the fleet might remain, for their protection, only till they could remove their families and most valuable effects. The

<sup>25</sup> See note 45, p. 621, of Wesseling's Herodotus. Plutarch, who in his Treatise against Herodotus has expressed great indignation at this tale, has nevertheless in his Life of Themistocles related very nearly the same.

<sup>26</sup> Ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Herodot. l. 8. c. 4. Ἔσω τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Plut. vit. Themist.

CHAP.  
VIII.

admiral refused. The Eubœans then applied to the Athenian commander. Themistocles, whose opinion was before decided against the retreat, told them that, tho words could not persuade, gold might ; and for thirty talents, something more than seven thousand pounds sterling, he would engage that the fleet should remain and fight the Persians. The money was presently paid into his hands. Five talents then brought over the commander in chief ; and under his orders all the commanders of squadrons readily consented to remain, except Adeimantus the Corinthian. ‘ To him then,’ says Herodotus, ‘ Themistocles swore,’ saying, ‘ Neither shalt thou leave us ; for I will give thee more than the Persian king would send thee for deserting thy allies ;’ and immediately ordered three talents to be conveyed to his ship. Fear of the accusation, or gratification with the present, prevailed ; and thus were the principal Grecian commanders bribed to the opinion of Themistocles, and to the protection of the Eubœans ; and the fleet, probably to the great advantage of the common cause, remained in its station.

Herodot.  
1. 8. c. 6.  
& 7.

Next morning at daybreak the Persian admirals moved. They had proposed immediately to attack the Grecian fleet ; but after approaching near enough to observe how inferior it was to their own, they concluded that, if they should advance, the Greeks would certainly retreat, and, through their knowledge of the narrow seas behind them, would probably escape.

cape. On consultation it was therefore determined to send two hundred galleys round Eubœa, to take a station in the rear of the Greeks; the main body abstaining from attack, till it should be known by signals that the detached squadron was arrived at the station proposed.

SECT.  
IV.

During these transactions, Scyllias, a Greek of Scionë, a remarkable diver, who, from having been useful to the Persian commanders in recovering many things of value from the wreck of their lost ships, had been introduced to means of information, deserted to the Greeks. He brought a more exact account of the present strength of the enemy's fleet than had yet been obtained, and he gave intelligence of the squadron sent round Eubœa. Immediately a council of war was held; and, after much debate, it was determined that the whole fleet should weigh at midnight, and go against the detached squadron; in the just hope that, taken separately, it might easily be overpowered. In the evening however, having received no confirmation of the intelligence for, to avoid observation, the enemy kept a considerable distance from the Eubœan coast), the Grecian commanders determined to try an attack upon the main body of the Persian fleet; or rather perhaps upon some part of it, when daylight would not suffice for bringing the whole into action, and when, should they nevertheless be overpowered, night would favor their retreat. They founded hopes also on a friendly disposition in the

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 8,  
& seq.

CHAP.  
VIII.

the Ionian commanders; of whom some were indeed well inclined to them, while others were eager to gain the Persian monarch's favor, and earn the rewards promised for zeal shown in his service. A sharp engagement ensued. If we may believe Herodotus, the Greeks took thirty galleys; tho he says afterward that neither side could claim a victory. Among the prisoners however, made by the Greeks, was Philaon, brother of Gorgus king of Salamis in Cyprus, a man of great estimation among the enemy's officers. Lycomedes, an Athenian captain, obtained the reward of valor for being the first who took a Persian galley. Antidorus of Lemnos was the only Grecian captain in the Persian service who deserted with his ship to the confederate Greeks. The Athenian government afterward rewarded him with a grant of lands in the island of Salamis. In the night the Greeks resumed their station at Artemisium; the Persians remained at Aphetæ.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 12.

The Grecian fleet had scarcely cast anchor when a storm arose, attended with heavy rain and violent thunder. The drift of the storm carried the wreck of the late engagement, and the floating bodies, among the Persian ships. Their cables were intangled, their oars impeded. Repeated flashes of lightning, amid extreme darkness, just served to discover the horrors of the scene, while the uncommon resonance of the thunder, among the neighbouring summits of Pelion, struck the seamen with the imagination that the gods themselves were thus loudly

SECT.  
IV.

loudly declaring their anger: a fancy likely enough to arise in the minds, at least, of the Grecian seamen in the Persian fleet; who, according to the belief of their age, were making war against the gods of their mother-country. The detached squadron, meanwhile, in the open sea, as it was there called where none was truly open sea, driving before the storm, and ignorant of their course, fell among the rocks of that peculiarly dangerous bay of the Eubœan coast called the *Cœla*<sup>27</sup>. All perished; 'and thus,' says Herodorus, 'the deity interferred to reduce the Persian force more nearly to an equality with the Grecian.'

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 13.  
& Diod.  
Sic.  
l. 11. c. 13.

All the next day the Persians remained in their station; while a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian galleys joined the Grecian fleet, bringing with them the welcome news of the destruction of the enemy's squadron on the Eubœic rocks. Thus encouraged, the Grecian commanders were the more intent upon watching opportunities for farther advantages. Means were observed for cutting off the Cilician squadron. The attempt was made in the evening, and succeeded; and in the night the fleet again resumed its station at Artemisium. The Persian commanders, irritated by repeated insults from an enemy so inferior, and apprehensive of blame for remissness, determined, on the following

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 14.  
& seq.

<sup>27</sup> *Sinus Euboicus, quem Cœla vocant, suspectus nautis.* Liv. Hist. Rom. l. 31. c. 41. See note 78, p. 625, of Wesseling's Herodotus.

day,

CHAP.  
VIII.

day, to attack the Grecian fleet with their whole remaining force. About noon they advanced, formed in a semicircle, with a view to surround the enemy. The Greeks waited in their station, probably an advantageous one. The plan of attack of the Persians, if well conceived, appears to have been ill executed. Such a multitude of vessels indeed, manned with people of different nations and languages, who varied both in method and in degrees of skill, must be extremely liable to disorder, and little fit to undertake nice and complicated evolutions. In approaching the enemy, they crossed and fell against one another. The battle was nevertheless warmly maintained. The Egyptians distinguished themselves, and took five Grecian galleys. More than half the Attic squadron was disabled; but the aristeia, the honors for superior merit in the action, were decreed to the Athenian Cleinias (son of Alcibiades, and grandfather of him to whom that name owes its celebrity) who commanded a galley built and manned with two hundred men at his private expence. Herodotus affirms that the Greeks remained masters of the wreck and of the dead: but these seem to have been their only tokens of victory. The historian acknowledges that they suffered greatly; and indeed proceeds to give the strongest proof of it by relating that, in a council of war held immediately after the engagement, it was resolved to retreat to the interior seas of Greece. This resolution was farther confirmed, and the measure hastened, by

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the arrival of Abrotychus, an Athenian, who SECT.  
IV.  
having been stationed with a light vessel at Thermopylæ for the purpose of communicating intelligence, brought information of the circumvention of Leonidas and his party, and the retreat of the rest of the army. It was then resolved not to delay for a moment the retreat of the fleet. The whole moved in the accidental order of the instant: the Corinthians led, the Athenians formed the rear<sup>a</sup>.

But Themistocles, ever fertile in expedients, conceived the idea of making even the flight of his fellowcountrymen useful to his country. With some of the swiftest galleys of the squadron under his command, he went to the watering-places of the road of Artemisium, which he concluded the enemy would scarcely fail to visit next day, and there on the rocks he wrote thus: ‘Men of Ionia, ‘you do ill in making war upon your fathers, ‘and helping to enslave Greece. Come therefore over to us; or, if that cannot be, remain ‘neuter, and persuade the Carians to the same ‘measure. But if the necessity which compels ‘you to the part you are engaged in, is such as ‘to make a secession impracticable, yet, when ‘we come to action, avoid exertion against us; ‘remembering that you are descended from one

Herodot.  
l. 8.  
c. 19, & 22.  
Plut. vit.  
Themist.  
Justin.  
l. 2. c. 12.

<sup>a</sup> Later writers tell of Grecian victories off Artemisium, utterly inconsistent with the events that followed; but Plato's slight mention of the actions there, confirms Herodotus's account (1); and even Plutarch gives some degree of corresponding testimony (2).

(a) Plat. de Leg. l. 4. p. 707. t. 2.

(2) Vit. Themist.

‘ blood



CHAP.  
VIII.

‘ blood with us, and that the enmity of the Persians was first drawn upon us in your cause.’ I imagine, continues the historian, that Themistocles had two views in this. If the inscriptions should be observed only by the Greeks of the Persian fleet, he hoped that some might be persuaded by them; but if the matter should be reported to the Persian chiefs, the Ionians would become suspected, and perhaps might be excluded from the line of battle in future engagements.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 23.

The road of Artemisium was no sooner clear, than a Greek, of the neighbouring town of Histiaea, hastened in a light boat to the Persian fleet, to obtain the reward for such intelligence. Some swift vessels were immediately dispatched to ascertain the truth of the report, and at sunrise the whole fleet weighed and proceeded to Artemisium. The same day the Persians took possession of the town of Histiaea; and the neighbouring district of the island sedulously made submission.

c. 26.

See  
Thucyd.  
l. 3. c. 34.

About the same time the army recommenced its march from Thermopylae. Some Arcadians, poor and without prospect at home, had been tempted, by the fame of the great king's riches and liberality, to wander thus far to offer their services to him. The practice of seeking hire in foreign military service appears to have obtained among that mountain-people, before it became usual with the other European Greeks. Herodotus seems to relate the story of these adventurers, not more for the purpose of eulogy than of

of admonition to his country. They were introduced, he says, to the presence of Xerxes, and being asked 'what was doing in Greece?' they answered with great simplicity, 'That it was the season of the Olympian games, and that consequently the Greeks were amusing themselves with seeing athletic exercises and horse-races.' Being then asked, 'What was the reward of the conquerors in those games?' they answered, 'An olive garland.' Upon which Tritantæchmes, a prince of the blood-royal of Persia, exclaimed, 'Oh Mardonius, what a people have you brought us to fight against; who contend among themselves not for riches but for virtue!'

SECT.  
IV.

Ol. 75.  
B.C. 480.

But whatever might be the general simplicity or the general virtue of the Greeks of this age, their patriotism at least was of very various complexion in the different states, and in the different factions of the same state. Of the provinces from mount Œta to the isthmus, Phocis almost alone was faithful to the confederate cause, the cause of Grecian independency. From the moment when the Persians became masters of Thermopylæ, Locris could not avoid submission. Doris, and all Bœotia, except the little cities of Thespiæ and Plataea, were led by a few principal men of Thebes, who had in view to confirm and advance their own power, through the patronage of the great king. Influenced by these men, those provinces had always been adverse to the confederacy; and now with ready zeal acknowledged themselves subjects to the Persian

Thucyd.  
l. 3. c. 56,  
& 62.  
Plat.  
Menex.  
p. 241. l. 2.  
Isocr.  
Paneg. &  
Panath.  
Plut.  
Aristid.

Thucyd.  
l. 3. c. 62.

CHAP. Persian monarch. Herodotus, with great ap-  
 VIII. pearance of reason, attributes the firmness, even  
 of the Phocians, more to their extreme animosity  
 Herodot. against the Theſſalians, their hereditary enemies,  
 I, 81 c. 30. and to the partial conſideration of the peculiar  
 interest of their province, than to any generous  
 regard for common welfare, or any enlarged view  
 of Grecian independency. If the Theſſalians,  
 c. 31. he ſays, had held with the Greeks, the ſame  
 animosity would have led the Phocians to join  
 the enemy.

The Perſians proceeded from Thermopylæ,  
 with the Theſſalians for their guides. Turning  
 immediately to the right along the foot of Cæta,  
 they then directed their march through the  
 narrow vales of Doris toward the river Cephiffus.  
 The Dorian, as a friendly territory, was ſpared ;  
 but as ſoon as the army entered Phocis, at the in-  
 ſtigatation of the Theſſalians rather than from the  
 diſpoſition of the Perſians, deſtruction was  
 begun with fire and ſword. The main body of  
 the army followed the courſe of the Cephiffus.  
 Detachments burnt the towns of Drymus, Cha-  
 radra, Erochus, Tethronium, Amphicæa, Neon,  
 Pedicæ, Triteæ, Eletæcia, Hyampolis, Parapo-  
 tamii, Abæ, with their temples. The people  
 fled ; many to the ſtneſſes of mount Parnaffus,  
 ſome to Amphiffa and other towns of the Ozolian  
 Locrians ; which, lying beyond the ridges of  
 Parnaffus and Helicon, were in leſs immediate  
 danger. A few were taken and reduced to ſla-  
 very. From Panopeæ a detachment was ſent to  
 ſeize the treaſures of Delphi ; about which ſo  
 much

c. 31, 32,  
 & Diod.  
 l. 11. c. 14.  
 Plut.  
 Themist.

much had been said by the Greeks under Xerxes, that Herodotus supposes the Persian monarch to have had more perfect knowledge of them, than of what he had left in his own palace at Susa. The main body continued their march through the friendly province of Bœotia toward Athens.

The defence of Delphi, itself a curious object, is not the less so for the veil with which interested ingenuity hath industriously covered it; and which superstitious ignorance would rather double than withdraw. The account transmitted by Herodotus, apparently current with the credulity of his age, may therefore be neither unamusing nor totally uninforming. As soon as news arrived that the Persians were in possession of Thermopylæ, the Delphian citizens, anxious for themselves, their temple, and the riches of which they were guardians, consulted their own oracle. They requested directions particularly concerning the sacred treasures; whether they should bury them; or whether they should carry them to some other country. The god, says the historian, would suffer nothing to be moved; declaring, that he would himself take charge of what belonged to him. The Delphians were thus relieved at least from their responsibility to the Greek nation: their cares were therefore now confined to themselves and their families. Their wives and children were sent across the Corinthian gulph into Achaia. The men, except a few who withdrew to Amphissa in Locris, occupied the neighbouring fastnesses among the crags of Parnassus. The

SECT.  
IV.

Herodot.  
I. 8. c. 35.

I. 8. c. 36,  
& seq.  
Diod. I. 11.  
c. 14.

CHAP.  
VIII.

Corycian cavern, a vast natural vault in the side of the mountain near the city, received many<sup>29</sup>. All quitted Delphi except sixty men and the prophet. The Persian detachment meanwhile approached by the way of Panopæ, Daulis, Lilæa, Phocian towns, which they burnt. As they drew near Delphi, and were now in sight of the temple, the prophet, whose name was Aecratus, saw the sacred armour, which it is unlawful for any mortal to touch, brought by some invisible power from the recess of the fane, and laid before the building. But no sooner was the advanced guard arrived at the chapel of Minerva, which is an outbuilding in front of the great temple, than thunder from heaven fell upon them; two vast fragments from the mountain rolled down with prodigious noise, and killed many: a voice of warlike acclamation issued from within the walls. Dismay seized the Persian troops. The Delphians then, rushing from the cavern, and descending from the summits, attacked them and made great slaughter. The survivors fled precipitately into Bœotia.

From this story it is not difficult to detach the preternatural machinery, and we find an account remaining, neither improbable nor very defective. The priests, unwilling to trust the treasures to others, and anxious for the credit of their oracle, which could scarcely but suffer should the place fall into the hands of foreign plunderers, determined upon a bold measure, which they

<sup>29</sup> This cavern is described by Pausanias, b. 10. c. 32.

# HISTORY OF GREECE.

159

executed with equal courage and prudence. A clear and firm response from the oracle first inspired the citizens with confidence. Then the best refuge that Greece afforded was provided for their families. The ablest and most trusty men were reserved for the defence of the place. If the mode of defence was uncommon, it appears however to have been perfectly adapted to the situation and circumstances, which were also very uncommon. Surrounded and almost overhung by very lofty mountain summits, the site itself of the city was composed of crags and precipices. No way led to it but through mountain defiles, narrow and steep, shadowed with wood, and commanded at every step by fastnesses above; and the approach from Bœotia was of considerable length through such defiles. Every measure seems to have been taken to make the enemy believe that the place was totally abandoned, and to induce them to advance in all the carelessness of perfect security. The surprise appears in consequence to have been complete. A thunderstorm at midsummer, among the mountains, was likely to be an accidental assistant. The rolling down of the rocky fragments might appear miraculous to those who did not know that numbers of men, concealed among the crags, were prepared to give them motion. Possibly artificial fires and explosions might imitate a thunderstorm and increase the horror<sup>30</sup>.

SECT.  
IV.

Strab. l. 9.  
p. 416, &  
seq.  
Pausan.  
l. 10. c. 6,  
& seq.  
Justin.  
l. 24. c. 6.  
Whell. b. 4.  
Chandler;  
c. 65.

<sup>30</sup> See Dutens' Inquiry into the Origin of the Discoveries attributed to the Moderns, c. 5. sect. 207.

CHAP.  
VIII.

The Delphians then attacked with every advantage. The small remainder of the Persian detachment, who reached the plains of Bœotia, readily adopted the reports of superstition, to excuse their surprize and flight. Two persons, they said, superior in their appearance to anything human, joined the Delphians in the pursuit and slaughter. The Delphians affirmed that these could be no other than Phylacus and Autonoüs, antient heroes of their country, to whom temples stood, in Herodotus's time, near the chapel of Minerva. Some of the fragments of rock, thrown down from the summits of Parnassus, were preserved within the chapel as memorials of the divine protection afforded upon that pressing emergency.

## SECTION

## SECTION V.

SECT.  
V.

*Unsteady Counsels of the Grecian Confederacy. The Athenians, deserted by the Peloponnesians, remove their families from Attica. Aristides. Ostracism. Athens taken by the Persians. Artemisia. Antient manner of Naval Action. Battle of Salamis. Return of Xerxes into Asia.*

WHILE any hope remained of defending the pass of mount Cæta, the Athenian fleet was of the utmost consequence to the confederated Peloponnesians. Without its assistance, every part of their coast would be open to the enemy's navy; and, the safety of Attica being therefore the first object in the plan of operations, it was resolved that, in case the enemy should penetrate across the mountains, the whole force of the confederacy should meet them in Bœotia, and oppose their farther progress. But the usual dilatoriness of confederacies recurred. The Peloponnesian troops were yet within their several states, when the news arrived of the death of the Spartan king, with his little band of self-devoted comrades, and of the retreat of the rest of his army. Then all hastened to the Corinthian isthmus, where Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, took the command. But the vehemence of the alarm, which spread on all sides, now set selfish counsels again afloat. Short-sighted through fear, the Peloponnesians determined not to risk anything for the preservation of Attica, but to contract their

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 49.

l. 8. c. 71.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 18  
Plutarch.  
Themist.



CHAP.  
VIII.

Chandler's Trav.  
in Greece,  
c. 44.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 72.

defence to their own peninsula. Their first business was to occupy, as an advanced post, the difficult passage of the Scironian rocks; another Thermopylæ, by which was the only road immediately from Attica into Peloponnesus. Then with earnest diligence they set to form strong lines across the isthmus. The people assembled there were the Lacedæmonians, all the Arcadians, the Eleians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Træzenians, Hermionians. 'These,' says Herodotus, 'met in arms at the isthmus, in deepest anxiety for the fate of Greece. The other Peloponnesians (the Argians and Achaïans) were careless of the event, or rather, if I may speak freely, they were disposed to the party of the enemy.'

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 49.

The fleet, in its hasty retreat from Artemisium, had made no stop till it arrived in the bay of Salamis, on the Attic coast. There information met the Athenians, whose crews, now in the fleet, were the principal part of their commonwealth, that no force was assembled in Bœotia; that the Peloponnesians had resolved to confine their defence to their own peninsula; that they had begun their measures for that purpose; that Attica thus was abandoned to destruction. The alarm was extreme. All that could be obtained from their allies was the assistance of the fleet, to transport their families and effects to Salamis, Ægina, and Træzen; places less exposed than Athens, but which expected only a delay of ruin. Nor were the Athenians now, like the Greeks of old, practised in wandering, and ready for

for migration. In proportion to the established security of property, and the peace of domestic life, the distress of families was great. At the awful moment of abandoning their country, a thousand anxious thoughts crowded upon every mind. In such excess of public misfortune, administration commonly loses its powers: the people, as in a shipwreck, become ungovernable through despair. All the wisdom, all the firmness, all the popularity of the ablest statesmen were wanted at Athens to preserve order, and to enforce those measures which political prudence required.

SECT.  
V.

Plut. vit.  
Arist.

But one of the wisest and most virtuous citizens that any country ever boasted, was in banishment. ARISTEIDES son of Lyfimachus, of a noble but not a wealthy family, had, in early youth, been patronized, and brought forward in public business, by Cleisthenes the expeller of the Peisistratids; and he is said, together with Themistocles, to have held a high military command under Miltiades, at the battle of Marathon. Themistocles, whose vast ambition was controlled by no scruple, avowed party principles, 'The gods forbid,' he is reported to have said, 'that I should be in power, and my friends no better for it.' Aristides, on the contrary, was, in public as in private life, so strictly upright and scrupulously impartial, that the title of THE JUST became applied to him as a common appellation. But democratical jealousy, or rather perhaps the ingenuity of ambitious individuals

CHAP.  
VIII.

to make popular passion serve their private purposes, had invented a peculiar mode of representing the dangerous superiority which great abilities and superior character might acquire in a republic. An assembly of the people, by what was called **OSTRACISM**, voted an illustrious citizen into banishment for five or ten years: alledging no crime, meaning no punishment, but only guarding against the overbearing influence of individuals: the exile's property and his honor remained unhurt. Aristeides had been thus banished; through the management, it is said, of Themistocles: for Aristeides inclined to the aristocratical party; opposing that increase of the general assembly's power which it had suited the ambition of Themistocles to promote. But, in this tremendous crisis of the commonwealth, the name of the just Aristeides began to be mentioned among the people; and it became evident that his absence was very generally regretted. Themistocles, whose capacious mind was never, by views of faction, blinded to greater interests, caught at the opportunity of popularity, and had the magnanimity himself to propose a decree which would inable his rival to return.

**CIMON**, son of the great Miltiades, is said also to have distinguished himself upon this trying occasion. Being, by inheritance from a long line of ancestors, one of the principal landed men of the Athenian commonwealth, he would not naturally be forward to abandon his country. But when proclamation was made that all should

forth.

Diod. l. ii.  
c. 55.  
Plut. vit.  
Themist.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 79.  
Plutarch.  
Aristid. &  
Themist.

Plutarch.  
Cimon.

forthwith remove their families and effects out of Attica, and that every man capable of bearing arms should immediately repair to his duty aboard the fleet, Cimon, at the head of a band of the principal youths of Athens, marched in procession, through the most public parts of the city, to the temple of Minerva in the citadel. In their hands they carried their bridles (the ensigns of that military service to which their birth and possessions had destined them) and, with solemn rites, dedicated these to the goddess. Then, arming themselves, the whole party set off for the fleet at Salamis; not a little encouraging the admiring citizens by this demonstration of confidence in the gods, and alacrity in devoting themselves to that new service, which the present crisis of their country required,

Nor were the advantages to be derived from popular superstition neglected. It was believed, from antient times in Athens, that a large serpent was a divine guard to the temple of Minerva in the citadel; and it was an established practice to place cakes, as an offering to this reptile, every new moon. The chief priest of the temple declared that the cakes, which hitherto had never failed to be eaten by the divine serpent, now remained untouched: proof that the goddess herself had forsaken the citadel. This, says the cotemporary historian, whatever truth was in it, not a little contributed to induce the Athenians readily and quietly to quit the city.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 41.  
Plutarch.  
Themist.

The

CHAP.  
VIII.

Herodot.  
l. 8.  
c. 49 & 74.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 12. c. 15.  
Plutarch.  
Themist.

The general business of the confederacy was not conducted either with equal wisdom or equal spirit. The want of one supreme authority was again felt. The measures of the land-forces were determined by the assembly at Corinth; of which the officers, commanding the troops of the several states, were principal members: those of the fleet seem not to have been taken into the consideration, but remained for the commanders of the several squadrons to decide. A council of those commanders was held for the purpose. The great question was, Where they should now wait the attack of that fleet from which they had been flying? Fear prevailed, and the majority were for retreating to the Corinthian isthmus; because there, it was urged, if they should be defeated, which seems to have been expected, tho the ships were lost, the crews might escape ashore, and still assist by land in the defence of their country.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 50,  
& seq.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 12. c. 14.

The Persian army meanwhile, advancing from Thebes, burnt the abandoned towns of Thespiæ and Platæa; and, entering Attica, found no resistance till they arrived at the citadel of Athens. This was still held by some ministers of the temple of Minerva, some of the poorer citizens unable to support the expence of migration, and a few others, obstinately addicted to that interpretation of the Delphian oracle, which supposed it to declare that the citadel should remain inexpugnable. The city was delivered to those Athenians of the Peisistratid

stratid party, who accompanied the Persian army. The citadel was immediately invested. Terms were offered to the besieged by the Peisistratids, and obstinately refused. After a resistance beyond expectation, the place was taken by assault, and all within put to the sword.

SECT.  
V.

Intelligence of this event, according to the probable detail of Herodotus, came to the fleet while a council of war was sitting. It occasioned such alarm, that some of the commanders of squadrons, without waiting for a decision of the question before them, hastened aboard their galleys and prepared for immediate flight. The rest, less panic-struck, were still, for the most part, of opinion that the proposed retreat to the isthmus should be executed without delay. Night came on, and all was confusion. Nothing can be more consonant to the common character of human affairs, in which little circumstances often decide the greatest events, than what the historian proceeds to relate. Themistocles, returning to his galley, was met by Mnesiphilus, an Athenian officer his particular friend, who anxiously asked, What was the determination of the council? 'To retreat instantly,' said Themistocles. 'Then,' replied Mnesiphilus, 'Greece is lost! for neither the present commander, nor any other man, will have influence to keep the fleet together. All will disperse to their several homes; and, through the folly of her chiefs, Greece is enslaved for ever!---Is there no possibility of persuading Eurybiades

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 56,  
& seq.

CHAP.  
VIII.

‘Eurybiades to wiser measures?’ Touched by his friend’s earnestness in delivering an opinion perfectly coinciding with his own, the active mind of Themistocles could not rest. Returning immediately to Eurybiades, he prevailed to have another council hastily summoned. Naturally vehement in his temper, Themistocles was forward and copious in discourse upon the subject, for the consideration of which the council met, before it was regularly proposed by the commander in chief. The Corinthian commander, Adeimantus, who was as warmly for different measures, interrupting him, said, ‘Themistocles, those who, at the games, rise before their time, are corrected with stripes.’ To so affronting a reprimand, the Athenian chief, with admirable self-command, calmly replied, ‘True, Adeimantus, but those who neglect to engage in the contest never win the crown.’ Then, in the course of the debate, he urged ‘the importance of preserving Salamis, Ægina, and Megara, which upon the retreat of the fleet must immediately fall; the advantage of the present station, a confined bay, which would render both the numbers and the superior swiftness of the enemy’s galleys useless; and the total want of such advantage

<sup>3</sup> Later writers, to make a better story, instead of Adeimantus, name Eurybiades, and add that he shook his cane over the head of Themistocles, who calmly said, ‘Strike but hear me.’ Plutarch, through an inattention not unusual with him, has in his Life of Themistocles attributed the reprimand to Eurybiades, in his Apophthegms to Adeimantus.

in any station that could be taken near the Corinthian isthmus.' When all this proved ineffectual, he concluded with declaring, 'That if so little regard was shown to the Athenian people, who had risked everything in the Grecian cause, their fleet would immediately withdraw from the confederacy, and either make terms with the enemy, or seek some distant settlement for a people so unworthily treated.' Eurybiades, alarmed, bent to this argument: a majority of the other commanders either felt its force, or were decided by the Spartan admiral; and it was determined to expect the enemy in the bay of Salamis.

The Persian fleet had remained three days in the road of Artemisium, to refresh the crews after their sufferings by storms and engagements. Three days then brought them through the Euripus to Phalerum, at that time the principal port of Athens. Herodotus supposes the Persian numbers, by sea and land, not less than on their first arrival at Sepias and Thermopylæ. For by land they were reinforced by the Malians, Dorians, Locrians, and Bœotians. Their fleet was increased with galleys from Andros, Tenos, Eubœa, and other islands. The recruits to the land-forces might easily supply the loss by battle; but those to the fleet would scarcely balance the damage by storms, which seems to have been very much greater than any hitherto suffered in action. The fleet and army being again met, a council of naval commanders was summoned,

SECT.  
V.Herodot.  
1. 8. c. 66,  
& seq.



CHAP.  
VIII.Herodot.  
L. 7. c. 92.L. 8. c. 67.  
& seq.

summoned, to consider whether the Grecian fleet should be attacked in its present station. It is difficult to determine how far credit may be due to Herodotus's account of a Grecian heroine, in the Persian fleet; who is yet so mentioned, in all histories of the times, that she must not be passed unnoticed. It was Artemisia, daughter of Lygdamis, a Halicarnassian, by a Cretan lady. Her husband had been tyrant of Halicarnassus, the native city of Herodotus, and he had extended his command over the neighbouring islands Cos, Nisyrus, Calydna. On his death, Artemisia succeeded to his authority. When the orders of the Persian court came to the Asian Greeks, to prepare forces for the European expedition, she fitted five galleys, which were confessedly superior to any of that vast armament, except the Sidonian; and she formed the extraordinary resolution of undertaking herself the command of this little squadron. On joining the fleet in the Hellespont, she was regularly admitted to her seat in all councils of war; and she acquired, in a high degree, the esteem of the Persian monarch. At the council held off Phalerum, she alone dissuaded the proposed attack of the Grecian fleet. 'Offensive measures,' she said, 'should be prosecuted only by land. There the superiority was decided, and operations more certain. The fleet should be reserved as an indispensable attendant upon so immense an army, which could not fail to suffer extremely, if by any misfortune it should lose the means of

‘ of supply by sea. Besides,’ she added, ‘ the  
 ‘ Greeks cannot long hold their present advan- SECT.  
V.  
 ‘ tageous situation ; for, if I am rightly inform-  
 ‘ ed, they have no magazines on the island which  
 ‘ they occupy, and the main is already yours.  
 ‘ Wait therefore only a little : you will see them  
 ‘ disperse of themselves, and all Greece will be  
 ‘ open to you.’ This wise advice was over-  
 ruled, and it was determined to attack the Gre-  
 cian fleet next morning.

The Grecian commanders, meanwhile, were far from being all heartily disposed to the measure resolved on. Eurybiades appears to have been a man not of great abilities : his authority therefore, as commander in chief, over forces from various independent states, was very uncertain. Themistocles was still fearful of the defection of some of the squadrons ; and, to insure what, in his judgement, was necessary for the common good, he is reported to have taken a very extraordinary step. A trusty person was sent to the Persian fleet, with orders to say that he came from the Athenian admiral, who was desirous of revolting to the Persians ; that he was therefore to give an account of the dissensions among the Grecian commanders, and of the measures likely to follow : adding that, if the present opportunity for destroying the whole Grecian fleet together should be neglected, such another would never be found. That very night the Persians moved and formed a semi-circle, from the point of Salamis to the port of

Munychia :

Æschyl.  
 Pers.  
 p. 140. ed.  
 H. Steph.  
 Herodot.  
 l. 8. c. 73.  
 Diod. Sic.  
 l. 11. c. 17.  
 Plut. vit.  
 Themist.  
 & Aristid.  
 Corn. Nep.  
 v. Themist.

CHAP.  
VIII.Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 17.  
Æschyl.  
Persf.p. 141. &  
145.Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 76.  
Plut. vit.  
Themist.  
& Aristid.

Munychia : the Egyptian Squadron was detached to block the western passage ; and a force was landed upon the little island Psyttaleia, between Salamis and the ports of Athens, to assist any of the Persian vessels, and seize any of the Grecian, that might be driven upon it. For the same purpose the Attic shore, to a considerable extent, was lined with troops ; and by daybreak the whole multitude of the army was in motion ; those whom no duty required, going, urged by curiosity, to take their stand on the adjacent heights. The most commodious eminence was chosen for the monarch himself, surrounded by his guards and attended by his splendid retinue, to view at leisure the action to ensue.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 79,  
& seq.  
Plut. vit.  
Themist.  
& Aristid.

During these preparations of the Persians, Aristides, then in Ægina, informed of the decree which had put a period to his exile, hastened to restore his services to his country ; and escaping, under favor of the night, through the middle of the enemy's fleet, arrived at Salamis. Aristides wanted not magnanimity, upon this great occasion, to lay aside both private animosity and the animosity of faction. He went directly to Themistocles, his rival and political enemy, related what he had seen, and offered his assistance for anything useful to the commonwealth. Themistocles (who, with a character of far less disinterestedness, could yet equally command his passions, and well knew the value of such assistance) joyfully accepting the offer, requested

requested that Aristeides would accompany him to the council of war then sitting, and deliver his information in person; which he said would have much more weight than anything that could be repeated by himself, accustomed as he had been to combat the military and political opinions of most of the Grecian commanders. Aristeides immediately complied. He had scarcely delivered his intelligence, when confirmation of it came by a captain of a trireme galley of the island of Tenos, who had deserted from the enemy. Then at last, pressed by necessity, the commanders with one voice declared a determination to exert themselves in action.

Among the antients, for a naval ingagement, a small space sufficed, in comparison of what modern fleets require; not only because of the smaller size of their vessels, but still more because of the different manner of working and fighting them. Our ships of war, very deep as well as large, and deriving motion only from the wind, with deep and open seas, want large intervals also between ship and ship. The antient galleys, on the contrary, always light however large, and, in action, worked by their oars alone, could form and move in very close order, and were not afraid of narrow seas. From their mode of ingagement also they required comparatively little space. Our ships, whose artillery decides their battles, must bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy; avoiding as much as possible to expose themselves in any

CHAP.  
VIII.

other direction. They engage therefore, according to the sea-phrases, close-hauled to the wind, and with the line of battle formed ahead. But the antients, whose principal weapon was a strong beak of brass or iron projecting from the stem of the galley, advanced to the attack always with the line of battle formed abreast. The greatest advantage one galley could obtain over another, was to bring its head to bear directly upon the enemy's broadside; the next, to gain the means of an oblique impulse, which might dash away some of his oars. By the success of the former attempt a galley was often sunk; by that of the other it became unmanageable, till the lost or damaged oars could be replaced; and this gave opportunity for the more decisive attack with the beak. Hence the importance of oars in action: by them alone attacks could be made, warded, or avoided in every direction. But Themistocles appears to have been the first to conceive the full advantage thus to be obtained. Missile weapons were much used by all nations; but it had been hitherto the great object of the Greeks to grapple ship to ship. The engagement then resembled an action by land; and the superiority of the heavy-armed soldier on the deck, carried the day. It seems to have been partly on this account, that the Persian commanders had added thirty men, of their best national troops, to the ordinary complement of heavy-armed in every galley of their fleet; and they seem to have depended much on this increase of strength for certainty of victory.

tory. The discernment of Themistocles, apparently instructed by observation in the various actions off Artemisium, led him to a contrary principle: he would depend less upon arms wielded by the hands of individuals than upon the vessel itself, as one great and powerful weapon, or a squadron, as a combination of such weapons. It was, with this view, important to have his vessels light and unincumbered. He therefore reduced the complement of soldiers in each trireme to eighteen; of whom fourteen only were heavy-armed, and four bowmen<sup>32</sup>.

Since the retreat from Artemisium, the Grecian fleet had been very considerably reinforced. The Lacedæmonians had added six triremes to their former ten: the Athenian squadron was increased to a hundred and eighty: some had been gained from other states: a few from the islands: and the total number of triremes was now three hundred and eighty. The triremes of the Persian fleet are generally said to have been about twelve hundred: according to Herodotus, they were above thirteen hundred<sup>33</sup>. If ex-

O 2

aggrégation

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 43.  
& seq.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 82.  
Isocr.  
Panegyr.  
p. 226. t. 1.  
ed. Aug.  
Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 89.  
& 184, 189.  
& l. 8. c. 66.

<sup>32</sup> These numbers we have only on the authority of Plutarch, who, being neither soldier nor seaman, merely states the fact. It receives however confirmation from Thucydides and Xenophon; and, as occasion will occur hereafter more particularly to observe, they explain the purpose of the alteration.

<sup>33</sup> The passage of Æschylus, which mentions the number of the Persian galleys, both as it stands in all the editions of his works, and in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles, seems clearly enough in itself to say that they were in all but a thousand; yet the commentators and translators have been generally desirous of straining

CHAP.  
VIII.

aggreration may be suspected, even in the lowest of these computations, it is yet little reasonably to be doubted but the fleet under Xerxes, however inferior in the size and quality of the vessels, exceeded, in the number of men which it bore, any naval armament ever assembled in the world.

Dodw.  
Ann.Thu.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 85.  
Æschyl.  
Pers.

Confident therefore in their strength, and urged by the common necessity of invaders to push vigorous measures, the Persians were impatient for decision. Accident seems to have made the Greeks at last the assailants; and thus perhaps contributed not a little to the greatness of their success. By daybreak, it is said on the twentieth of October, in the four hundred and eightieth year before the Christian era, they had formed their fleet in order of battle. The Athenians, on the right, were opposed to the Phenician squadron; the Lacedæmonians, on the left, to the Ionian. As the sun rose, trumpets sounded, pæans were sung, and the Grecian leaders endeavoured by all means to excite that animation among their people, which their own divided and hesitating counsels had so

straining it to mean that, to make the total, the two hundred and seven, which the poet mentions as the swiftest of the fleet, should be added to the thousand. See Stanley's note. Plato says the Persian fleet was *χιλίων καὶ ἑνὶ σελήνῳ* (1); an expression sufficiently indicating that he did not believe it to have been of many more than a thousand. According to Æschylus, the Grecian triremes were only three hundred. It is not impossible but Herodotus might have collected more accurate information of the numbers furnished by the several states.

(1) De Leg. l. 3. p. 699. t. 2.

tended

S E C T.  
V.

tended to repress. A trireme galley, returning from Ægina, excluded from the Grecian fleet by the enemy's line, and nevertheless endeavouring to pass, was attacked. An Athenian galley commanded by Ameinias, brother of the poet Æschylus, advanced to her rescue: others followed: then the Æginetans moved, and the battle soon became general.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 84.  
Æschyl.  
Pers.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 27.

The onset was vigorous on both sides. But space did not suffice for the Persians to bring their whole fleet regularly into action, nor for the Phenicians, in particular, to profit from the superior swiftness of their galleys and skill of their seamen. The Athenians and Æginetans therefore, after a sharp contest, broke the part of the Persian line first engaged. Numbers of galleys, yet out of action, pressed to its support. Among the various nations who composed the Persian fleet, commanded in chief by Persian officers little versed in naval business, while the vast army which lined the Attic shore, with the sovereign of the East at its head, were witnesses of the scene, zeal itself contributed to disorder. Damage and loss of oars, and wounds in the hull from the beaks of their own galleys, ensued; while the Athenians and Æginetans, forgetting their late enmity, or remembering it only as an incentive to generous emulation, with the most animated exertion preserved the steadiest discipline. Shortly the sea itself became scarcely visible for the quantity of wreck and floating bodies which covered it. Such is the strong expression of the poet, who himself



CHAP.  
VIII.

fought in the Athenian squadron. In the mean time the business was easier to the Lacedæmonians and other Greeks in the left wing. Some of the Ionian officers exerted themselves to earn the favor of the monarch whom they served; but others were zealously disposed to the cause of the confederates. The confusion thus created, and variously otherwise arising, in the Persian fleet, spread, and rapidly became general and extreme. All their galleys which could disengage themselves fled. Some were taken: many were sunk; and numbers of the crews, inland men, unpractised in swimming, were drowned. Among those who perished were very many of high rank, who had been forward to distinguish themselves, in this new species of war, under their monarch's eye. According to Herodotus, Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes, and admiral of the fleet, was among the killed; but he is not mentioned by Æschylus. Forty Grecian galleys are said to have been sunk, or otherwise destroyed; but the crews mostly saved themselves aboard other ships, or on the neighbouring friendly shore of Salamis. When the rout was become total, Aristides, landing on Psyttaleia at the head of a body of Athenians, put all the Persians there to the sword; under the very eye of Xerxes, who, with his immense army around him, could afford them no assistance.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 89.

Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 19.

Æschyl.  
Pers.  
Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 95.  
Plut.  
Aristid.

In considering Herodotus's account of this celebrated sea-fight, we find not less reason, than on former occasions, to praise his scrupulous

lous honesty and modesty. His narrative is SECT,  
V.  
dubious and incomplete, as all faithful narratives of great battles must be, unless some eyewitness, very peculiarly qualified by knowledge and situation, be the relater. We cannot therefore but regret, not indeed that Æschylus was a poet, but that prose-writing was yet in his age so little common, that his poetical sketch of this great transaction is the most authoritative, the clearest, and the most consistent, of any that has passed to posterity. Concerning a day, however, so glorious, so singularly interesting to Greece, and particularly to Athens, anecdotes would undoubtedly abound; and a historian, a few years only later, desirous to shine in description rather than to relate the truth, could not have wanted materials. Anecdotes indeed of particular circumstances in great battles may often be authenticated; and to those Herodotus has chiefly confined himself; avoiding a detail of the battle at large, with an express declaration that he could obtain none upon which he could rely. Among his anecdotes, one is too remarkable and of too much fame to be omitted. The queen of Halicarnassus, after showing extraordinary bravery during the action, being among the last who fled, was closely pursued by the Athenian galley which Ameinias commanded. In this extremity, at a loss for other refuge, she suddenly turned against the nearest galley of the Persian fleet, which happened to be that of Damasthymus, king of Calynda in Lycia, with whom she is said to have

Herodot.  
1. 8. c. 87,  
88 & 93.

CHAP.  
VIII.

been upon terms not of perfect friendship; and, taking him totally unprepared for such an attempt, the stroke of the beak of her galley, against the side of his, was so violent and so well aimed, that the Calyndian prince instantly sunk with his crew. Ameinias, in the hurry of the moment, without means for inquiry, concluding from what he had seen, that Artemisia's galley was either one of the confederate fleet, or one that had deserted to it, turned his pursuit toward other vessels, and the queen of Halicarnassus escaped. According to Herodotus, tho, in this instance, we shall have difficulty to give him intire credit, Xerxes, from the shore where he sat, saw, admired, and applauded the exploit.

It is indeed impossible here not to wish for those Persian histories of these great events, which probably once existed, and which a learned orientalist of our own country would flatter us with the hope of still recovering<sup>34</sup>: but most we wish for them when the Persian counsels become particularly interesting, of which the Grecian historian has undertaken to give a detail that could not come to him duly authenticated. Not that an author under a despotic monarchy, who often must not publish what he knows or believes, and sometimes may not dare even to inquire, could be put in any general competition with a republican writer, who not

<sup>34</sup> Richardson's Dissertation on the Languages, &c. of the Eastern Nations,

S E C T.  
V.

only might inquire everywhere and speak anything, but has actually manifested his free impartiality by relating with the ingenuous severity of a reproving friend, the disgraces of his fellowcountrymen, and by liberal and frequent eulogy of their enemies. We might however possibly draw, even from the flatterer of a despot, some information of which the total wreck of Persian literature hath deprived us. Yet the Greeks were not without considerable means of information, often even of the intrigues of the Persian court. The eunuchs of the palace, the persons perhaps most intimate about the monarch (for, according to Xenophon, even the great Cyrus preferred eunuchs for his confidants) were of any nation rather than Persian. Some of them were Greeks; at least born among the Greeks, tho mostly perhaps of foreign origin as of servile condition. Herodotus mentions a Greek of Chios, who acquired great wealth by the infamous traffic of castrated boys. One of these, Hermotimus, born at Pedasa in the territory of Halicarnassus, was in high favor with Xerxes, attended him into Greece, and, both before and after that expedition, was employed in affairs in Asia Minor which would lead him to communication with the principal Greeks of that country. Refugee Greeks moreover, from the various republics, continually swarmed about the courts of the Persian satraps, and even of the monarch himself; so that, tho the speeches, which Herodotus puts into the mouths of Persian cabinet-counsellors, must be as fictitious

Xenoph.  
Cyropæd.  
l. 7.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 104.  
105, 106.

as

CHAP.  
VIII.

as those which Livy attributes to his fellowcountrymen at the head of armies, yet large means were certainly open, for Greeks of rank and character, to know the manners of the Persian great, and even to pry into the politics of the empire, as far perhaps as the Persians themselves: for under a despotic government the counsels which direct the greatest affairs are generally open to very few.

After the battle of Salamis, however, the transactions of public notoriety bespeak, in a great degree, the counsels that directed them. The defeat of the fleet necessarily deranged the measures of the Persian commanders. No port was near, capable of protecting its shattered and disheartened; but still large remains. Phalerum, then the principal harbour of Athens, could not contain half its numbers. A hasty order, of the very night after the engagement, directed it to go immediately for the Hellespont. Day broke, and the Greeks, who expected a renewal of the action, looked in vain for an enemy. Quick determination of new measures was then necessary for the Persian army; which, having no sufficient magazines in the country, was, by the departure of the fleet, reduced, with its attending multitudes, to immediate danger of starving. In a few days it fell back into the rich and friendly province of Bœotia, and thence shortly into Thessaly.

Æschyl.  
Pers.  
Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 113.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 100,  
& seq.

Probably the punishment of Athens, with the submission of so many other provinces, were, in the Persian council, held sufficient, if not to satisfy

satisfy the monarch's hope of glory, yet to prevent the imputation of disgrace, and perhaps even to form some shadowy claim to honor. The defeat of the fleet would be of course attributed to the faults of the immediate commanders, and to the defects and inferiority to be expected in an armament, not properly Persian, but composed almost intirely of the conquered subjects of the empire. The spoil of Athens, and among it the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, were sent as trophies, to mark to the interior provinces the exploits of that prodigious armament, which had so diminished their population and exhausted their wealth. The affairs of the empire might require the presence of the prince. The conquered countries were not yet so far settled that it could be particularly agreeable to a young monarch, by education and by disposition probably not much either a warrior or a man of business, to pass the winter among them. To support all his forces there, during the stormy season, even had he still had command of the sea, would have been impossible. Xerxes was therefore to return into Asia; but the projects of conquest were not to be yet abandoned. Three hundred thousand men were chosen from the whole army, to remain under the command of Mardonius; who, with that force, undertook to complete the reduction of Greece in the following summer. The rejected multitude were to return with all haste into Asia; urged by the prospect of famine, and the apprehension that the approach of winter

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 113.

Æschyl.  
Pers.

CHAP.  
VIII.Herodot.  
iii sup.

winter might totally bar the passage of the mountains and rivers of Macedonia and Thrace. Of the three hundred thousand selected by Mar-donius, sixty thousand under Artabazus were to march as a guard of the royal person as far as the Hellespont. These were perhaps, among the innumerable croud of various nations and languages who attended, or endeavoured to attend, the monarch's retreat, those who alone deserved the name of soldiers. Of these, as of soldiers forming a guard necessary to the prince's dignity, and even to his safety, some care was probably taken. The rest suffered beyond description, from the haste of the march, and an almost total want of magazines: for the invasion only had been considered; the retreat was unprovided for. The disorderly multitude therefore lived by rapine, from friends equally and from foes; but all was insufficient. Other sustenance failing, they ate the very grass from the ground, and the bark, and even leaves from the trees; and, as the historian, with emphatical simplicity, says, 'they left nothing.' Dysenteries and pestilential fevers seized whom famine spared. Numbers were left sick in the towns of Thessaly, Pæonia, Macedonia, and Thrace, with arbitrary orders, little likely to be diligently obeyed, that support and attendance should be provided for them. On the forty-fifth day from the commencement of his march in Thessaly, Xerxes reached the Hellespont; with an escort which, compared with the prodigious numbers a few months before under his command

4 Dec.  
B.C. 480.

mand there, might be called nothing<sup>35</sup>. The bridges were already destroyed by storms and the violence of the current; but the fleet was arrived<sup>36</sup>. Artabazus immediately marched his detachment back toward Macedonia. The monarch proceeded to Sardis.

SECT.  
V.Herodot.  
1.8. c. 125.

35 ——— ἀπώγων τῆς στρατῆς οὐδὲν μέρος ὧς ἵπται.

Herodot. 1. 8. c. 113.

<sup>36</sup> Herodotus is not among the reputable fablers who report that Xerxes in his retreat, without an army, without a fleet, and almost without an attendant, crossed the Hellespont in a cock-boat. He tells indeed another story, not perhaps wholly undeserving attention, as a specimen of tales circulated in Greece concerning these extraordinary transactions; tho he declares for himself that he did not believe it. The curious may find it in the 118th and 119th chapters of his 8th book.

## CHAPTER



## CHAPTER IX.

The History of GREECE from the Battle of  
SALAMIS to the Conclusion of the  
PERSIAN Invasion.

## SECTION I.

*Return of the Athenians to their Country. Measures of the Grecian Fleet. Dedication to the Gods for the Victory at Salamis. Honors paid to Themistocles. Revolt of Chalcidicæ from the Persians. Siege of Potidæa by Artabazus.*

THE various affections of Grecian minds after so glorious, so important, so unexpected a victory as that of Salamis, and the consequent hasty retreat of that numberless army, the means of resistance to which seemed beyond human calculation, may in some degree be conceived, but can scarcely in any degree be described. It does not appear that the Peisistratid Athenians, or any Persian garrison remained in Athens. That city and its whole territory seem to have been recovered without a struggle. Much difference of opinion and much debate arose among the Grecian commanders, concerning the measures next to be taken by the confederate

derate fleet. It was proposed to pursue the Persians to the Hellespont, and at once crush the naval power of the empire, which would render its gigantic land-force less formidable to a country scarcely to be successfully invaded without a coöperating fleet. This was overruled<sup>1</sup>. But the most powerful naval armament that Greece had ever yet assembled, flushed with unhopèd-for success, would not immediately rest. Many of the islanders were obnoxious for their forwardness in the Persian cause. It was determined to exact a fine from them to be applied to the expences of the war. Themistocles, whose great qualities were sullied by a sordid attention to his private interest, is said on this occasion to have filled his own coffers through the influence which his high command and high reputation procured to him. The Parians, we are told, avoided all public payment through a bribe to the Athenian commander. The Andrians alone,

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 111,  
112.

<sup>1</sup> It appears difficult to determine what should be thought of the story told by Herodotus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch, and supported in some degree by the authority of Thucydides (1), of a message sent by Themistocles to Xerxes, informing him of the intention of the Greeks, after the battle of Salamis, to send their fleet to destroy the bridges of the Hellespont, and interrupt his return into Asia. Herodotus mentions it as an act of treachery, or at least of selfish policy; and were it not for the support derived from the slight mention of the circumstance by Thucydides, some incoherence in Herodotus's detail would lead to suspect that it was a meer fabrication of the adverse faction at Athens. Nepos and Plutarch, on the other hand, commend the deed as an act of the most refined, but the most patriotic policy.

(1) Herodot. l. 8. c. 108, 109, 110. Corn. Nep. & Plut. vit. Themist. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 137.

**CHAP.** of the islanders on the European side of the  
**IX.** *Ægean*, resolutely refused to pay anything. Siege was in consequence laid to their principal town, but without effect; and the fleet returned to Salamis.

Winter now approached, with a political calm, which for a long time had been little expected by the confederate Greeks. Gratitude to the gods, for the great deliverance obtained, was among the first emotions of the public mind. It was usual, after a victory, to select some of the most valuable articles of the spoil, to be offered, by the name of *Acrothinia*, first-fruits, to the supposed propitious deities. On the present occasion three Phenician trireme galleys were first chosen. One was dedicated in Salamis to the hero *Ajax*; another at the promontory *Sunium*, probably to *Minerva*<sup>a</sup>; and the third at the *Corinthian isthmus* to *Neptune*<sup>a</sup>. Other offerings required more preparation. A statue, twelve cubits high, holding in one hand a galley's prow, was dedicated to *Apollo* at *Delphi*. The oracle there demanded a particular acknowledgement from the *Æginetans*; because, it said, in the glorious contest of *Salamis*, they had excelled all the other Greeks. Those

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 121.

c. 122.

<sup>a</sup> *Minerva* and *Neptune* are not mentioned by the historian; but the conjecture seems little hazardous. The ruins of the temple of the *Suniad Minerva* remain on the promontory to this day; and *Neptune* was not only the tutelary deity of the *Isthmian games*, but esteemed proprietary of the isthmus; and a statue, we find, was erected to him there upon occasion of the subsequent victory of *Plataea*. See Herodot. b. 9. c. 81. & Pausan. b. 2. c. 1.

Islanders gladly received the honorable testimony, and sent to Delphi a brazen mast, adorned with three stars of gold. These public dedications being made or decreed, the remaining booty was divided. The fleet then proceeded to the isthmus, where another ceremony, of established practice among the Greeks, remained to be performed. It was to be decided to whom the first and second honors were due for behaviour in the war<sup>3</sup>. The chiefs delivered their opinion in writing upon the altar of Neptune. Every one gave the first vote for himself; but a large majority of the second appeared for Themistocles. Thus it remained undecided to whom the first honors should be paid; and the squadrons separated to their several states; but the general voice of the people founded the fame of Themistocles far beyond all others. Unsatisfied however with such vague applause, and disappointed of the degree of distinction which his ambition affected, Themistocles went to Lacedæmon, probably knowing that he should be well received. The Spartan government there took upon itself to decide the claims of merit. It would have been invidious to have refused the Aristeia, or first honors for bravery and general conduct, to their own admiral who had commanded in chief; but, a new and singular compliment was invented for

<sup>3</sup> ——— ἀριστεία δόσαντες τῷ ἀξιωτάτῳ γενόμενῳ Ἑλλήνων ἀπὸ τῶν πύλων τῶτον. — τοῖς πρώτῳ καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ κρίναντες ἐν πάσι. Herodot. l. 8. c. 123.

CHAP.  
IX.

the Athenian commander: they adjudged to him the prize of wisdom and maritime skill. Eurybiades and Themistocles therefore together received, from the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, the honorable reward of olive crowns. Themistocles was besides presented with a chariot; and, at his departure from Lacedæmon, three hundred Spartans, of those called Knights, or Cavalry, were appointed to escort him to the frontier; a kind of honor never, to the time of Herodotus, paid to any other stranger.

The news of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis, and of the consequent retreat of Xerxes into Asia, was quickly conveyed through all the Grecian settlements, in uncertain rumors, here exaggerated, there deficient, according to the information, the temper, the interest, the memory, or, sometimes, the invention of individuals reporting it, where public and certain means of extensive communication were little known. But the Greeks of the Thracian colonies, who had seen, with trembling, the proud march of the immense host of Persia toward Greece, were also eyewitnesses of the miserable reverse, when the monarch precipitated his retreat into Asia. Their information was, however, probably little exact concerning the force yet left hovering over their mother-country, and their knowledge of the resources of the Persian empire generally very im-

Σπαρτιητίων λογάδες, οὗτοι οἵπερ ἱππῆες καλῶσαι.

Herodot. l. 8. c. 124.

perfect.

perfect. According, therefore, to the common nature of that tide of the human mind, which operates generally with more force upon the determinations of a multitude than of an individual, the fruitful province of Chalcidicē, on the confines of Thrace and Macedonia, boldly revolted from the Persian dominion, each little town asserting its beloved independency. Meanwhile Artabazus, having seen his sovereign safe on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, hastened back with his detachment, itself a large army, to rejoin Mardonius. But as the quarters of Macedonia and Thessaly were already crowded, he halted in Chalcidicē. He received with indignation intelligence of the revolt, and thought, not unreasonably, that he should scarcely escape censure, if he suffered the winter to pass without punishing it. Immediately he laid siege to Olynthus and Potidæa. Olynthus was presently taken; and, if we may believe Herodotus, the inhabitants, being conducted to a neighbouring marsh, were there all massacred. The town, which had been occupied by a colony from Bottiæa on the Macedonian coast, was given to native Chalcidians; and according to that common policy of the Persians, which we have heretofore remarked, the government was intrusted to Critobulus, a Greek of the town of Toronē in the neighbouring peninsula of Sithonia.

The actions of Thermopylæ and Salamis had, however, had a quick effect in diminishing the extreme dread before entertained of the Persian power, and in promoting, among the Greeks, a

SECT.  
I.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 126,  
& seq.

CHAP.  
IX.Herodot.  
1.8, c. 128.

general emulation, in arms, and in the spirit of independency. The Potidæans, whose situation commanded the neck of the fruitful and rebellious peninsula of Pallenë, defended themselves so vigorously that little progress was made in the siege. But the wealth of Persia, continually brought forth to supply the deficiency of military science and discipline, created a weight in the balance of war, against which the Greeks with difficulty found a counterpoise. Timoxeinus, commander of the Scionæan auxiliaries in Potidæa, was bribed to a treasonable correspondence with the Persian general. They communicated by means of letters, wrapt around arrows, which were shot to spots agreed upon. The accidental wounding of a Potidæan, by one of those arrows, however discovered the treason before it had gone to any pernicious length. A crowd immediately gathered about the wounded man; and, on extracting the arrow, a letter from Artabazus to Timoxeinus was found upon it. Three months had now been consumed in the siege, and little progress made, when the tide, to which many of the recesses of the Ægean sea are subject, flowing to an unusual height, flooded the Persian camp<sup>5</sup>. Immediately upon the ebb, the general ordered the army to march, meaning to take a station on higher ground within the peninsula of Pallenë; but not half the troops had passed the flats, when the

<sup>5</sup> See Herodotus, b. 7, c. 198, also note 48, p. 680, of Wesseling's edition.

flood

flood, made again, with increased violence. SECT.  
L  
Many of the Persians were drowned: the Potidæans, fallying in boats, killed many; and Artabazus found his measures so disconcerted, that he raised the siege, and led the remains of his army into Thessaly.

## SECTION II.

*Preparations for the Campaign. Speeches of Alexander King of Macedonia, of the Lacedæmonian Ambassador, and of the Athenian Minister in the Athenian Assembly. The Athenians a second time quit Attica. Zeal of the Athenian People for the Prosecution of the Persian War.*

THE Persian fleet, as soon as Xerxes was passed into Asia, quitting the Hellespont, had gone, part to Samos, part to Cuma, in whose ports it wintered. In the spring, the whole assembled at Samos. Mistrust of those conquered subjects of the empire, who alone were mariners, led those who directed the affairs of the navy, to an alteration of the establishment of their crews, the direct contrary to that which the genius and experience of Themistocles had imagined, and which had proved so advanta-

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 130.  
& seq.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 27.



CHAP.  
IX.

geous in practice: they increased the proportion of Median and Persian soldiers. The fleet however remained at Samos, to awe the Asiatic and Thracian coasts and neighbouring islands, making no attempt westward.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 136.  
& seq.

Spring, says the historian, and the recollection that Mardonius was in Thessaly, awakened the Greeks. The assembling of the army was yet delayed, but a fleet of a hundred and twenty trireme galleys was collected at Ægina, under Leotychidas, king of Lacedæmon. Xanthippus, the prosecutor of Miltiades, commanded the Athenian squadron. During the winter, some of the leading men of Chios had conspired against Strattis, whom the Persians had appointed governor, or, in the Greek term, tyrant of their island. They were detected, but found means to fly, and they went to Ægina. Addressing themselves to the naval commanders there, they urged, That all Ionia was ripe for revolt, and wanted only the countenance of the victorious fleet of Greece, to make a powerful diversion for the Persian arms. They prevailed so far that the fleet moved eastward, as if to cross the Ægean; but, stopping at Delos, dread of engaging the might of Persia, at a distance from their own coasts and in seas less known to them, again predominated; so that, as the historian proceeds to observe, the space between Samos and Delos remained in peace through mutual fear.

Herodot.  
l. 8, c. 136,  
& seq.

Mardonius, meanwhile, had not neglected those measures which might promote the success  
of

of his arms by land. Sensible of the importance of naval coöperation, he resolved upon the endeavour to detach the Athenians from the Grecian confederacy; justly thinking that, if this could be effected, the Persian fleet would immediately resume a decided superiority. Alexander king of Macedonia was judiciously chosen for his ambassador to the Athenian commonwealth. That prince was intimately connected with both the Grecian and Persian nations. His family boasted its descent from Hercules and Perseus, through Temenus, the Heracleid, king of Argos. It held, with the Athenian commonwealth, the sacred connection of hereditary hospitality: Alexander himself had communicated with Athens in those revered offices of friendship. But his sister Gygæa was married to Bubares, a Persian high in rank and in command, son of that Megabazus, who in the reign of Darius had conquered the western Thracians, and compelled Amyntas, father of Alexander, to the delivery of earth and water. Yet, tho Alexander had constantly acted with the Persians, he had nevertheless, as far as his dependent situation would permit, always shown himself friendly to the confederate Greeks. He was well received at Athens. But as the news of his arrival would quickly be spread through Greece, and would probably excite jealousy among the confederates, especially the Lacedæmonians, the leaders of the Athenian administration deferred his public audience be-

Diod. Sic.  
l. xi. c. 28.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 141.

CHAP. fore the assembly of the people, till ministers  
IX. came from Sparta.

Herodotus does not inform us who particularly, during these remarkable transactions, directed the measures of the Attic government; which, both in wisdom and in magnanimity, at least equal anything in the political history of mankind. Plutarch attributes all to Aristides. As early as possible after the arrival of the Lacedæmonian ministers, an assembly of the people was summoned. The Lacedæmonian ministers and the king of Macedonia were together admitted to this really public audience. Silence was proclaimed. Alexander rose; and, according to the original historian, spoke in this simple and antiquated, but emphatical style of oratory\*: ‘Athenians, thus saith Mardonius: “The commands of the king are  
“come to me, saying, I FORGIVE THE ATHE-  
“NIANS ALL THEIR OFFENCES AGAINST ME.  
“NOW THEREFORE, MARDONIUS, THUS DO;  
“RESTORE TO THEM THEIR TERRITORY,  
“AND ADD TO IT WHATSOEVER THEMSELVES  
“SHALL CHUSE, LEAVING THEM TO THEIR  
“OWN LAWS; AND IF THEY WILL MAKE  
“ALLIANCE WITH ME, REBUILD ALL THE  
“TEMPLES WHICH HAVE BEEN BURNT. Such  
“being the king’s commands to me, so I must  
“necessarily do, unless you prevent. From

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 140.

\* Testimony is also borne to this remarkable transaction by Demosthenes, 2d Philipp. Diodorus Sic. b. 11. c. 28. and Plutarch in his Life of Aristides.

“ myself

S E C T.  
II.

“ myself I say to you thus: Why would you  
 “ persevere in the folly of making war against  
 “ the king? You cannot overcome him; you  
 “ cannot long resist him. You know how nu-  
 “ merous his armies are, and what they have  
 “ effected. You are informed of the force un-  
 “ der my command. Should you overcome  
 “ me, which in reason you cannot hope, imme-  
 “ diately a still greater force will be sent against  
 “ you. As a friend I recommend to you, not,  
 “ in the vain contest with the king, to lose  
 “ your country; but to seize the honorable  
 “ opportunity of this offer, from the king him-  
 “ self, for making peace. Be free; and let there  
 “ be alliance between us without fraud or de-  
 “ ceit.” These things, O Athenians, Mardo-  
 “ nius commanded me to say to you. For  
 “ my own part, I shall omit to inlarge upon the  
 “ friendship I bear you, since this is not the  
 “ first occasion upon which you have experien-  
 “ ced it. I beseech you to accept the terms  
 “ proposed by Mardonius; for I well see the  
 “ impossibility of your long contending against  
 “ the Persian empire. Upon no other conside-  
 “ ration would I have come to you thus com-  
 “ missioned. But the king’s power is more than  
 “ human: his arm is of unmeasurable length.  
 “ I dread the event for you, if you refuse the  
 “ great conditions now offered. The very situ-  
 “ ation of your country should indeed admonish  
 “ you: lying in the road to the rest of the  
 “ confederates, you alone are first exposed, and  
 “ actually bear all the brunt of the war. Com-  
 “ ply


## CHAP.

I A.

ply therefore ; for it is not a little honorable to you, that you, alone among the Greeks, are selected, by that great king, for offers of peace and friendship.

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 148.

The king of Macedonia concluded, and the chief of the Spartan ministers rose : ‘ The Lacedæmonians,’ he said, ‘ have sent us to request that you will admit nothing to the prejudice of Greece, nor receive any proposal from the Persian. For such a proceeding were unjust, unbecoming any Grecian people, and on many accounts, most of all unbecoming you. To you indeed we owe this war, which was excited contrary to our inclination. The quarrel was originally with you alone ; now it is extended to all Greece. That the Athenians, therefore, who from of old have, more than all mankind, asserted the liberties of others, should become the authors of slavery to Greece, were most hainous. We grieve for your sufferings ; that now for two seasons you have lost the produce of your lands ; and that the public calamity should so long press so severely upon individuals. The Lacedæmonians and the other confederates are desirous of making you reparation. They will engage, while the war shall last, to maintain your families, and all those of your slaves who may not be wanted to attend you on military service. Let not therefore Alexander the Macedonian persuade you, softening Mardonius’s message. He is certainly acting in his proper character : a tyrant himself, he coöperates with a tyrant. But for you,

‘ you, prudence utterly forbids what he advises : SECT.  
II.  
 ‘ you well know that among barbarians there is   
 ‘ no faith, no truth.’

In the name of the Athenian people (according to Plutarch, by Aristeides) the following answer was then made to the king of Macedonia : ‘ We know that the power of the Persian empire is many times greater than ours, Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 143,  
 ‘ With this therefore it was needless to reproach us. Nevertheless, independency being  
 ‘ our object, we are determined to defend ourselves to the utmost, and you would in vain  
 ‘ persuade us to make any terms with the barbarian. You may therefore tell Mardonius,  
 ‘ that the Athenians say, “ While the sun holds  
 ‘ his course we will never make alliance with  
 ‘ Xerxes ; but trusting in our assisting gods and  
 ‘ heroes, whose temples and images he, setting  
 ‘ at nought, has burnt, we will persevere in resisting him.” Come then no more to the  
 ‘ Athenians with such proposals, nor, with any  
 ‘ view of promoting our welfare, recommend  
 ‘ what is dishonorable and unjust. For yourself, we shall always be desirous of showing  
 ‘ you all the friendship and respect, to which the  
 ‘ antient hospitality and alliance between us intitle you.’

The orator then addressed the Lacedæmonian ministers thus : ‘ The apprehension of the Lacedæmonians that we might accept the terms Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 144,  
 ‘ proposed by the barbarian, was, upon a general view of human nature, certainly not unreasonable : but after the proof you have had  
 ‘ of

CHAP.  
IX.

of the resolution of the Athenians, it becomes  
 a dishonorable apprehension. No riches, nor  
 the offer of the finest country upon earth, should  
 bribe us to connect ourselves with the Persians,  
 to the enslaving of Greece. Were it possible  
 that we could be so disposed, yet the obstacles  
 are many and great. First, and what principally  
 affect us, the images and temples of the  
 gods burnt and reduced to rubbish. This it  
 is our indispensable duty to resent, and revenge  
 to the utmost, rather than make alliance  
 with the perpetrator. Then, as a Grecian  
 people, our connection in blood and in language,  
 our common dedications to the gods,  
 our common sacrifices, and our similar customs  
 and manners. Of these the Athenians cannot  
 become the betrayers. Know then this, if  
 before you knew it not, that, while one Athenian  
 survives, we will never ally ourselves  
 with Xerxes. We gratefully acknowledge your  
 kind attention to us, amid the distress and ruin  
 of our private affairs, in proposing to maintain  
 our families. We will however still make the  
 best we can of our own means, without burdening  
 you. These then being our resolutions,  
 let there be, on your side, no delay in corresponding  
 measures. Your army must march  
 immediately; for, according to all appearances,  
 it will not be long before the barbarian will invade  
 our country: he will move instantly,  
 upon receiving information that we have rejected  
 his proposals. Before therefore he can  
 arrive in Attica, it will behove us to meet him  
 in

\* in Bœotia.\* With these answers the king of Macedonia and the Lacedæmonian ambassadors departed.

SECT.  
II.

Mardonius did not deceive the expectation of the Athenian leaders: he advanced immediately, by nearly the same road that Xerxes had taken, toward Attica. The wonted hesitation and dilatoriness meanwhile prevailed in the counsels of the Peloponnesians. The Persian army was already in Bœotia, and no measures were taken by the confederacy for defending Attica. Once more therefore it became necessary for the Athenians hastily to abandon their country. Probably however the necessity was less grievous than on the former occasion: for, beside being more prepared, they had less to apprehend; their own fleet now commanding the Grecian seas. In their own island of Salamis, therefore, their families and effects would, for the present at least, be beyond annoyance from the Persian arms. Thither all were removed; and about eight months after Xerxes had quitted Athens, Mardonius, unopposed, retook possession of that city.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. i.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 3.  
& 6.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

June.  
B.C. 479

The conduct of the Peloponnesians, but most particularly of the Lacedæmonians who were at the head of them, appears upon this occasion, by the account of Plutarch as well as Herodotus, ungenerous, ungrateful, and faithless, if not even dastardly<sup>†</sup>: that of the Athenians, magnanimous

<sup>†</sup> Plutarch, in his Treatise against Herodotus, has censured that historian for relating what, in his life of Aristides, he has himself in strong terms confirmed.

even



CHAP.  
IX.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 4.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 5.  
M. T. Cic.  
de Off. l. 3.  
c. 11.

even to enthusiasm. Deprived of their country, and apparently betrayed by their allies, the Persian general thought this a favorable opportunity for attempting once more to draw the Athenians from the Grecian confederacy. He therefore sent Muriichides, a Hellespontine Greek, to Salamis, with the same offers which he had before made by the king of Macedonia. The minister was admitted to audience by the council of five hundred. Lycidas, alone of the counsellors, was for paying so much attention to the proposal as to refer it to an assembly of the people. This circumstance was communicated : and so vehement was the popular zeal for persevering in enmity to Persia, a tumultuous crowd, on the rising of the council, stoned Lycidas to death. The frenzy spread ; and, what we had rather not believe, tho Herodotus the friend and panegyrist of Athens affirms it, and the philosophic Plutarch seems even to applaud the deed, the Athenian women attacked the house of the unfortunate senator, and his widow and children perished under their hands. The law of nations was at the same time so far respected, that Muriichides was dismissed without injury or insult.

## SECTION

## SECTION III.

SECT.  
III.

*Campaign in Bœotia. Battle of Plataea. Punishment of Thebes.*

MINISTERS had been sent from Athens, accompanied by others from Plataea and Megara, to remonstrate with the Lacedæmonian government on their shameful neglect of their engagements, and to learn what were now to be the measures of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians were celebrating their feast of the Hyacinthia, one of the most solemn of their calendar. This furnishing some pretext, the ephors, those magistrates who had usurped a power in the Spartan government superior to that of the kings, delayed their answer from day to day for ten days successively. The works at the Corinthian isthmus, never meanwhile intermitted, were now upon the point of completion. The Athenian ministers, thinking themselves insulted and their country betrayed, determined on the morrow to declare to the Lacedæmonian senate their sense of such treatment, and to leave Sparta. At length, however, the Lacedæmonians, after consultation with their allies, and, it is added, some reproaches from them, had determined upon juster measures. Five thousand Spartans, each attended by seven Helots, making all together a body of forty thousand fighting men (for all the Helots acted as light-armed troops) marched silently out of the city in the evening, under

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 6  
& 7.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 8.  
& 11.

c. 7 & 8.

c. 1.

c. 29.

CHAP.  
IX.

under the command of Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, regent for his cousin Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, yet a minor. In the morning, when the Athenian ministers came to make their final complaint to the senate, they were told, that the Lacedæmonian army was already on the confines of Arcadia, in its way to meet the Persians. The Argians were, according to Herodotus, so thoroughly in the Persian interest, that they had undertaken to intercept any Spartan troops which should attempt to quit Laconia. The suddenness and secrecy of Pausanias's march defeated their intention. Immediately, however, on receiving intelligence that the Lacedæmonian army had entered Arcadia, they sent information to Mardonius.

While the Persian general had any hope of bringing over the Athenians, he had carefully spared Attica; but as soon as he was assured that they were immoveable, he gave up the country for plunder to his troops, and he completely destroyed the city. Then, hearing that the Peloponnesians were in motion, he returned into Bœotia; a country more commodious for the action of his numerous cavalry, nearer to his magazines, which were principally at Thebes, and whence, in any misfortune, retreat would be more open, while in success, the way was equally ready into Peloponnesus. He fixed his camp in the Theban territory, extending it along the course of the Asopus, from Erythræ toward Hysia, on the border of the Platæan lands. Within this tract he chose a situation, where

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 13.

c. 15.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 28.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 41.

c. 15.

where he fortified a space of something more than a square mile. SECT.  
III.

The Lacedæmonians meanwhile were joined, at the isthmus, by the other Peloponnesians of the confederacy; and there, according to the constant practice of the Greeks in all momentous undertakings, after solemn sacrifices, the bowels of the victims were observed, whence persons believed to be inspired, or, if such were not to be found, persons learned in divination, undertook to know how far and upon what conditions the gods would be propitious. Tisamenus, an Eleian, attended Pausanias in quality of prophet to the army. The Lacedæmonians had such confidence in the fortune and prophetic abilities of this man, that, to secure him to themselves, when he had refused all other price, they admitted him and his brother to the full privileges of Spartan citizens; an honor never, to the time of Herodotus, conferred upon any other person. Upon the present occasion the symptoms were very favorable; which would perhaps commonly happen when measures were already resolved upon; tho, among the Greeks, policy and superstition were so intimately blended, that it is often difficult to discover what should be attributed to each. At Eleusis the combined army was joined by the Athenian forces, to the chief command of which Aristides had been raised, by a particular decree of the people. There farther sacrifices were made, and the symptoms of the victims were again favorable. The army,

c. 38.

c. 39.

c. 19 & 28.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 30.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

CHAP.  
IX.

therefore, proceeded with confidence into Bœotia, and took a position on the roots of mount Cithæron, opposite to the camp of the Persians, the river Asopus flowing between them.

Heródot.  
l. 9. c. 20.

Mardonius had judiciously left the passage of the mountains uninterrupted to the Grecian troops; his business being, if possible, to draw them into the champain country; where, through his cavalry, on which, then as at this day, was the principal reliance of Asiatic armies, victory would be nearly certain to him, and probably easy. But Pausanias would not move from his advantageous ground; and his position was so strong that the Persian general could not venture an attempt to force it. He therefore ordered Masistius, his general of the cavalry, to advance with all the horse, and, by harrassing in various parts, to make the Greeks uneasy in their situation; not neglecting at the same time, if he could find or create an opportunity, to attempt an impression. The Persian cavalry all used missile weapons, darts or arrows, or both; a practice by which, near four centuries and a half after, they destroyed the Roman army under Crassus, and in which the horsemen of the same countries are still wonderfully skilful at this day. Like the eastern cavalry at this day also, they commonly attacked or harrassed by small bodies in succession; vehement in onset, never long in conflict, but, if the enemy was firm in resistance, retreating as hastily as they had advanced, to prepare for another charge.

The

The Megarian camp was in the part of the Grecian line the most accessible to cavalry. Here, therefore, Masistius directed his principal efforts. The Megarians, somewhat surprized by the novel manner of the attack, nevertheless maintained their station. Wearied, however, at length by the unceasing succession of fresh troops, all of whom approached enough to give opprobrious language, and discharge their darts and arrows, after which they instantly retired, the Megarian leaders sent to inform Pausanias of their distress; adding, that they must abandon their post if not quickly relieved. Pausanias himself was at a loss how effectually to oppose those desultory attacks of the Persian cavalry. He assembled the generals for their advice, and expressed his wish, that volunteers could be found to undertake a business, which was so new to him, that he was unwilling to risk orders upon it. The Athenians alone offered themselves. Aristeides had had the advantage of serving in a high command under the great Miltiades at the battle of Marathon. Upon the present occasion he selected an active officer named Olympiodorus, under whose orders he placed three hundred chosen heavy-armed foot, with a large proportion of archers and dartmen. These seem to have been, in the Athenian armies, superior to the light troops of the Peloponnesians; and probably also to those of the Megarians; who, being a Dorian people from Peloponnesus, would pride themselves upon adhering to the Peloponnesian discipline. Olympiodorus hastened to the relief of the pressed part of the line. The

SECT.  
III.c. 21.  
Plut.  
Aristid.Plut.  
Aristid.Herodot.  
& Plut. ut  
sup.

CHAP.  
IX.

Persian horse, who, by the swiftness of their retreat, eluded every effort of the Megarian heavy-armed foot, found themselves unexpectedly incommoded by the Athenian bowmen. Charging to disperse them, they were received by the heavy-armed foot, upon whom they could make no impression, but suffered in the attempt. Masistius, vexed to be thus baffled, and anxious to recover an advantage from which he had promised himself credit, advanced to direct and encourage those desultory attacks, so harrassing to regular infantry. In the instant of a charge, his horse, wounded with an arrow, reared upright, and Masistius fell. His troops, attentive to their usual evolution, without adverting to their general's misfortune, wheeled and retreated full speed. The Athenian heavy-armed foot, rushing forward, surrounded Masistius. His horse was caught and led off. Himself, lying on the ground, after the excellence of his armour, which was complete like that of the knights of western Europe in the times of chivalry, had resisted many efforts of the Athenian soldiers, was at length pierced in the eye by a javelin, which penetrated to the brain. The Persian cavalry, halting at their usual distance from the enemy, waited in vain for fresh orders. Perceiving then their loss, the whole body prepared to charge together, to revenge their slain general, or, at least, to recover the body. Olympiódorus, expecting this, had sent for succour; but the Persians made their charge before any sufficient reinforcement could arrive, and the Athenians were obliged to retire for

for more advantageous ground. Assistance however was not delayed. The Grecian foot charged the Persian horse, put them to flight, and recovered their prize. The cavalry stood again at the distance of about a quarter of a mile; but, after some consultation among the principal surviving officers, retreated to their camp.

SECT.  
III.

Masistijs was a man very high both in rank and in esteem among the Persians, and, as it appears from Herodotus, next in command to Mardonius. His death was therefore lamented in their camp, with all the pomp of public mourning, and every honorable testimony of general grief. The event was, on the other

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 24.

hand, not a little encouraging to the Greeks. The leaders derived just confidence from the experience that the formidable cavalry of the East could be resisted; and the body of the slain general, borne on a carriage through the whole camp, however, in itself a melancholy object, was, in this season, an animating spectacle to the soldiers. It was now determined to quit the present ground, which, tho otherwise advantageous, had been found inconvenient from scarcity of water (for the decided superiority of the enemy's cavalry made it difficult to water from the Asopus) and to venture to a lower situation, within the Platæan territory, near the Gargaphian fountain. In their march from Erythræ, they kept the mountain-ridge by Hysiaë, but the ground of incampment consisted of gentle eminences only.

c. 25.

9 Sept.





## HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP.  
IX.

c. 25, 26.

In this situation, nothing forbidding, the troops of every Grecian state claimed their accustomed post in the line. The Lacedæmonians, having been long the leading people of Greece, had the right as their acknowledged privilege. The Athenians, unquestionably next in consequence, thought themselves intitled to the second rank; but having never acted in any large body with Peloponnesian armies, no custom had established their degree of precedency. The Tegeans therefore claimed the left of the line, as their post by ancient prescription. A very ruinous quarrel might have ensued, but for the wise and dignified conduct of the Athenian commanders. The dispute was brought before a meeting of the officers of the army. The Tegeans urged their claim in a studied oration, supporting it by a long detail of the great actions of their ancestors. Aristides answered for the Athenians<sup>\*</sup>. ‘We understand,’ he said, ‘that we came hither not to harangue but to fight. Otherwise, were we disposed to boast of the deeds in arms of our ancestors, we could go as far into antiquity as the Arcadians, and perhaps find more honorable testimonies in our favor. For what has passed in our own times we need only mention Marathon. But we think it highly unbecoming, in a moment like the present, to be disputing

c. 27.

<sup>\*</sup> Herodotus, in relating this transaction, speaks of the Athenians in general, without naming any one: Plutarch attributes all to Aristides.

‘ about

‘ about precedency. We are ready to obey  
 ‘ you, Lacedæmonians, wheresoever, and next  
 ‘ to whomsoever you think it for the common  
 ‘ advantage to place us. Wherever our sta-  
 ‘ tion may be appointed, we shall endeavour  
 ‘ to act as becomes us in the common cause of  
 ‘ Greece. Command therefore, and depend  
 ‘ upon our obedience.’ The Lacedæmonians,  
 without hesitation, and with one voice, ex-  
 claimed, that ‘ The Athenians ought to have  
 ‘ the post of honor in preference to the Arca-  
 ‘ dians.’

SECT.  
III.

c. 286

The army was then disposed in the following order : five thousand Spartans of the city held the first place on the right, attended by thirty-five thousand light-armed Helots : then five thousand Lacedæmonians of the other towns of Laconia, attended by five thousand Helots. Next to these were the Tegeans, in number fifteen hundred : then five thousand Corinthians, three hundred Potidæans from Pallenë, six hundred Orchomenians of Arcadia, three thousand Sicyonians, eight hundred Epidaurians, one thousand Træzenians, two hundred Lepreats, four hundred Mycenæans and Tirynthians, one thousand Phliasians, three hundred Hermionians, six hundred Eretrians and Styrians, four hundred Chalcidians, five hundred Ambraciots, eight hundred Leucadians and Anactorians, two hundred Paleans of Cephallenia, five hundred Æginetans, three thousand Megarians, six hundred Platæans, and lastly, eight thousand Athenians held the extreme of the left wing.

Q 4

These,

CHAP.  
IX.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 29.

c. 31.  
c. 40.

c. 31.

These, exclusively of the Helots, were together thirty-eight thousand seven hundred; all heavy-armed foot. But every Spartan of the city had seven Helots attending him: every other Lacedæmonian had one; and the slaves, who acted as light-armed soldiers, attending the other Greeks, were also, according to Herodotus, nearly in the proportion of one to every heavy-armed soldier. The light-armed would thus be, in all, sixty-nine thousand five hundred, and the total number of fighting men <sup>9</sup> a hundred and eight thousand two hundred. There were besides eighteen hundred Thespians, not regularly armed, who would make the whole a hundred and ten thousand. Herodotus mentions no horse in the Grecian army; probably because the force was inconsiderable, and utterly incompetent to face the numerous and excellent cavalry of Persia.

As soon as it was known that the Greeks had filed off toward Platæa, Mardonius also moved and incamped over against them, keeping still the Asopus in his front. Herodotus supposes his army to have consisted now of three hundred and fifty thousand fighting men; of whom fifty thousand were Greeks or Macedonians; tho, he says, the number of these was never exactly ascertained. In numbering the others also he has omitted to deduct those pro-

<sup>9</sup> Ἀνδρῶν μαχητῶν. There were perhaps other slaves who did not bear arms, and there might be light-armed soldiers who were not slaves. Such apparently the Thespians were. See note 49, p. 706, of Wesseling's Herodotus.

bably lost in the march of Artabazus and in winter-quarters, together with the sick, beside those by his own account destroyed at the siege of Potidæa. Cornelius Nepos makes the infantry two hundred thousand, and the horse twenty thousand, all chosen troops. Among the Greeks under the Persian banners, a thousand Phocians followed with extreme reluctance; while their fellowcountrymen, who had taken refuge among the fastnesses of Parnassus, were, with all the activity that the zeal of revenge and the lust of plunder united could excite, continually harrassing the outskirts of the army.

SECT.  
III.

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Arist.

Herodot.  
ut sup.

Mardonius, as well as Pausanias, had an Eleian prophet in his pay. Herodotus affirms that he even solicitously consulted Grecian oracles concerning the event of the war; and gives a very detailed account of his application to the prophetic cavern of Trophonius at Lebadea in Bœotia. Possibly he might think it of consequence to propagate among the Greeks, both his auxiliaries and his enemies, the belief that their own gods favored the Persian cause. But the Greeks under his command had also their particular prophet, whose predictions might be inconvenient to him, and against whom a Grecian prophet, under his own influence, might be useful. For himself, it is utterly unlikely that he would pay any regard to the oracles of deities, the belief in whom the religion of his country taught him to despise and abhor. The

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 37.  
38.

Grecian

CHAP.  
IX.

Grecian prophets however in both armies, on inspection of the sacrificed victims, foretold victory to their own, provided it received the attack. These prophecies, if dictated by policy, appear on both sides judicious<sup>10</sup>. For the Greeks had only to keep their advantageous ground, while the vast army of their enemy consumed its magazines, and they would have the benefit of victory without risk. To the Persians also the same prediction might be useful; to account to the soldier for the inaction of his general before an army so inferior, and to keep him quiet under sufferings from scarcity and probably badness of provisions, together with the want of many things to which Asiatics were accustomed, while means were sought to intice or force the Greeks from their position. Eight days passed without any material attempt on either side. But, during this pause, Mardonius obtained exact information of the defiles of mount Cithæron, through which the Grecian army received its supplies. On the evening of the ninth day a large body of horse marched,

c. 39.

17 Sept.

<sup>10</sup> If the simple Herodotus sometimes tires with reiterated details of the superstition of his age, yet the philosophical Plutarch is far more disgusting. Herodotus, drawing his pictures from the life, is often informing, and never fails to be in some degree amusing. We are indeed sometimes at a loss to know what he believed himself; and often we wish in vain to discover how far the real belief of statesmen and generals has operated, and where their policy only has made use of the credulity of the vulgar. Here we might expect the philosopher of an enlightened age to assist us; but we are totally disappointed.

Just

Just where the defile meets the plain they fell in with a convoy. They killed men and cattle till fated with slaughter, and drove the remainder to their own camp. Two days then again passed without any considerable event, neither army venturing to pass the Asopus; but the Persian horse, in detached bodies, were unceasingly harrassing the Greeks.

SECT.  
III.

Whether the Grecian soothsayer in the Persian general's pay was really intractable, or whether only the historian's zeal for the credit of the religion of his country induced him to propagate, and perhaps believe, the report, Mardonius, we are told, at length determined to disregard the Grecian prognostics, which forbade attack, and to follow the laws and customs of the Persians alone in engaging the enemy. The conduct, however, which Herodotus attributes to him upon this occasion, shows both the general and the politician. Having summoned the principal Grecian officers of his army, he asked if they knew of any oracle declaring that a Persian army should perish in Greece. None would own they knew of any such, tho it seems a report of such an oracle had been circulated. 'Then,' said Mardonius, 'I will tell you, that I well know an oracle has foretold the destruction of a Persian army that shall plunder the temple of Delphi. Be however assured that the army under my orders shall never violate that temple. The Greeks therefore, allies of the Persians, may proceed, confident of the favor of their gods, and of victory.' He then declared

Herodot.  
I. 9. c. 42.

20 Sept.

CHAP.  
IX.

c. 16.

clared his intention to attack the confederates on the next day, and directed to prepare accordingly. As the historian had conversed with Bœotians of rank who served under Mardonius, the account of this transaction, in itself probable, might come to him well authenticated.

Among those of Grecian race now subjects of the Persian empire, Alexander king of Macedonia, from an independent sovereign become the follower of a Persian general, would not naturally be the most satisfied with his new situation. Revolving in his mind the possible consequences of the approaching day, he could not rest. At midnight he mounted his horse, rode to the Athenian line, and demanded to speak with the general. Aristides, informed that an unknown person on horseback from the Persian camp, and apparently of rank, demanded to speak with him, assembled some of his principal officers, and went with them to the place. The king of Macedonia told them, ' that Mardonius had determined to attack the ' Grecian camp next morning, and had given ' his orders for the purpose. Should anything ' nevertheless prevent the attack from taking ' place, he advised that the Grecian generals ' should persevere in holding their present ' situation; for the deficiency of the magazines would soon compel the Persians to retire. His affection for the Greek nation in ' general, and his particular regard for the ' Athenian people, had induced him to hazard ' the

Herodot.

I. 9. c. 44.

45.

Plut. vit.

Aristid.

‘ the very dangerous measure in which they saw  
 ‘ him engaged. He need not therefore, he was  
 ‘ sure, request from them that secrecy which his  
 ‘ safety required; but, on the contrary, should  
 ‘ the war at last have a favorable issue for them,  
 ‘ he trusted that his known inclination for the  
 ‘ Grecian cause, and more especially his service  
 ‘ of that night, would be remembered, when  
 ‘ Greece, being free, might assist Macedonia  
 ‘ in recovering independency.’ Alexander hastened back to his own camp; Aristides immediately went to Pausanias with the intelligence he had received.

SECT.  
III.

Herodo.  
l. 9. c. 46.

On the arrival of the Athenian general at the commander in chief's tent, the important consultation was entered upon, in what manner to resist the attack, expected in a few hours, which was to decide the fate of Greece. It had been observed that the native Persians, esteemed far superior to the other Asiatic infantry, held the left of the enemy's line, against the Lacedæmonians, and the Greeks in the Persian service the right, against the Athenians. Pausanias proposed a change in the order of the Grecian army; that the Athenians, who alone of the confederates had any experience of action with the Persians, and who were elated, not only with the memory of their great victory at Marathon, but also with the event of their recent engagement with the cavalry, should move to the right wing, and that the Lacedæmonians, long accustomed to be superior to all the Greeks, should take the left. Aristides readily consented, and orders.



CHAP.  
IX

21 Sept.  
Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 47.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

orders were given accordingly. Day broke, and the Persian generals observed the Grecian troops in motion. This unexpected circumstance induced them to defer the intended attack. Change in their own disposition might become necessary; changes were made; the day was consumed in evolutions of both armies, and the Persian infantry never came into action. But the cavalry harraressed unceasingly the more accessible parts of the Grecian line. Generally they did no more than discharge their bows and hastily retire; thus, however, keeping a constant alarm, and, while they inflicted many wounds, receiving little injury. But a more serious attack was made upon that part of the Lacedæmonian line which guarded the Gargaphian fountain, where the horse remained masters of the field.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 49.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 50.

Night put an end to this desultory kind of action; when, after a day of unremitted fatigue<sup>11</sup>, the Grecian army was without water. Provisions also began to fail, the activity of the Persian horse intercepting all supplies. To move therefore was indispensable. At little more than a mile from the Gargaphian fountain, toward Platæa, the waters of the Asopus, in their descent from mount Cithæron, formed an island, not half a mile wide. This spot, for the sake of water, it was determined to occupy. At the same time it was resolved to send half

c. 51.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

<sup>11</sup> Κείμεν μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκυμένης τῆς ἡμέρας, ἔχει πόρον ὕδατος. Herodot. l. 9. c. 51.

SECT.  
III.

the army to the mountains, to bring in a convey of provisions which waited there, not daring to stir beyond the defiles. But it was feared to attempt a movement in the plain, in presence of the Persian horse, which in the very camp had given such annoyance. The second watch of the night was therefore the time appointed for the march. But when, danger pressing, fear ran high, the troops of each independent state little regarded the orders of the commander in chief. The Tegeans steddily observed the motions of the Lacedæmonians, and the Platæans those of the Athenians; but the rest, instead of halting at the island, fled (for that is the term used by Herodotus, and confirmed even by Plutarch) as far as the temple of Juno, under the walls of Platæa, at the distance of two miles and a half from the Gargaphian fountain.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 52.  
Lys. or.  
fun. p. 107.  
vol. 195.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

The obstinacy of a Spartan officer, from which only unfortunate consequences could reasonably be expected, led immediately to the great and most important victory which followed. Amompharetus, whose military rank was that of locage, but who was besides vested with the sacred dignity of the priesthood, urging the laws of his country against his general's orders, absolutely refused to retreat. Pausanias, incensed at this disobedience, yet, as the circumstance was altogether new in the Spartan service, at a loss how to act, detained the Lacedæmonian forces while the others were pressing their march. But the Athenian general, ever attentive to the interest

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 53.  
54.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

CHAP.  
IX.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 55.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

interest of the confederacy at large, before he would suffer his own troops to move, sent to inquire the cause of the delay of which he was informed among the Lacedæmonians. The officer dispatched upon this occasion found the commander in chief in high altercation with Amompharetus; who at the instant of the Athenian's arrival, taking up a large stone in both his hands, in allusion to the Grecian mode of voting, by casting a shell, a pebble, or a die into an urn, threw it before his general's feet, saying, 'With this die I give my vote not to fly from the strangers;' for by that gentle term the Lacedæmonians usually distinguished foreigners, whom the other Greeks called barbarians. Pausanias desired the Athenian officer to report to his immediate commander what he had seen, and to request that the motions of the Athenian troops might be directed by what should be observed of the Lacedæmonian. At length, day breaking, he gave his orders for the Lacedæmonians with the Tegeans, who alone of the other confederates remained with him, to move toward the proposed ground of incampment. They directed their march along the hills: the Athenians only ventured in the plain. Then at last Amompharetus, yielding something of his obstinacy, ordered his lochus, with a slow pace, to follow the rest of the army.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 56.

22 Sept.  
Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 57.

The dawn again discovered to the Persians the Grecian army in unexpected motion. The horse, always alert, and now elate with the success

SECT.  
III.

success of the preceding day, was quickly upon the Lacedæmonian rear. The movement of the Greeks being taken for flight, Mardonius led the Persian infantry in pursuit. The whole army followed, with all the haste and confusion of an ill-disciplined multitude, eager to share in certain victory. The Grecian general had not been immediately aware of the cowardly disobedience of that large part of his forces, which had pushed on beyond the ground intended to be occupied. It was now advisable, if possible, to join them; but the Persian horse so annoyed his rear, with desultory attacks continually reiterated, that it became necessary to make a stand. He sent therefore to inform the Athenian general of all circumstances, and to request his immediate coöperation in an effort to repel the enemy's cavalry. Aristides readily consented; but before he could join the Lacedæmonians, the Grecian troops in the Persian service were upon him, and he had himself to contend with superior numbers. The Lacedæmonians and Tegeans however alone formed a considerable army. They were above eleven thousand heavy-armed foot, and more than forty thousand light-armed slaves attended them. But the light-armed of the Peloponnesians were of so little estimation, that, notwithstanding their numbers, Pausanias had particularly desired a reinforcement of Athenian bowmen. The ground however, consisting of the rugged roots of mount Cithæron, with the Asopus flowing at the bottom, was favorable for defence, and

c. 58.

c. 59.

c. 60.

c. 61.

Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

CHAP.  
1X.Herodot.  
1. 9. c. 62,  
& seq.

adverse to the action of cavalry. The Persian infantry was therefore brought up; and a fierce engagement ensued. The Persians, after discharging their missile weapons, closed upon the Greeks, and showed themselves, says the impartial historian, neither in strength nor in courage inferior<sup>12</sup>. But they were very inferior in arms for close fight, and not less so in practice and in science. With their undefended bodies and short weapons they nevertheless made vigorous assaults, many of them seizing and even breaking the long spears of the Greeks. Unacquainted with that exactness of close formation and that steady march, in which the Greeks, and particularly the Lacedæmonians, excelled, they rushed forward singly, or in very small bodies, and perished in vain attempts to penetrate the Spartan phalanx. As their efforts at length, through repeated failure, began to relax, the Greeks advanced upon them. The Tegeans, according to Herodotus, made the first impression; the Lacedæmonians then pushed forward, and confusion soon became general among the Persian infantry.

Mardonius, who, a little before, had thought himself pursuing an enemy neither able nor daring to withstand him, was seized with the deepest anguish to find victory thus turning against him. Had he instantly determined upon

<sup>12</sup> To the same purpose also even Plutarch speaks: *Περσῶν πολλοὺς — οὐκ ἀπράκτους οὐδὲ ἀθύμως πειρομένους*, vit. Aristid. and at least as much is implied by Plato. *Laches*. p. 191. t. 2.

S E C T.  
III.

a retreat, he might probably still have avoided any considerable loss; for his infantry would soon have been safe in the plain under the protection of his numerous cavalry. But possibly signal and speedy success was indispensable to him. His fortune, perhaps his life, and the lot of all his family, might depend upon it: less however through the caprice of the prince than that of the people; which is always most dangerous under a despotic government. His army was too numerous to subsist long in a narrow and mountainous country, without supplies by sea. The necessity of decision therefore urging, in the crisis before him, he determined to rest all upon the fortune of the present moment. At the head of a chosen body of cavalry he hastened to rally and support his broken infantry. By a vigorous and well-conducted charge, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground, he checked the progress of the Spartan phalanx: but he could not break that firm and well-disciplined body. In his efforts, after many of his bravest officers and numbers of his soldiers had been killed about him, he received himself a mortal wound. His fall was the signal for instant flight to those about him, and, through them, to his whole army. For in Asiatic armies, the jealousy of despotism being adverse to that close succession of various ranks in command, which, in the European, contributes so much to the preservation of order in all events, the death of the commander in chief can scarcely fail to superinduce complete confusion, and the

Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 99  
& 100.

CHAP.  
IX.

certain ruin of the enterprize. Artabazus, next in command to Mardonius, is said not only to have differed in opinion from his general in regard to the mode of conducting the war, but to have disapproved of the war itself. It does not appear that he was at all engaged in the battle<sup>13</sup>. As soon as he was assured of the rout of the Persian infantry, leaving the rest of the army to any who would take charge of it, with forty thousand men who had been under his immediate orders, he retreated hastily toward Phocis.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 67.  
et Plut.  
Aristid.

While the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans were thus unexpectedly victorious upon the hills, the Athenians were sharply engaged with the Bœotians in the plain below. The Greeks in the Persian service are said to have been no fewer than fifty thousand; but the greater part, little earnest in the cause, kept aloof. The abilities of Aristides, therefore, and the valor of the Athenians, not exposed to a contest too unequal, at length prevailed. The Bœotians fled

<sup>13</sup> Rollin, tho he sometimes mistakes the Greek military writers, as Thucydides and Xenophon, on subjects merely military, is otherwise generally exact; but I know not where he learnt that Artabazus distinguished himself by his gallant exertion in this battle. Herodotus mentions on a prior occasion (1), that Artabazus got credit for his conduct in the business of Platæa; apparently for his counsel given before the battle, which was justified by the event; and for an able retreat, by which alone any part of the army was saved; but neither Herodotus nor Diodorus nor Plutarch, in describing the battle, mention that he was at all engaged. Diodorus gives an account of his retreat exactly corresponding with that of Herodotus.

(1) b. 7. c. 126.

toward

toward Thebes. The rest, prepared to act according to circumstances, made a timely retreat. The croud of Asiatics, of various nations, never stood the charge of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, but fled profusely, on the first appearance of flight among those bands of native Persians who had borne the brunt of the battle. The horse however, both Persian and Bœotian, still kept the field, and gave considerable protection to the fugitive infantry.

§ E C T.  
III.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 68.

Intelligence had quickly passed to the Greeks under the walls of Platæa, that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans were engaged and successful. Anxious then to repair their shameful misconduct, with that usual unhappiness of error which leads to farther error, they advanced with more haste than good order toward the field of battle; and the Megarians and Phlians, venturing by the plain, were attacked by the Theban horse, who killed six hundred, and drove the rest to the mountains.

c. 69.

The Lacedæmonians and Tegeans meanwhile, animated by unexpected success, yet steddy through practised discipline, repelling all the efforts of the Persian cavalry, pressed on to the fortified camp; the refuge of the greatest part of the routed troops, and the depository of all the valuables of the army. Immediately they attempted an assault: but the Lacedæmonians, as remarkable for ignorance of sieges as for skill in the field, were baffled with loss till the Athenian forces arrived. Under the direction of the Athenian officers, after vigorous efforts

c. 70.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 9. c. 32.



CHAP.  
IX.

on both sides, an assault succeeded. A horrid slaughter ensued. The victory, indeed, of a free people, fighting for their possessions, their families, and their independency, against foreign invaders, is never likely to be mild. Of near two hundred thousand Asiatics, the lowest reported numbers of the Persian army, exclusively of those who retreated under Artabazus, only three thousand, we are told, survived. Both Herodotus and Plutarch, however, avoid all detail of this massacre. How much of it happened within the fortified camp, and what execution was done on fugitives, over a country so surrounded by seas and mountains that it was scarcely possible for one to escape, we neither are nor should desire to be informed. Artabazus himself, at the head of forty thousand men, was so apprehensive of being cut off in his difficult march to the Hellespont, that, to deter the nations through which he passed from any hostile attempts, he industriously spread the report, That his forces were only the advanced guard of the great army, which was following under Mardonius.

When opposition ceased within the Persian lines, and the spirit of slaughter was at length fated, the rich plunder of the camp drew the attention of the conquerors. Here the wealth of the lords of Asia displayed a scene so new to the citizens of the little Grecian republics, that they were at a loss on what objects in preference to fix their avidity. The Tegeans, however, who had first surmounted the rampart,

and

and throughout the action had well supported their pretension to precedency among the Greeks, having the fortune also to arrive first at the magnificent pavilion of Mardonius, did not hesitate to stop there. Instantly they laid their rapacious hands upon all its rich contents; great part of which had been the furniture of Xerxes himself, which, on his hasty departure for Asia, he had presented to his general and brother-in-law. But they were not permitted intirely to enjoy this precedency in pillage. c. 80. The commander in chief quickly issued orders, That none should presume to appropriate any part of the booty, but that the whole should be collected, to be fairly divided among those who had together earned it. A brazen manger only, of very curious workmanship, the Tegeans were allowed to retain, as an honorary testimony to their particular valor and fortune. The Helots, attending the Lacedæmonian forces, were ordered to collect the rest. Tents and their furniture, adorned with gold and silver, collars, bracelets, hilts of cimeters, golden cups, and various other utensils of gold and silver, together with horses, camels, and women, were the principal spoil. Abundance of rich clothes, which at another time, says the historian, would have been thought valuable plunder, were now disregarded. But the vigilance of those appointed to superintend the business, did not suffice to prevent the Helots from concealing many things of value, which they sold, principally to the Æginetans; a

**C H A P.** nation (if we may so call the inhabitants of a  
**IX.** rock) of merchant-pirates, who, by this unworthy traffic, acquired riches before unknown among them.

**Herodot.** The booty being collected, a tenth was first  
**l. 9. c. 81.** set apart, according to the customary piety of  
**& Diod.** the Greeks, for an offering to the gods. From  
**Sic. l. 11.** the produce of this, continues the cotemporary  
**c. 33.** historian, was dedicated, to the god at Delphi, the golden tripod which stands upon the three-headed brazen serpent next the altar, the brazen statue of Jupiter at Olympia, ten cubits high, and the brazen statue of Neptune, seven cubits high, at the isthmus. The Tegeans dedicated their manger at Tegea in the temple of the Alean Minerva. To attribute to them a modesty becoming their valor, and which had profited from reproof, we should wish to interpret the goddess's title, from analogy in a language derived from the Arcadian, to signify That divine wisdom which directs what human ignorance calls Chance. The rest of the spoil was divided among those who had fought for it.

**Herodot.** Among the anecdotes transmitted concerning  
**l. 9. c. 82.** this great event, one, related by the original historian, has been particularly celebrated. The appendages of the royal household were found, in Mardonius's tent, nearly intire; and most of the domestic slaves had escaped the massacre. Pausanias, after admiring the various riches of the scene and the many contrivances of luxury, ordered a supper to be prepared by the Persian slaves.

slaves, exactly as it would have been for Mardonius, had he been living and in his command. The orders were diligently executed: the splendid furniture was arranged; the sideboard displayed a profusion of gold and silver plate; the table was covered with exquisite elegance. Pausanias then directed his usual Spartan supper to be placed by the side of this sumptuous entertainment. Little preparation was necessary. Then sending for the principal Grecian officers, 'I have desired your company here,' he said, 'to show you the folly of the Persian general. Living as you see at home, he came thus far to take from us such a miserable pittance as ours.'

The Mantineians had arrived from Plataea c. 77. presently after the storming of the camp. Vexed to have lost their share of glory and reward, both so extraordinary, they marched immediately, contrary to the inclination of Pausanias, in pursuit of Artabazus. Having reached the borders of Thessaly, they however returned without effecting anything. Presently after them the Eleians had arrived. The generals of both, on their return to their respective countries, were punished with banishment.

After the collection of the spoil, the next c. 85. care of the Greeks, and what upon all occasions they esteemed a necessary and sacred office, was the burial of their slain. The Lacedæmonians formed three separate burying-places: one for those who had borne sacred offices,

CHAP.  
IX.

offices<sup>14</sup>, of whom the gallant Amompharetus had fallen; another for the other Lacedæmonians; and the third for the Helots. Herodotus relates a remarkable instance of the severity of their maxims of discipline at this time. Aristodemus, who, in the preceding year, had been disgraced for not taking his share in the action at Thermopylæ, distinguished himself beyond all others in the present battle, and was at length slain. The merit of his behaviour was acknowledged; but it was admitted only as sufficient, in his circumstances, to wipe off infamy, and not to confer honor. The historian, however, with the inclination, has not wanted the power, to bestow on him more liberal reward; and the eulogy of Herodotus will transmit the name of Aristodemus with glory, probably, to latest generations. The Athenians, Tegeans, Megarians, and Phliasians had each a single burying-place. Barrows, raised according to that extensive practice of antiquity which we have already had occasion to notice, distinguished to following ages the several spots<sup>15</sup>.

These

<sup>14</sup> This obvious interpretation of the term *ισπες*, which stands in all the editions of Herodotus, does not appear to me loaded with any difficulty. I wish to avoid discussion of matters which lie within the proper province of the critic or the antiquarian rather than of the historian; yet I must own that I think the ingenious conjectures of Valckenarius and others upon this passage, in the notes of Wesseling's edition, all more open to objection than the old reading.

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch, in his Life of Aristides, expresses wonder, and, in his Treatise against Herodotus, much indignation, at the assertion that the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians alone gained

These solemn ceremonies were scarcely over, when a dangerous jealousy broke out between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians; on the question to whom the accustomed *Aristeia*, or first honors for military merit, were due, upon this great occasion. Immediate ill consequences were however prevented through the influence of the Corinthian leaders; who, interfering as mediators, named the Platæans as having merited beyond all others. When the common cause particularly required exertion by sea,

S E C T.  
III.

Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

Herodot.,  
1. 8. c. 1.  
Thucyd.  
1. 3. c. 54.

gained the victory of Platæa: yet in the former work, relating, much in the same manner as Herodotus, the disorderly flight of the other Greeks before the battle, he has given pretty direct testimony to the fact. Lysias, in his funeral oration, asserts it positively (*Lys. or. fun. p. 107 vel 195.*). It is indeed little likely that, while memory of the transaction was yet fresh, a historian, writing for the Greek nation, would venture a false assertion so dishonorable to so large a part of it. concerning facts in their nature of such public notoriety; and it is still less likely that such an assertion would remain to be refuted in Plutarch's age. The interest which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians afterward had in courting the other Grecian states, may sufficiently account for the epigrams, barrows, and other such uncertain evidences as Plutarch has quoted. Indeed, before Plutarch's testimony against Herodotus can be of any weight, he must be first reconciled to himself. It does however appear extraordinary, that Herodotus, in his narrative of this great event, should never once have mentioned the Platæans. The assertion of Plutarch, that the Greeks decreed to the Platæans the first honors for military merit on the occasion, tho Diodorus differs from him, is confirmed by Thucydides, against whose authority that of Diodorus is not to be mentioned. Possibly on account of their subsequent fate, Herodotus might have had some reason for omitting all mention of them, similar to that, whatever it was, which has made him totally silent concerning the first two Messenian wars. When we consider his extreme freedom by turns with all the most powerful states of Greece, both omissions appear mysterious.

they,

CHAP.  
IX.

they, tho an inland people; had served aboard the fleet; and in the campaign by land, which had now had so glorious an event, none had more distinguished themselves by their zeal and bravery. Their actions on the day of Plataea are not particularly recorded by any writer; apparently because, being citizens of Athens, as they are modestly called by Thucydides, or subjects, as they are perhaps more truly stiled by Herodotus, they had formed one body with the Athenians under the orders of Aristides. Their commonwealth was too small to excite jealousy: all the other Greeks approved the determination of the Corinthians; and the Lacedæmonians and Athenians acquiesced.

Thucyd.  
l. 3. c. 55,  
& 63.  
Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 108.

Plut.  
Aristid.  
Thucyd.  
l. 3. c. 56.

This dangerous business being thus accommodated, a council was held to consider of farther measures. The battle of Plataea, it is said, was fought on the twenty-second of September<sup>16</sup>. The season was therefore not too far advanced

<sup>16</sup> Thus the chronologers have determined, not without authority; but the Grecian calendar was yet too little exact for absolute certainty to a day. Ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἰμαχίσαντα (says Plutarch, speaking of the battle of Plataea) τῇ τετράδι τοῦ Βοηδρομιῶνος ἱσταμένου, κατ' Ἀθηναίους, κατὰ δὲ Βοιωτοὺς τετράδι τοῦ Παιῆμου φθινοῦτος, ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἀδροίζεται συνῆδριον, καὶ θύουσι τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ διὰ Πλαταιαῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς νίκης. Τῇ δὲ τῶν ἡμέρων ἀναμνηστικὴν οὐ θαυμαστόν, ὅπου καὶ νῦν, διηγερούμεναι τῶν ἐν ἀσφαλοσίᾳ μᾶλλον, ἄλλην ἄλλοι μνηρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν ἄγουσι. Plut. vit. Aristid. The fourth day of the Attic month Boëdromion, according to our chronologers, would correspond with the 23d of September; but they have preferred the authority of the copies

advanced for taking vengeance on those Greeks who had joined the Persians. It was determined to march immediately against Thebes, and to require the delivery of Timegenides and Attaginus, heads of the faction which had led the Bœotians to the Persian alliance. On the eleventh day from the battle of Platæa, the army entered the Theban lands; and, the delivery of the obnoxious persons being refused, plunder and waste of the country, and preparations for the siege of the city, were begun. This was borne during twenty days. Then Timegenides, fearing the turn of popular favor against him, proposed to the Theban people to offer the payment of a fine, to atone for the transgression of the republic against the common cause of Greece; declaring that, if it should be refused, he would be ready to surrender himself with Attaginus, rather than be the occasion or pretence for the destruction of his country. The proposal was accepted by the assembly. But in the following night Attaginus fled; leaving his own family, as well as his associate Timegenides, to the mercy of the enraged Thebans. His children were immediately delivered to the commander in chief of the confederate Greeks. But the Spartan prince did not want liberality to distinguish between

SECT.  
III.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 86,  
& seq.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 33.

3 Oa.

copies of Plutarch's Life of Camillus, and of his Treatise on the Glory of Athens; in both of which the third of the month Boëdromion is named as the day of the battle of Platæa. The day of the battle being fixed, Herodotus furnishes the other dates given in the margin.

the



CHAP.  
IX.

the criminal father and the innocent offspring, whom he immediately dismissed unhurt. Timagenides and some other principal Thebans being then demanded, were surrendered. They expected that time would be allowed them to prepare for a public defence, and trusted that their interest, assisted by money well bestowed, would insure their safety. Pausanias suspected this, and determined to prevent it. He detained them till the confederate forces separated for their several homes; and then, taking them to Corinth, caused them to be there executed: a salutary severity, no doubt, for the security of Greece against the common enemy; but, as far as appears, unsupported by the solemnity of a trial, and certainly unauthorized by any positive law.

## SECTION

## SECTION IV.

*Measures of the Grecian Fleet. Battle of Mycale.  
Conclusion of that called by Grecian Writers the  
Persian or Median War.*

WHILE the arms of the confederate Greeks were thus wonderfully attended with success and glory against the immediate invaders of their country, the fleet, which had lain during the summer inactive at Delos, was at length excited to enterprize. There appears to have been, in Samos, always a strong party ready to take any opportunity for spirited opposition to the Persians, and to Theomestor, whom the Persians had raised to the tyranny of the island. Engaging in their views Hegesistratus, son of Aristagoras the Milesian chief, the Samians deputed Lampon and Athenagoras, two principal men among them, to attend him on a mission to the commanders of the confederate fleet. In a conference with Leotychidas and Xanthippus, Hegesistratus represented, 'That the whole Ionian people were ready, on the least incouragement, to revolt against the Persians, and join the Grecian cause: that the bare appearance of the Grecian fleet off their coast would suffice to excite them to spirited action: that the Persian government was remiss and weak beyond what could be readily believed; inso-much that never did the means offer, to the commanders of a powerful armament, of so rich

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 90.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 34.

CHAP.  
IX.

rich a booty with so little risk.' He proceeded to urge the Spartan king and the Athenian chief, by their common gods, to use the means, so easily in their power, for rescuing a Grecian people from subjection to barbarians; and he offered, for himself and his colleagues, if their fidelity was doubted, to remain hostages with the fleet. Leotychidas, according to a common superstition of both Greeks and Romans, struck with the name of Hegeisistratus as a favorable omen (it signifies the leader of an armament), readily came into the measure proposed. Dismissing the two other deputies, he detained Hegeisistratus; and, only one day being allowed for preparation, the whole fleet, consisting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred and fifty trireme galleys, moved, on the next, for Samos.

Diod.  
L. II. c. 34.

Herod. I. 9.  
c. 96.

The season was so far advanced that the commanders of the Phenician Squadron in the Persian service, finding enterprize neither intended by the Persian admiral, nor expected from the Greeks, had requested leave to depart for their own ports for the winter, before the equinoctial storms should set in; and it had been granted. Having thus incautiously parted with their best ships and ablest seamen, the Persians were highly alarmed with intelligence that the Grecian fleet was approaching. Hastily quitting Samos, they passed to the neighbouring promontory of Mycalë on the Ionian coast; where an army, according to Herodotus, of sixty thousand men, was incamped under

under the command of Tigranes. Here, says <sup>CT.</sup> the historian, near the temple of the venerable <sup>W.</sup> deities, and that temple of the Eleusinian Ceres <sup>c. 97.</sup> which Philistus son of Pasicles built, when he followed Neleus son of Codrus to the founding of Miletus, they hauled their galleys upon the beach; and, with stones found upon the place, and palisades formed of olives and other cultivated trees, they raised a defence around them.

The Grecian commanders had expected to <sup>c. 98.</sup> find the Persian fleet in full force at Samos, and proposed to engage it on that friendly coast: but they were not prepared for the more hazardous measure of following it to the Asiatic shore. A council of war was therefore held, in which it was deliberated whether to retire again immediately to their own seas, or first to make some attempt in the Hellespont. But intelligence of the departure of the Phenician squadron gave encouragement; the spirit of vigorous enterprize gained; and it was shortly determined to seek the enemy's fleet. On approaching the Ionian coast, it was not without surprize that they found the sea completely yielded to them, and the enemy prepared for opposition by land alone. Ardor on one side would naturally rise in proportion to such evident backwardness on the other. The bold measure was resolved upon, to debark their whole force, capable of acting by land, which would be by far the larger part of their crews, and to attack the Persians in their fortified

VOL. II. S camp.

CHAP.  
IX.

camp. Probably the leaders had reasonable hopes, and perhaps confirmed information, that the numerous Greeks, among the Persian forces, wanted only opportunity to revolt: Leotychidas, however, practised an expedient like that of Themistocles at Artemisium. He sent a herald, in a boat, within hearing of the Ionian camp, who made proclamation, according to the original historian, in these words: 'Men of Ionia, attend to what I say, of which the Persians will understand nothing. When we engage, it will become every one of you to think of the liberty of all: the word is Hebe. Let those who hear inform those who are out of hearing.' The Samians had before incurred some suspicion, from the Persian leaders, by their generous kindness to about five hundred Athenian prisoners, who had been brought from Attica and disposed of as slaves in Asia Minor. They had ransomed all, and sent them, with subsistence, to Athens. The Samian troops in the Persian army were therefore deprived of their arms; and the Milesians, being also suspected, were detached on pretence of service.

Leotychidas debarked his forces, without opposition, at some distance from the Persian camp. To add to their animation, he caused report to be spread, that Pausanias had gained a complete victory over Mardonius in Bœotia; of which intelligence could not have arrived, if, as historians affirm, it was the very day of the battle of Plataea. Possibly, however, information

Herodot.  
ut sup. &  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 34.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 99.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 35.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 100.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 35.  
Polyæn.  
Stratag.  
l. 2. c. 33.

tion of the death of Masiſtius, with ſome exaggeration of the ſucceſs obtained upon that occaſion, might have reached him. The Grecian forces marched in two columns: one, under the command of Xanthippus, compoſed of the Athenian, Corinthian, Sicyonian, and Trœze-  
 nian troops, held the plain againſt the ſhore; the other, conſiſting of the Lacedæmonians with the remaining allies, under Leotychidas, went by the more inland and hilly road. The former arrived firſt, and, eager to ingroſs the glory of the day, proceeded immediately to the aſſault; which was ſo ſudden, ſo well conducted, and ſo vigorous, that they had already entered the Perſian rampart before the Lacedæmonians could come up. Their raſhneſs was favored, and perhaps juſtified, by the ready zeal of the Greeks in the Perſian ſervice to give them every aſſiſtance. The Samians, exaſperated by the treatment they had received, exerted themſelves, tho unarmed, by all means in their power; and their exhortations and example determined the other Aſian Greeks. From every account in Herodotus, it appears that the proper Perſians had not yet deſerved to loſe that military reputation, which they had acquired under the great Cyrus; but, of all the infantry in the ſervice of the empire, they almoſt alone ſeem to have merited the title of ſoldiers. Probably the proportion of them at Mycalë was not great. The other Aſiatics ſhrunk before the vehemence of the Athenian attack; but the Perſians were ſtill reſiſting with the utmoſt bra-

SECT.  
IV.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 102.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 103.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 36.

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 102.

CHAP.  
IX.

c. 103.

very when the Lacedæmonians arrived. Then they were overpowered, and mostly cut in pieces. Tigranes, general of the Persian land-forces, and two of the principal naval commanders, were among the slain. Of the Greeks, Perilaüs, commander of the Sicyonians, was the only man of rank who fell.

c. 104.

Mycale was a small peninsula; and, from the place of action, was no retreat by land, but through narrow passes over a mountain. The Persian commanders, little expecting so sudden an attempt upon their numerous forces within fortified lines, thought they had provided sufficiently for security by disarming the suspected Samians, and detaching the Milesians to guard the passes. The latter circumstance turned to the complete destruction of their army: The Milesians, with the most determined enmity, intercepted the fugitives, and few escaped. When slaughter ceased, the Greeks, remaining quiet possessors of whatever the Persian camp and fleet had contained, carried out every valuable of easy removal, and then set fire to the rest, together with the ships, and the whole Persian fleet was burnt.

c. 106.

Herodot.

l. 3. c. 106.

Diod. Sic.

l. 11. c. 37.

After this signal blow upon the Persian power, the Grecian fleet returned to Samos. A council was immediately held to consider what measures should be taken for the present security and future welfare of the revolted Ionians. The islanders might be safe under the protection of the fleet; against which it would now be difficult, even for the resources of the Persian empire,

pire, soon to raise a force capable of disputing the command of the seas. But it was generally deemed impossible, for any power of Greece, to defend the long line of continental colonies against the land-force lying immediately behind them. Confirmation arrived of the news of the complete victory over the Persian arms in Bœotia. The Peloponnesians then proposed to remove the Ionians from Asia to Greece, and to put them in possession of all the seaports of those states which had sided with the Persians. But the Athenians dissented: they denied the necessity of so violent a measure; and they insisted peremptorily that the Peloponnesians had no right to interfere in the disposal of Athenian colonies. The Peloponnesians had the moderation to yield to this argument. Then the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders, bound themselves by solemn oaths to be faithful to the Grecian confederacy. The islands would be a present refuge for those continentals most obnoxious to Persian vengeance, whom the walls of their towns could not protect. Sardis was too near, the force there too great, and the season besides too much advanced for any farther attempt in Ionia. But the Hellespont, more distant from the center of the Persian force, was open to enterprize by sea. Thither therefore the fleet directed its course. It was determined to destroy the bridges, which were supposed to be still standing and



CHAP.  
IX.

protected by a garrison; but they had already yielded to the weather and current, and the Persians had deserted the place. Winter now approaching, Leotychidas, with all the Peloponnesians, returned to Greece. Xanthippus resolved nevertheless, with his Athenians and their Ionian allies, to attempt the recovery of the Chersonese, an Athenian colony, and where the Greeks were still numerous. The Persians, exposed to attacks in various parts, through the command which the Athenian fleet possessed at sea, collected their whole force in Sestos. After an obstinate defence, being pressed by famine, they made good their own retreat; upon which the Grecian inhabitants joyfully surrendered the town to the Athenians.

Herodot.

l. 9. c. 118.  
198.Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 89.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 37.

The Persian monarch remained in Sardis, to see the sad relics of his forces, which found means to fly from Mycalë, and to receive the calamitous news of the still greater loss of his army in Greece. Shortly after he moved to his distant capital of Susa. On his departure he ordered all the Grecian temples within his power to be burnt; whether supposing the deity offended with his long sufferance of them, or that he thought to gain popularity among his subjects of the upper provinces, by this sacrifice to the prejudices of the Magian religion.

Strab.

l. 1. p. 28.

M. T. Cic.

de Nat.

Deor. l. 1.

&amp; de Leg.

l. 2.

Such was the conclusion of the expedition of Xerxes, and of that called by Grecian  
writers

writers the Persian, or often the Median war; after two campaigns, wonderfully glorious to Greece, and, both in themselves, and for their known consequences, perhaps the most remarkable and important in the annals of mankind.

SECT.  
IV.

## CHAPTER X.

View of the People of the Western Countries politically connected with the GREEKS, and of the Grecian Settlements in SICILY and ITALY.

## SECTION I.

*Of Carthage. Of Sicily: Agrigentum: Phalaris: Syracuse: Gelon: Invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians: Battle of Himera.*

**D**URING those great transactions in Greece and its eastern Colonies, which decided, for the time, the fate of Europe and Asia, and then first displayed that superiority of the former over the rest of the world which it still maintains, events, less important indeed for their consequences, and less intimately affecting the interests of the mother-country, less accurately also related to us, yet upon sufficient evidence great and glorious, were taking place among the western settlements of the nation.

The warlike and enterprizing spirit of the Greeks had long ago driven the industrious and informed Phenicians from all their antient establishments

establishments in the Grecian seas; had then wrested from them the distant and large island of Cyprus, whose situation would seem to allot it rather to the Phenician than the Grecian dominion, and had appropriated all that valuable part of the African coast which, after the powerful kingdom of Egypt, lay nearest to the Phenician shore. But in maritime skill, and still more in commercial system, in the spirit of commercial adventure, and in those manufactures which formed the principal and most advantageous basis of commerce, the Phenicians stood yet unrivalled. On the coast of Africa, from the deserts bounding the Grecian colonies on the west, they had extended their settlements to the western extremity of the Mediterranean, penetrated into the ocean beyond, and, according to some not unsupported accounts, carried their traffic across all the dangers of the bay of Biscay to the distant shores of Britain, then the extreme of the known world, and, excepting the Phenicians, unknown among civilized nations. Wherever the Greeks did not interfere, the Phenicians were superior, in arms as in arts, to all maritime people. But, confined at home within a narrow territory; pressed, on the land, first by the power of the Jewish kingdom, then by the more overbearing weight successively of the Assyrian and Persian empires; and, on the sea, interrupted by the Grecian spirit of war, and, it must be added of piracy, they were equally prevented from becoming

**CHAP.** coming a great nation on their own continent,  
**X.** and from assuring their dominion over their  
 distant maritime settlements.

Vell.  
 Patere.  
 l. 1. c. 2.  
 Justin.  
 l. 18.  
 c. 4 & 5.  
 Strab.  
 l. 17.  
 p. 832.

In their voyages westward, the large projection of AFRICA, overagainst Sicily, could not fail, by its position to attract, and by its circumstances to fix, the attention of the Phenician navigators. At a very early period, accordingly, some settlements were formed there, among which Utica had the fame of being the most antient. Afterward the princess immortalized by Virgil's poetry, driven to seek refuge, with her adherents, from the tyranny of her brother the king of Tyre, is said either to have founded or increased the colony which, in process of ages, became the powerful and renowned CARTHAGE. The era of these transactions is very uncertain. The more received system places Dido two centuries later than the Trojan prince, whose intercourse with her the Roman bard hath so interestingly described: Newton's calculation, reducing the age of the Trojan war, makes them cotemporary. Carthage, however, situate nearly midway between Phenicia and the ocean, happy in its climate and territory, and preferable to Utica for its port, was a most eligible situation for a place of arms, to command the communication with the invaluable western settlements, with Spain, the country of silver and gold mines, the Indies of the old world. For, in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, navigation was exposed to continual

continual piracy from the Greeks, who possessed the northern and southern shores; and in the western from the Tuscans. Thus principally Carthage seems to have risen early to eminence, and to have become, in some degree, the capital of the Phenician colonies. The troubles of Phenicia, and the wars which, with its very scanty territorial strength, it was obliged to sustain against the force of the Assyrian empire, seem to have given to its dependencies an emancipation which perhaps they did not desire; for which, at least, it does not appear that any struggle was made. Probably, on the reduction of Tyre by Nabuchodonosor king of Assyria, many Tyrian families would migrate to the colonies; and Carthage was likely to attract the greatest number. Carthage, however, then, profiting from its strength and its situation, appears to have taken decidedly the lead. It is remarkable that, excepting Assyria and Egypt, whose extreme antiquity, together with the uncertainty of their early history, makes them exceptions to all rule, none of the antient people, who flourished by arts, arms, and policy, were great nations, like those which form the states of modern Europe; but each a small society of men, inhabiting one city, and there served by slaves, who made commonly by much the larger portion of the population. The Carthaginian government, established, like all the Grecian states upon these principles, in taking the lead among the sister colonies, did not as-  
sociate,

S E C T.  
I.Strab. l. 5.  
p. 219.Hist. des  
Anc. Co-  
lonies, par  
le baron de  
S. Croix,  
p. 32.See c. 6.  
f. 2. of  
this Hist.

CHAP.  
X.

De S.  
Croix,  
p. 32 & 37.  
Aristot.  
Polit.  
l. 2. c. 11.  
Polyb.  
l. 6. p. 493.

fociate, but subjected them. Even the towns in its immediate neighbourhood were not admitted to a share in the government: each had its own municipal administration; and so far each was a separate commonwealth; but all were held under political subjection, and that apparently a severe subjection, to Carthage; while Carthage itself had one of the best balanced and wisest constitutions known to antiquity.

Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
De S.  
Croix.

As long as the Phenician settlements remained under the authority and protection of the mother-country, few of them were more than factories; for the government of Tyre was little able to maintain armies and make conquests at the farther end of the Mediterranean. But when Carthage was become the independent capital of those colonies, greater views than the meer acquisition of riches by commerce began to animate the ambition of her citizens. Along the coast of Africa, as far as the Atlantic ocean, and on the extensive shores of Spain, having only ignorant barbarians to contend with, they established their dominion, apparently with little difficulty, wherever they chose to exert their force. But on the nearer coast of SICILY, the Phenician factories, some of them probably as old as Carthage itself, had been disturbed by the successive arrival of Grecian adventurers; skilled as well as daring in the practice of arms, and who, tho not always averse to commerce, generally preferred piracy. Against those new occupants

occupants of that fruitful country, other precautions were necessary than had sufficed against the simplicity of the native barbarians. Uniting therefore their factories, which had been scattered all around the island, the Phenicians confined themselves to three settlements; Soloeis and Panormus (now Palermo) on the northern coast, and Motya at the western extremity; and they began to cultivate more attentively the friendship of the antient inhabitants, particularly of the Elymians, that mixed people, Greek, Trojan, and Sicel, who held the towns of Eryx and Egesta. This easy acquiescence of the Phenicians, which, till the age of Xerxes, allowed no opportunity for the Greek historians to boast of a single feat of arms to the honor of their nation in Sicily, sufficiently proves that tho the foundation of the city of Carthage may have been as antient as it was pretended, yet the power of the Carthaginian state was comparatively of late growth. The Phenician colonies then, thus assembled toward the western part of the island, might readily receive such protection as Carthage could give; and their need of protection would lead them to admit willingly its superintending authority. As soon therefore as Carthage itself became independent, the Phenician settlements in Sicily would become appendages of its dominion; and disputes between Carthage and the Greek settlements would be consequently unavoidable.

SECT.  
I.

Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 2.

See  
c. 5. f. 2.  
of this  
Hist.

Little



CHAP. X. Little remains for history concerning the GRECIAN COLONIES in Sicily, till toward that splendid period which has been treated in the preceding chapters ; and indeed it appears that, before that period, the Sicilian and Italian Greeks had no important transactions, and little political connection with the mother-country, unless with the one commercial commonwealth of Corinth. Some of the towns, however, we find, were populous and wealthy ; Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, Camerina, dividing between them the southern coast, beyond the rest of that fruitful island productive in grain ; Syracuse possessing one of the finest ports of the Mediterranean in a situation very advantageous for trade, and surrounded also by a territory of uncommon fertility.

B.C. 560 to 570. Ol. 54. nearly. Already in the age of Solon, AGRIGENTUM, originally a colony from Gela, was become a considerable independent commonwealth, when Phalaris, a Cretan, acquired the sovereignty. Crete had been, jointly with Rhodes, the mother-country of Gela. Phalaris, whose history, on more than one account, excites curiosity, is represented as a monster in human nature ; possessing, with very extraordinary abilities, the most opposite virtues and vices, the most abominable cruelty, with the most exalted magnanimity and generosity. But tho all traditions concerning that famous tyrant are extremely dubious and imperfect, yet the contradictions concerning his character are not wholly unaccountable.

countable. He fell, we find, a victim to the party in opposition to his government, and that party held the sway in Agrigentum under a democratical form of administration, for sixty years. What happened in Athens, on the expulsion of the Peisistratids, would, during this period, from the same causes, happen in Agrigentum. To render odious the character of the deceased tyrant would tend to weaken the credit of his party, and proportionally to strengthen the situation of the ruling party and advance their power: nothing, therefore, that could produce such effects would be neglected.

SYRACUSE was already considerable, yet we do not find it particularly eminent among the Sicilian Greek cities till, toward the age of Xerxes, it was raised to power and fame by its great and beloved tyrant Gelon. That illustrious man was born of an antient and noble family, of Rhodian origin, established at Gela. The Sicilian colonies, beyond all other Grecian states, were remarkable for frequent revolutions, the sudden elevation and downfall of tyrannies, and every change of government and every calamity which faction and internal war could occasion. Cleānder, tyrant of Gela, being killed by Sabyllus, a Geloān citizen, was nevertheless succeeded in the sovereignty by his brother Hippocrates. Gelon, already of reputation for abilities and bravery, was appointed by the new tyrant, commander in chief of the Geloān cavalry: for in Sicily, a country much more generally adapted than

SECT.  
I.

Cic.de Off.  
l. 2.

See  
c. 7. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 153.

c. 154.  
Ol. 74. I.  
B.C. 484  
Dodw.  
Ann.  
Thuc.

## CHAP.

X.

than Greece to the breeding of horses and the operations of cavalry, that service was early and extensively cultivated \*. Hippocrates, an ambitious and able prince, made successful war upon some of the Sicel tribes, and upon the Grecian states of Syracuse, Callipolis, Naxos, Leontium, and Messena; all of which, excepting Syracuse, he compelled to acknowledge his sovereignty. The Syracusans, defeated in a great battle and reduced to extremity, applied to Corinth, their metropolis, for assistance; and the interference of that rich maritime commonwealth, in conjunction with its powerful colony of Corcyra, procured an accommodation; by which, however, the town of Camarina, then subject to Syracuse, was yielded to the Geloan prince. Hippocrates, being soon after killed in an action with the Hyblæan Sicels, left Gelon, who had distinguished himself very advantageously in all the late wars, guardian of his infant sons, and administrator of their government. To this trust, according to Herodotus, Gelon was unfaithful; for making a pretence of some commotions among the Geloans, which were repressed by arms, he assumed the sovereignty to himself. At Syracuse, about the same time, in the prosecution of that contest for power between the higher and lower citizens, which was nearly perpetual in almost every Grecian commonwealth, the leaders of the populace, engaging the slaves of

Herodot.  
L. 7. c. 155.

\* Arduus inde Agragas ostentat maxima longe  
Mœnia, magnanimum quondam generator equorum.

Virg. Æn. l. 3. v. 704.  
the

SECT.

I.

the rich in the party against their masters, compelled these to seek their personal safety by flight. Finding refuge at Castmenæ they applied to Gelon, who readily undertook their cause. The Syracusans in possession dreaded the power of that prince; but, according to the same historian who reports his treachery to the sons of Hippocrates, they had confidence in his character. The result is highly remarkable. They professed themselves not unwilling to readmit the refugees, and to restore their property; provided only security could be given that an equal government should be established, that an act of amnesty for what had passed should be strictly observed, that the nobles, on being restored to wealth, honor, and authority, should neither exert their power and influence to the persecution of individuals who had been active in expelling them, nor to the subversion of the constitution of the commonwealth, and the establishment of oligarchal despotism. The expedient in which both parties concurred, was to appoint Gelon supreme moderator between them, by making him king of Syracuse.

This important acquisition of dominion thus extraordinarily made, it became the object of Gelon to mold into one the many little states which acknowledged his authority. The circumstances of every Grecian government required that the capital should be strong, and all the dependent towns weak. For, on account of the universal narrowness of territory, as we have heretofore had occasion to observe, it was neces-

CHAP<sup>r</sup> X. sary that every cultivated spot should have its fortified town at hand for refuge and protection; and, on account of the universal scantiness of public revenue, it was necessary that the inhabitants of every town and its district should be the garrison. If then these were able to defend themselves against an enemy, they might also defy the authority of their own capital. The interest, or the ambition of individuals would often lead the municipal government to aspire to independency; and the interest or ambition of neighbouring states would seldom fail to afford encouragement for such views. But if it was necessary for every Grecian government to attend to these circumstances, it was peculiarly so for Gelon, whose dominion was composed of so many conquered cities. It comprized now the whole eastern coast of Sicily, with a small part of the northern, and of the southern the larger portion.

Among the towns of this range of country Syracuse possessed advantages which attracted the notice of Gelon. His native city, recommended by its territory, the celebrated Geloan plain, eminent even among the Sicilian fields for fruitfulness, was near one extremity of his dominion, and without a port. A central situation, the completest harbour of the island, the largest town, a rich surrounding country, and a people of whose favor he was apparently most secure, determined Gelon to make Syracuse the seat of his government. This being decided, he proceeded to the arduous business of forming the heterogeneous

Strab.

l. 6. p. 270.

Thucyd.

l. 6.

geneous parts which composed his dominion, into one harmonised whole. His measures, in the present circumstances of Europe, would appear violent and extravagant; yet, if we may judge from what we learn of their effects, they were wisely accommodated to the times in which he lived; and perhaps beyond any other that could have been devised, productive of happiness to his subjects, as well as of security to his own authority. Without a distribution of powers legislative, judicial, and executive among a favoring party, a tyranny could hardly subsist. Of that favoring party it was necessary to have in the capital a decided majority; and it was also necessary that the other towns should want the protection of the capital, and be unable to resist its force. With these views, destroying Camarina, Gelon established all its people in Syracuse: he removed thither more than half the Gelonians: of the Eubœans in different towns, he gave the higher ranks only to enjoy the privileges of the capital; leaving the poorer, with their several municipal administrations, to cultivate the country: but the lower people of the Megarians of Hybla he sold for slaves, with an express obligation on the purchasers to transport them out of Sicily, as the last resource against those disturbances which their mutinous disposition, and rancor against their superiors, would,

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 156.  
Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 3.  
Strab.  
l. 6. p. 268.  
et l. 10.  
p. 449.

\* <sup>3</sup> Πολιτικῆς ἐκποίησις. Herodot. l. 7. c. 156. Πολίτης δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσθμίων τῶν ἄλλων ἐρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχοντι κτίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. Aristot. Polit. l. 3. c. 1.

CHAP. if they lived within the same country, perpetually occasion.

X.



This then was the state of Sicily when Xerxes invaded Greece : the barbarian Sicans and Sicels yet held the center of the island, and the Elymians the western corner. A part of the northern coast was possessed by the Carthaginians ; never, probably, in perfect friendship with all the Greeks, and lately in open hostility with some of them ; for, while Cleomenes, king of Sparta, was yet living, his half-brother Dorieus, elder brother of the renowned Leonidas, conducting a fleet with the view to settle a colony in Sicily, was defeated and killed in action with a Carthaginian fleet. Gelon commanded a dominion, very small, compared with the kingdoms of modern Europe, and still more below comparison with the Persian empire then existing, but considerably larger than was united under one government elsewhere among the Greeks ; and this he ruled with such wisdom, uprightness, and vigor, that he was equally beloved by his subjects and respected by all neighbouring powers. Agrigentum, the only Grecian city in Sicily of any consideration, not subject to Gelon, was administered by Theron, a man also of high merit, who had raised himself to the tyranny ; and he had lately reduced Himera on the northern coast, ejecting its tyrant Terillus. This circumstance gave immediate occasion to the first considerable effort of the Carthaginians toward extending their dominion in Sicily ; the first important transaction in which they were engaged with the Greeks,

while

Herodot.

l. 5. c. 41

& 46. &

l. 7. c. 158.

Thucyd.

l. 1. c. 17.

Herodot.

l. 7. c. 165.

Diod. l. 9.

c. 20. & 77.

while the Romans, afterward conquerors of SECT.  
I.  
Carthage, Greece, and the known world, had yet scarcely a name among nations. It is therefore to be regretted that Herodotus has treated this part of history so slightly, and that little satisfactory remains upon it from any other writer. The narrative of Diodorus is the injudicious, and even ridiculous attempt of a man unversed in political, and still more in military business, to exalt his fellowcountrymen, the Sicilian Greeks, above the fame of Lacedæmon and Athens. Circumstances enough, however, remain, either reported or confirmed by better authority, whence a general ideâ may be gained of the principal events.

It was a solace, among the miseries occasioned by the frequent revolutions in the little Grecian republics, that, as every state had always enemies, open or secret, the exiled of every state could generally find protection somewhere. But beside the resources within Greece itself, the Persian empire had been, for some time, a common refuge for the unfortunate who were of any consideration in their own country : Tuscany also had afforded settlements to some ; and now Carthage, rising to new importance among foreign powers, offered prospect of new relief. Here the expelled prince of Himera applied, and found a favorable reception. The opportunity was inviting for the Carthaginians to extend and secure their own dominion, by crushing that of the Greeks in Sicily ; while the collected force of the Persian empire, on the point of overwhelming

Herodot.  
L. 7. c. 165



CHAP. X. Greece itself, would effectually prevent any assistance from that quarter. Under pretence therefore of reinstating their ally in his dominion, they assembled a very powerful armament. By a treaty with the Tuscans they engaged the naval force of that people in their service; and, according to the practice which we find afterward usual with them in their wars with the Romans, they collected mercenary land-forces from many of the barbarous nations with whom they had commercial intercourse. Herodotus, beside Phenicians, names Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Elifycians (a name not occurring elsewhere) Sardinians, and Corsicans. The command in chief was committed to Hamilcar, one of the two magistrates who, with the title of Suffete, presided over the Carthaginian commonwealth, and whose eminence of dignity and authority was such, that the Greek writers, generally averse to foreign terms, not unusually stiled them kings.

Herodot.  
loc. cit.  
Polyb. l. 6.

In the same summer in which Xerxes invaded Greece, Hamilcar passed into Sicily, and immediately laid siege to Himera. Theron, unable with his own forces to cope with the Carthaginian armament, applied to the king of Syracuse for assistance. Tho the war was professedly intended only against the Agrigentine prince, yet the whole Grecian interest in Sicily was too evidently concerned in the event for Gelon to remain a quiet spectator. Putting himself therefore at the head of his army, which, according to the most probable accounts, consisted of about ten thousand heavy-armed foot, and two thousand

land horse, and, with the usual addition of light-armed slaves, might be in all perhaps twenty-five thousand men, he marched to join the Agrigentine forces. His fleet, which, as we are assured by Thucydides, was superior to that of any other Grecian potentate of his age, and, according to Herodotus, was of no less than two hundred trireme galleys, he committed to his brother Hieron. This prince met, and defeated the combined fleets of Carthage and Tuscany. About the same time the united armies of Syracuse and Agrigentum engaged the Carthaginian army near Himera, with the most complete success. Hamilcar himself fell; a large proportion of his army was destroyed, and almost the whole remainder were made prisoners.

The concurring testimony of antient writers to these glorious events, which appear to have at once terminated the war, little as we are assured of any particulars, is confirmed by the irrefragable evidence of the growing greatness and lasting splendor of Syracuse and Agrigentum. The prisoners, according to the practice of the times, were all condemned to slavery. The larger share, we are told, was acquired by the Agrigentines, who employed great numbers on public works, which remained to late ages, and some even yet remain, proofs both of the greatness of the victory, and of the taste of the victors. Here, however, on considering the account given by the Sicilian Diodorus, the zealous eulogist of his country, a suspicion cannot but arise, that all those prisoners were not Carthaginian soldiers.

CHAP.  
X.

For the battle was fought near Himera, on the northern coast of the island. The Carthaginians, in the confusion of their defeat, says Diodorus, fled in great numbers up the country, and mostly toward the Agrigentine territory, where they were afterward taken by the Agrigentines. It seems much more probable that they would have directed their flight toward their own garrisons of Soloeis and Panormus, which were not far distant on the coast; or, if they were cut off from these, and compelled to take an inland road, Egesta, the strong hold of their Elymian allies, would have been their object, rather than the Agrigentine territory. But if they fled up the country, and did not reach Egesta, they would get among the highlands held by the Sicans and Sicels; and would be much more likely to stop there, than to pass on into the Agrigentine plains. It seems farther improbable, that the powerful Gelon would permit his people to be defrauded of their fair share of the booty, by those who owed to them, not only the victory, but perhaps even their existence as a people. Upon the whole, therefore, it seems more than probable, that the Agrigentines took advantage from the blow given to the Carthaginian power, perhaps making a pretence of some shelter afforded to fugitives, for oppressing the Sicans and Sicels of their neighbourhood; and that the stupendous works of art, which travellers yet admire at Girgenti, were in large proportion the produce of the labor and the misery of those unfortunate barbarians. It is the purpose of history to represent

present men, not such as they should be, but such as they have been; and thus learning what they should be, through observation of what they should not be, far more valuable instruction, both political and moral, may be gathered than from any visionary description of perfection in human nature. Thus, at least, Herodotus and Thucydides and Xenophon and Polybius and Sallust and Tacitus thought; tho some other historians, Greek, Roman, and modern, have written upon a different plan. It is indeed little allowable for the historian to go beyond authority; yet when some important facts are certain, with some attending circumstances dubious, it will be his business to lead his reader as near to the whole truth as he can. The general spirit of the Grecian commonwealths, and even the doctrine of the Grecian philosophers, the methods ordinarily practised among the Greeks to obtain slaves, the full assurance we have of the great works executed at Agrigentum, and the account even of Diodorus, partial as he is to his fellowcountrymen, compared with the known state of Sicily at the time, all concur to mark the conjecture ventured concerning the prisoners made by the Agrigentines, as very likely to be true, and, at least, very near the truth.

Among the deficiencies of Sicilian history, however, nothing is so much to be regretted as the scantiness of information about the form of government established by Gelon, and the civil occurrences of his reign. It is not the number of prisoners he made, nor the buildings he erected, that excite curiosity, so much as the  
general

CHAP.  
X.

general prosperity of the country under his administration, and the lasting popularity of his character. Of the former some valuable testimony remains transmitted by the arts, which the literature of his age, much less proportionally advanced, does not afford. There are gold coins yet existing of Gelon and his immediate successors, tho no commonwealth of Greece, not Athens itself, coined gold, as far as can now be discovered, for more than a century after. Nor are the coins of Gelon more remarkable on this account than for the beauty of the design and workmanship; which are of a perfection at any rate surprising, and which would appear almost miraculous, if we did not learn from an author living so near the time, and so possessing means of information, as Herodotus, that the western Greek colonies had constant communication and intimate connection with those of Asia. With regard then to the government of Gelon, comparing what remains from Herodotus with the anecdotes reported by later writers, we can but gather some general ideâ. Power, it appears, was committed principally to the higher ranks of citizens, yet Gelon was always the favorite of the lower; and in this he appears to have been singular among the Grecian political leaders, that he could reconcile the jarring pretensions of the two, and maintain concord between them. Probably the forms of a mixed republic were observed; as at Athens, under the Peisistratids; and an impartial administration of just laws assured property and civil liberty to all. We are

Herodot.  
1.3. c. 138.  
& 1.6. c. 41.

are told that, after the defeat of the Carthaginians, and the return of the Grecian forces to their several homes, the people were summoned to a general assembly at Syracuse, with a requisition that they should come completely armed, as for a military expedition. Gelon attended in the habit of a private citizen, unarmed and without guards. The assembly being formed, he mounted the speaker's stand, and after giving a detailed account of his administration in peace and in war, concluded with observing to the people, that he was now in their hands; if he had done well, they would reward him with their good words and good wishes; if he had done ill, his doom was in their power. He was answered with loud acclamation; styled benefactor, deliverer, and king, and required to continue the exercise of the supreme authority; and a decree was passed, directing that a statue should be erected at the public expence, representing him, in memory of this transaction, habited as a private citizen. Nor was this meer flattery to the living prince: above a hundred and thirty years after, when, in circumstances most likely to excite democratical fury, a decree was proposed for the demolition or removal of all statues of tyrants, the surviving fame of the just and beneficent administration of Gelon had such weight with the popular mind, that an exception was made in favor of his statue, which was accordingly preserved in its place.

The history of Carthage, where literature never flourished, is still more defectively transmitted

SECT.  
I.

Diod. l. iii.  
c. 26.  
Æl. Var.  
Hist. l. 23.  
c. 37.

Plut. vias  
Timol.

CHAP.  
X.

mitted than that of Syracuse; so that we know not to what should be attributed the total in exertion of its government in Sicily, for near a century after the battle of Himera. The testimony of Aristotle to the lasting internal quiet of that wisely-constituted commonwealth, seems to warrant our belief that no domestic trouble impeded; and this tends to corroborate the presumptive evidence, arising from other circumstances, that Carthage had yet no great resources. She was providing them by the successful extension of her commerce, and of her settlements on the western shores of the Mediterranean; and accordingly between sixty and seventy years after, we find Carthage accounted by Thucydides, not formidable as a warlike state, but the richest commonwealth known. Her factories in Sicily therefore, where less profit was to be acquired with far greater difficulty and risk, were neglected; and Motya thus became an Agrigentine garrison. Panormus and Soloeis appear to have remained to the Carthaginians, who, as we learn from Thucydides, continued to hold establishments in the island; but among the various wars of the Sicilian Greeks, between themselves, and with the barbarians, in whose number Thucydides reckons the Elymians of Egesta, for more than seventy years no mention occurs of any interference of the Carthaginian government\*.

Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 34.

Diod. l. 9.  
c. 90.

Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 46.

Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 11.

## SECTION

\* Scarcely any equally important transactions in Grecian history remain so unsatisfactorily related as those of the Himæran war. Herodotus says the Carthaginian army was of three hundred thousand

## SECTION II.

SECT.  
II.

*Of Italy: Tuscany: Rome: Latium: Sybaris:  
Crotona: Pythagoras: Thurium: Paestum: Cuma:  
Campania: Lucania.*

AMONG the hords who in the early ages held Italy, the people whom the Romans called Etruscans, or Tuscans, and the Greeks Tyr-  
rhenes,

thousand men. This, the only improbable circumstance (indeed nearly an impossible one) in his concise narrative, and expressly given, not as what he would vouch for, but only as a Sicilian report, is the only one in which he has been followed by Diodorus and some later writers, who have added largely to the tale from stores with which we are unacquainted. They say the fleet consisted of two thousand galleys; nearly double the number reported of the fleet of Xerxes, which has passed with some for incredible. (Diod. l. 11. c. 20.) The Carthaginians never, in the most flourishing times of their empire, sent out an army of half, or perhaps even a fourth of three hundred thousand men, and still less a fleet of two thousand galleys. They say then that Gelon led from Syracuse fifty thousand foot and more than five thousand horse; neglecting the account of Ephorus the Sicilian, a much earlier writer than Diodorus (which has been preserved to us by the scholiast of Pindar), who says Gelon's army was of ten thousand foot and two thousand horse. Neither has the confident assertion of Diodorus, that the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was made in consequence of a treaty between the Carthaginian commonwealth and the Persian court, merited the credit that has been paid to it. Herodotus evidently had never heard of such a treaty: indeed his account virtually contradicts its existence. It is indeed very possible that, through the medium of Tyre, there may have been communication between the Carthaginian commonwealth and the Persian court; but it was widely alien from the temper of that court at that time, to make treaties with little, distant, and almost unheard-of republics, upon the terms mentioned by Diodorus. Herodotus sufficiently expresses it as Gelon's opinion, that the only terms upon which alliance could be made with Persia, were  
submission,



CHAP.  
X.

rheneſes, or Tyrfeneſes, became eminent, not only by their military prowefſs, and the extent of do-

ſubmiſſion; not only to the humiliating ceremony of delivering earth and water, but alſo to the payment of tribute (Herodot. l. 7. c. 163). That the Carthaginians were not, in that age, powerful enough to attract the notice of Perſia upon a footing at all approaching to equality, the annoyance which the diſunited little piratical Grecian republics in Sicily were always capable of giving them, and the ſucceſs of the diſtant colony of Maſſilia againſt their fleet, amply indicate. (Herodot. l. 1. c. 166. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 13.) Juſtin, in reporting a treaty between Carthage and the Perſian court, which however he attributes to the reign of Darius (Juſtin; l. 19. c. 1.), deſcribes terms that could only be impoſed on a ſubject people, and would never be acceded to by a ſtate capable of raiſing at the ſame time an army of three hundred thouſand men, and a fleet of two thouſand ſhips of war. But what Herodotus relates of the leading ſteps to the Carthaginian expedition into Sicily; is perfectly conſiſtent with everything that we learn on beſt authority of the circumſtances of the times, and fully ſufficient to account for the undertaking, without any aſſiſtance from fancied treaties with the court of Suſa, by which the merchants of Carthage were to ſhare the conqueſt and ſpoil of Europe with the monarch of the Perſian empire. Finally, the ſilence of Thucydides concerning the immenſity of the Carthaginian armament; and the ſplendor of the victory of Gelon, where, in treating of the principal military actions of the Greeks in general, he ſpeaks of the power of the Sicilian tyrants of that age in particular (Thucyd. l. 1. c. 14.), ſufficiently proves that, if any ſuch reports were in his time current, he thought them unworthy of notice. The account which Diodorus proceeds to give of the terrors at Carthage, left Gelon, with his victorious army, ſhould immediately croſs the ſea and lay ſiege to that city; of the tears of the Carthaginian ambaffadors, and the generoſity of the Syracuſan prince, who ſcorned to conquer Africa, while he was really unable to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily; all theſe, with ſome other circumſtances in the courſe of his narrative of this war, are too puerile for ſerious criticiſm. The naval victory is not noticed by either Herodotus or Diodorus, but remains reported in a quotation from the hiſtorian Ephorus by the ſcholiſt on Pindar, and is mentioned by Pindar himſelf in his firſt Pythian ode, which is addreſſed to Hieron. Some notice of it alſo occurs in Pausanias, b. 6. c. 19. p. 499. The value of theſe authorities has been very ably diſcuſſed by Mr. Weſt, in a note to his tranſlation of the ode above-mentioned.

minion which they acquired, but by their policy, their knowledge of letters, and their proficiency in arts. Concerning their origin, which the existing monuments of early art among them principally makes an object of reasonable curiosity, Strabo agrees with Herodotus in tracing it from Lydia\*. Dionysius of Halicarnassus differs; yet a concurrence of antient testimony makes it appear probable that the Tuscans migrated from the shores of the ~~Aegean~~ <sup>Adriatic</sup> sea, where the Tyrrhene name, we learn, was once extensive, and where, so late as the age of Thucydides, it was retained by a people on the Thracian coast. These were of acknowledged Pelasgian-origin; and notwithstanding the declared opinion of Dionysius, the weight of evidence collected by him tends strongly to prove that the Tuscans, like the Greeks, were at least in part of Pelasgian race\*. The question however is not important enough in Grecian history

SECT.  
II.

Herodot.  
l. 1. c. 94.  
Strab. l. 5.  
p. 219.  
Dion. Hal.  
Ant. Rom.  
l. 14.

Thucyd.  
l. 4. c. 109.

\* The antient vases, which of late years have so much excited the attention of the lovers of antiquity and the arts, seem to have contributed in some instances to give a celebrity to the Etruscan name which is not its due. The proof however of the proficiency of the Etruscans in the arts does not rest only upon the merit and the authenticity of the vases attributed to them. The sepulchral monuments of the antient city of Tarquinii, which will soon be better known to the public by the accurate delineations and description of Mr. James Byres, give more unquestionable and more complete information upon the subject.

\* According to Thucydides the antient inhabitants of Athens, and according to Sophocles those of Argos, were Tyrrhene Pelasgians. Thucyd. l. 4. c. 109. Sophoc. ap. Dion. Hal. Antiq. Rom. l. 1. p. 17. This indeed is testimony only to a name; but from such early authors it is remarkable testimony.

CHAP.  
X.

T. Liv.  
Hist. Rom.  
l. 11  
v. 1 & 5.

to be allowed long discussion here: and it may suffice that, according to every report collected on the subject by Dionysius and Strabo, and everything remaining from the Roman writers, people from the countries around the Ægean sea migrated at different times in the early ages into Italy; that some settled in Tuscany, and some on its northern, and some on its southern borders. The Ligurians were supposed a colony from Greece; Pisa and Carræ in Tuscany, Formiæ, Antium, Aricia, Ardea, Tibur and Præneste in Latium, and Rome itself were held to be Grecian towns.

Fab. Max.  
& C. Sem-  
pron. ap.  
Dion. Hal.  
c. 1. p. 9.  
Strab. l. 7.  
p. 228.  
222, 228,  
232, &  
233.  
Virg. Æn.  
l. 6. v. 96.  
& l. 8.  
v. 54 &  
313.  
Cecil. ap.  
Strab.  
p. 230. &  
Liv. Hist.  
Rom.  
ut sup.  
Strab.  
l. 5. p. 220.  
Dion. Hal.  
l. 3. p. 136.  
T. Liv.  
Hist. Rom.  
l. 1. c. 34.  
C. 4. f. 1.  
of this  
Hist.

A colony however of later date, and concerning which testimony is more ample and more precise, may have carried science and the arts into Tuscany, in a state of at least as much advancement as they seem ever to have attained there. It was led by Demaratus from Corinth, upon occasion of the revolution in that city, through which the democratical party, under Cypselus, became masters of the government; when the oligarchal chiefs, and particularly the family of the Bacchiads, of which Demaratus is said to have been, would find it desirable, or perhaps necessary, to seek settlements elsewhere. Demaratus found in Tarquinii, the principal city of Tuscany, a safe and honorable retreat for himself, his friends and dependants: he married a lady of high rank there, and died in the peaceable possession of wealth, then esteemed extraordinary. A son of that marriage, inheriting the wealth, became, with the name of

Tarquinus

Tarquinius Priscus, king of Rome, by election of the Roman people. The concurrence of testimonies, Greek and Roman, to these facts, tho of so early an age, seems to go far toward proving one of two things; either that the Tuscans, and it might be added, the Romans, esteemed the Corinthians a kindred people, or that they found them a people superior to themselves in arts and general knowledge.

SECT.  
II.

For the history of Etruria materials are very scanty. We find that its people, like the Greeks, but unlike the other Italians, applied themselves much to maritime affairs. Like the Greeks also they were at the same time a piratical and a commercial people. While they remained united under one government, their power by land and sea was formidable; they extended their arms with success into Lombardy; they conquered Campania, and the shores of Sardinia and Corsica became appendages of their dominion. Afterward, separating into several commonwealths, power sunk, arts declined, and while the growing strength and growing ambition of Rome gave constant alarm on the land-side, the Etrurian maritime force went into neglect and decay. Thus, except in one instance, which will be spoken of hereafter, they were prevented from interfering very materially with the interests of the Grecian colonies in Italy. It appeared, nevertheless, proper, to take thus much notice of a people, of some name in antient times, and of much

Herodot.  
l. i. c. 196.  
Strab. l. 5.  
p. 219 &  
232. &  
l. 6. p. 267.

CHAP. X. revived, with perhaps some new renown in modern, who, in the progress of this History, must occasionally occur to mention.

In the decline of the power of Tuscany the Carthaginians succeeded to a more intire command of the western parts of the Mediterranean : the shores of Sardinia and Corsica passed from the Tuscan to the Carthaginian dominion ; and, but for the newly risen power of Rome, there would have been Carthaginian garrisons on the Latin coast. Of this we are assured by that remarkable treaty between Carthage and Rome, in the time of the first consuls, twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, the original of which, ingraven on a brazen tablet, remained to the time of Polybius, among the archives in the Capitol. What gave cause to the treaty, its own words, assisted by a passage of Strabo, sufficiently explain. The maritime towns of Latium carried on some little commerce, but were more addicted to piracy. Even after their subjection to Rome, associating themselves with the corsairs of Tuscany, they pushed maritime depredation sometimes as far as the African coast ; but they were principally annoying to the commerce with the new Carthaginian settlements in Sardinia and Corsica. At the same time Rome itself, powerful enough to hinder those strong measures of coercion by land, which the Carthaginian government had apparently attempted, was also rich enough to be an object for the Carthaginian merchants. Hence the equality established for the subjects

Polyb. l. 3.  
P. 177.

Strab.  
l. 5. P. 232.

jects of the two republics by some articles of the treaty, while the general tenor of it is accommodated intirely to secure and promote the peculiar interest of Carthage; and nothing in it affords the least ground for supposing, with some modern writers, in opposition to all the Roman historians, that Rome had then any naval establishment.

SECT.  
II.

While therefore the Sicilian Greeks, by their success against the Carthaginians, earned a glory which we want means justly to estimate, their fellowcountrymen in Italy, unassailed by any formidable foreign power, had no opportunity to acquire any similar fame. Their republics have nevertheless become objects of curiosity to posterity by the residence of the philosopher Pythagoras, and some of his principal disciples among them, and by the wonderfully beneficial effects, political and moral, attributed to the propagation of his doctrine there. Unfortunately, however, Pythagoras living while writing was little practised in Greece, both the doctrine and its effects, notwithstanding very assiduous researches of many learned men, remain very deficiently and uncertainly known; and the reports of the extraordinary populousness of some of the Italian Greek cities, and of the military force which, for want of a foreign foe worthy of it, they exerted against one another, tho supported in some degree by authority so far respectable that they excite wonder, will not be found, upon examination, to deserve belief.

## CHAP.

## X.

Strab.

l. 6. p. 263.

Athen.

l. 12. c. 6.

Diod.

l. 11. c. 25.

We learn however on sufficient authority, that about the age of Solon and the Peisistratids, some of the Italian Greek cities were considerable. SYBARIS had twenty-five towns within its territory, and held four neighbouring tribes of barbarians in subjection. The luxury of its citizens became proverbial. Indeed the application of the term luxury to anything that could exist among the little republics of that age, has been ridiculed by some eminent modern writers; yet, if we sufficiently consider the circumstances of those republics, we shall perhaps find reason to think the charge of luxury against them may have been founded, tho the accounts of their military force are evidently fabulous. The luxury indeed of a narrow society, where manual labor is the business of slaves only, will differ from that of a great nation where all ranks are free; and it will be likely to differ particularly in this, that while general elegance in the stile of living of persons in easy circumstances will be very inferior, particular indulgences will be carried to greater extravagance. We are told by Diodorus that, in consequence of the victory of the Sicilian Greeks over the Carthaginians near Himera, the number of slaves acquired by the Agrigentines was so great, that many individuals shared each five hundred; and it is to be presumed, from his account, that no citizen would be without a share. Allowing here largely for exaggeration, we may still have a probable fact, so involving with it a sudden, general, great, and most pernicious

icious change of manners, that, among the modern nations of Europe, nothing can be imagined within the bounds of possibility parallel to it. Indeed if we would see examples of the character of luxury among the antient republics, we must seek them perhaps rather in our colonies than in our capitals. Upon the whole then, tho the luxury of Sybaris remains chiefly recorded by writers who lived not till some centuries after Sybaris ceased to exist, for Herodotus mentions only one Sybarite remarkably luxurious, yet we may not unreasonably believe that luxury was extravagant there. It may have been even elegant, through the intercourse which we learn was intimate with the Asiatic Grecian cities; and in regard to some points we are assured of its elegance; for some of the Sybarite coins yet existing are of a beauty that modern art will with difficulty rival. Indeed the Lydian court might communicate among the Greeks of its neighbourhood many refinements little known in proper Greece, which yet from Miletus might pass to the wealthy towns of Italy.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 127.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 21.

The government of Sybaris however was not better established than that of many other Grecian states. In the usual contest of the aristocratical and democratical factions, the lower people, under the conduct of a demagogue named Telys, expelled the richer citizens, to the number of five hundred, and shared their property. The exiles found refuge in the neighbouring city of CROTONA. The Sybarite people

Diod.  
l. 12. c. 9.



CHAP.  
X.

ple under Telys, confident in their strength (for the population of Sybaris far exceeded that of any other Italian city) demanded the fugitives, and on refusal, made war upon Crotona. Herodotus, in his account of this war, speaks with little confidence of any particulars, tho, within little more than half a century after, he resided upon the spot. The current reports were evidently known to him, and his history appears to have been finished in Italy : yet he mentions neither the philosopher Pythagoras, whom some later writers have made the counsellor of the Crotoniats upon the occasion, nor his disciple, the celebrated athlete Milo, who is asserted, on the same authority, to have been their general and hero. The event, which alone we learn with certainty, was, that the Sybarites were defeated, their city taken and destroyed, their commonwealth annihilated, and the very name lost.

Such is the account that can now be collected of Sybaris ; and it involves almost the whole political history of the rival and conquering city Crotona. But the fame of Crotona does not rest on its political eminence only. We have already had occasion to observe that, in many points of art and science, the Grecian colonies went before the mother-country. The medical school of Crotona, probably derived from Pythagoras, who is universally said to have applied himself, and to have directed his scholars, much to the study of nature, was of reputation, before the first Persian war, superior to  
any

any then in the world: its fame reached the court of Susa, where the Crotoniat Democedes became principal physician, and was in high favor with Darius. It is indeed remarkable that not any school within Greece, but that of the distant colony of Cyrenë, held even the second rank in medical reputation. But Crotona acquired extraordinary renown also in another line: its air was esteemed singularly salubrious; whence the natives were supposed to derive a peculiar firmness of muscle, with a general superiority of strength and agility; and no city boasted so many victors in the athletic contests at the Olympian games. Of the political system established in Crotona, by Pythagoras, or the scholars of Pythagoras, we have little or nothing on any good authority. The later Greek writers alone mention it; while the earlier agree in ascribing all that was most valuable in legislation among the Italian and Sicilian cities to Zaleucus and Charondas. That the arts however flourished, the Crotoniat medals, yet remaining, testify; and the reputation of the physical school alone, in the want of authentic information more precise, would mark Crotona for a populous, wealthy and well-regulated city, where security and leisure were enjoyed for the pursuit of science, and means for its encouragement.

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S E C T.  
II.Herodot.  
1.3. c. 131.Herodot.  
ibid.

\* The accounts given by Diodorus, and other ancient writers, of the wonderful populousness of Crotona, and still much more of Sybaris, in themselves utterly improbable, are not only unauthorized,

CHAP.  
X.

The other Italian Greek cities, of which  
Cuma, Rhegium, Locri-Epizephyrrii, Tarentum, Brundisium, were populous and rich, are  
scarcely

thorized, but virtually contradicted by the earlier Greek authors. They have therefore been rejected from the text; yet, as they have not only been followed by all modern writers on the subject, but are countenanced by the respectable authority of Strabo among the antients, it may be proper to take some farther notice of them in a note. The Sybarites, according to Diodorus, marched against Crotona, forming an army of three hundred thousand citizens. The Crotoniats met them with only one hundred thousand; but their general Milo, habited and armed in the wild manner ascribed by the poets to Hercules, was himself equal to half an army; and the astonishing slaughter which he made with his club, was a principal cause of the victory, in consequence of which Sybaris was destroyed. Strabo also reports that the Sybarite army consisted of three hundred thousand men: but he does not, like Diodorus, call them citizens; so that admitting his account, the greater part might be slaves. Before this event, according to Justin (l. 20. c. 3. et 4.), tho he makes no mention of the event itself, but after it, as it should seem from Strabo (l. 6. p. 261.), a hundred and thirty thousand Crotoniats were defeated by the Locrians and Rhegians. But Strabo informs us that Herodotus, the historian, accompanied the Athenian colony which raised Thurium on the ruins of Sybaris, about sixty years, according to Diodorus, after its overthrow. And there is a passage in the history itself of Herodotus which has manifestly been written in Italy and for the Italian Greeks. The traditions preserved among the descendants of the Sybarites concerning their city, as well as those of their conquerors, have evidently enough been known to him. But if only a report remained of such a superiority of population in the Italian cities over those of Greece, it must have been striking; and Herodotus never had the reputation of being backward to relate reports; yet, tho he mentions the destruction of Sybaris, with some disputed circumstances concerning it, he has not a syllable of the extraordinary numbers of the Sybarite and Crotoniat armies. Herodotus and Thucydides are very seldom found in contradiction; and the silence of the latter upon this occasion strongly confirms the negative testimony of the former. Where Thucydides professedly enumerates all the Grecian states which had been eminent for  
military

scarcely objects for history but as they become occasionally connected in transactions with states of greater political importance. To avoid interruption

military power, and mentions the naval strength of the Sicilian tyrants, far inferior to what Athens afterward possessed (Thucyd. l. i. c. 14.), he could not have omitted all notice of those immense armies of the Italian Greeks, to which no other Grecian state ever had anything comparable, had such armies existed. It is farther observable, that Aristotle mentions Sybaris only to quote an instance of sedition. The name I believe never occurs in Plato's works, and the name of Crotona is mentioned by neither of them: an omission utterly unaccountable but upon the supposition that the effects attributed by later writers to the doctrine of Pythagoras, were, for some ages after the time to which they are ascribed, unheard of. We may indeed wonder where later writers, and particularly Cicero (Cic. Tusc. Quæst. i. 16. and 4. 1.), had their information. Herodotus, who mentions Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus (l. 4. c. 90.), as an eminent sophist in Samos, has not taken the least notice of his residence in Italy. Plato, in the same passage in which he speaks of Charondas as the admired legislator of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, mentions Pythagoras in contradistinction to the great reformers of republics, as a private teacher, singularly beloved and respected indeed by his disciples, but the meer founder of a sect. (Plat. de Rep. l. 10. p. 599, 600. v. 2.) It is there only in Plato's works that his name occurs. Aristotle (Ethic. l. 1. c. 1.) mentions him as the first who attempted to teach moral philosophy among the Greeks, and refers to his physical and metaphysical doctrines, but nowhere gives the least hint that he was even a speculative politician. Isocrates (Busr. encom. p. 402. t. 2.) also affirms that he was the first who brought philosophy into Greece, and that he introduced new magnificence in religious ceremonies: of his politics he says nothing. The earliest testimony, in any extant author, to the Pythagoreans of Italy, is that of Polybius (b. 2. p. 126.): of Pythagoras himself that author makes no mention. In short, what remains from earlier writers concerning this celebrated philosopher is next to nothing; later accounts are contradictory, and abound with gross and palpable fictions. "Ne' libri che si leggono," as the learned Florentine doctor Antonio Cocchi, in his treatise concerning the Pythagorean diet, observes, "ci si vede far figura, or di operator  
" di

CHAP.  
X.

Interruption therefore in the account of the affairs of the leading republics of Greece, it may be convenient here to look forward to some of those transactions of the Italian states which principally deserve attention.

Diod.  
l. 12. c. 10.  
Strab. l. 6.  
p. 263.

Among the consequences of the conquest of Sybaris by the Crotoniats, one is recorded, which particularly merits notice; because it is of a kind which, extraordinary as it may appear now, was, in the early ages, so far from uncommon, that it forms one among the characteristical marks of difference between the political state of the antient and that of the modern world. The Sybarite territory, chiefly a plain, watered by the little rivers Sybaris and Crathis, of no great extent, but uncommon fertility, scarcely forty miles from the conquering city Crotona, and adjoining, or nearly so, to its domain, lay fifty-eight years unoccupied. The Crotoniats were unable to

“ di miracoli per la sua bontà, ed ora di mago ridicole e d'impossibile.” That the Samian Pythagoras was eminent among the earliest fathers of Grecian philosophy is clearly established; but that he was a legislator, the silence of all the earlier writers, and especially of Aristotle, seems very strongly to confute.

The passage of Herodotus which proves that a part of his history was written in Italy, and for the Italian Greeks, is in his fourth book; where, after describing some circumstances of the Tauric Chersonese, he illustrates them, for the inhabitants of proper Greece, by a comparison with some circumstances of Attica; but as this might be no illustration for many of those among whom he then lived, he proceeds thus: Ὅς δὲ τῆς Ἀθηναίων τὰύτη μὴ παραπέπλωκε, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄλλως δηλώσω ὡς ἐκ τῆς Ἰωνυγίης ἄλλο ἔθνος, καὶ μὴ Ἰόνες, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ Βερνισίου λιμένος, ἀποσταμοίαια μέγχι Τάραντος, καὶ νεμείλο τὴν ἀρχήν. l. 4. c. 99.

protect

protect their own people in the cultivation of it, and their jealousy, perhaps a reasonable jealousy, deterred others. At length some Thesalians ventured to attempt a settlement there; but were quickly expelled by the Crotonians. Not thus however totally discouraged, associating such remnant of the Sybarite people as they could collect, they applied first to Lacedæmon and then to Athens for assistance. It was little in the general disposition of the Lacedæmonian government to engage in such enterprizes; and its circumstances at the time being adverse, as we shall have occasion to observe more particularly in the sequel, nothing was obtained there. The circumstances of Athens, on the contrary, made such an application welcome. Under authority of the Athenian government, a proclamation was published over Greece to engage volunteers for the colony. To give efficacy to this, an encouraging response was procured from the oracle of Delphi; and Lampon and Xenocritus, with ten ships of war under their orders, were appointed to command the expedition. The adventurers became numerous; Herodotus the historian, Protagoras the philosopher, scholar of Democritus, and Lysias son of Cæphalus the friend of Socrates, himself afterward the celebrated rhetorician whose orations remain to us, were of the number: measures were wisely taken; and the colony was established, as far as appears, without opposition. A spot was chosen at a small distance from the antient site of Sybaris, where the fountain

SECT.  
II.

Strab.  
l. 14.  
p. 656.  
Diog. La.  
v. Protag.  
Lys. or.  
con.  
Eratoſth.

CHAP.  
X.

tain. Thuria afforded the advantage of a plentiful supply of water. There a town was built on a regular plan, with three streets crossing four others at right angles; and the antient name being rejected, as of ill omen, the colonists assumed the appellation of Thurians, and the town was called Thuria or Thurium<sup>s</sup>. A constitution was framed for the new state, according to Diogenes Laertius, by Protagoras. Probably he took the system of Charondas for his model, and thence may have arisen the mistake of Diodorus, who attributes to Charondas the honor of having founded the Thurian constitution.

When we consider the advantageous circumstances under which this colony was established, the uncommon abilities, and uncommon power of the patron of the undertaking (the great minister of Athens, Pericles), the superiority of the men engaged in it, and the celebrity of the laws under which it long flourished, and then look forward to what remains of its history, we cannot but be shocked to find how little personal security was enjoyed under the best po-

<sup>s</sup> *Ἀφύλαι δὲ Θευρίας καὶ Βακχίων.* Schol. in Aristoph. Nub. v. 331. Diodorus has transmitted to us the ichnography of Thurium and the names of the streets. The four parallel streets were called Heracleia, Aphrodisias, Olympias, Dionysias; or Hercules-street, Venus-street, Olympia-street, and Bacchus-street. Instead of favorite deities, an analogous superstition in the same country in modern times would have named them from some favorite saints. The other streets were called Heroa, Thuria and Thurina.

SECT.  
II.

litical constitutions of that age; how much less than under those governments of modern Europe, which we are accustomed most to reprobate and despise; and then, while we exult in the singular blessings which we ourselves enjoy, we shall be less disposed to blame others, who, in political circumstances far less fortunate, chuse yet rather to rest under the lot derived from their ancestors, than risk the horrors of civil war, to obtain, with final success, perhaps only a revival of those miseries with which most of the antient republics abounded, and from which the happiest were never secure\*. All the wise regulations of Protagoras could not prevent the growth of sedition in Thurium. Disputes arose early between the forein colonists and the Sybarites who were associated with them; and those disputes ended only with the massacre of a part, and the final dissipation of the rest, of that remnant of unfortunate people.

Aristot.  
Polit.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
Strab. l. 6.  
p. 263.

A remnant of the Sybarite people nevertheless survived, and we may venture even to add that they flourished; tho antient history has scarcely left three words about them. We are uninformed whether it was in the exuberance of the population of Sybaris that the colony was sent out, or in the calamity of the city that a portion of its people fled, to that extensive bay on

\* This sentiment was deduced simply from Grecian history, having been long written, and some time published, before France began to exhibit horrors beyond all recorded example.

the



CHAP.  
X.

Strab.

l. 5. p. 251.

the western coast of Italy, now called the gulph of Salerno, where the Greek city of POSEIDONIA, otherwife named PÆSTUM, acknowledged Sybaris for its mother-country. To this day the magnificent remains of the public buildings of that place, amid the desolation furrounding them, interest as they astonish the curious traveller, whether antient political history, or the history of the arts, or art itself be his object; while the obscurity, and almost nullity of tradition concerning them, afford endless room for conjecture.

It were difficult to say what advantage the world may or may not derive from those speculations on the antient state of mankind, those visionary inquiries into antient history, in prosecution of which so much ingenuity hath of late been employed, to overthrow every tradictionary testimony transmitted by the earliest writers. But when on one side we see it asserted that what have been four thousand years the finest climates of our globe, were in its first ages uninhabitable through excess of heat, and that all science had its birth in the now frozen regions of Tartary, then alone, by their height above the ocean, affording that temperature of air in which men could live; when, on the other, we find not less force of erudition or of reason engaged in the attempt to show that the progress of things has been the reverse; and that the first civilized nations lived on a portion of the globe now covered to the depth of many hundred fathom by the Atlantic ocean; it seems probable

probable that, these militating systems destroying one another, the fashion of all will pass; and that learned men, however wishing for better information about the early state of mankind than the oldest authors furnish, may nevertheless come to acknowledge that better is not likely to be obtained. In the spirit of inventive history it has been a supposition of late cherished, by some among the curious and learned, that the noble piles whose ruins remain at Pæstum, as well as the various existing monuments of the arts of antient Etruria, have been the produce of science and improvement, not derived from Greece or the East, but the native growth of Italy; or, however, that, whether Italy received the arts from the lofty plains of Tartary, or from the submerged Atlantic continent, she had them before Greece, and at least assisted the eastern nations in communicating them to that country. I would avoid long discussion of matters which are rather of the province of the antiquarian; and indeed upon the subject in question it seems enough for the historian, that neither Cicero, with all his partiality for Italy, and all his diligence, and all his means of inquiry, nor Horace, with all his desire to gratify his Etruscan patron, nor Virgil, nor Livy, nor Pliny, had the least suspicion that their fellowcountrymen had any claim to the priority in science and art, which it has been proposed to attribute to them. Without therefore adding anything to what has been already said about Tuscany, I shall proceed to  
state

**CHAP.** state some circumstances, not alien from the purpose of Grecian history, which may afford grounds from which to estimate the state of civilization and improvement among the inhabitants of the middle and southern parts of Italy, previous to the migration of the first Grecian colonies thither.

**X.** Occasion has heretofore occurred to mention that CUMA, situated a few miles northwest of the present city of Naples, was esteemed the oldest Grecian colony westward of the Ionian sea. The distance of Cuma from its mother-country Eubœa, and the extent of barbarian shores that, in the coasting navigation of the age, must be passed to reach it from any part of Greece, here deserve consideration. Of the course that was usually, or, it may be said, constantly held, if storms did not force the navigator out of his way, we are perfectly informed. The shores of Greece were measured, in fair weather, from headland to headland; but along the windings of the coast, if the sky threatened, as far as the island of Corcyra. The navigator then became particularly anxious for a serene sky and quiet water to cross the Ionian gulph. Having made the Iapygian promontory, if fair weather continued, he would avoid the circuit of the gulph of Tarentum, and stretch away for the Lacinian promontory, whence the coast would conduct him to the Messenian strait. The antients seem to have little known the art of profiting from any wind that did not blow nearly in their course. The wind therefore

**C. 5. f. 2.**  
**of this**  
**Hist.**

**Thucyd.**  
**l. 6. c. 34.**  
**et al.**  
**Xen.**  
**Hellen.**  
**l. 6. c. 2.**  
**l. 17, 18.**

therefore which had favored the navigator from Eubœa to the southern capes of Peloponnesus, would oppose his progress toward the Epirot coast. In proceeding then to Messena, he would want another change; and to hold his way thence, between two and three hundred miles northward to Cuma, a third; or, in defect of these, weather so calm as not to impede his oars. The course from the nearest part of Greece to Cuma would be, even with favoring weather, about six hundred miles, and from Eubœa near a thousand.

With this length of navigation, and these difficulties inseparable from it, difficulties with which the Mediterranean coasting seamen are to this day well acquainted, the settlers at Cuma, it is evident, must rest their safety upon their own strength, compared with that of those who were likely to oppose them, and not upon any assistance to be expected from Greece. Those adventurers then, so risking themselves out of all reach of support from home, chose for their settlement no barren and worthless corner, likely to be neglected in a country which had any civilized inhabitants, but a critical post, on the verge of the CÂMPANIAN plain, the richest, and, from earliest ages, the most coveted part of Italy. The local circumstances deserve notice; and the whole Cumæan territory is so trodden by travellers, for the sake of the antiquities, the natural curiosities, and the picturesque beauties with which it abounds, that in speaking of it I shall speak of what is more familiar to many

Polyb. l. 3.  
P. 336.  
Strab. l. 5.  
P. 243.

CHAP. English readers than most parts of their own  
 X. country; and its features are so characteristical,  
 that, to those who never saw it, a good map  
 may give sufficient assistance.

At the foot of the mountains, which occupy so large a proportion of the interior of Italy, the Campanian plain stretches about fifty miles in length, from the Maffic hills to those which divide the bay of Naples from that of Salerno, and sometimes twenty in width, from the Appennine to the sea. The inclination of the ground suffices, in most parts, to give course to the streams which cross this plain, and yet scarcely any visible inequality interrupts the apparent level of the surface, except where a series of volcanoes has given form to the coast, from the bay of Cuma to the bay of Stabia. Of the hills however in this tract, except Vesuvius, none are too high for cultivation; and the subterranean fires, which produced them, had long been quiet before the Greeks became acquainted with them; even Vesuvius having been unknown to any antient writer as a burning mountain, till the eruption happened which destroyed Herculaneum and Pompeii<sup>10</sup>.

When Megasthenes, with his band of Eubœan adventurers, arrived on the Campanian coast, the bay of Baiæ, one of the best roads that the Italian shores afford, presented harbours

<sup>10</sup> The Cumæan territory was however known to be volcanic ground as early as Pindar's time, as we learn from his first Pythian ode. Perhaps Mount Epomeus, in the neighbouring island of Ischia, might then emit flame. See Strabo, b. 5. p. 243.

so commodious for the vessels of the age, that they might have fixed the choice of those whose object was either commerce or piracy. But Megasthenes looked to greater things. The Oscans, who then held the Campanian plain, are said to have won it by arms from the Ausonians; yet the evident weakness of those barbarian conquerors excited the hope that so rich a possession might be ravished from them. This view seems to have directed the founder in chusing the site of his town; and for the three purposes of security to a garrison, of commanding an extent of coast abounding with harbours, and of carrying on enterprize against the possessors of the plain, a spot could not perhaps have been more judiciously selected than the rocky summit, toward the western end of the volcanic hills, and at some distance from the shore, where the ruins of the castle of Cuma still remain. Immediately below is a small plain, guarded on the land side by the castle and by the hills themselves; and so protected toward the sea by marshes, lakes, and broken ground, that a small force might easily defend it against a large one. This plain, in the infancy of the colony perhaps nearly sufficing to supply it with bread, became, in its increase, as relics everywhere still to be discovered testify, in large proportion covered by the city. For his port Megasthenes chose, not the harbour of Misenum, whose superior advantages, considered by themselves, decided the Romans afterward to make it their principal naval arsenal,

CHAP.  
X.

but a spot preferable for his purpose, on account of its readier communication with Cuma, where the town of Dicæarchia was built, better known afterward by the Roman name Puteoli.

Strab. l 5.  
P. 242.

The early success of the Eubœan adventurers was answerable to the prudence with which their measures appear to have been concerted; for, tho at what time, and through what struggles, we are uninformed, they conquered the Campanian plain. But they were not allowed the quiet enjoyment of so valuable an acquisition: the Tuscans, then in the height of their power, whether solicited by the oppressed Oscans, or incited merely by ambition and avarice, carried their arms thither, and the force of Cuma was unequal to the contest. The Tuscans made themselves complete masters of the plain; they founded the city of Capua, which became its capital; and from them, according to Strabo, descended the people afterward known by the name of Campanians.

The Cumæans, after this reverse, which extinguished their hope to become a considerable power by land, nevertheless prospered as a maritime colony. They extended their maritime settlements, and, in spite of the force of Campania, vindicated to themselves the possession of the hills on the coast, at the eastern extremity of which they built the town of Naples. It was not till after they had flourished some centuries, that faction, the common bane of Grecian

Grecian cities, at length superinduced their ruin. 78 E. G. T. II.  
 The Campanians, with whom they seem to have had almost perpetual warfare, thus first got footing in Naples, and afterward reduced Cumæ itself.<sup>21</sup> Strab. l. 5. p. 243 & 246.

Such then having been the weakness and barbarism of the Italian tribes, the Tuscans alone excepted, that, according to every testimony of Greek and Roman writers, wherever almost a Grecian pirate chose to form a settlement on the coast, he found no force among the natives capable of preventing his purpose, it seems needless to seek for other proof that such people were not the founders of those edifices at Poseïdonia, which have existed now between two and three thousand years, and survived, near nine centuries, the total destruction of the city. It appears from Strabo that, when the Sybarite adventurers arrived there, they found a town, either unfortified, or fortified so slightly, that the barbarous inhabitants abandoned it almost without resistance, and betook themselves to the neighbouring mountains. The local circumstances were not such as the Greeks generally coveted for a settlement, yet such as they sometimes accepted. The place was strong, not by a lofty rock offering itself for a fortress, but by a marsh on which it bordered, and by a

Strab. l. 5. p. 237.

See c. 1. f. 3. of this Hist.

<sup>21</sup> According to Diodorus, in the fourth year of the eighty-ninth Olympiad, the twelfth of the Peloponnesian war, and 420 before the Christian era. Diod. l. 12. c. 76.



C. H. A. P. X. stream with which a surrounding ditch might be floated. These, with the neighbourhood of the sea, and the extent and fertility of the adjacent plain, were the advantages of the situation, which had also great inconveniencies: the neighbouring marsh infected the air, and the water of the stream is brackish and unwholesome. But security and sustenance were the great objects of the Sybarites. Having fortified the town, they thence commanded a large portion of the plain; and how they flourished, their works, now remaining amid wide desolation melancholy monuments of past human grandeur, largely testify.

Strab. l. 5.  
p. 251.

But tho, in the early ages, a small body of Sybarites, not the most renowned in arms among the Greeks, was superior to any force the barbarian Italians could oppose to them; tho a few fugitive Phocæans from Asia Minor could establish themselves, and flourish in their settlement of Velia on the LUCANIAN coast, which became one of the earliest seats of philosophy; yet in process of years, arts and knowledge introducing themselves among the Italians, their population and their political strength increased; and those who had been unable to oppose the infancy of the Grecian towns, could overpower their maturity. Thus not only the Campanians, who came originally fraught with all the arts of Etruria, reduced Cuma and its dependencies, but the once savage Lucanians conquered Poseidonia and Velia.

See c. 7.  
f. 1. of this  
Hist

Strab. l. 6.  
p. 254.

dia<sup>12</sup>. Afterward, under Roman protection, Poseidonia prospered again with the name of Pæstum, survived the Roman empire in the west, and about the beginning of the tenth century, in one unhappy hour, received its total ruin from the destructive hands of the Saracens<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Virgil, who expressly brings civilization to Italy from Asia Minor,

(Æneas —

Bellum ingens geret Italiâ, populosque feroces  
Contundet, moresque viris et mœnia ponet.)

Æn. l. 1. v. 268.

attributes barbarian cruelty and ignorance particularly to the tribes in the neighbourhood of Velia. Æn. l. 6. v. 359; 366.

<sup>13</sup> The stile of the ruins of Pæstum, nearly resembling that of most of the temples remaining in Sicily, and of one of which small relics only are left at Pompeii, differs from anything known to exist in Greece, or among the Grecian settlements in Asia; being more simple and more massive. Hence some would infer, that the Pæstan, Sicilian, and Pompeian buildings have all been anterior to the age to which they are commonly attributed, and that they are Italian and not Grecian architecture. But not to say any more of the total want of testimony to the existence of an Italian people capable of teaching architecture to the Greeks, the following considerations, I think, may sufficiently account for the difference between the stile of the Attic, and that of the Sicilian and Pæstan buildings. Sybaris was destroyed about eighteen years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the buildings of Agrigentum, where the noblest ruins of Sicily remain, were raised, according to Diodorus, immediately after that event, when Athens was also to be restored, after its complete destruction by the Persians. It is likely that the Agrigentines and Sybarites would build in the stile of their forefathers: but we are well informed that the Athenians did otherwise. Themistocles who superintended the rebuilding of Athens, splendid in his disposition, rather to excess, acquainted with the elegancies of Asia Minor, and possessing power to command the science, art, and taste of that country, would not restore when he could improve. Cimon, who succeeded him in the administration, was also remarkable for his magnificence; and he too had seen whatever the Asiatic coast possessed of great and beautiful

CHAP. X. ful. But the ornamental buildings of both these great men were comparatively little to what were afterward raised under the superintendence of Pericles and the direction of Phidias. The fame of the buildings of Athens then spreading over Greece, a new stile of architecture was introduced gradually everywhere. The Ionic order had been imported into Attica from Asia; the Corinthian was soon after invented by an Athenian architect; and the Doric itself began to change its antient simple and massive grandeur, for more embellishment, lightness, and grace.

Mistakes about things often arise from mistakes about names. The order of architecture called Doric, has been supposed, even by Vitruvius, originally peculiar to the Dorian Greeks; but apparently, indeed almost evidently, without foundation. For till after the age of Xerxes, only one order of architecture, as we are well assured, was known in Greece; and that is not likely to have had a name; because names arise only from the necessity of distinguishing in speech two or more things of the same kind. But when the Ionic order was imported from Ionia in Asia by the Athenians, who were themselves original Ionians, the term Ionic would naturally grow into use as the distinguishing name for the new order; and then, and not before, a name was wanted for the old one. Ionic and Doric being the two great distinctions of the Greek nation, and the old stile of architecture holding its vogue among the Dorian cities for some time after the new one had been adopted by the Athenians, the Doric name thus would as naturally adhere to the one as the Ionic to the other.

## CHAPTER XI.

Affairs of GREECE from the Conclusion of that commonly called the PERSIAN WAR, to the Establishment of Security for the Greeks against the Barbarians by the Successes of CIMON.

## SECTION I.

*State of the known World at the time of the Retreat of Xerxes from Greece. Dedications, Festivals, and Monuments in Greece, occasioned by the Victories over the Persians. Restoration of Athens: Jealousy of the Peloponnesians: Administration of Themistocles: Parties at Athens: Banishment of Themistocles.*

RETURNING then to the period whence we digressed, and looking over the world, as far as history will carry the view, this nearly was the state of things: Toward the east, the Persian empire, crippled for external exertion by immense waste of men and treasure, nevertheless continued to spread its power over almost all that was known of the Asiatic continent; for Scythia, tho its formidable hords had mili-  
tary

CHAP.  
XI.

tary fame, as a country, may be called almost unknown. In the west, the rising power of Carthage was checked by the great defeat received from the Greeks in Sicily; Tuscany, divided into several republics, was in a kind of natural decay; the growing strength of Rome, engaged in continual struggles with little states in its immediate neighbourhood, was scarcely heard of beyond them; the southern Italians, excepting the Campanians, lived unpolished among their mountains; the Greek cities on the Italian coast, unconnected, and thus, in the concerns of nations, inconsiderable, were nevertheless prosperous and wealthy seats of science and arts; the Sicilian Greeks, united under the abilities of Gelon, were the most powerful and flourishing people of the Grecian name. Civilization had hitherto moved in a line eastward and westward, in the climate most favorable for the first exertions of man in society; and confined there to the countries most favorably circumstanced. It could not penetrate the mountainous and frozen continent immediately north of Greece. Under a more genial sky, Spain, tho a great object for Carthaginian commerce, affords nothing for history; and of the extensive country of Gaul, little was known beyond the small portion of its coast washed by the Mediterranean, the most inviting spots of which were occupied by the Massilian Greeks. Britain, esteemed almost beyond the limits of the world, was heard of only through uncertain reports of Carthaginian

Carthaginian or Phenician navigators<sup>1</sup>; and Germany was one vast forest, impenetrable to civilized man. SECT.  
I.

Such was the state of the known world, when the Persian monarch withdrew from those great scenes of action where his immense armies and fleets had been destroyed, leaving to his officers, instead of the splendid views of conquest with which the war had been undertaken, the melancholy care to defend the maritime provinces of his vast empire. Among the Greeks on the other hand the late events, at once dispelling those terrors of subjection to a foreign yoke which had been long impending, gave them, in the security of peace, to enjoy at leisure their exultation in the wonderful and glorious deliverance, which, under divine providence, their own valor and skill in arms, and the wholesome institutions, prevailing for a time against the vices of their governments, had procured for them.

The usual piety of the Grecian people, exerting itself upon this great occasion, was not limited to the dedications, made or decreed, as already related, immediately after the division of the Persian spoil. Eighty talents of silver, allotted to Plataea, were employed by that heroic

Ol. 75.<sup>3</sup>.  
B.C. 478.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

<sup>1</sup> When the British islands first became known to the Greeks, we are not informed. In Aristotle's time, Great Britain with the name of Albion, and Ireland with that of Iernē (the same evidently with the modern Celtic name Erin), were known to be islands, larger than any in the Mediterranean, with many smaller islands near their shores; and all together were called the BRE-TANIC ISLANDS. Aristot. de Mundo, c. 3.

CHAP.  
XI.

Thucyd.  
l. 3. c. 58.  
Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

little commonwealth in building a temple to Minerva, and adorning it with paintings, by the most eminent artists of the time, which were preserved with so much care that they remained perfect, above six hundred years, to the age of Plutarch. A funeral solemnity was at the same time instituted to be annually performed by the Platæans; in which the first-fruits of their country were offered to the gods, preservers of Greece, and to the souls of the heroes who had died in its defence; and this also remained in Plutarch's time. A festival repeated every fifth year, in commemoration of the victory, probably not instituted till after the age of Thucydides, who mentions only the annual ceremony, was of similar duration.

After thanks to the gods, the merits of the men who had fallen in their country's service, were taken into consideration. Means had not hitherto been open for paying due honors to the heroism of those who, in the preceding year, had fallen in the extraordinary action under Leonidas. The care of their obsequies, and of erecting monuments to perpetuate their well-earned fame, was now committed to the Amphictyonic Assembly. Two structures of marble marked the place of the engagement, with inscriptions, which remained many ages; and which having been recorded by Herodotus, will probably be secured by the press against perishing while the world shall last. One was in honor of the Peloponnesians collectively, without mentioning the other Greeks, who, under Leonidas, defended

Herodot.  
l. 7. c. 228.  
Lycurg.  
or. con.  
Leocrat.  
p. 215. or.  
Gr. ed.  
Reiske.  
Strab. l. 9.  
p. 429.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 33.  
Antholog.

defended the pass; the other commemorated only the Lacedæmonians who fell with their prince. The simplicity of these inscriptions characterizes the manners of the age, and the partiality to Peloponnesus and Lacedæmon marks the prevalence of Peloponnesian influence in the assembly. They were, as was then usual, in verse. The former may be literally translated thus: 'Here four thousand men from Peloponnesus fought with three millions.' The other, less admitting a close translation, says nearly, 'Stranger, go tell the Lacedæmonians that we have obeyed their laws, and that we lie here.'

SECT.  
I.

More pressing cares meanwhile engaged the Athenians, the restoration of their country laid waste, and of their city reduced to ruins and ashes: yet now, according to Diodorus, they also instituted their public funeral anniversary; Diod. Sic. l. 11. c. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo says the monument, with the inscription, was in his time still in its place. The inscription remains reported by Herodotus, the Athenian orator Lycurgus, Strabo himself, Diodorus, and others, with some little variations, which show that some of them at least have trusted to memory. Cicero says it was composed by Simonides, and he has given a Latin translation of it thus:

*Dic, hospes, Spartæ nos te hic vidisse jacentes,*

*Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.*

*M. T. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1. n. 101.*

The original is thus variously reported:

ὦ ξέν' ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε

Κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι. Herodot.

ὦ ξέν' ἀγγεῖλον Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε

Κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις. Lycurg. & Diodor.

ὦ ξέν' ἀπάγγειλον, κ. τ. ε. Strab.



CHAP.  
XI.

Thucyd.  
l. 2. c. 34.

Pausan.  
l. 1. c. 32.

to which the superior genius of their orators, who pronounced the praises of the deceased, together with the political eminence which their commonwealth acquired, gave afterward a celebrity unequalled in other parts of Greece. Public funerals indeed in honor of those who had merited highly of the commonwealth, as we learn from higher authority, were of earlier date; yet the ceremony may have been now first established in that form which became the rule for following times. Now also probably were raised the columns, which remained many ages, on the barrows covering the bodies of those who fell in the field of Marathon; for it is little likely that monuments erected for such a purpose would have escaped the destructive hands of the Persians, and of those Greeks who sided with the Persians, while they possessed the country. Pausanias, visiting the spot above six hundred years after, found them, with the inscribed names of the slain, still perfect. One barrow covered the Athenians, another the Plataeans, together with the slaves; and to make some amends to the memory of Miltiades for the severity with which he had been treated when living, tho he had not fallen in the field, a particular monument to his honor was erected there<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> The inscription on the Athenian barrow remains reported by the orator Lycurgus, thus:

Ἕλλησιν ἀνταμαχούσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι,  
Χρυσόφορον Μήδων ἐξόρυσαν δύναμιν.

‘The Athenians, fighting at Marathon as the advanced guard of the Greek nation, overthrew the force of the goldbearing Medes.’

The

The Athenians, in retaking possession of the site of their city, found only a small part of the walls standing, with a few houses which had been reserved for the residence of the principal Persian officers. During the past summer, Themistocles appears to have been in no public situation. Some jealousy excited by the high distinction shown him at Sparta, and too boastful a display of his own glory, had given disgust; and the chief commands had been committed to the leaders of the opposite party, Aristides and Xanthippus. In the following autumn however, when the reparation of the ravages of war came under deliberation, Themistocles again stepped forward, again found means to acquire the favor, and through that favor to become the ruler of the Athenian people. In restoring the city, which was the most urgent business, the late events would impress strongly upon their minds the necessity of providing in the most effectual manner possible for its future security. What others were anxious for, each with a view to his domestic ease, Themistocles urged to promote the political greatness of his country, to which he looked for the foundation of his own greatness. At his instigation therefore it was determined to postpone everything to the completion of the fortifications; and these were put under his direction. A larger space was marked out than had been included within the former walls, and the work was prosecuted with the most zealous diligence.

S E C T.  
I.Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 89.Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 129.  
Diod. l. ix.  
c. 27.  
Plut. vit.  
Themist.Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 93.

While

CHAP.  
XI.

While the Athenians were thus employed in repairing the past mischiefs of war, and providing against the future, the Lacedæmonians, who had suffered nothing but the loss of a very inconsiderable proportion of their citizens, had full leisure to contemplate the state of things around them, and the probable consequences of the late events. They had long been accustomed, not only to esteem themselves, but to be esteemed by all Greece as the superior state, intitled by a kind of prescriptive right to take the lead in all common concerns of the nation. This right had been disputed hitherto only by the Argians, who still claimed hereditary pre-eminence, transmitted, as they urged, from the Danaïd, Perseid, and Pelopid monarchs, through the elder branch of the Heracleid family. But Argos, continually torn by internal faction, and weakened by almost every external war in which it had been engaged, wanted force to support its claim; while Sparta had the advantage in public opinion, of boasting the regular descent of its reigning princes from Hercules, Pelops and Perseus, with the more solid advantage of possessing superior military strength; and this farther supported by the confidence of the Peloponnesian states in the wisdom and steadiness, which, through the superiority of its constitution, seldom failed to appear in its counsels. But the late transactions had brought forward a people, hitherto of very inferior political weight among the Grecian states, of very inferior military power, and of the Ionian race,

far

Isocrat. ad  
Philip.  
p. 340. t. 1.  
ed. Auger.

far inferior in general estimation to the Dorian. SECT.  
I.  
 This rising state had been nearly crushed under the overwhelming pressure of the Persian arms; but what had threatened its annihilation, had in effect only directed its strength to a new mode of exertion, through which it had acquired a new kind of power, to an amount that Lacedæmon could not hope immediately to rival. A jealousy thus unavoidably arose, and every motion of the Athenians was watched with suspicious attention; which some of the allies, according to the candid Thucydides, carried farther than the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 94.

No sooner therefore were the new fortifications of Athens begun, than the Æginetans, whose antient enmity had been smothered, not extinguished, by the terrors of the Persian invasion, sent ministers to excite the interference of Sparta. A remonstrance came in consequence to Athens. ‘Experience,’ it was urged, ‘had proved, that Athens, however fortified, could not withstand the force of the Persian empire. The erection therefore of fortifications beyond Peloponnesus, was but forming a strong hold for the enemy; and the common interest of Greece required rather that all fortified places so situate should be dismantled. Peloponnesus would suffice as a temporary retreat for

Diod.  
l. 11. c. 39.  
Plut. &  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Them.  
Justin.  
l. 2. c. 15.  
Ol. 752.4  
B.C. 477.

\* This date and the next are conjectural. Dodwell is evidently wrong in supposing the walls completed, as well as all the negotiations about them, within the year.

CHAP. XI. **all who should be obliged to quit their posses-  
 sions in the more exposed part of the  
 country.** Such, we are told by Thucydides,  
 Thucyd. L. 1. c. 90. was the avowed policy not of the Lacedæmo-  
 nians only, but of all their Peloponnesian allies.  
 If these arguments should immediately be infor-  
 ced by arms, Athens was not in condition to  
 resist; to temporize was necessary; and the  
 conduct of Themistocles, upon this occasion,  
 has been celebrated as a masterpiece of policy,  
 where nothing was omitted by which a genius  
 equally fertile, pliable, and daring could pro-  
 secute its purpose. To the Spartan ministers  
 who brought the remonstrance, it was answered,  
 'That their government must certainly have  
 ' been misinformed, both of what was doing  
 ' and what was intended by the Athenian peo-  
 ' ple. Athens was not, like Lacedæmon, an  
 ' inland town: near as it lay to the coast, if  
 ' totally unfortified, it would be liable to insult  
 ' from every daring pirate; but for their own  
 ' sakes, not less than for the common interest of  
 ' Greece (for which of all Grecian people  
 ' surely the Athenians least merited the suspi-  
 ' cion of deficient zeal) they should be careful not  
 ' to form strong holds for the common enemy.  
 ' Ambassadors should however be immediately  
 ' sent to Lacedæmon, who should account satis-  
 ' factorily for the proceedings of the Athenian  
 ' government.' With this reply the Spartans were  
 dismissed, according to the usual practice of  
 the Greeks; the jealous temper of whose little  
 commonwealths did not readily admit any  
 long

long residence of foreigners in a public character. SECT.  
I.

Themistocles himself undertook the embassy to Sparta; and to give it all possible weight and dignity, as among the antients an embassy commonly consisted of more than one person, Aristides was appointed to accompany him, together with Abronychus, who is otherwise known to us only as the officer commanding the vessel stationed at Thermopylæ to communicate between the army under Leonidas and the fleet at Artemisium<sup>s</sup>. Themistocles hastened his journey; but he provided that his colleagues, or at least one of them, should be detained till the walls of the city were of such a height as to give some security to a garrison. In the prosecution of the work the zeal of the people fully seconded the policy of their leader: freemen did not scruple to toil among slaves; the very women and children would assist for whatever their strength and skill were equal to; reliefs were established, so that no hour of the day or night was the business intermitted; and, to save the time which the preparation of materials would have consumed, whatever could serve the purpose was taken, wherever it could be found, from the remains of buildings public and private, and even from the tombs. The patchwork thus occasioned, Thucydides observes, was evi-

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 91.  
See  
c. 8. f. 4.  
of this  
Hist.

<sup>s</sup> The name of his father, Lyficles, mentioned both by Herodotus and Thucydides, identifies him.

CH. A. P. dent in his time in the external appearance of  
 XI. the walls of Athens.

Themistocles, meanwhile, being arrived at Sparta, was in no haste to open the business of his embassy. When at length urged by the Spartan ministry, he excused himself by saying, 'he waited for his colleagues, who had been detained by some business for which their presence was indispensable; but he expected them hourly, and indeed wondered they were not yet arrived.' The Spartans, we find, even at home, notwithstanding the severity of their institutions, were not universally inaccessible to bribery; and of the expertness of Themistocles in the use of that engine of policy, many instances are recorded. Plutarch mentions it as reported by the historian Theopompus, that he found means to corrupt even some of the Ephors. Certain it is that, through his management, time was gained for the Athenians to execute a very great work. The progress made, however, could not remain intirely unknown at Lacedæmon, and Themistocles was reproached with it. In reply, he denied that the Spartans had any just information upon the subject, and urged that it ill became them to found their proceedings upon vague reports. 'Let men of sufficient rank,' he said, 'and unimpeachable character be sent to Athens, whom the Athenians may respect, and in whom yourselves may place intire confidence: I will remain a hostage in your hands to insure the proper conduct of the Athenian people.'

Thucyd.  
 l. 1. c. 13.

Plut. vit.  
 Themist.

‘ple.’ This requisition, boldly put, and in itself not unreasonable, was complied with, Three persons, of the first consequence in Lacedæmon, were sent to Athens; where, in pursuance of directions from Themistocles, they were received and treated with the utmost respect, but secretly watched, and effectual measures were taken to prevent their departure, if any violence or restraint should be put upon the Athenian ambassadors.

S E C T.  
I.Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 91.

Not till the walls of Athens were advanced to that height which was, according to the expression of Thucydides, most indispensably necessary to give due advantage to a garrison, Aristides and Abronychus joined Themistocles at Sparta. The senate being then assembled, gave audience to the embassy; and Themistocles, laying aside that dissimulation which was no longer necessary, declared that ‘by the last intelligence received, he had the satisfaction to learn that Athens was now sufficiently fortified for its security. The Lacedæmonians,’ he added, ‘and their allies, whenever they communicated with the Athenians by embassies, ought to consider them as a people capable of judging both what their own interest and what the common cause required. With regard to the object of their present meeting, all Greece surely ought to rejoice in the restoration of a city, whose people, by their counsels, their actions, and their sufferings, had demonstrated that they consulted the interest of the whole nation not less than their own;



CHAP.  
XI.

Thucyd.  
1, 1. c. 92.

‘ nor would the Lacedæmonians themselves  
‘ blame what had been done, unless they would  
‘ prove to the world that not the welfare of  
‘ Greece, but the extension of their own com-  
‘ mand was the object of their solicitude.’

Whatever the Lacedæmonians might feel upon this occasion, the steady wisdom usual in their administration showed itself in the suppression of all appearance of resentment. No reproaches of any kind were vented, but on the contrary a civil apology was made for the interference of the Lacedæmonian government, in a matter concerning which the Athenian people, it was acknowledged, were to decide for themselves; tho, it was added, admonition (which was all that had been intended) to an ally, and concerning a point in which it was supposed the common interest and that of the Athenian people were one, could not be improper. The ambassadors of each state then returned home; and thus, by a train of conduct hazardous to comment upon, admirable for its policy, but dubious in its morality, yet commendable at least for its patriotism, Themistocles delivered his country from imminent danger of falling under the yoke of Lacedæmon, immediately after, and almost as a consequence of, its glorious exertions and heroic sufferings in the common cause against Persia.

This important and difficult negotiation thus successfully concluded, the views of Themistocles were yet but opening. Amid all her sufferings from the Persian war, Athens, through the supe-

S E C T.  
I.

rior abilities of her leaders, had been gradually rising to a rank far above what she had formerly held among the Grecian states. It had been the ancient policy, we are told, of the Athenian government, to discourage maritime commerce and a turn to naval affairs among the people; relying upon agriculture as the source of wealth, and the land-force as the means of being secure and respectable. Themistocles had already successfully combated this policy with the highest, most undeniable, and most flattering advantage to the commonwealth; for Athens not only owed the preservation even of its existence to its navy, but for the last two years had existed almost only in its navy; and this navy was become, not only superior in strength to that of any other Grecian state, but superior by the glory of its actions to any that the world had yet seen. It was now the purpose of Themistocles, after having given security to the Athenian people, to lead them to empire; and with this view he extended his favorite policy to a very extraordinary length. The circumstances of the times had indeed already gone far in preparing the business, for they had made almost all the Athenian people seamen; his object was to keep them so always.

The first thing wanting was a sufficient port. The Attic shore in the part nearest to the city, had three inlets, named, from three adjacent villages, Phalerum, Munychia, and Peiræus. Of these Munychia was small, and comparatively incommodious. Phalerum, to the southeast of it, nearest of the three to the city, had been hither-

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 93.

CHAP.  
XI.



Diod. l. ii.  
c. 41.

Descr.  
Geogr. du  
Golfe de  
Venise,  
&c. par  
Bellin.  
Wheler's  
and  
Chand-  
ler's Tra-  
vels in  
Greece.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 93.

An. Thu.  
ad ann.  
A. C. 481.

Diod. l. ii.  
c. 41.

to the principal harbour and arsenal; and it had sufficed for all the purposes of the state, when, without assistance from Corinth, Athens could not meet at sea the inhabitants of the Æginetan rock. But it was insufficient for the present navy, and still more unequal to the great views of Themistocles. Peiræus to the northwest of Munychia, a much more spacious inlet than Phalerum, might, with some labor, be so improved as to form, for vessels of the ancient construction, drawing little water, the completest harbour in Greece. It was naturally divided into an inner port and an outer; the former capable of being made a perfect basin, furnished so as effectually to prevent the entrance of an enemy's fleet. Within this basin is a smaller basin, now, according to the report of travellers, choked with sand, but in the age of Themistocles, in a different state; whence Thucydides describes Peiræus as having three natural harbours. Adjoining to the outer port, on the northwest, is an excellent road, protected by the islands Psyttaleia and Salamis, which would be inestimable for a modern navy, and was not without its value to the ancients.

The natural advantages thus offered did not escape the penetrating eye of Themistocles. When in the office of archon, in the year, it is supposed before, the expedition of Xerxes, having already meditated to make Athens a naval power, works had been under his direction begun for improving the port of Peiræus, and constructing a naval arsenal there. He would

now

SECT.  
I.

now pursue the plan, but he still feared interruption from the jealousy of Lacedæmon. This he would have precluded by secrecy in preparation ; but a democratical government little admits secrecy : it was absolutely necessary to have the sanction of the assembled people. To obtain this therefore, without betraying his project, he declared that he had measures to propose, of the utmost importance to the prosperity and greatness of the commonwealth ; but a public communication of them would defeat the purpose. He therefore wished that two men might be chosen, who should be thought best to deserve public confidence, to whom he might propose his plan ; and who, if they judged it for the public good, might be authorized to direct the execution. Aristides and Xanthippus were accordingly named ; popular jealousy itself favoring so advantageous a choice ; for those two great men were generally political opponents of Themistocles. They nevertheless declared their approbation of his present proposal. But fresh jealousy seized the people ; they suspected that apparent coalition of the leaders of opposite parties, and nothing less would satisfy them than the communication of the project to the council of five hundred, who should be bound to secrecy. The council however also approved, and then the business was committed to Themistocles.

Preparations were made with the utmost dispatch, while the purpose remained a profound secret. Whatever the keenest politician could devise

Ol. 78.4.  
B.C. 476.

CHAP.  
IX.



Thucyd.  
1. 1. c. 93.  
Plat. Gor.  
899. p.  
455. l. 2.

devise was practised, first to lull the Spartan government, and then to gain its approbation of the measure; which tended, it was asserted, to nothing more than the forming of a port fit for the combined navy of Greece, and not at all to interfere with the views of the Lacedæmonians, who never affected maritime power. Fortifications, meanwhile, much more complete than those of the city, arose around a space sufficient for a town almost equal to the city; the walls, of a thickness to admit two carriages abreast, were formed of large blocks of marble, squared, and exactly fitted, without cement, but the outer stones firmly connected by cramps of iron fixed with lead. Only half the intended height was ever accomplished; the purpose of Themistocles having been to make the place defensible with the smallest possible garrison, old men and boys, so that every citizen capable of more active service might be spared, and the whole force of the commonwealth exerted at sea; yet such as Peiræus under his care became, it was the completest naval arsenal that the world had yet seen\*. Mean-

\* Plutarch delighted in telling a good story, and, for what is here related, he has substituted one so brilliant, that among modern writers of Greek history (the diligent compilers of the Antient Universal History, as far as my observation goes, are alone to be excepted), it has quite eclipsed the simple and probable narrative of Diodorus. The Athenian assembly, says Plutarch, (vit. Themist.) directed Themistocles to communicate his proposal to Aristides alone. Aristides declared that nothing could be either more advantageous or more wicked; upon which the people commanded that it should be no more thought of. Whether Aristides was the rogue, or Themistocles the fool, afterward to divulge the secret,

Meanwhile the disappointment, rather a disgracing disappointment, which had attended the attempt to prevent the fortifying of Athens, had not damped the ambition or changed the policy of the Lacedæmonian government. Ever attentive to strengthen and extend their ascendancy over the other Grecian commonwealths, and now more than ever jealous of Athens, yet cautious of farther interference in its internal concerns, they di-

SECT.  
I.

secret, Plutarch, with a thoughtlessness ordinary with him, omits to inform us; but he asserts, with perfect confidence, that the proposal of Themistocles was to burn the allied Grecian fleet assembled in the bay of Pagasæ; and with a farther thoughtlessness which has justly excited the indignation of the good Rollin, he appears to give his approbation to such an infernal project as a great idea. But the evident impolicy of the measure, without taking anything else into consideration, might reasonably lead us to doubt the truth of the tale. Had it been executed, the Athenians indeed alone would have had a fleet; but where would they have found an ally? What would have been their prospect of command, and what even the security of their country, a continental territory, against the united resentment of Greece?

Thucydides mentions neither Plutarch's tale, nor what is related by Diodorus: but it was not his purpose to give a connected history of this period; and tho Diodorus would sometimes stretch a point to favor his fellowcountrymen the Sicilian Greeks, or to tell a story of a hero with a club and a lion's skin, yet it was not his disposition without authority to relate a simple fact, merely illustrative of the inconveniencies of democracy and of the temper of the Athenian people. We find however in Tully's Offices, b. 3. c. 2. the very story which Plutarch has told, but with the material difference, that the proposal of Themistocles was to burn, not the fleet of the whole Grecian confederacy in the bay of Pagasæ, where, after the battle of Salamis, we may venture to affirm, that fleet never was, but only the Lacedæmonian fleet in Gythium. This indeed appears not at all an improbable project for Themistocles to have conceived, when the forcible interference of Lacedæmon, for preventing the fortifying of Athens and Peiræus, was apprehended; but we still want information how, consistently with the other circumstances of the story, it could be publicly known.

rected

CHAP.  
XI.

Plut. vit.  
Themist.

rected their intrigues to another quarter. In the council of Amphictyons it was at their instigation proposed that every Grecian state, which had taken part with the Persians in the late war, should be deemed to have forfeited all its rights in that general assembly of the nation. This was particularly aimed against the Argians and Thebans; in the well-grounded hope that two of the most powerful states, and most inimical to Sparta, being excluded, Spartan influence would thenceforward govern the assembly. But the vigilance and activity of Themistocles here again thwarted them. Inciting the sluggish and encouraging the cautious, he procured a decision, 'That it would be utterly unjust to deprive any Grecian state of its inherent rights, on account of the crimes of those who at any particular time had directed its councils.'

Plut. vit.  
Themist.

Thus successful in his political administration, Themistocles took the command of the fleet; and going round the Ægean, collected the subsidies apportioned to the island and Asiatic states toward carrying on the war against Persia. In the course of this business he was attentive to strengthen and extend the influence of Athens; but he is accused of having been here, as upon many other occasions, too attentive to his own interest. The factions, between which almost every little Grecian commonwealth was divided, would furnish abundant opportunity for both public service and private lucre. In one place nearly balanced, and each party, beyond all things, afraid of the other, they would contend for

Plut. ut  
sup.  
Herodot.  
l. 8. c. 113,  
112.

S E C T.  
I.Plut. vit.  
Themist.

for the favor and support of the Athenian government: in another, some wealthy citizens, banished, would be ready to pay largely for the interest of the Athenian admiral to procure their restoration. Loud complaints of partiality were circulated against Themistocles; and Plutarch has transmitted some fragments of poems on the occasion, by Timocreon, a principal man of Ialysus in Rhodes, valuable as genuine relics of political invective, of an age prior to the oldest remaining Greek historian. Timocreon had been banished for treason to the common cause of Greece, or, as the Greeks termed it, for Medizing; and he had gone far, for we find by his own free confession, that he had bound himself by oath to the Persian cause. He hoped, nevertheless, through his interest with Themistocles, with whom he was connected by hospitality, to procure his restoration. Being disappointed, he exerted his poetical talents in revenge. ‘Let others,’ he says, ‘extol Pausanias, or Xanthippus, or Leotychidas: my praise shall be for Aristeides, the best man of sacred Athens. For Latona detests Themistocles, the false, the unjust, the traitor; who for paltry pelf deserted the interest of Timocreon, his friend and host, and refused to restore him to his native Ialysus. Money guided the destructive course of the fleet: while the corrupt commander, restoring unjustly, persecuting unjustly, some into banishment, some to death, as the larger bribe persuaded, filled his coffers. Most ridiculously  
‘ then



CHAP.  
XI.

‘ then at the isthmus he courted favor with his  
‘ entertainments; those who ate his victuals  
‘ wished his ruin.’ From the concluding sentence we learn, that a splendid hospitality was among the means by which Themistocles endeavoured to extend his influence in Greece.

Tho we should not, perhaps, give intire credit to the angry Rhodian, yet imputations against Themistocles are too numerous, and too general among historians, to permit the supposition that he supported an unblemished integrity. Openings were thus found for giving efficacy to intrigue, which was always busy against every great public character in Athens. The superiority which Themistocles was not contented to possess, but would ostentatiously display, excited heart-burnings among the old Athenian families. In political opposition to him, Aristides had been scrupulously just; Xanthippus moderate: Alcmaeon, head of the long powerful house of his name, became violent. He was warmly supported by all the influence of the Lacedæmonian government. Aristides and Xanthippus, tho not disposed to go his length, were among his friends: Xanthippus was his near relation. To gain the zealous coöperation of Cimon son of Miltiades, seemed the one thing wanting to acquire to the party a decisive superiority. Cimon, yet a young man, was, however, of young men, by far the first in Athens; great by his father’s greatness; powerful by his large possessions, and the inherited influence of his family; of eminent abilities; of rough yet condescending and popular manners;

Plut. vit.  
Themist.

Plut. vit.  
Cim.

manners; with a supercilious neglect of elegant accomplishments, the reverse of the general Athenian temper, but marking him as a man to be connected with the Lacedæmonians. The house of Alcmaeon had indeed been the principal agents in procuring the condemnation of Miltiades. To overcome the repugnance which a generous young mind would feel at the proposal of a coalition with that house, much diligence was used to stimulate the ambition of Cimon. To connection with the Lacedæmonians he did not object, but it was only by a union with the powerful house of Alcmaeon that he could hope to rise to the first situations in the commonwealth. Flattery, ably and assiduously applied, gained him to their party, while his openness, simplicity, and unbending integrity, not less than his abilities and influence, recommended him to Aristides; who wanted his support against the overbearing ambition of Themistocles.

But another party at Athens, more formidable than all the rest, was growing adverse to Themistocles. The party of the lower people, by whom he had raised himself, and whose power therefore it had been his policy to favor, had increased their importance, by the events of the Persian war, beyond what even Themistocles wished. The temporary ruin of the country, the destruction of houses and estates, the ceasing of all revenues, the community of lot among families in the removal beyond sea, and the still nearer equality among men long engaged together in one common military service, from which

CHAP.  
XI.Plut. vit.  
Aristid.Aristot.  
Polit.  
l. 2. c. 12.

no rank gave exemption, had tended strongly to level distinctions. Flattery and indulgence to the multitude had often been necessary, toward keeping order and persuading to patience under hardship and misfortune. The extraordinary success afterward of their arms elevated and imboldened them. Victory they would then consider not as their leaders' but as their own. Did the commonwealth require their arms by sea or by land, they were ready to serve the commonwealth, because they were the commonwealth: having fought for their existence, they were ready still to fight for riches, power, and glory; but it must be for themselves, not for others as their superiors. Argument, such as will weigh with the people, and orators to urge it, may always be found in favor of the popular cause; and so irresistible the torrent of popular ambition became, that even Aristides was reduced to temporize, so far as not only to admit but to promote a very great change in the constitution of the government. The laws of Solon had gone far to level distinctions of birth: all Athenian citizens were thought sufficiently noble to execute the highest offices in the commonwealth, the priesthood only excepted; for civil offices a qualification by property was however still required. This restraint was now totally done away. In the actions of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, the poor had contributed equally with the rich to save and to innoble their country. All civil and military offices were therefore laid open not only to those of meanest birth, but to those  
totally

totally without property; and the most important of the civil offices being conferred by ballot, tho the expensiveness of most of them generally deterred the indigent from seeking them, yet the scrutiny of the *Dokimasia*, often perhaps a vain form, remained the only legal check.

SECT.  
I.

See  
c. 5. f. 4.

While this condescension of Aristeides to the ambitious requisition of the multitude, increased his popularity, and strengthened his situation, the various clamors of the allies reached Athens against Themistocles. Occasional sallies of that ostentation in the display of his glory, which had before injured him, again gave umbrage. The intrigues of Lacedæmon were at the same time taking effect; reports were circulated of secret correspondence with the Persian satrap, and it was insinuated that Themistocles carried his views to the tyranny of Athens, if not of all Greece. This probably was calumny; for Aristeides, we are told, refused to join in any severe measure against him. But Alcmaeon, taking the lead of the opposition, engaged Cimon with him. A capital accusation was not yet ventured; but that less invidious attack of the ostracism, against which the integrity and modesty of Aristeides had formerly been insufficient protection, all the policy of Themistocles proved now unable to resist, and he was compelled to leave Athens.

Plut. vit.  
Aristid.

Ol. 77. 3.  
B.C. 469.  
Ann.  
Thu.



## SECTION II.

*War prosecuted against Persia under Pausanias and Aristeides. Treason of Pausanias: Athens head of a new confederacy composed of the Greeks of the Aegean islands, Asia Minor, and Thrace.*

THE summary account remaining from Thucydides, of transactions in Greece from the Persian to the Peloponnesian war, inestimable for the authority with which it ascertains most of the principal facts reported by later writers, does not always distinguish their dates, or even the order in which they happened: and tho we have the lives of Themistocles, Aristeides, and Cimon, written with much detail by Plutarch, and in a more abridged manner, with the addition of the life of Pausanias, by Cornelius Nepos, tho we have the history of the times by Diodorus, distinguishing, as far as his information and judgement enabled him to distinguish, the events of every year, marking the year by the names of the archons of Athens and the consuls of Rome, and stating both the number of the olympiad and the name of the victor in the stadion, yet the chronology of these times remains very imperfect<sup>7</sup>. We are with no

<sup>7</sup> Tandem aliquando ad Pausaniæ, Themistoclis, et Cimonis chronologiam constituendam accingimur, quæ omnis est in Diodoro vitiosissima. Dodw. Ann. Thuc. ad ann. A. C. 470. The faults in the chronology of Diodorus are evident and gross, and the labors of Doddwell to elucidate the order of the transactions of these times are

certainly informed when the banishment of Themistocles took place; whether before or after some of the events which we proceed to relate. His removal, it should seem, would be the removal of an obstacle to that concert, which we find was renewed, between Lacedæmon and Athens, for the prosecution of hostilities against Persia. But the great works executed at Athens under his direction, required considerable time. His policy might incline him to yield something to Spartan jealousy, rendered more dangerous by the state of parties at home; and not only to acquiesce in, but perhaps even to desire the appointment of his rivals, Aristides and Cimon, to a distant command. His own residence at Athens, meanwhile, would inable him the better to prosecute those great public works by which he meant to establish his country's power and his own glory, and seems to have been desirable for the purpose of watching and counterworking that intrigue which was unremitting against him.

are highly valuable. His assistance indeed is so great a relief to me, that I can never willingly reject it: but he has certainly trusted too much to Plutarch, Justin, and other late writers, sometimes giving authority to merely constructive evidence from them. Plutarch seldom aims at exactness in the course of events. When he means to be exact indeed, he generally quotes his authorities, and thus gives additional value to his testimony. But taking Thucydides for my polar star, and trusting later writers only as they elucidate what he has left obscure, and for the rest, comparing circumstances, and considering the probable, or even the possible connection and course of things, I cannot but sometimes differ from Dodwell. I never quit him, however, but with regret, and always put myself under his guidance again, the moment I can regain the same track.

CHAP.  
XI.

But however this may have been, we find Themistocles in no military command after that mentioned by Plutarch, in which he collected the tribute from the allies, but undertook nothing against the enemies of his country. Circumstances meanwhile still called for exertion against Persia. The efforts of that empire had indeed been severely checked by the late glorious successes of the Greeks; but its resources were immense, its spirit was damped more than its strength was reduced, and many Grecian towns, not only in Asia but even in Europe, remained yet under its dominion. A fleet was therefore assembled, to the command in chief of which Pausanias was appointed: Aristeides, attended by Cimon, commanded the Athenian squadron. They sailed first to Cyprus. The Persian garrisons there, cut off from all support, through the mastery which the Greeks possessed of the sea, were apparently more solicitous to obtain favorable terms for themselves than to defend the island for their prince; and most of the Grecian cities were rescued from the Persian dominion with so little effort, that historians have left no particulars of the transactions. The fleet then proceeded to the Hellespont and the Propontis. The extraordinary advantages of situation which Byzantium possessed, had not escaped the observation of the Persian commanders. It was made their principal place of arms for those parts, and the key of communication with their European dominions. After sustaining a siege for some time against the forces under Pausanias,

the

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 94.  
Died.  
l. ii. c. 44.  
Plut. vit.  
Arist. et  
Cim.

Ol. 77.<sup>2</sup>/<sub>3</sub>.  
B.C. 470.  
Ann.  
Thu.

the garrison capitulated; and several Persians of high rank, among whom were some connected by blood with the royal family, were made prisoners.

SECT.  
II.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 94  
& 128.

Decided as was now become the superiority of the Grecian over the Persian arms, and at once totally sunk as the energy of the Persian councils appeared, Persia was however still a very formidable enemy to Greece. The mind of Pausanias was not of strength to bear his fortune. The lustre of his own glory won by the victory of Platæa (the greatest yet known on the records of European fame) dazzled him; the splendor of Persian magnificence and the sweets of Persian luxury, laid open to his view, allured him; and, in the comparison, the austere simplicity of Spartan manners began to appear sordid and miserable. But beyond all things his haughty temper could least support the consideration, that, after shining the first character in the known world, the leader of the glorious confederacy which had brought the pride of the Persian empire to crouch beneath it, he must yield the reins of command to the young king his relation, and sink into the situation of a private citizen of Sparta. Early after the victory of Platæa, he had displayed a very indiscreet instance of vanity and arrogance: On the golden tripod dedicated at Delphi, in pursuance of a common decree of the confederates, an inscription was by his order engraved, which may be literally translated thus; 'Pausanias, general of the Greeks, having destroyed the Persian

Herodot.  
l. 9. c. 64.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 132.  
Corn.  
Nep.  
vit. Paus.



CHAP. XI. ' army, dedicated this memorial to Apollo.' By order of the Spartan government this was afterward erased, and a new inscription ingraved attributing the dedication to the cities of the confederacy, without any mention of the general.

But his communication in Asia, and the circumstances attending the conquest of Byzantium, completed the corruption of the mind of Pausanias, and decided his future views. He found his kinsman, Demaratus, the banished king of Lacedæmon, lord of the Æolian cities of Pergamum, Teuthrania and Halisarnia, the present of the Persian monarch to himself and his heirs, living in ease and splendor that might leave, in most minds, little regret of the parsimonious and jealously-watched dignity of Spartan royalty. He became acquainted with an Eretrian, named Gongylus, whose treachery to his country at the time of the invasion under Datis and Artaphernes, had been rewarded by the liberality of the Persian court with the hereditary lordship of four towns also in Æolia. On the capture of Byzantium, through the Persians of rank, his prisoners, he became more intimately acquainted with Persian manners; the pomp of command, the wide distinction between the higher and lower people, and all the refinements of the table, the bath, and every circumstance of Asiatic luxury. Gongylus, already master of the Persian language, and versed in Persian manners, became his confidant. To this man he committed the government of Byzantium, together with the custody of the principal prisoners. These were all

Xen. l. 3  
c. 3, s. 4.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 128.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
s. 4.  
Diod.  
l. 11. c. 44.  
Corn.  
Nep.  
vit. Paus.

S E C T.  
II.

all permitted, at several times, to make their escape; and then Gongylus himself was dispatched to the Persian court. He carried proposals from Pausanias, offering his services, but stipulating for very high conditions. On one side it was proposed that all Greece should be reduced under the Persian dominion; on the other, that a daughter of Xerxes should be given in marriage to Pausanias, with every advantage of rank, command, and fortune, that might become such lofty alliance. Not only this proposal was very favorably received, but Artabazus was sent to supersede Megabates in the Phrygian satrapy, purposely to prosecute the negotiation. Pausanias was no sooner assured of this than he became elated beyond all bounds of moderation and discretion. As if already a Persian satrap, and son-in-law of the great king, his manners, dress, table, and his whole stile of living and communication, became immediately Persian; insomuch that a guard was formed of his Median and Egyptian prisoners, who became his constant attendants.

The immediate effect of this extreme imprudence was no other than might be expected. The highest discontent quickly pervaded the army. The allies were incensed by the tyrannical haughtiness of the general: the Spartans were disgusted by his splendid and luxurious manner of living: his affectation of Asiatic pomp was equally offensive and suspicious to all. Consultations were held among the principal officers; Pausanias was publicly insulted by some

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 95.  
Diod.  
l. ii. c. 44.

CHAP.  
XI.

of them, and shortly all agreed no longer to submit to his arrogance. The Peloponnesian allies failed to their respective homes: the Asiatics, Hellenes, and islanders, offered to follow Aristides, if, in taking them under his command, he would assure them of his protection. The Lacedæmonians, neither able nor desirous to support their chief in his extravagant and odious conduct, sent home charges against him. He was in consequence recalled, and Dorcis came commissioned to supersede him; but the Lacedæmonian command had received a wound not of easy cure. The allies, whose affections the great and amiable characters of Aristides and Cimon had firmly conciliated, refused obedience to Dorcis. That commander therefore, with his principal officers, judging that to act in an inferior situation neither became themselves, nor would be satisfactory to the Spartan government, withdrew their forces from the allied armament, and returned home. Those who directed the Lacedæmonian affairs thought, perhaps justly, that the present was not a moment either for resenting the conduct of the allies, or for making any farther attempt to resume their lost authority: and thus, by a most unforeseen revolution, that superiority among the Grecian states, which all the energy of the administration of Themistocles had been unable to procure for his country, was gratuitously given to the mild virtues accompanying great abilities in Aristides and Cimon.

The

The moderation of the Lacedæmonian government upon this occasion, like that of the Athenian when the confederate fleet was first assembled to oppose the invasion of Xerxes, has been a subject of eulogy among antient and modern writers. Commendation is certainly due to the wisdom of the leading men of both states; but it may be useful toward obtaining an insight into Grecian politics, as we have observed the causes of that moderation among the Athenians upon the former, to advert also to what evidently influenced the conduct of the Lacedæmonians upon the present occasion. The Lacedæmonian administration was at this time evidently weak; probably distracted by party. Of the kings, the aged Leotychidas, under imputation of taking bribes when commanding an expedition in Thessaly, and Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, scarcely arrived at manhood, neither could stand in any competition among the allies with the great and popular characters of Aristides and Cimon. Even at home the small power which the constitution gave them was overborne by the influence and the intrigues of Pausanias. The change of the seat of war, moreover, was unfavorable to the Lacedæmonian command. Led, or rather forced, by the circumstances of the times, to exertions toward the establishment of a marine, little congenial either to the temper of the government or the disposition of the people, Lacedæmon was yet so inferior as to be almost without a hope of equalling the naval power of Athens. If therefore weakness and distraction had  
not

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 73.  
Diod. l. 11.  
Pausan.  
l. 3. c. 8.  
Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 132.

CHAP.  
XI.

not prevented exertion, policy, even an ambitious policy, might have induced the Lacedæmonian administration quietly to let the rival republic waste itself in distant warfare, and in making precarious distant acquisitions; while Sparta, nourishing her force at home, might watch opportunities for extending her power and influence in Greece itself, where her former connections remained intire, and no subordination to Athens was acknowledged. Thus Lacedæmon wisely yielded to the necessity of the moment, while the weak ambition of Pausanias combined with the virtues and abilities of Aristides and Cimon, to make Athens, for the purpose of prosecuting the war beyond sea against Persia, the leading state of Greece.

But probably neither the Lacedæmonian, nor even the Athenian administration, was immediately aware of all the extent of advantage about to accrue to Athens from this revolution. No great dissatisfaction, we are assured, appeared in Lacedæmon upon the occasion. Themistocles was obnoxious there; but the Athenian people, whatever jealousies existed among some warmer politicians, were not generally so. On the contrary, there was virtue enough among the bulk of the Lacedæmonian people to induce them to admire and esteem the Athenian character for the noble spirit shown during the Persian invasion. They were besides generally desirous to avoid being further engaged in the prosecution of a war which must now lead them far from home; and they were therefore not displeased to have the

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 95.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 75.

the Athenian government undertake the direction of those operations, whether for protecting Greece against attacks by sea, or for prosecuting hostilities offensively beyond sea, in which the superiority of its fleet to that of all other Grecian states gave it so fair a claim to command.

The wise moderation of Aristides and Cimon meanwhile in the direction of Athenian affairs, tended greatly to prevent occasion of jealousy among the Lacedæmonians and their adherents, and to strengthen the attachment of the other Grecian states to Athens. A system of executive command, and in some degree, even of legislation for the new confederacy, was necessary. It had been usual for deputies from all the allied states to meet in Lacedæmon, as a common capital. Aristides would summon no such assembly to Athens, but appointed, for the place of meeting, the little island of Delos, venerated all over Greece as sacred ground, the favorite property of Apollo, and of whose people no state could have any political jealousy; and the temple itself of the deity was made the senate-house, and the treasury. The first symptom of a dangerous superiority assumed by the Athenian government seems to have been in the appointment of treasurers, who with the name of Hellenotamiæ, Treasurers of Greece, became a permanent magistracy, at the election, and under the controul of the Athenian people. But the wisdom and equity of Aristides, who was first placed at the head of that board, if, in the want of another, we may use the term, satisfied all the allies in present,

§ E C T.  
II.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 43.  
Diod.  
l. ii. c. 45.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 96.  
Diod.  
l. ii. c. 47.  
Plut vit.  
Arist.

C H A P.  
XI.

present, and blinded them to consequences. The sum agreed upon to be annually raised was four hundred and sixty talents, about a hundred and fifteen thousand pounds sterling; and this was assessed upon the different states with such evident impartiality, that not a murmur was heard upon the occasion; but, on the contrary, every part of Greece resounded the fame of the just Aristeides.

The extraordinary success of that truly great man in the execution of so hazardous and invidious an office, is the last public act in which history takes notice of him. Probably he died soon after; but we are without certain information of the time, the place, or any of the circumstances of his end. It is generally said that, employed as he had been in the most important offices of the Athenian commonwealth, civil and military, and vested with its highest honors, he lived and died in extreme poverty; insomuch that he did not leave sufficient even to pay the expence of a funeral. The commonwealth therefore, in honor of his virtues and in gratitude for his services, took upon itself the charge of his obsequies and the care of his family. A monument to his memory was raised in Phalerum, which remained in the time of Plutarch; and an allotment of land, a sum of money and a pension were given to Lyfimachus, who seems to have been his only son, and marriage-portions to his daughters. Lyfimachus never put himself forward in public business, but was a respectable character in private life. He lived in in-

timacy

timacy with Sôphroniscus, the father of Sophocles; and in advanced years, after the death of his friend, we find him mentioned by Plato as the companion in leisure of the first men of the Commonwealth.

SECT.  
III.

### SECTION III.

*Administration of Cimon. Death of Xerxes, and accession of Artaxerxes to the Persian Throne: Successes of the confederate arms under Cimon: Battle of the Eurymedon.*

THE banishment of Themistocles, and the death of Aristeides, left Cimon without an equal in favor and authority with the Athenian people; at a time when, through the exertions of a succession of great men amid favoring contingencies, to be the first citizen of Athens was nearly to be the most important personage in the world. No state ever before had such a fleet, such naval arsenals, such naval skill and discipline as Themistocles had formed for his country, to promote her glory and his own, and had left in the hands of his rivals. With these advantages, in addition to those of high birth, hereditary fame, and great abilities, in the ninth year after the battle of Platæa, Cimon took

Ol. 77.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
B.C. 470.



**CHAP.** took the command in chief of the confederate  
**XI.** forces by sea and land.

Diod.  
 L. 11. c. 69.  
 Ctesias.  
 Persic.  
 Justin.  
 l. 3. c. 1.  
 Aristot.  
 Polit.  
 l. 5. c. 10.

The circumstances of the Persian empire, at this time, invited attempts against it. Xerxes, disgusted with public affairs through the miserable failure of his great enterprize against Greece, had abandoned himself to indolence and debauchery. In one of those intrigues of the palace, often so full of horrors in despotic countries, but of which the final catastrophe commonly alone becomes with certainty known to the public, the monarch and his eldest son were murdered; each under the shocking imputation of having at least intended the murder of the other. A civil war ensued; and it was not till after a bloody contest that peace was restored to the interior of the empire, by the establishment of Artaxerxes, third son of the late king, upon the throne.

It was important for the Greeks to avail themselves of this opportunity for strengthening their confederacy, by rescuing from the Persian dominion the many Grecian cities yet remaining under it. Those of Europe attracted the first attention. Cimon led the confederate armament against Eion on the river Strymon in Thrace, formerly the settlement of the unfortunate Ionian chiefs, Histæus and Aristagoras, and now commanded by a Persian noble whose name, variously written by Greek authors, was, in the orthography of Herodotus, Boges. Cimon, having reduced the garrison to extremity, offered permission for their retreat into Asia.

But

But Boges, with that ferocious heroïsm which is sometimes found in sultry climates and under despotic governments, obstinately refused all terms; and, when provisions totally failed, scattering all the gold and silver within the place in the Strymon, he caused a vast pile of wood to be formed, killed his wife, concubines, children and slaves upon it, and then, setting fire to it, killed himself, and all were consumed together. The garrison, in no condition to stipulate, surrendered at discretion; and, according to the common practice of the Greeks of that age, were made profitable by being made slaves.

Herod. l. 7.  
c. 107.  
Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 98.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. 11. c. 60.  
Plut. &  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Cim.

Mascames, the Persian governor of Doriscus, either was more able than Boges, or commanded a stronger garrison. He baffled all the many attempts made by different Grecian commanders against him, and, while he lived, held Doriscus for the Persian king. Herodotus alone, among the Grecian historians remaining to us, has had the candor to mention this, or to acknowledge that a Persian garrison continued to exist in Europe; but these events, being posterior to the period which he had fixed for the term of his history, he has noticed them only incidentally; so that we are without information of any further particulars concerning that remarkable defence of Doriscus by Mascames. Every other garrison, both in Thrace and on the Hellespont, a name under which the early Grecian writers often included the whole water from the Ægean sea to the Euxine, with the shores

Herod. l. 7.  
c. 106.

CHAP. XI. shores on each side, yielded to the Grecian arms.

Plut vit.  
Cim.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 98.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. ii. c. 60.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Cim.  
& Plut.

From the Trojan war to the invasion of Xerxes, Greece had never seen a fleet assembled from its several maritime states; nor had any extensive confederacy been formed among them. It had depended therefore upon every state by itself to take the measures which its own convenience required, or its power admitted, for repressing those piracies which had never ceased to disturb the navigation of the Ægean. The inhabitants of the little island of Scyrus, a Thessalian tribe, had made themselves particularly obnoxious by their maritime depredations. The Amphictyonic assembly now interfering, called upon that armament which Cimon commanded, to put an end to such enormities, and to give peace to the Grecian seas, as well against domestic ruffians as foreign enemies. Cimon readily obeyed. The Scyrians, compelled to surrender at discretion, were sold for slaves, and their island was put into possession of a colony from Athens. The Carystians of Eubœa by some means also incurred the indignation of the confederacy, inasmuch that war was made upon them; but they obtained terms of accommodation.

Those great interests and urgent necessities which had given birth to the confederacy against Persia, now ceased to exist; for Greece could no longer be supposed in any immediate danger from the ambition or the resentment of that empire; yet the maintenance of a powerful navy, to deter or to repel any future attacks from

from a neighbour still so formidable, might be highly advisable; and the private interest of individuals, who enjoyed or hoped for commands, and the particular political interest of the Athenian commonwealth, whose power and influence were so greatly increased by its situation at the head of the confederacy, would concur both to enforce the maintenance of the navy, and to keep that navy employed. Many of the inferior states, however, when danger no longer pressed, became first lukewarm, then averse to the continuance of the war and the burthens with which it loaded them. The citizens grew tired of an endless service on shipboard, under what they esteemed, in some measure, a foreign command, and to promote no obvious interest of their own commonwealth. Their several administrations, accustomed to perfect independency, would still determine, each for itself, when it would no longer exert itself in the irksome and invidious office of taxing its citizens for the expences of the navy, and the still more invidious office of compelling them to take their turn of personal service. The Athenian government, on the other hand, at first modest, and, under the administration of Aristides, scrupulously just in the exercise of its supremacy, began to grow first rigid, and then imperious: and some of the subordinate commonwealths, induced either by some public in-

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 97  
& 99.  
Plot. vit.  
Aristid. &  
Cim.

\* *Ἀκριβὲς ἔπαρσεν καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν*, is the candid confession of the Athenian historian. Thucyd. l. i. c. 99.

CHAP.  
XI.

terest, or by the interest and influence of a party, to concur in the measures of Athens, were of course jealous of the defection of others, and ready to join in compelling adherence to the confederacy.

The first to venture opposition were the people of the rich and populous island of Naxos. Confiding in that strength with which they had once baffled the force of the Persian empire, they sustained war, for some time, against the confederate arms, but were at length compelled to capitulate, upon terms by which they surrendered their independency, and, contrary to the articles of confederacy, were reduced under subjection to the Athenian commonwealth<sup>9</sup>.

This example being made of the Naxians, some exertion against the common enemy became perhaps necessary, to prevent clamor, and to keep up that spirit of enterprize, without which the confederacy could not long exist in vigor; and circumstances arose to call for the efforts of its arms. For, in the Grecian states bordering on the Persian empire, all who had been or who aspired to be tyrants, all, and they were often very numerous, whom faction had banished, all who were discontented at home with the government under which they lived, and bold enough to be active in attempting a change, but too weak to depend for success

<sup>9</sup> Παρὰ τὸ καθεστὸς ἰδοῦσθαι, is again the free confession of Thucydides.

upon

upon themselves alone, still looked to Persia for patronage. The prospect of revived vigor in the councils of that empire, under the administration of the new king, gave encouragement to such views; and most of the Cyprian towns had already renounced the Grecian confederacy. There were moreover Grecian cities in Asia Minor which had never yet been rescued from the Persian dominion. In Caria the confederate arms had not appeared; and the people of Phaselis, a Grecian settlement in the adjoining province of Pamphylia, did not scruple to profess a preference of the Persian dominion to the Grecian alliance.

These considerations directing the Athenian councils, Cimon led his forces to the Carian coast; and such was the terror which the fame of their uninterrupted success inspired, many of the towns were deserted by their garrisons before any enemy came in sight; and the spirit of the confederate troops, directed by the abilities of Cimon, quickly brought all the rest to surrender. Conquest was still pursued: the army entered Pamphylia, and laid siege to Phaselis. But here was experienced the common bane of confederacies, discordant interests and jarring affections. The friendly connection between the people of Phaselis and of Chios had been such, that the Chians of Cimon's army still considered the Phaselites (attached as they were to Persia, and consequently inimical to Greece) as friends to Chios. To save them therefore from the ruin which now threatened, they gave information by letters, fastened to arrows, of all measures

SECT.  
III.

Plut. vit.  
Cim.

Ol. 77.  
B.C. 469.  
Ann. Thu.

**C H A P.** taking against the town. This treason however  
**XI.** was discovered, and Phaselis was at length compelled to submission.

The government of Artaxerxes was not yet sufficiently established in the capital to admit any great exertion on the frontiers, but it was beginning to acquire steadiness. The command of so many maritime provinces, especially Phenicia, gave means to be still formidable at sea. For the purpose of defence, however, rather than of conquest, a numerous fleet had been assembled in the river Eurymedon on the Pamphylian coast, and an army to coöperate with it, incamped on the banks; a reinforcement of eighty Phœnician triremes was expected, upon the arrival of which it was proposed to begin operations.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 100.  
Diod. l. ii.  
c. 60, 61, 62.  
Corn. Nep.  
& Plut.  
vit. Cim.

Intelligence of these circumstances determined Cimon to quit the objects before him on the continent, and endeavor to bring the enemy to action by sea, before they were strengthened by the expected squadron. Imbarking therefore a considerable part of his forces, for, among the ancients, naval operations were almost always intimately connected with those by land, he sailed for the Eurymedon. On his arrival the enemy's fleet, already much more numerous than his own, came out to meet him. An engagement immediately ensued; but the Persians, disheartened by the repeated ill success of their arms, sustained the action with no vigor: quickly retreating with much confusion into the river, the crews immediately

ately landed to join the army drawn up on the shore. The ships were thus abandoned to the enemy : no less than two hundred trireme galleys, little damaged, are said to have been taken ; some were destroyed, and a very few escaped.

The Greeks, elate with this easy victory, joyfully received their commander's orders immediately to land, and attack the Persian army. Here the contest was more obstinate ; and in the exertion of the Athenian leaders, anxious to support a reputation equal to the new glory of their country, many men of rank fell. After a long and bloody struggle, however, the Greeks obtained the most decisive success ; what survived of the Persian army was dissipated, and its camp became the prey of the conquerors. Thus Cimon acquired the singular glory of erecting two trophies, for two victories, gained on different elements, by the same armament, in one day. Receiving intelligence, then, that the reinforcement of Phenician galleys, which had been expected to join the Persian fleet, lay in the port of Hydrus in Cyprus, he hastened thither with a sufficient squadron of his best ships, and every trireme was either destroyed or taken<sup>10</sup>.

SECT.  
III.

Thucyd.  
I. i. c. 100.

Plut. vit.  
Cim.

<sup>10</sup> This fact I have ventured to relate on the authority of Plutarch ; for Thucydides, in his concise mention of the affair of the Eurymedon, says nothing of it. According to Diodorus, the Athenian fleet went twice to Cyprus : but his account altogether is both romantic and blind, and appears indeed to have been written with little consideration of what was possible.



CHAP.  
XI.

Ifocrat.  
Panath.  
& Areiop.  
Diod.  
ut sup.

By this great success the naval strength of Persia was so broken, its land-forces so disheartened, and the spirit of enterprize, which had formerly animated its councils and excited its commanders, was so depressed, that offensive operations against Greece were totally intermitted; and it became the boast of the Greek nation, that no armed ship of Persia was to be seen westward of the Chelidonian islands on the coast of Pamphylia, or of the Cyanean rocks at the entrance of the Euxine; and that no Persian troops dared show themselves within a horseman's day's journey of the Grecian seas<sup>11</sup>.

## SECTION

<sup>11</sup> In aftertimes report arose that a treaty of peace was regularly made between the Persian monarch and the Athenian commonwealth, in which it was stipulated that no Persian forces of land or sea should come within the limits mentioned in the text. Plutarch supposed it to have immediately followed the battle of the Eurymedon. Diodorus reports confidently that it took place in the fourth year of the 32d Olympiad, which, according to his chronology, was twenty years later; and he asserts it to have been stipulated, that no Persian ship of war should appear between Phaselis and the Cyaneans; that no land-forces, nor even a satrap, should approach within three days journey of the Grecian seas; and that all Grecian towns should be free. With regard to the first article, probably no Persian naval force would appear within the limits mentioned; but that the Persians did not abide by the second article, and never executed the third, we are very well assured. There appears indeed sufficient evidence that the treaty never existed. The fiction seems to have had its origin in the interest which the orators of aftertimes found in flattering the Athenian multitude. Lycurgus in the midst of a long train of vaunting panegyric on the deeds of their ancestors, mentions such a treaty (Lycurg. or. con. Leocrat. p. 157. vel 187. or. Gr. Reiske); and Isocrates has not scrupled in his Panathenæic (Isocrat. Panathen. p. 462.) to assert that the Persians were not allowed

## SECTION IV.

*Intrigues and death of Pausanias. Prosecution and flight of Themistocles: his reception at the Persian court: his death.*

WHILE the power and renown of Athens were thus wonderfully advancing under the conduct of Aristides and Cimon, a train of circumstances continued long to deprive the Lacedæmonian government of the ability to take any leading part in the common concerns of the Greek nation. Pausanias, when recalled from his command on the Propontis, had been brought to trial: but his interest had sufficed to

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 96.

allowed to have any land-force west of the river Halys; which is a monstrous extravagance: proof what imposition might be attempted by orators upon the Athenian people, but certainly no proof that the Lydian and Phrygian satraps were driven out of their provinces, or had not armies there. What the fact was may be gathered from earlier writers. The informed and exact Thucydides, who, in a concise summary, carefully enumerates all the more important transactions of the time, would not have omitted one so remarkable and so important, had it had any real existence. But his testimony is not merely negative. He shows that hostilities never intirely ceased between Greece and Persia; and from the fifth and sixth chapters of his eighth book it appears that the Persian court never ceased to expect the remittance of the usual tribute of the Asian Greek cities from the satraps of Lydia and Phrygia. From Plato also we have a summary of the political transactions of the age without mention of such a treaty, the existence of which indeed he directly contradicts, by the assertion (*Menex.* p. 241. t. 2.) that Greece owed its tranquility to the prosecution of the war by the Athenian arms, far from home, in Cyprus and in Egypt. Even Plutarch, tho he cites evidence in favor of the treaty, had clearly no perfect faith in it.

CHAP.  
XI.



Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 131,  
132.

Plut. vit.  
Lyfand.

procure his acquittal from all public crimes; the suspicion, and, as it should seem from Thucydides, even proof was strong against him. He was indeed convicted of injuries to individuals, and condemned to amends: but this did not suffice to repress his rash and extravagant ambition. The king his nephew was yet a minor, and himself still in the high office of regent. Without commission or authority from the government, hiring a Hermionian trireme galley, he went again to the Hellespont, and renewed his negotiation with Artabazus. As a more commodious situation for communicating with the satrap, he ventured even to proceed to Byzantium, then occupied by an Athenian garrison; hoping perhaps to find the more favor there as he had less in his own country: but he was quickly compelled to quit that place, and he passed to Colonæ in Troas. The Lacedæmonian government, meanwhile, informed of his procedure, and both irritated and alarmed by the audaciousness of it, sent a herald bearing a scytalæ to Colonæ. The scytalæ was the ensign of high office among the Lacedæmonians, common to the general and the herald. It was a staff exactly tallied to another in possession of the ephors; and all orders and communications which required secrecy, were so written that, till applied in a particular manner to one of these, they were illegible<sup>12</sup>. By such an order

Pausanias

<sup>12</sup> The Athenian proboules, in the *Lyfistrata* of Aristophanes (v. 985), mistook the scytalæ borne by the Lacedæmonian herald for

SECT.  
IV.

Pausanias was commanded, to accompany the herald whithersoever he should go; with a denunciation of the enmity of the Spartan state against him, if he disobeyed. His former indiscreet conduct had so baffled his own purposes, that his scheme was yet very far from ripe for execution: he could have no hope of prosecuting it with success, unless he could reingratiate himself with his own country; and such was already the deviation from the institutions of Lycurgus at Lacedæmon, that, as Thucydides says confidently, he trusted in means of bribing the leading men, for security against accusation. Obeying therefore implicitly the order contained in the scytalæ, he accompanied the herald to Sparta. On his arrival he was arrested by authority of the ephors, whose power now extended to the imprisonment even of the kings; but intrigue shortly procuring his liberty, he publicly defied accusers.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 131,  
132.

Imboldened now by repeated success in repelling crimination, he began again to seek means for prosecuting his treachery, and realizing his dreams of enjoyment in all the oriental splendor and luxury of royalty. The obstacles to his reinstatement in that foreign command which had formed his fairest ground of hope, appeared insuperable; but prospect of other means to accomplish his purpose was not wanting. The neighbouring commonwealth of Ar-

for a spear. The staff and the written order communicated by it, seem equally to have borne the name of scytalæ.

CHAP.  
XI.



Thucyd.  
l. v. c. 33.  
Plut. &  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Them.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 32.

gos not only bore the most inveterate enmity to Sparta, but had sought alliance with Persia; and at Argos resided Themistocles, whose banishment might induce him to join in a project for his own aggrandizement at the expence of his country. It appears that they actually corresponded on the subject; tho how far Themistocles acceded to the views of Pausanias remains uncertain. But in every Grecian state, and particularly in Laconia, the number of slaves, very far exceeding that of freemen, invited the attention of the seditious. Pausanias tampered with the Helots; proposing, not only freedom, but all the rights of Spartan citizens, as the reward of their successful support to him. Some of them betrayed his secret: but the deposition of slaves was esteemed insufficient ground for proceeding against a citizen. His correspondence with Artabazus meanwhile was continued, as opportunity offered; till a slave, charged with a letter to the satrap, suspecting danger in the service he was sent upon, from having observed that, of many messengers dispatched toward the same quarter, not one had ever returned or been heard of, opened the letter intrusted to him; and having thus assured himself both of his master's treason and of his own intended fate (for the letter mentioned that the bearer should be put to death), he carried it to the ephors. The extreme wariness which the Spartan institutions prescribed, and which the temper of the government disposed it to observe, in criminal prosecution against any Lacedæmonian

dæmonian citizen, but particularly against one of the blood of Hercules, uncle to the king, and actually in the high situation of regent, had very much favored the treason of Pausanias, and encouraged him in it. Even his own letter was not thought ground to convict him upon, the evidence to its authenticity being deemed incomplete.

SECT.  
IV.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 133.

But the knowledge of his treasonable practices was now become too certain, and the danger of them too great and alarming, to allow the Spartan administration, however composed in part of those who were still his friends, any longer to neglect measures for putting an effectual stop to them. To obtain complete legal proof against him was the object, and the superstition of the age furnished the means. The slave, who brought the letter, must avoid the revenge of his master. While therefore his communication with the ephors remained yet unknown to Pausanias, he was directed to betake himself as a suppliant to the temple of Neptune on mount Tænarus; and, within its sacred precincts, to form a hut for his shelter, with a partition, behind which witnesses might be concealed. Pausanias, alarmed, as was foreseen, on hearing that his messenger, instead of executing the commission intrusted to him, had fled to an asylum, hastened to the place; and the conversation that ensued, afforded the most unequivocal proof of his guilt. The ephors, who, with some chosen attendants, overheard all, proposed to arrest him on his return to the city; but one

Thucyd.  
ibid.  
Diod. Sic.  
l. ii. c. 49.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Paul.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 134.

of

**CHAP.** of them, more his friend than the rest, giving  
**XI.** him some intimation of his danger, he fled to  
 that highly-venerated sanctuary the temple of  
 Minerva Chalciœca. Religion forbidding to  
 force him thence, and yet his execution ap-  
 pearing absolutely indispensable for the security  
 of the commonwealth, a wall was built around  
 the temple, and he was starved to death; but,  
 to obviate profanation, when it was known that  
 he was near expiring, he was brought without  
 the sacred place, and he died in the hands of  
 those who bore him. Superstition, however,  
 being even thus alarmed, the Delphian oracle  
 was consulted; and, in obedience to the sup-  
 posed meaning of the obscure response, the  
 body was buried in front of the temple<sup>13</sup>,  
 the spot remaining marked by a monument with  
 an inscription in the time of Thucydides, and  
 two brazen statues were dedicated to the  
 goddess.

The fate of Pausanias involved with it that  
 of Themistocles. The Spartan administration  
 pretended that, in the course of their inquiry  
 into the conduct of the former, full proof was  
 discovered of the participation of Themistocles  
 in the concerted treason against the liberties of  
 Greece; and they insisted that he ought to be  
 brought to trial, not before the Athenian as-  
 sembly, or any Athenian judicature, but before  
 the Amphictyons or some other court of depu-  
 ties from all the states composing the Greek

Thucyd.  
 l. i. c. 135.  
 Diod. l. 11.  
 c. 55.  
 Corn. Nep.  
 & Plut.  
 vit. Them.

<sup>13</sup> Εἰ τῇ προτεμένιῳ ματι.

nation. The party in opposition to him, which now ruled at Athens, acceded to the requisition; and, under the joint authority of the governments of Athens and Lacedæmon, persons were sent with orders to apprehend him, wherever he could be found. He had resided, since his banishment, principally at Argos; but he went occasionally to other parts of Peloponnesus, where he had cultivated an interest. Through his numerous friends and adherents, he received information of his danger, in time to pass to the island of Corcyra; whose people, in gratitude for particular good offices done to their commonwealth, were disposed to show him kindness; but as they could not undertake, tho' among the most powerful of the Grecian maritime states, to protect him in defiance of the united force of Lacedæmon and Athens, he proceeded to the coast of Acarnania: and, at a loss otherwise to evade his pursuers, he resolved to apply to Admetus king of the Molossians; trusting apparently in his knowledge of the magnanimity of that prince, from whom, otherwise, he had little reason to expect offices of friendship, having formerly been his open opponent in a transaction with the Athenian government.

The anecdote of his reception, reported by the authentic pen of Thucydides, affords a curious specimen of the relics then still subsisting, in that remote province, of the antient hospitality connected with religion, which, with some difference of ceremony, perhaps in different places,

SECT.  
IV.

Ol. 78. 2.  
B.C. 466.  
Ann. Thu.

Thucyd.  
ibid.



CHAP.  
XI.

places, appears to have prevailed in the days of Homer throughout Greece. It happened that, when Themistocles arrived at the usual residence of Admetus, that prince was absent. He applied however to the queen; and having the good fortune to conciliate her favor, she furnished him with means to insure protection from her husband. Among the Greeks, some altar was the usual resource of fugitives; if they could reach one, their persons were generally secure against violence. But the queen of the Molossians delivered her infant son to Themistocles, and directed him to wait the return of the king, sitting by the hearth, with the child in his arms. No manner of supplication was held by the Molossians so to enforce attention from those to whom it was addressed, as a religious duty. An audience being thus insured, Themistocles won Admetus to receive him, not only into protection, but into friendship. The Lacedæmonian and Athenian messengers arriving soon after, the Molossian prince, careful not to give unnecessary offence, urged the custom of his country, sanctified by religion, in excuse for a decisive refusal of permission to apprehend, within his dominion, a suppliant who had acquired so sacred a claim upon him.

Thucyd.  
li. c. 137.

Aristoph.  
Lystr.  
v. 1139.  
Thucyd.  
li. c. 24.

Molossis was however not a situation for Themistocles to remain in. With assistance therefore from his protector, making the difficult journey across the mountains of Epirus and Macedonia, he proceeded to the sea-port of Pydna, and

and embarked, in disguise, aboard a merchant-ship going for Asia. In the passage, he was forced by stress of weather to the island of Naxos, where the confederate armament under Cimon then lay. Chusing among the dangers before him, he made himself known to the master of the vessel, alarmed him with the consequences of having so far favored the escape of a proscribed person, allured him with promises of large reward, and at length prevailed on him to put to sea again without permitting any of his people to go ashore. Arriving then safe at Ephesus, he proceeded immediately up the country, under protection of a Persian to whom he had had means of introduction. All his property that could be discovered at Athens, when the order was issued for apprehending his person, had been confiscated; yet his faithful friends there and at Argos had found means to preserve effects to a large amount, which they remitted to him as soon as they learned that he was in a place of security. The sum confiscated, as Plutarch informs us, was, according to Theophrastus, eighty talents; but, as Theopompus reported, a hundred, about twenty-five thousand pounds sterling. What was the value of the effects preserved by his friends we are not informed, but before entering on public business his whole property, according to Plutarch, had not amounted to three talents.

Tho we are not assured that Themistocles was intirely innocent of the crime for which Pausanias suffered; yet that the prosecution  
against

CHAP.  
XI.

Plut. vit.  
Themist.

against him was principally urged by party-spirit, is sufficiently evident; and it is therefore no wonder if it was conducted with an acrimony regardless of justice, of humanity, and even of policy. Plutarch reports, on the authority of the historian Stefinbrotus, that Epicrates, at the prosecution of Cimon, was condemned to death and executed for procuring the escape of the wife and children of Themistocles from Athens, and conveying them in safety to the residence of Admetus. We should hope, for the sake of the generally amiable character which Cimon bore, that this was not strictly true, in the unqualified manner in which it is related to us; yet the report shows, at least, what was thought possible of the temper of party-spirit in Athens at the time, and what might be the horrors of democratical despotism, even in what are called the virtuous times of the republic. No law surely could exist at Athens to make the friendly and humane action of Epicrates a capital crime. His condemnation could proceed only from a decree of the people; and tho Plutarch expresses himself dubious of the authority of Stefinbrotus, yet it appears not to have been because he thought the Athenian people incapable of making such a decree.

The sole hope therefore of security, remaining to Themistocles against the most cruel persecution that party-spirit could urge, was in the chance of protection from the great enemy  
of

of his country, the king of Persia. He might indeed think himself, beyond all others, obnoxious to the Persians, as a principal cause of their disgraces and losses in their attempts against Greece. Yet, as it had long been the policy of the Persian court to protect and incourage Grecian refugees, he might hope that the acquisition of him as a future friend would be valued, in proportion as he had been heretofore a formidable enemy. The state of the Persian empire, scarcely yet restored to secure internal quiet, favored his views; and he ventured to address a letter to Artaxerxes, then lately settled on the throne. Receiving a favorable answer, he applied himself diligently to acquire the Persian language, and get information of the Persian manners; and after he had thus employed a year, he went to Susa. His reception at that court was such as no Greek had ever before experienced. After having been treated some time with the highest distinction, an extensive command in Asia Minor was conferred upon him, with a revenue far exceeding Grecian ideas of private wealth. In the usual stile of oriental magnificence, three the most flourishing of the Grecian cities yet remaining under the Persian dominion, were, with their territories, assigned for the nominal purpose of supplying his table only: Magnesia was to furnish bread, Myus meat, and Lampfacus wine. According to Thucydides, the reduction of Greece under the Persian empire was the return which he was expected to make to the king for such munificence.

§ ECT.  
IV.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 138.

Ol. 78. 3.  
B.C. 465.  
Ann. Thu.

Thucyd.  
ibid.  
Strab.  
l. 14.  
p. 636.

CHAP.  
XI.

Thucyd.  
l. 2.  
Diod. l. 11.  
c. 57, 58,  
59.

Plutarch says that Themistocles lived long in this splendid banishment; but his account is not altogether coherent; and from earlier writers it rather appears that he did not live long: from all accounts it is evident that he did nothing memorable; and probably he had little real enjoyment in all the advantages of high fortune, to which the bounty of the Persian monarch raised him. A temper warm like his, is likely to have been violently agitated by the consideration of the circumstances in which he stood, and the business he had undertaken. To raise his country to power and splendor had been the object that, through life, his mind had pursued with singular ardor. He had succeeded, and his success had covered him with no common glory. The thought of being engaged, now in advanced years, in the purpose of bringing destruction on that country, of ruining his own great work, could not but embitter his best hopes; while at the same time every fair hope was highly precarious; the envy and jealousy of his new friends were little less to be apprehended than the swords of his enemies; and defeat, in such a cause, must involve him in tenfold misery and disgrace. It is no wonder therefore reports should have gained that he procured a voluntary death by poison: but, tho the truth was not certainly known, Thucydides seems rather to have thought that his end was natural. A magnificent monument raised to his memory in the agora of Magnesia on the Mæander, where had been his principal residence,

dence; is mentioned by Thucydides, and remained to the age of Plutarch; but his bones, in pursuance of his dying request, were carried into Attica, and privately buried there. This circumstance, to which, tho it seems not to have been fully authenticated, Thucydides evidently gave credit, would mark strongly the regret he had in undertaking the part against his country, to which the ruthless violence of his political opponents drove him<sup>14</sup>.

Indeed we cannot but wish that the blemishes in character and conduct attributed to this great man, could, with due regard to historical authority, be more completely done away; yet it may be owing to him to make large allowance for calumny, arising from that party-spirit from which, in Greece, beyond all other countries, high political worth was wont to suffer<sup>15</sup>. In

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch omits, in his Life of Themistocles, to inform us at what time the death of that extraordinary man happened. In his Life of Cimon, he tells us that Themistocles died about the time of the expedition into Cyprus under Cimon, and but little before the death of Cimon himself. Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus give any precise information upon the subject; but it is rather implied in their narrative, and seems upon many accounts more likely, that he died some years earlier.

Dodwell places the death of Themistocles in the same year with that of Cimon B. C. 449. twenty after his banishment, and sixteen after his journey to Susa.

<sup>15</sup> Plato and Xenophon, whose authority is weighty, from the age in which they lived, as well as from their characters, and whose united authority is the greater on account of their difference in political principles, both give very honorable testimony to Themistocles. Plato in Theages, p. 126. v. 1. and in Menon, p. 93. v. 2. and Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates, b. 2. c. 6. f. 13. Nor is the eulogy of Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Knights, v. 812 and 884, of no consideration.

CHAP.  
XI.

abilities, and by his actions, Themistocles was certainly one of the greatest men that Greece or the world ever produced: Not, like Leonidas and Pausanias, placed, by the accident of birth, at the head of the affairs of Greece, but born to an inferior station in an inferior commonwealth, he first raised himself to the head of that commonwealth, and then raised his little commonwealth, the territory of a single city, to be the leading power in the political affairs of the known world; and, even when afterward banished from that commonwealth and from Greece, and reduced to the simple importance of his own character, he remained still the most important political character of his time. Whatever relates to such a man is interesting. It appears, says Plutarch, by his statue still remaining at Athens in the temple of Diana Aristobulë, built under his direction, that his person and countenance announced something uncommonly great and heroic. For the character of his understanding, we may best take it from Thucydides; who, by his own abilities, and by the age in which he lived, was most competent to form a just judgement. ‘In the mind of Themistocles,’ says that historian, ‘seems to have been displayed the utmost force of human nature; for the evident superiority of his capacity to that of all other men was truly wonderful. His penetration was such that, from the scantiest information and with the most instantaneous deliberation, he formed the justest judgement of the past, and gained the clearest insight

insight into the future. He had a discernment that could develope the advantageous and the pernicious in measures proposed, however involved in perplexity and obscurity; and he had not less remarkably the faculty of explaining things clearly to others, than of judging clearly himself. Such, in short, were the powers of his genius and the readiness of his judgement, that he was beyond all men capable of directing all things upon every occasion<sup>16</sup>.

He died, according to Plutarch, in his sixty-fifth year, surrounded by a numerous progeny, to whom a large share of the bounty of the Persian monarch was continued. Nor was a restoration to the privileges of their own country denied them, when, the interest of party no longer urging their persecution, the merits of Themistocles were remembered as far outweighing his failings. Some of his daughters were married to Athenian citizens; and Cleophantus, his third son, is mentioned by Plato as having resided at Athens, but remembered for no higher qualification than that of a most extraordinary horseman, such as might vie with those who in our days most excel in public exhibition. We do not indeed find that any of his posterity were

Pausan.  
l. i. c. 2.

Plut. vit.  
Themist.  
Plat.  
Menon.  
p. 93, t. 2.

<sup>16</sup> From Lysias we have a corresponding eulogy of him in one short sentence—*Στρατηγὸν μὲν Θημιστοκλῆα, ἰκανώτατον ἑκαστῶν καὶ γινῆσθαι καὶ ἀράξαι*, (Or. fun. p. 194 vel 105.) and from Cicero, in a still shorter phrase, a very high panegyric, Themistoclem, quem facile Græciæ principem ponimus. M. T. Cic. Lucullus, f. 1.



CHAP.  
XI.Plut. vit.  
Themist.

eminent as political characters; but the estimation in which his own memory was held, contributed to their benefit to late generations. By a decree of the people of Magnesia, honors were granted to his family, which were still enjoyed by Themistocles, an Athenian, the friend of Plutarch, above six hundred years after the death of his great ancestor,

CHAPTER

## CHAPTER XII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Establishment of its Security against PERSIA, to the TRUCE for Thirty Years between ATHENS and LACEDÆMON.

## SECTION I.

*Athens the seat of Science and Arts. Extension of the power of Athens: Jealousy of Lacedæmon. Earthquake at Lacedæmon: Revolt of the Helots: Assistance sent from Athens to Lacedæmon: Renunciation of the Lacedæmonian confederacy by the Athenians. War of Argos and Mycenæ,*

**A**THENS, become, within a very few years, from the capital of a small province, in fact, tho not yet in avowed pretension, the head of an empire, exhibited a new and singular phenomenon in politics, a sovereign people; a people, not, as in many other Grecian democracies, sovereign meerly of that state which themselves composed, but supreme over other people in subordinate republics, acknowledging

CHAP.  
XII.

Under this extraordinary political constitution, philosophy and the arts were beginning to make Athens their principal resort. Migrating from Egypt and the east, they had long been fostered on the western coast of Asia. In Greece itself they had owed some temporary encouragement principally to the tyrants; the Peisistratids at Athens, and Periander at Corinth. But their efforts were desultory and comparatively feeble, till the communication with the Asian Greeks, checked and interrupted by their subjection to Persia, was restored, and Athens, the head of the glorious confederacy by whose arms the deliverance had been effected, began to draw every thing toward itself as a common center, the capital of an empire. Already science and fine

\* Through alterations which have taken place in things, words are not always to be found in any modern language to express with precision ancient ideas. Perhaps the word *vassal* most nearly of any in our language expresses what the Greeks understood by their word ὑπάκοος. Yet feudal vassalage, tho similar in many circumstances, differed so totally in the original idea, from the kind of subjection by which the inferior Grecian commonwealths were bound to the more powerful, that the use of the term in Grecian history, however a term is wanting, would not be warrantable. We may observe similar difficulty about many other terms. Λιμὴν signified a port or harbour for shipping; but the ancients often called by that name what our seamen would not allow to be a port or harbour. We are often at a loss to render the verb πλέω otherwise than by our verb *to sail*, tho they are far from being of the same precise import. The use of oars, so prevalent in Grecian navigation, is so little known in our seas, that *to sail* is our only general term for going by sea, and sailor is another word for seaman. Thus also for ἀνάγω and ἐξορμίζω, we must risk the sea-phrase *to get under way*, or content ourselves with the inaccurate expression *to set sail*.

taste

taste were so far perfected that Æschylus had exhibited tragedy in its utmost dignity, and Sophocles and Euripides were giving it the highest polish, when Cimon returned in triumph to his country. Together with trophies, such as Greece had never before won in so distant a field, he brought wealth to a large amount, the fruit of his victories; part of which enriched the public treasury, part rewarded the individuals who had fought under him, and a large proportion, which he had had the virtue and the good fortune to acquire without incurring any charge of rapaciousness, became an addition to the large property inherited from his ancestors.

It was the peculiar felicity of Athens in this period, that, of the constellation of great men which arose there, each was singularly fitted for the situation in which the circumstances of the time required him to act; and none filled his place more advantageously than Cimon. But the fate of all those great men, and the resources employed, mostly in vain, to avert it, sufficiently mark, in this splendid era, a defective constitution, and law and justice ill assured. Aristides, we are told, tho it is not undisputed, had founded his security upon extreme poverty: Cimon endeavoured to establish himself by a splendid and almost unbounded, yet politic liberality. To ward against envy, and to secure his party with that tremendous tyrant, as the comic poet not inaptly calls them, the

Aristoph.  
Eq.  
v. 1111.

SECT.  
I.

CHAP.  
XII.

Corn. Nep.  
 & Plut.  
 vit. Cim.  
 & Plut.  
 vit. Peric.

sovereign people, he made a parade of throwing down the fences of his gardens and orchards in the neighbourhood of Athens, and permitted all to partake of their produce: a table was daily spread at his house for the poorer citizens, but more particularly for those of his own ward, whom he invited from the agora, the courts of justice, or the general assembly; a bounty which both enabled and disposed them to give their time at his call whenever his interest required their support. In going about the city he was commonly attended by a large retinue, handsomely clothed; and if he met an elderly citizen ill clad, he directed one of his attendants to change cloaks with him. To the indigent of higher rank he was equally attentive, lending or giving money, as he found their circumstances required, and always managing his bounty with the utmost care that the object of it should not be put to shame. His conduct, in short, was a continual preparation for an election; not, as in England, to decide whether the candidate should or should not be a member of the legislature; but whether he should be head of the commonwealth or an exile. In his youth, Cimon had affected a roughness of manners, and a contempt for the elegancies of life. In his riper years, he discovered that virtue and grossness have no natural connection: he became himself a model of politeness, patronized every liberal art, and studied to procure elegant as well as useful indulgences for the people. By him were raised the first of those edifices, which,

for

SECT.  
I.

For want of a more proper name, we call porticoes, under whose magnificent shelter it became the delight of the Athenians to assemble, and pass their leisure in promiscuous conversation. The widely celebrated groves of Academia acknowledged him as the founder of their fame. In the wood, before rude and without water, he formed commodious and elegant walks, and adorned them with running fountains. Nor was the planting of the agora, or great market-place of Athens, with that beautiful tree the oriental plane, forgotten as a benefit from Cimon; while, ages after him, his trees flourished, affording an agreeable and salutary shade to those who exposed their wares there, and to those who came to purchase them. Much, if not the whole of these things, we are given to understand, was done at his private expence; but our information upon the subject is inaccurate. Those stores, with which his victories had enriched the treasury, probably furnished the sums employed upon some of the public works executed under his direction, particularly the completion of the fortification of the citadel, whose principal defence hitherto, on the southern side, had been the precipitous form of the rock.

While with this splendid and princely liberality Cimon endeavoured to confirm his own interest, he was attentive to promote the general welfare, and to render permanent the superiority of Athens among the Grecian republics.

The

CHAP.  
XII.Thucyd.  
c. 99.  
Plut. vit.  
Cim.

The citizens of the allied states grew daily more impatient of the requisitions regularly made to take their turn of service on shipboard, and longed for uninterrupted enjoyment of their homes, in that security against foreign enemies which their past labors had, they thought, now sufficiently established. But, that the common interest still required the maintenance of a fleet, was a proposition that could not be denied, while the Persian empire existed, or while the Grecian seas offered temptation for piracy. Cimon therefore proposed that any commonwealth of the confederacy might compound for the personal service of its citizens, by furnishing ships, and paying a sum of money to the common treasury; and the Athenians would then undertake the manning of the fleet. The proposal was in the moment popular; most of the allies acceded to it, unaware or heedless of the consequences; for while they were thus depriving themselves of all maritime force to make that of Athens irresistible, they gave that ambitious republic claims upon them, uncertain in their nature, and which, as they might be made, could now also be enforced, at its pleasure.

Having thus at the same time strengthened themselves and reduced to impotence many of the allied states, the Athenian government became less scrupulous of using force against any of the rest who should dispute their sovereign authority. The reduction of Eion, by the confederate arms under Cimon, had brought them  
more

more particularly acquainted with the value of the adjacent country; where some mines of gold and silver, and a lucrative commerce with the surrounding Thracian hords, excited their avidity. But the people of the neighboring island of Thasus, very antiently possessed of that commerce, and of the more accessible mines, insisted that these, when recovered from the common enemy by the arms of that confederacy of which they were members, should revert intire to them. The Athenians, asserting the right of conquest, on the contrary, claimed the principal share. The Thasians, irritated, renounced the confederacy. The Athenian government ordered Cimon immediately to lead the confederate armament against them. The islanders venturing an action at sea, were defeated; and Cimon, debarking his forces in Thasus, became quickly master of everything but the principal town, to which he laid siege. The Athenian government meanwhile, to appropriate effectually that valuable territory on the continent, which was their principal object, sent thither a colony of no less than ten thousand men; partly Athenian citizens, partly from the allied commonwealths. Eion stood immediately at the mouth of the Strymon: a place called the Nine-ways, a few miles up the river, was chosen for a new town; a situation commodious for the double purpose of communicating with the sea, and commanding the neighboring country. But the Edonian Thracians, in whose territory it was, resenting the incroachment,

SECT.  
I.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 47.  
Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 100.  
Diod. l. 11.  
c. 70.  
Corn. Nep.  
& Plut.  
vit. Cim.

B.C. 465.  
Ol. 78  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
Ann. Thuc.



CHAP.  
XII.

ment, infested the settlers with irregular but continual hostilities. To put an end to so troublesome a war, the whole force of the colony marched against them. As the Greeks advanced, the Edonians retreated; avoiding a general action, while they sent to all the neighboring Thracian tribes for assistance, as in a common cause. When they were at length assembled in sufficient numbers, having engaged the Greeks far within a wild and difficult country, they attacked, overpowered, and cut in pieces their army, and annihilated the colony.

During these transactions on the continent, the siege of Thasus, carried on with great vigor, and with all the skill of the age, under the direction of Cimon, was resisted with uncommon obstinacy. The Thasians, however, did not depend intirely upon their own strength for the hope of final success. Early in the dispute they had sent ministers to Lacedæmon, to solicit protection against the oppression of Athens. The pretence was certainly favorable, and the Lacedæmonian government, no longer pressed by domestic troubles, determined to use the opportunity for interfering to check the growing power of the rival commonwealth, so long an object of jealousy, and now become truly formidable. They were accordingly taking measures secretly for an invasion of Attica, when a sudden and extraordinary calamity, an earthquake which overthrew the city of Sparta, and, in its immediate consequences, threatened destruction to the commonwealth,

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 101.

B.C. 465.  
Ol. 78  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
Ann. Thu.

monwealth, compelled them to confine all their attention at home. The Thasians therefore, after having withstood the power of the confederacy for three years, capitulated; upon terms severe indeed, but by which they avoided that wretched condition of slavery, to which Grecian people, less able to defend themselves, were often reduced by Grecian arms. Their fortifications were destroyed; their ships of war were surrendered; they paid immediately a sum of money; they bound themselves to an annual tribute; and they yielded all claim upon the opposite continent, and the valuable mines there.

S E C T.  
I.B.C. 463.  
Ol. 79½

Cimon, thus successful, did not meet, on his return to Athens, the acclamations to which he had been accustomed. Faction had been busy in his absence, and a prosecution was instituted against him, on the pretence that he ought to have extended the Athenian dominion by conquest in Macedonia, and that bribes from Alexander, king of that country, had stopped his exertions there. The covetous ambition, indeed, of the Athenian people, inflamed by interested demagogues, was growing boundless. Cimon, indignant at the ungrateful return for a life divided between performing the most important services to his country, and studying how most to gratify the people, would enter little into particulars in refuting a charge, one part of which he confi-

Corn. Nep.  
& Plut.  
vit. Cim.B.C. 462.  
Ol. 79¾

\* I am not perfectly satisfied with these dates assigned by Dodwell, but cannot undertake to correct them.

CHAP.  
XII.

dered as attributing to him no crime, the other as incapable of credit, and therefore beneath his regard. He told the assembled people, 'that they mistook both him and the country which it was said he ought to have conquered. Other generals had cultivated an interest with the Ionians and the Theſſalians, whose riches might make an interference in their concerns profitable. For himself, he had never sought any connection with those people; but he confessed he esteemed the Macedonians, who were virtuous and brave, but not rich; nor would he ever prefer riches to those qualities, tho he had his satisfaction in having enriched his country with the spoils of its enemies.' The popularity of Cimon was yet great; his principal opponents apparently found it not a time for pushing matters to extremity against him, and such a defence sufficed to procure an honorable acquittal.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 101.  
Diod. l. 11.  
c. 63, 64.  
Plut. vit.  
Cim.

Meanwhile Lacedæmon had been in the utmost confusion and on the brink of ruin. The earthquake came suddenly at midday, with a violence before unheard of. The youths of the principal families were in great numbers crushed by the fall of the gymnasium, where they were assembled at the appointed hour for exercise; many of both sexes and of all ages were buried under the ruins of other buildings: the shocks were repeated; the earth opened in several places; vast fragments from the summits of Taygetus were tumbled down its sides: in the end, only five houses remained standing in Sparta,

Sparta, and it was computed that twenty thousand lives were lost.

The first strokes of this awful calamity filled all ranks with the same apprehensions. But, in the continuance of it, that wretched multitude, excluded from all participation in the prosperity of their country, began to found hope on its distress: a proposal, obscurely made, was rapidly communicated, and the Helots assembled from various parts with one purpose, of putting their severe masters to death, and making the country their own. The ready foresight and prudent exertion of Archidamus, who had succeeded his grandfather Leotychidas in the throne of the house of Procles, preserved Lacedæmon. In the confusion of the first alarm, while some were endeavoring to save their most valuable effects from the ruins of the city, others flying various ways for personal safety, Archidamus, collecting what he could of his friends and attendants about him, caused trumpets to sound to arms, as if an enemy had been at hand. The Lacedæmonians, universally trained to the strictest military discipline, obeyed the signal; arms were the only necessities sought; and civil rule, dissipated by the magnitude of the calamity, was, for the existing circumstances, most advantageously supplied by military order. The Helots, awed by the very unexpected appearance of a regular army instead of a confused and flying multitude, desisted from their meditated attempt; but, quitting the city, spread themselves over the country,

CHAP. and excited their fellows universally to rebel-  
 XII. lion.

Thucyd.  
 l. i. c. 101.

The greater part of those miserable men, whom the Lacedæmonians held in so cruel a bondage, were descendants of the Messenians, men of the same blood with themselves, Greeks and Dorians. Memory of the wars of their ancestors, of their hero Aristomenes, and of the defence of Ithomë, was not obsolete among them. Ithomë accordingly they seized and made their principal post. But they so outnumbered the Lacedæmonians, that, tho' deficiently armed, yet, being not without discipline acquired in attendance upon their masters in war, they were capable of being formidable even in the field. Nor was it thus only that the rebellion was distressing. The Lacedæmonians, singularly ready and able in the use of arms, were singularly helpless in almost every other business. Deprived of their slaves, they were nearly deprived of the means of subsistence; agriculture stopped, and mechanic arts ceased. Application was therefore made to the neighboring allies for succour. The zealous friendship of the Æginetans upon the occasion, we find afterward acknowledged by the Lacedæmonian government; and troops came from as far as Plataea. Thus reinforced, the spirited and well-directed exertions of Archidamus quickly so far reduced the rebellion, that the insurgents remaining in arms were blocked up in Ithomë. But the extraordinary natural strength of that place, the desperate obstinacy of the defenders, and

Thucyd.  
 l. 2, c. 27.

Thucyd.  
 l. i. c. 101.  
 Diod. l. ii.  
 c. 64.

And the deficiency of the assailants in the science of attack, giving reason to apprehend that the business might not be soon accomplished, the Lacedæmonians sent to desire assistance from the Athenians, who were esteemed, beyond the other Greeks, experienced and skilful in the war of sieges.

This measure seems to have been, on many accounts, imprudent. There was found at Athens a strong disposition to refuse the aid. But Cimon, who, with a universal liberality of spirit, always professed particular esteem for the Lacedæmonians, prevailed upon his fellowcountrymen to take the generous part; and a considerable body of forces marched under his command into Peloponnesus. On their arrival at the camp of the besiegers, an assault upon the place was attempted, but with so little success, that recourse was again had to the old method of blockade. It was in the leisure of that inactive and tedious mode of attack, that principally arose those heartburnings which first occasioned an avowed national aversion between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and led, not indeed immediately, but in a direct line, to the fatal Peloponnesian war. All the prudence and all the authority of Cimon could not prevent the vivacious spirit of the Athenians from exulting, perhaps rather insultingly, in the new preëminence of their country: wherever danger called, they would be ostentatiously forward to meet it; and a superiority assumed, without a direct pretension to it, was continually appear-

S E C T.  
I.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 102.  
Diod.  
ut sup.  
Plut. vitæ  
Cim;

B.C. 461;  
Ol. 79.  
Ann. Thuc.

CHAP.  
XII.

ing. The Spartan pride was offended by their arrogance; the Spartan gravity was disturbed by their lively forwardness: it began to be considered that, tho Greeks, they were Ionians, whom the Peloponnesians considered as an alien race; and it occurred that if, in the continuance of the siege, any disgust should arise, there was no security that they might not renounce their present engagements, and even connect themselves with the Helots, who, as Greeks, had not less than the Lacedæmonians a claim to friendship and protection from every other Grecian people. Mistrust thus arose on one side; disgust became quickly manifest on both; and the Lacedæmonians shortly resolved to dismiss the Athenian forces. This however they endeavoured to do, as far as might be, without offence, by declaring that ‘an assault having been found ineffectual, the assistance of the Athenians was superfluous for the blockade, and the Lacedæmonians would not give their allies unnecessary trouble.’ All the other allies were however retained, and the Athenians alone returned home; so exasperated by this invidious distinction that, on their arrival at Athens, a decree proposed by the party adverse to Cimon for renouncing the confederacy with Lacedæmon, was carried. An alliance with Argos, the inveterate enemy of Sparta, immediately followed; and soon after the Thessalians acceded to the new confederacy.

While Lacedæmon was engaged with this dangerous insurrection, a petty war took place  
in

in Peloponnesus, which affords one of the most remarkable among the many strong instances on record, of the miseries to which the greater part of Greece was perpetually liable from the defects of its political system. Argos, the capital of Argolis, and indeed of Peloponnesus, under the early kings of the Danaïd race, or perhaps before them, lost its preëminence, as we have already seen, during the reigns of the Perseid and Pelopid princes, under whom Mycenæ became the first city of Greece. On the return of the Heracleids; Temenus fixed his residence at Argos, which thus regained its superiority. But the troubles of the Argian government had since given the means, as the oppressions arising from a defective political system occasioned very generally through Greece the desire, for the inferior towns to become independent republics. The Argian government, probably like the rest or more than the rest; generally oppressive, was certainly often ill-conducted and weak; and Lacedæmon, at perpetual enmity with Argos, fomented the rebellious disposition of its dependencies. During the antient wars of Sparta and Messenia, the Argians had expelled the people of their towns of Asinæa and Nauplia, and forced them to seek foreign settlements; a resource sufficiently marking a government both weak and oppressive. Mycenæ was now a much smaller town than Argos; but its people, encouraged by Lacedæmon, formed lofty pretensions. The far-famed



CHAP. temple of Juno, the tutelar deity of the country,  
 XII. situated about five miles from Argos, and little  
 more than one from Mycenæ, the Argians con-  
 sidered as theirs; and, under the protection of  
 their government, it was supposed from the  
 time of the Heracleids, the priestess had been  
 appointed and the sacred ceremonies administered: but the Mycenæans claimed the right to  
 this superintendancy. The games of Nemea,  
 from their institution, or, as it was called, their  
 restoration, had been under the direction of the  
 Argians, but the Mycenæan government claim-  
 ed the prior right to preside there. These how-  
 ever were but branches of a much more impor-  
 tant claim; for they wanted only power, or  
 sufficient assistance from Sparta, to assert a right  
 of sovereignty over Argos itself and all Argolis;  
 and farther to enforce their pretensions, they  
 were continually urging another claim, not the  
 less invidious to Argos, because better founded,  
 namely, their merit with all the Greek nation  
 for having joined the confederacy against Persia,  
 while the Argians allied themselves with the  
 common enemy of Greece. The favorable op-  
 portunity afforded by the Helot rebellion was  
 eagerly seized by the Argians, for ridding them-  
 selves of such troublesome and dangerous neigh-  
 bours, whom they considered as rebellious sub-  
 jects. With their whole force therefore laying  
 siege to Mycenæ, after some resistance they took  
 it, reduced the surviving people to slavery, and  
 dedicating a tenth of the spoil to the gods, totally  
 destroyed the town, which was never rebuilt.

## SECTION

## SECTION II.

*Change of administration at Athens and banishment of Cimon. Renunciation of the Peloponnesian confederacy by Megara, and accession to the Athenian. Difficulties of the new Athenian administration: Epibialtes; Pericles; depression of the court of Areiopagus: Expedition to Egypt. War in Greece; Siege of Ægina; relief of Megara by Myronides. Long walls of Athens built.*

AT Athens, after the banishment of Themistocles, Cimon remained long in possession of a popularity which nothing could resist; and his abilities, his successes, and his moderation, his connection with the aristocratical interest and his favor with the people, seemed altogether likely to insure, if anything could insure, permanency and quiet to his administration. But in Athens, as in every free government, there would always be a party adverse to the party in the direction of public affairs; matters had been for some time ripening for a change; and the renunciation of the Lacedæmonian alliance was the triumph of the opposition. The epithet Philolacones, friends to Lacedæmon, was circulated as the opprobrium of the existing administration. Cimon had always professed himself friendly to the Lacedæmonians, and an admirer of their institutions. His partiality had gone so far as to

CHAP.  
XII.

Plut. vit.  
Cim.

Plat.  
Gorg.  
p. 516.  
t. 1.  
Plut. &  
Corn.  
Nep.  
vit. Cim.

induce him to name his eldest son Lacedæmonius ; and the more completely to prove that he did not esteem the Athenian character a model of perfection (apparently by way of admonition, both to his family and to his country) he named his two other sons Theſſalus and Eleius. All theſe circumſtances were now turned to his diſadvantage, with all the acrimony of party-ſpirit ; a favorable moment was ſeized, while the popular mind was heated ; the oſtraciſm was propoſed and carried ; and by his baniſhment the party in oppoſition to him became fully poſſeſſed of the government.


Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 103.

In the divided ſtate of Greece, meanwhile, circumſtances were ariſing ſtill to promote the power of the Athenian commonwealth. An ancient diſpute between Megara and Corinth, about the limits of their reſpective territories, led to hoſtilities, in which the Megarians were preſſed by the ſuperior ſtrength of their enemy. Megara was of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, but ſo alſo was Corinth, and the leading Megarians could obtain no partial favor from the Lacedæmonian government. Under theſe circumſtances the democratical party in Megara propoſing to re-nounce the Peloponneſian for the Athenian confederacy, the oligarchal was obliged to yield. The ſituation and circumſtances of their territory gave them importance. Almoſt wholly mountainous, it formed a very ſtrong frontier for Attica againſt Peloponneſus : its ſituation againſt the iſthmus completely commanded the communication by land between the peninsula and northern

northern Greece : and its ports of Nisæa on the Saronic and Pegæ, on the Corinthian gulph, were valuable acquisitions to a naval power ; on one side depriving the enemy of means to annoy Attica : on the other affording means to distress the Peloponnesians, and to extend the Athenian command in the western seas. The new Athenian administration, therefore, very gladly accepted the proposal of the Megarians ; and under pretence of providing in the most effectual manner for the security of their new allies, they took the most effectual measures for holding them in subjection. Athenian garrisons were immediately put into the city of Megara and the port of Pegæ ; a measure to which those who now led the Megarian affairs were obliged to submit, still more, perhaps, through fear of domestic than of foreign foes. Fortifications at the same time raised to connect the city with its port of Nisæa, brought Megara itself in some degree under the controul of the Athenian fleet.

These circumstances, employing the minds of the people and flattering their ambition, were favorable to the new administration of Athens. Probably also the party in Megara which effected the revolution there, would not so readily have connected themselves with the former Athenian administration ; better disposed toward Lacedæmon, and less friendly to unbalanced democracy. But the liberality of Cimon was quickly missed : to equal it from their own stores was beyond their power ; yet to find means for gratifying the people as they had been accustomed

Plut. vit.  
Cim. &  
Pericl.

**CHAP.**  
**XII.**  accustomed to be gratified, or even more, was absolutely necessary to those who took the lead in public affairs, if they would hold their situation, or if they would avoid the risk even of taking the place of Cimon in banishment. The public treasury tempted; but all issues thence were under the controul of the court of Areiopagus, a large majority in which was of the aristocratical party, adverse to them and friendly to Cimon. No resource occurred but in that despotic power which the people in assembly might arrogate: the people might probably be persuaded to consent to the prostitution of the public money to their private emolument; and while thus, in reality, they bribed themselves, popular favor would accrue to the advisers of the gratifying measure. This was indeed hazardous in extreme: the great barrier established by the constitution against excess of popular caprice would be done away: but the necessities of the administration were pressing; and the leading men, it was hoped, by their influence, or their oratory, might still be able to guide the proceedings of the general assembly.

It was indeed not by ordinary men that Cimon was removed from his situation at the head of the commonwealth, and these violent and hazardous changes were made. The ostensible head of the party was Ephialtes; but Pericles, son of Xanthippus, had lately been gaining a superiority in popular estimation. Pericles possessed extraordinary advantages from nature and from fortune. His father, a man of one of the first families

Plut. vit.  
Pericl.

Corn.  
Nep. &  
Plut. vit.  
Pericl.

families of Athens, and of large property, had distinguished himself in the prosecution of the great Miltiades, and had afterward much more advantageously distinguished himself in the command of the Athenian forces on the glorious day of Mycalè. He married Agaristè, niece of Cleisthenes, chief of the Alcmaeonid family; and leader of the party that expelled the Peisistratids. Their son, born with uncommon abilities, was educated under the ablest of those fathers of science and fine taste who at this time arose in Athens, or resorted thither from the various establishments of the Greek nation. Anaxagoras and Pythocleides are particularly mentioned as the instructors of his youth; Damon as the companion of his riper years. It was observed by old men that, in person, manner, and voice, he remarkably resembled Peisistratus; and this circumstance, communicated among a superstitious people, infused a jealousy that long deterred him from putting himself forward in public business. In his youth, therefore, arms employed his active hours, and science was the pursuit of his leisure. But when, Aristeides being dead, Themistocles banished, and Cimon mostly absent on military commands, no superior man remained to take the lead in the popular assembly, Pericles was induced to show himself. His powers of eloquence far exceeded those of any orator of his age; and his speeches were distinguished by a new polish of style and manner, which singularly captivated the Athenian people. His family-interest and his party-connections

SECT.  
II.Id. *ibid.*,  
& Plat.  
Alcib. p.  
p. 118.  
t. 2.Plat. *ibid.*Plut. vit.  
Pericl.

joined

CHAP.  
XII.

joined to put him in unavoidable opposition to the aristocratical interest; which his private judgement and private inclination otherwise disposed him to support. He had taken a part in the prosecution instituted against Cimon, on his return from the conquest of Thasus: yet the moderation with which he conducted himself in it, showed private esteem in the midst of political opposition. The banishment by ostracism being reputed not a punishment, or at least no disgrace, he did not scruple to concur in such a measure, when its consequence would be to give his own party complete possession of the government. He was then induced, by the necessities of that party, to concur in the proposal, so fatal to the Athenian constitution, to contract the powers, and reduce the dignity of the court of Areiopagus. Ephialtes was the instrument to bring forward the measure. What Ephialtes proposed, the people willed, and it was done: the more important of those causes which, by the constitution of Solon, were connisable by the court of Areiopagus only, were in future to be brought before the assembly of the people; and the assembly of the people was to direct without controul, issues from the public treasury<sup>3</sup>. This was the finishing stroke to form at Athens that union of all the powers of government, legislative, executive, financial, and judicial, in the

Aristot.  
Polit.

l. 2. c. 12.

Diod. l. 12.

c. 77.

Plut. vit.

Cim. &

Pericl.

<sup>3</sup> Dodwell refers this transaction to the year B. C. 462, the year, according to him, preceding the banishment of Cimon: but his proof is very deficient. I think Diodorus more probably right, in placing it in the first year of the 80th olympiad, B. C. 460.

same hands, which, according to the sage Montesquieu, constitutes the essence of despotism; and hence the term Tyrant was, even in that age, applied to the assembled Athenian people \* SECT.  
II.

An individual despot has generally his favorites, who govern him, but a despotic multitude must necessarily have its favorites to guide its measures. Under the direction therefore of Ephialtes, Pericles, and some other leading men, new or increased pay was given to the people for attendance upon the general assemblies and the courts of judicature: amusements the most elegant were provided for their leisure; the sublime dramas of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the jocular satire of the comic poets, were alternately exhibited in magnificent theaters; the religious festivals were increased in number and celebrated with new splendor, and the carcases of the numerous victims in the sacrifices, distributed among the multitude, feasted them on holidays, as the pay for attending the courts subsisted them on days of business. But to support these new expences new supplies were necessary. The commanding power of the Athenian people, and the depression of the allies were thought now so established, that the former might exercise, and the latter must bear, any tyranny. Not only therefore the common treasury of the confede-

\* Πάντες ἄνθρωποι διδασί σ', ὥσπερ ἄνδρα τύραννον.

Aristoph. Equit. v. 111.

ὥσπερ τυράννῳ, τῷ δήμῳ χαρίζομενοι.

Aristot. Polit. l. 2. c. 12.

racy

4.



CHAP.  
XII.Xenoph.  
Rep.  
Athen.

racy was removed from Delos to Athens<sup>3</sup>, but the moderate assessment of Aristeides, to which all the allies had cheerfully submitted, was greatly advanced. To the tribunals of Athens recourse must be had if any dispute arose; and hence new profit, new power, and very flattering distinction to even the meanest of the Athenian people, with most grievous humiliation and oppression to the people of those subject states which were still called allies.

These circumstances superinduced new necessity for maintaining the navy in vigor. But to be maintained in vigor it must be employed: and it was highly desirable that it should be employed, as under Cimon it had been, so as to bring new gratification to the people, and at the same time to acquire something toward the expence of its own maintenance. Cyprus appeared at present the most inviting object, and a fleet of two hundred trireme galleys was sent thither under Charitimis<sup>6</sup>. But shortly a more alluring field of action presented itself.

<sup>3</sup> That this removal took place, and about this time, seems unquestionable, tho Thucydides has not particularly mentioned it. Plutarch, in his life of Aristeides, quotes Theophrastus for its being the act of Aristeides, with whose character it seems less congenial. In his life of Pericles he makes that able but less scrupulous statesman apologize for it as his act, and with this the account of Justin would correspond.

<sup>6</sup> Barthelemi (Anacharsis, p. 269. v. 1. ed. 8<sup>o</sup>.) gives the command of this expedition to Cimon, and quotes Thucydides and Plutarch. He has probably trusted to his memory, which has deceived him. Neither Thucydides, nor Plutarch, nor Diodorus has mentioned the commander's name. It is here given on the authority of Ctesias. I will however say for Barthelemi that, for myself,

In the relaxation of the Persian government during the last years of Xerxes, and the confusion which ensued on his death, Inarus, chief of some African tribes on the western borders of Egypt, engaged the greater part of that rich country in rebellion. But when the empire became again settled under Artaxerxes, apprehensive that he should be unable to withstand its collected force, which would probably be soon directed against him, he looked around for foreign alliance. The little Athenian commonwealth, commanding the navy of the Grecian confederacy, was, at this time, by far the first maritime power in the world; and the difficulty of approach to Egypt by land, together with the command which the Persian monarch possessed of the Phœnician navy, made a maritime ally of great importance to Inarus. The Grecian infantry of this age was also not less beyond all other in esteem; and tho, among themselves, the Peloponnesian, and particularly the Lacedæmonian, had the reputation of superiority, yet, among foreigners, no Grecian name was of higher renown than the Athenian. Inarus therefore sent to Athens proposals of alliance; offering very advantageous returns for assistance to complete the deliverance of Egypt from the Persian dominion.

SECT.  
II.

Thucyd.  
l. 2. c. 104.  
Diod.  
l. 11. c. 74.

Thucyd.  
l. 4. c. 33.

myself, I prefer a writer who, if he makes a mistake, may be corrected from the authority which himself quotes, to those who fastidiously require their readers to believe all on their own assertion.

Sir

CHAP.  
XII.

Hist. of the  
World,  
b. 2. c. 7.  
§ 5.

Sir Walter Raleigh, who looked upon this part of history certainly with a master's eye, but with too transient a glance, imputes folly to the Athenian government for their conduct; when, having it in their power to make the valuable acquisition of Cyprus, which their naval force would have enabled them to keep, they quitted so desirable an object for the wild project of acquiring dominion on the continent of Africa. If indeed the Athenian empire, as the confederacy under the controul of the Athenian commonwealth is often called by antient writers, had been connected by any regular and settled form of government, or if the constitution of Athens itself had been such as to be capable of carrying any steady command, the observation would certainly have been just. But the existing circumstances of Athens, to which we have been adverting, offer at least an apology for those able men, for certainly there were able men in its administration, who promoted the expedition to Egypt. For, however valuable an acquisition Cyprus might in time have been made, under such a course of prudent and steady management as the constitution of Athens seemed utterly to deny, the wealth of Egypt was a far more tempting present object. There, it was hoped, victories might be obtained to rival those of Cimon; which, through the ransom of wealthy prisoners, the spoils of Persian camps, and the produce of Thracian mines, had wonderfully enriched individuals and filled the public treasury. Charimius therefore was ordered to lead the whole

whole force under his command from Cyprus to the Nile. His rapid success appeared at first to justify the enterprize: all yielded before him till he arrived at Memphis, the capital of lower Egypt; and he possessed himself of two divisions out of three which composed that vast city. A numerous body of Persians, and of those Egyptians who had not joined in the revolt, retiring into the third division, called the White-castle, prepared for a vigorous defence.

A war meanwhile, in which the acquisition of Megara had involved Athens with the Corinthians, and in some measure with the whole Peloponnesian confederacy, of which Lacedæmon had always remained the head and Corinth was a principal member, called for the exertion of the Athenian administration. In a descent at Halizæ on the Argolic coast, their forces were defeated by the Corinthians assisted by the Epidaurians. Shortly after, in a naval action off Cecryphaleia, the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians. The Æginetan fleet, which was considerable, then joined the Corinthian; and the assistance of the other Peloponnesian allies being called in, the Athenians also collected the naval force of their confederacy. An action ensued, in which the Athenians gained a complete victory,

B.C. 459<sup>7</sup>  
Ol. 80 $\frac{1}{2}$ .  
Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 102.  
Diod.  
l. 9. c. 73.  
Ctes.  
Perfic.  
B.C. 458.  
Ol. 80 $\frac{3}{4}$ .

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 105.  
Diod.  
l. 11. c. 78.

<sup>7</sup> I know not why, for the dates of the Egyptian war, Dodwell has given implicit credit to Diodorus, who, in regard to these, is as evidently contradictory to Thucydides, as he is clearly proved wrong by Dodwell himself, in regard to many preceding transactions. The account of Thucydides however, not sufficing to ascertain the dates, we can assign them but by conjecture.

CHAP.  
XII.

took seventy ships, and then landing upon Ægina, under the conduct of Leocrates, laid siege to the capital town. It was a most favorite object to subdue an island which, from its situation, its naval strength, and the active and adverse temper of its people, was emphatically called the eyesore of Peiræus\*. The same circumstances made the Peloponnesians the more anxious to provide for its defence. Three hundred heavy-armed Corinthians and Epidaurians were introduced into the place: a larger reinforcement might have endangered a failure of provisions, while the Athenians commanded the sea; but to give more effectual relief, the Corinthians invaded the Megarian territory, seized the heights of Geranea commanding the passage from the isthmus into northern Greece, and advanced towards Megara; in confidence that, while so large a part of the Athenian force was absent in Egypt, either Megara must be exposed, or the siege of Ægina must be raised.

Thucyd.  
l. 2. c. 105.

While, from the division of Greece into so many little republics, great talents were mostly confined within a very narrow circle, from which they could scarcely by any possibility emerge, the circumstances of Athens, little favorable to private security or domestic happiness, gave singular opportunity and ample scope for genius, wherever it existed among the people, to come forward and exert itself: and Athens was fruitful of great men at this period. Among those less

\* *Ὀφθαλμὸς τοῦ Πειραιῶς.* Plut. Peric.

known

SECT.  
II.

known to fame, but high in merit, was Myronides, who, upon the present occasion, was appointed to the command of the forces; for such was the general spirit of the Athenian people, while the leading men dreaded the unpopularity of a timid policy, that it was determined, with such an army as could yet be collected within Attica, old men chiefly and boys, to march to the relief of Megara, rather than recal their more vigorous troops from a favorite enterprize. Myronides, with the army, such as it was, under his command, did not scruple to meet the flower of the Corinthian youth; and tho' the event would not justify the boast of a decisive victory, he remained master of the field, and erected on it his trophy. The Corinthians, retreating within their own territory, were ill received by their fellowcitizens; who upbraided them with their inglorious return from a fruitless expedition, in which they had yielded the honor of the day to an enemy unable to conquer them. Urged by shame, and under no good conduct, on the twelfth day from the battle, the Corinthian youth returned to the field; and, to vindicate their honor, erected their own trophy in claim of victory. The able Myronides, taking his opportunity for issuing with his motley troops from the walls of Megara, cut in pieces the detachment employed to erect the trophy, and then attacking the supporting army, put it completely to rout. A large body of the vanquished, pressed in their flight by the conquerors, and missing their road, entered an inclosure surrounded by a ditch, so wide and

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 105.Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 106.

CHAP. deep as to preclude passage. The Athenians,  
 XII. apprized of this, secured the only outlet with a  
 sufficient body of their heavy-armed, and then  
 disposing their light-armed around, plied their  
 missile weapons so effectually that every Corinthian within perished. Corinth was so weakened by this severe blow as to be, for some time, incapable of any considerable exertion.

For a long course of years after the banishment, and even after the death of Themistocles, the spirit of that great man seemed to animate the Athenian councils. In all the changes of administration, measures were in a great degree directed by the political principles which he first conceived, and of which he so forcibly demonstrated the advantage in practice: his ideas for insuring safety, for acquiring power, for extending dominion, continued to be carried into execution. The present administration of Athens were well aware that the state of parties within their own commonwealth, and the complexion of affairs through Greece, did not promise them a time of ease and leisure. The necessity of employing a large proportion of their force in distant service on shipboard, if they would hold their controul over the confederacy, was not likely to cease; and the remaining strength, they had found, scarcely sufficed for the remaining probable occasions. In prosecution therefore of the idea of Themistocles, and with a spirit which distinguishes this age of Greece, and particularly of Athens, they set about a very great and very costly work; no less than to unite the city  
 with

with its ports by strong fortifications, which might secure the communication against any interruption from an enemy. A wall was conducted to Phalerum, the distance about four miles, and another to Peiræus, five miles, with towers at proper intervals. Thus Athens and Peiræus came to be often distinguished by the names of the upper and the lower town, as two parts only of the same city. Afterward, by the advice of Pericles, as we learn from Plato (who informs us that his master Socrates was present at the delivery of the oration which persuaded the Athenian people to the measure) a third wall was added, from Athens to the middle port Munychia. Thus should an enemy get possession of one of the outer walls, the communication between Athens and one of its ports would still be secure.

SECT.  
II.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 107.  
& l. 2. c. 13.

Plat.  
Gorgias,  
p. 455. t. 2.



## SECTION III.

*War between Doris and Phocis, leads to hostilities between Athens and Lacedæmon: battle of Tanagra. Affairs of Bœotia: battle of Œenophytia: successes of the Athenians under Myronides. Ægina taken. Successes of the Athenians under Tolmides: Messenians established in Naupactus. Conclusion of the Egyptian expedition. War in Thessaly. Expedition under Pericles to the western coast of Greece.*

LACEDÆMON, weakened by misfortune and internal disturbance, and usually slow in its councils, had not been induced by the revolt of Megara, nor by the sufferings of so close an ally as Corinth, added to the inimical measures before taken by Athens, to come to a rupture with that rival republic. But the division of Greece into so many little states, precluded the possibility of secure peace through the country, and hostilities begun in any obscure corner, always endangered the tranquility of the whole. The rugged province of Doris, the mother-country of the greater part of the Peloponnesians, destitute of any considerable city, had three small towns, Bœon, Cytineon, Erineon (names hardly elsewhere occurring in Grecian history) in which the little public business of so poor and thinly peopled a territory was transacted. The Phocians invading Doris, took one of those towns.

The

S-E C T.  
III.

The Lacedæmonians, who always bore a religious regard for their mother-country, were no sooner informed of its distress than they prepared to relieve it. Fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their own people, with no less than ten thousand of their allies, which, with the light-armed slaves attending, would make an army of perhaps twenty-five thousand men, marched toward Phocis. Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus commanded, as regent during the minority of his nephew Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, to whom the scepter of Sparta had fallen by the premature death of Pleistarchus son of Leonidas. The Phocians, unable to resist such a force, surrendered the Dorian town, and submitted to the conditions imposed by the Lacedæmonians.

B.C. 457.  
Ol. 80  $\frac{1}{2}$ .  
Ann. Thu.

There were at this time some of the aristocratical party at Athens so far from considering Lacedæmon as a hostile state, that they looked toward it for relief from the oppression which they suffered under the present administration of their country, and for the restoration of that constitution under which Athens had become great, and without which they thought it could not long flourish. Accordingly they opened a secret correspondence with Nicomedes. But the same circumstances, which led the partizans of aristocracy to desire a friendly connection with Sparta, induced the leaders of the democratical interest, who now governed the republic, to confirm and inflame the animosity of the people against that state, and to persuade them of its determined enmity to Athens. It was therefore resolved to

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 107.

CHAP.  
XII.

oppose the return of the Peloponnesian army into the peninsula, and means were much in their power: for possessing the strong places of Megara on one side of the isthmus, and Pegæ on the other, and keeping a guard on mount Geraneia, they completely commanded the passes by land; and the port of Pegæ, together with an interest which they possessed among the towns of the Achaian coast, enabled them to keep a fleet in the Corinthian gulph, which would effectually prevent an army from crossing it. Nicomedes was in consequence much at a loss what measures to take; but some political intrigues at Thebes, together with the overtures received from the aristocratical party at Athens, determined him to wait and watch opportunities; and he wintered in Bœotia<sup>9</sup>.

This was highly suspicious to the Athenian administration. They had expected that the approach of the severe season and the impatience of his troops would have urged Nicomedes to the hazardous attempt of forcing the passage of the mountains: but observing no appearance of a disposition to move from his present situation, and suspecting intrigue, they resolved in the spring to attack him in the plain. A body of cavalry, which they obtained from their allies of Thessaly, they hoped would enable them to do this with certain advantage. Collecting there-

B.C.456.  
Ol.80.4.

<sup>9</sup> The chronology of Diodorus here so accords with, and illustrates the summary narrative of Thucydides, that we may give him credit for this circumstance, which Thucydides has not specified.

S E C T.  
III.

fore what other auxiliary troops they readily could, among which were a thousand from Argos, they formed, with their own forces, a body of fourteen thousand heavy-armed foot. These, with the cavalry, and the attending slaves, would make an army of scarcely less than thirty thousand men, with which they marched into Bœotia. Nicomedes met them at Tanagra, and a severe action ensued, so equally maintained, that neither side could claim the victory. It was renewed on the following day, when the treachery of the Thessalian horse compelled the Athenians, after great slaughter on both sides, to leave the Peloponnesians masters of the field. Nicomedes then, without attempting to make any other use of his victory, except to plunder and waste the Megarian territory as he passed it, returned into Peloponnesus.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 108.  
Diod.  
l. 11. c. 80.  
Pausan.  
l. 1. c. 29.

The Thebans, always claiming rights of sovereignty over the other towns of Bœotia, but humbled by the event of the Persian war, had judged the opportunity favorable, while the Peloponnesian army lay in their neighbourhood, to attempt the recovery of their antient authority. With this view they had engaged in a treaty with the Spartans; who readily acceded to the purpose of raising a city without Peloponnesus to a capacity of balancing the power and curbing the ambition of Athens. With such a force at hand, it was not difficult to induce most of the towns to engage in the Peloponnesian confederacy, and admit the supremacy of Thebes in superintending the general protection, and for that

Diod.  
l. 11. c. 30.  
Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 193.  
Thucyd.  
l. 3. c. 61.

C H A P.  
XII.

that purpose directing the military affairs of the Bœotian people<sup>10</sup>. Whatever within Bœotia was immoveably adverse to their proposal, and particularly the heroic little commonwealth of Plataea, the antient and faithful ally of Athens, was of course to be oppressed. Phocis and the Opuntian Locrians joined in their alliance.

Neither the force nor the spirit of Athens were however broken by the check received at Tanagra. As soon as the motions in Bœotia were known, it was determined to obviate their effects. Myronides was appointed general of the Athenian forces. On the sixty-second day after

B.C. 456.  
OL. 81. 1<sup>st</sup>  
Thucyd.  
1, 1, c. 108,

<sup>10</sup> *ἡγούμενος ἐν τῇ ἀσπίδι*, according to the expression which Thucydides puts into the mouth of a Theban orator (b. 3. c. 61.). The value of this term is in some degree to be collected from a following passage (c. 67.), in the speech of the same orator, addressing himself to the Lacedæmonians, *ἡγούμενος ὑποπτεῖ ὑπὸν ὑμῖν*.

<sup>11</sup> I think Dodwell clearly right in placing this event one year later than Diodorus, who has crowded together transactions that could not have passed within the year. Allowing this, the account of Diodorus will assist to illustrate that of Thucydides. The battle of Tanagra was fought in the spring of the year 456 before Christ, toward the conclusion of the fourth year of the eightieth Olympiad; for the Olympian year began a little after midsummer. The battle of Ænophyta was fought in the beginning of the first year of the eighty-first Olympiad, in the autumn of the same year before Christ 456.

Thucydides says that the Peloponnesian army, in passing through the Megaris, after the battle of Tanagra, cut down the trees; that is trees objects of cultivation, as olives and vines; and he mentions no other waste, the harvest being probably not forward enough to be readily destroyed. Smith, in his translation of Thucydides, interprets *ἀνὰ τὰ δένδρα κομίσαντες* by the expression, *having cut down the woods*. The mistake is of a kind that an Englishman, who never travelled in more southern countries, might easily fall into, if he did not consider how little it could answer the Spartan general's purpose, to delay his march by such laborious waste, as that of cutting down what in English is properly called *woods*.

the

the unfortunate action of Tanagra, he met the Bœotian army, much more numerous than his own, at Œenophyta, and gained a complete victory. Tanagra was taken and dismantled; through all the towns incouragement was communicated to the democratical party, everywhere adverse to the Lacedæmonian connection, and all Bœotia, except Thebes, was rapidly brought either into alliance with Athens, or under its dominion.

SECT.  
III.

The democratical interest was strong in the neighbouring country of Phocis, but the oligarchal party, supported by Thebes and Lacedæmon, still prevailed there. Myronides without loss of time entered that province, and overbearing opposition, put the power in all the towns into the hands of those whose interest would keep them dependent on Athens; and thus Phocis, like Bœotia, became an appendage of the Athenian empire. The Opuntian Locrians, more attached to their oligarchal government and the Lacedæmonian alliance, but dreading the attack with which they next were threatened, delivered a hundred of their principal men as hostages to insure the compliance of their state with terms imposed. This campaign of Myronides, tho no detail of it remained, even in the time of Diodorus, was esteemed equal to the most brilliant atchievements of the Athenian arms<sup>12</sup>.

The

<sup>12</sup> Thucydides in his concise mention of the expedition under Myronides, tho he particularizes that the battle of Œenophyta was fought on the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, does not name Thebes. I have been very cautious of following any other writer, in relating the transactions of these times, when not  
in

CHAP.  
XII.

It was no small addition to the joy which the important conquests of Myronides gave at Athens that, about the same time, Leocrates returned victorious over the little barren island of Ægina. Cut off from all relief, through the command which the Athenians possessed of the sea, the Æginetans had at length capitulated: their ships of war were surrendered, their fortifications were demolished, and they bound themselves to the payment of a perpetual tribute. In the same summer the great work of the long walls which connected the city of Athens with its ports, was completed.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 108.

B.C. 456.  
Ol. 81. 1.

Thucyd.  
ib.  
B.C. 455.  
Ol. 81. 2.  
Ann. Thu.

The Athenian government, now, confident in their strength, resolved to prosecute offensive operations against their Peloponnesian enemies. Tolmides, with a strong squadron under his command, sailing round Peloponnesus, burnt

in some degree supported by him. Diodorus tells of many glorious and very surprizing feats of Grecian arms, utterly unknown to Thucydides; of which his account of the expeditions to Cyprus and to Egypt afford some remarkable instances. They may however be nearly paralleled out of Livy; who tells of many victories gained by the Roman arms against the forces of Hannibal in Italy, and leaves us to wonder why they had no consequences, till, upon looking into Polybius, we find the greatest reason to believe that they never had more than an imaginary existence. There is seldom equal temptation to romance concerning circumstances merely political. The narrative of Thucydides, in the part in question, tho it may have sufficed for his contemporaries, and for his particular view in that prefatory part of his work, leaves us totally uninformed of the motives to the Boeotian war. These however may be gathered from some passages which afterward occur in his History (l. 3. c. 62. & 95.), and from what we find in Plato on the subject (Menex. p. 242. t. 2.); and thus what is here supplied from Diodorus, in itself probable, and consistent with every authenticated fact, appears sufficiently established.

the

the Lacedæmonian naval arsenal at Gythium, and proceeding into the Corinthian gulph, debarked his forces, defeated the Sicyonians in an action by land, and took the town of Chalcis, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Ætolia. It was not till the tenth year of the blockade of Ithomë that the Helots there had been induced to capitulate; and they obtained, at last, liberty for themselves and their families; upon condition, however, that they should finally quit Peloponnesus. Tolmides collected those fugitives, and settled them at Naupactus on the northern shore of the Corinthian gulph, which he conquered from the Ozolian Locrians. There with the revived name of Messenians, which they had never intirely lost, forming a free republic, or at least a republic of free citizens, under the protection of Athens, they became once more numbered among the Grecian people.

While success was so generally attending the Athenians within Greece, their forces engaged in the distant operations in Egypt, were experiencing a variety of fortune. Grecian valor and Grecian discipline at first so overbore the efforts of oriental arms, that the Persian government was at a loss what to oppose to them. The measure taken marks very strongly what may be the weakness of despotic empire, while its territory and population are immense. Megabazus was sent with a large sum of money to Lacedæmon, to endeavour to obtain by bribes the alliance of that little republic, and procure the invasion of Attica by a Peloponnesian army. It tells very  
highly

SECT.  
III.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 109.  
Diod. l. ii.  
c. 54.



**CHAP.**  
**XII.**  
highly to the honor of the Spartan government of the time, from an Athenian writer almost contemporary, that Sparta was not to be bribed to a measure to which resentment, ambition, and political interest contributed so powerfully to incite. Megabazus, after having spent a part of his treasures uselessly, in ways which Thucydides does not explain, returned with the remainder into Asia, without having in any degree accomplished his purpose.

Then at last measures more consonant to the former dignity of the empire were taken for the recovery of Egypt. A very numerous army was assembled on the confines of Cilicia and Syria; and a fleet was prepared in Phenicia and the other maritime provinces. Megabazus, or Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, head of one of the six great families of Persia, was appointed to the command in chief. The spring and summer were employed in collecting troops; the autumn and winter in the endeavour to restore discipline and skill in arms among them: in the following spring Megabyzus led them into Egypt. His measures appear to have been judicious, and correspondent success followed. The Egyptians venturing a battle were defeated. The little army of Greeks, compelled to raise the siege of Memphis, for the White-castle still held out against them, retired into an island of the Nile called Prosopitis, where their fleet joined them. In this strong situation their valor and discipline defied the Persian assaults. Wealth and numbers, however, under able management, may supply great

**B.C. 457.**  
**OL. 80.<sup>3</sup>.**  
**Thucyd.**  
**ib.**  
**Diod. L. 11.**  
**c. 75.**

**B.C. 456.**  
**OL. 81.<sup>1</sup>.**

great deficiencies. Forming dikes and cutting water-courses, Megabyzus drained the channel in which the Athenian galleys lay; and while he thus made the fleet useless, which had been hitherto a great annoyance to him, he laid the little army open to wide attack. Thus, after a siege of eighteen months, he took Profopitis: a part of the Grecian troops, forcing their way through Libya, escaped to Cyrenë; but the greater part perished. Inarus the mover of the war, betrayed by his followers, was put to death by crucifixion; and all Egypt, except the marshes, held by a chief named Amyrtæus, submitted again to the Persian dominion.

SECT.  
III.

B.C. 454.  
Ol. 81. 3.  
Thucyd.  
l. 2. c. 110.

The misfortunes of the Athenian arms in this part of the world did not close thus. Fifty trireme galleys, going to Egypt, to relieve an equal number of the fleet there, entered the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, ignorant of what had happened. The Phenician fleet attacked them with superior force in the river, while the Persian army assisted from the shore: a few ships forced their way to sea and escaped, but the greater part were destroyed or taken. Such was the conclusion of the Athenian enterprize against Egypt, when it had been carried on six years.

Thucyd.  
ibid.

Circumstances meanwhile were arising still to extend the devastation of war within Greece. Orestes, son of Echecratides king of Theffaly, such is the title given him by Thucydides, being compelled to fly his country, implored assistance from Athens. The Athenian people, exasperated

Thucyd.  
l. 2. c. 111.

**CHAP.** exasperated against the Theſſalian government  
**XII.** for the treachery of their troops in the affair of  
 Tanagra, and the Athenian chiefs, hoping to  
 ſecure an effectual intereſt in that rich and popu-  
 lous province, concurred in zeal for the cauſe

**B.C. 454.** of the young prince. An army, compoſed of  
**Ol. 81  $\frac{3}{4}$ .** the newly-acquired auxiliary force of Bœotia  
 and Phocis, together with a body of Athenian  
 troops, entered Theſſaly under the command of  
 Myronides, and penetrated as far as Pharfalus.  
 But with the uſual deficiency of the ſouthern  
 Greek armies in cavalry, that general was unable  
 to do anything againſt the Theſſalian horſe, and  
 in the Theſſalian plains, worthy of his former  
 fame. In the field, wherever he turned his  
 force, nothing ventured to reſiſt him; but he  
 could detach nothing, and, according to the  
 expreſſion of Thucydides, beyond the imme-  
 diate reach of his arms he could keep nothing.  
 After an ineffectual attempt, therefore, upon  
 the city of Pharfalus, he withdrew his army  
 from Theſſaly, and returned to Athens.

Meanwhile the leading men in the Athenian  
 councils were ſtill directing their attention to  
 extend the power of the republic on all ſides.  
 Maſters of the Ægean ſea, with the greater part  
 of its coaſts and iſlands, and commanding a  
 large proportion of the continent of Greece,  
 they had great influence even in Peloponneſus.

Argos was connected with them by its own ne-  
 ceſſary intereſt: the greater part of Achaia was  
 in their dependency; and, poſſeſſing Naupactus  
 near the entrance, and Pegæ at the bottom, of  
 the

Thucyd.  
 l. 1. c. 111,  
 & 115. &  
 l. 4. c. 21.  
 Plut. vit.  
 Peric.

the Corinthian gulph, they commanded its navigation. With the general view, apparently, to protect their allies, molest their enemies, and extend their authority and influence, as opportunity might offer, a thousand Athenian soldiers were put aboard the squadron lying at Pegæ, and the command was committed to Pericles. Crossing the gulph, Pericles debarked his force on the territory of Sicyon; and the Sicyonians quitting their walls to protect their fields, he gave them battle and defeated them. Then taking aboard a reinforcement of Achaïans, he proceeded to the Acarnanian coast, and after an unsuccessful attempt upon CEniadæ, but not without a large collection of booty, always a great object of antient warfare, he conducted his squadron home.

SECT.  
III.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 111.  
Diod.  
l. 11. c. 84  
& 87.  
Plut. vit.  
Peric.

CHAP.  
XII.

## SECTION IV.

*Change in the Athenian administration, and Recall of Cimon: Truce of five years with Peloponnesus. Expedition to Cyprus under Cimon; death of Cimon. Contention of parties in Athens, and change in the administration. Sacred War.*

A CHANGE infused in the domestic politics of Athens, of the motives to which we are not informed by historians; but its effects, which were important and extensive, enable us, with the assistance of the known circumstances of the times, in some degree to discover them<sup>13</sup>. A reconciliation took place between the leaders of the democratical and aristocratical parties; and Pericles himself proposed to the assembly of the people a decree for the recall of Cimon, after the expiration of only five years of the term of his banishment. An anecdote reported by Plutarch, if true in all its circumstances, would powerfully forward this measure. When the Athenian forces marched to meet the Lacedæmonian army at Tanagra, Cimon met them

<sup>13</sup> The account of Plutarch, the only writer from whom we have any detail upon the subject, is unsatisfactory in itself, and ill accords with the course of events marked in the summary of Thucydides, to which I always chuse to refer as a standard for authenticating other information. The reader who will take the trouble to compare the accounts of the battle of Tanagra and its consequences, in Plutarch's lives of Cimon and Pericles, with the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 11<sup>th</sup> chapter of the first book of Thucydides, will be enabled to judge for himself.

where they passed the Attic border; and, the law of his exile not absolutely forbidding, desired to join the troops of his ward as a volunteer. His request however was denied, and he was ordered to quit the camp; but before he departed he had opportunity to communicate with his friends among the troops, whom he earnestly exhorted to prove, by their behavior in the battle to insue, the falsehood of the charge in which they were in some degree involved with him. Accordingly a band of a hundred pledged themselves to one another not to fly; and when the army was routed, they continued to fight around the panoply of Cimon, which they had carried into the field as their banner, till they were killed to a man. This was the most powerful of all oratory; none would any more be persuaded that Cimon, or the friends of Cimon, were enemies to their country. Meanwhile the men in power had a most arduous office to sustain; the administration of what has been called an empire; but an empire without any regular constitution; held together partly by force, partly by accidental circumstances; the capricious populace of Athens being the sovereign, while a large majority of the principal men were in opposition; and a war was to be conducted against a confederacy, whose land-force far exceeded theirs. The very conquests, already made, moreover distressed them; they were at a loss for means to keep what they had acquired. At the same time they knew that the most powerful of the enemies of the republic,

C.H.A.P.  
XII, the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, would be highly averse to any negotiation with them, but would readily treat with their opponents of the aristocratical party, and particularly with Cimon. These seem to have been the considerations that led the party in power to the accommodation. And they were not deceived in their views; for a cessation of hostilities presently followed the restoration of Cimon to a leading situation in the commonwealth. To reconcile all interests however, where so many were concerned, would not be an easy business. Three years of intermitted war elapsed before any treaty with the Peloponnesian confederacy could be brought to a conclusion; and then nothing more was effected than a truce for five years.

B.C. 453.  
Ol. 81  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
Thucyd.  
I. I. c. 112.  
B.C. 450.  
Ol. 82  $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
Ann. Thu.

So large a proportion of the Athenian people had now been so long accustomed to subsist by war, whether from pay or from plunder, that the cessation of hostilities filled the city with a very inconvenient number of men little disposed, and most of them little able, to earn a comfortable livelihood by peaceable industry; all however proud of the dignity of Athenian citizens, proud of their services to their country, and ready to claim support and reward suitable to that imaginary dignity and to those services which they would not estimate below their worth. The inconvenience, or at least some degree of it, was common among the Grecian states; and the ordinary resource, particularly of the powerful, was to send out colonies. Accordingly Pericles, being appointed to the command

mand of a squadron of fifty trireme galleys, convoyed a thousand Athenian citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, the principality formerly of the great Miltiades, and divided the lands of that rich peninsula among them. Tolmides conducted an equal number, whether of Athenians to Naxos, or of Naxians to Eubœa, does not clearly appear.

But such was become the constitution of the Athenian commonwealth, such the temper of the people, and such the consequent difficulties to be contended with in the endeavor to preserve quiet at home, that, as soon as present peace was established by the conclusion of the five years truce, Cimon determined to turn the spirit of enterprize once more toward foreign conquest, and exertion against the common enemy; in the hope so to prevent brooding faction at Athens, and brooding war within Greece. With this view he resumed the purpose of adding Cyprus to that dominion, which, under the title of Confederacy, the Athenian commonwealth held over so large a portion of the Greek nation.

A fleet of two hundred trireme galleys was equipped, of which himself took the command. At the request of Amyrtæus, chief of the Egyptians of the marshes, who still maintained the war against Persia, he detached sixty to Egypt; having in view, apparently, to distract the attention of the Persian government, and perhaps to collect some booty, rather than to pursue any romantic purpose of conquest there. With his remaining force he laid siege to Citium in Cy-

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 112.  
Diod. l. 12.  
c. 3.  
Plut. vit.  
Cim.



CHAP.  
XII.

B.C. 419.  
Ol. 82.  
Ann. Thu  
Plut.  
ut sup.

Thucyd.  
ut sup.

prus; but in the camp before that place, to the great misfortune of Athens and of Greece, he died. Foreseeing, it is said, both his own end, and the necessity of abandoning the enterprize, which, as we learn from Thucydides, arose immediately from want of provisions, he gave suitable directions to those in trust about him, with a requisition that his death should be concealed, and orders still issued in his name as if he was living. In passing Salamis the fleet was attacked by the Persian fleet, composed of squadrons from Phenicia, Cilicia, and Cyprus, which it defeated. The army, breaking up its camp before Citium, and marching along the coast to meet the fleet at a more commodious place for embarkation, was also attacked, and also gained the victory. Imbarking then without molestation, and being joined by the squadron from Egypt, the whole armament returned to Attica. The relics of Cimon, carried to Athens, were buried there; and a magnificent monument was erected to his memory, which remained, with the name of the Cimoneia, to Plutarch's time.

Great as the military character of Cimon was, his wisdom, his integrity, his moderation, his conciliating temper, and the influence which enabled him to lead his fellowcountrymen in the paths of wisdom, integrity, and moderation, were found to be the qualities for which his loss was most to be regretted. Others could command fleets and armies, but others could not equally divert the military spirit of Greece from  
civil

civil feud and domestic war. After Cimon, says Plutarch, for a long time, nothing great was done, or even attempted against the barbarians; but the Greeks turned their arms against one another, to the great advantage of Persia, and to the unspeakable injury of Greece.

SECT.  
IV.

Plut. vit.  
Cim

While Cimon lived, Pericles was contented to be the second person in the Athenian commonwealth: when that great man was gone, a concurrence of circumstances tended to make him the first. The aristocratical party however, of which Cimon had been the head, opposed him. Justly desirous to restore the wounded constitution, yet still more anxious to recover their own lost importance, and strongly tinctured with that short-sighted jealousy and narrow policy which are so much of the essence of party-spirit, the aristocratical chiefs ill brooked the ascendancy rather naturally adhering to the superior abilities of Pericles, than assumed by himself. They would have one of their own party at the head of public affairs; and Thucydides, son of Melesias, brother-in-law of Cimon, was the person to whom in preference they looked as their leader. Thucydides was a man of very respectable character, not without reputation for military talents, but more known as an experienced statesman, and an able speaker; and, but for the stimulation of party-connections, he was apparently disposed to moderation in politics. But party-spirit and the importunity of those about him urging, Thucydides became vehement in opposition to Pericles; who was thus reduced to the necessity of

Plat.  
Laches.  
p. 179. t. a.

CHAP.  
XII.



Plut. vit.  
Peric.

either seceding from public business, and so abandoning his political friends, or of pushing his interest with the democratical party against the aristocracy. A war of oratory ensued: of the particulars of which we have little information. We are told that it lasted long, but not with any certainty how long; nor how far, or in what instances principally it affected public measures. The collateral light however afforded by the political events which remain recorded, enables to collect some general ideas on the subject.

B.C. 448.  
Ol. 51. 4.

In the very next year after the death of Cimon, we find Pericles in a command indicating that he had already acquired a superiority, which was for the time decisive. The change ensuing in the administration of Athens portended nothing peaceful to Greece: for such was the friendly connection of the aristocratical party with the Spartan government, that it was necessary for Pericles and his adherents to guard against the Lacedæmonians as their personal enemies, by keeping alive the disposition in the people to be jealous of them as the natural enemies of the republic. In the internal quiet also, which Lacedæmon had now been some time enjoying, as strength returned ambition revived; and the Spartan government, having leisure to look to the affairs of their neighbors, opportunity only was wanting to interfere again among them, and assert the ancient claim of Sparta to be supreme arbiters of Greece. Such opportunity the divided state and uncertain constitution of the nation

sion quickly afforded. A dispute arising between the Delphian citizens and the other Phocians, about the possession of the temple of Delphi and the presidency over the sacred ceremonies, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to decide the cause; and sending a military force into Phocis, they put the Delphians in possession of the temple. In gratitude for this favor the Delphians passed a decree, granting to Lacedæmon the honors of the *promanteia*, or precedence in the consultation of the oracle, and they caused it to be engraved on the forehead of a brazen statue of a wolf consecrated in the temple. It would not be difficult to excite indignation among the Athenian people at such an arbitrary exertion of authority by the Lacedæmonians, in what was esteemed, beyond all things, a common concern of the Greek nation; but, in the present instance, it appeared particularly insulting and injurious to Athens, because Phocis was among its allies. An army therefore marched under the command of Pericles. The Lacedæmonian troops being gone, the Delphians were obliged to submit: the supremacy of the temple and its appendages was again committed to the Phocian people, who immediately passed a decree, giving the *promanteia* to Athens, and caused it to be engraved on the side of the same brazen wolf whose forehead bore the decree of the Delphian citizens in favor of Lacedæmon. It does not appear that the Lacedæmonians took any immediate measures to revenge this insult; probably being deterred,

SECT.  
IV.

Thucyd.  
l. 2. c. 312.  
Plut. vit.  
Peric.

CHAP.  
XII.

deterred, or perhaps effectually prevented, by the command which, through their possession of the Megarian territory, the Athenians held of the passes of the isthmus.

## SECTION V.

*Athens at the summit of its greatness; weak through the imperfection of its constitution: Attempt of Pericles to improve the constitution. Revolt in Bœotia; battle of Coroneia: revolt of Eubœa: revolt of Megara: Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians: Truce for thirty years.*

WE may fix upon this point as the era of the most extensive power, if not of the greatest glory of the Athenian commonwealth. On the continent of Greece it commanded Megaris, Bœotia, Locris, Phocis, and the territory of Naupactus. In Peloponnesus, an Athenian garrison held Trœzen; Athenian influence governed all Achaia, properly so called; and even Argos was but a subordinate ally. The large and fruitful island of Eubœa, separated only by a narrow strait, had long been an appendage of Attica; and all the other islands of the Ægean sea, except Melus and Thera and part of Crete,

most

most of the Grecian cities of Asia Minor, and all those of Thrace, the Hellespont, and the Propontis, acknowledged the sovereignty of the Athenian people. Had Athens had a government so constituted as to be capable of a wise and steady administration, men were not wanting, qualified by abilities and by information, to direct the business of an empire. But, of all forms of government, democracy is not only the most capricious but the most selfish. The Athenians were jealous in the highest degree of communicating the rights of Athenian citizens; and the policy employed, however in the existing circumstances necessary, to hold such extensive and populous territories under subjection to one little state, consisting of less than thirty thousand families, was execrable. To coerce all by the force of its native military was impossible. The superiority of its navy gave some facility for the command of the islands. But the general policy for maintaining sovereignty, was founded on that division into parties, almost universally pervading the Grecian commonwealths, to which we have so often had occasion to advert. In the ordinary course of things, when, after a critical contest in any republic, the aristocratical party prevailed, they expelled only the leaders of the lower people, with a few of the more turbulent of their followers, whom they sometimes sold into foreign countries for slaves; and the rest they held under a severe subjection. But if the democratical party obtained the superiority, they often expelled all  
the

CHAP.  
XII.

the men of rank and property, and shared among themselves their houses, estates, slaves, and whatever other effects they could seize. In both cases numerous executions were ordinary. Some few Grecian republics were better constituted. At Lacedæmon the active powers of government were in the hands of a few; but, through a balancing weight established upon just principles, liberty and security, under equal law, were extended to all. So still at Athens, tho the great legal checks, which secured the balance of the constitution, were nearly destroyed, yet the motions of a government established through all its parts upon wise principles, held their usual course; the rich and the noble, tho often severely oppressed, retained nevertheless much of that influence which, under every regular government, will adhere to nobility and riches; and common right, ably defined, was secured by an administration of jurisprudence wisely constituted, against everything but the despotic will of the assembled people.

But the Athenian empire, for so we must now call it, was composed of most discordant parts: no one of the many little independent republics of which it consisted, not Athens itself, had a proper interest in the prosperity of all: on the contrary, it was necessary to Athens to keep every one from flourishing too much. The capacious mind of Pericles had, according to Plutarch, conceived an ideâ of an improved constitution for the Athenian empire, or rather,

Plut. vit.  
Peric.

for

for all Greece; and he even attempted to carry it into execution. His purpose was to form, of the several little states, one great commonwealth, of which Athens should be the capital. Afraid, however, of exciting jealousy by the direct avowal of an intention to innovate in political matters, he made a pretext of some old circumstances affecting religion; the only point in which the several members of the Greek nation universally claimed to have a common interest. He accordingly proposed a decree to the Athenian people, and it was carried, for sending ministers to every Grecian state of Europe and Asia, to invite all, from the most powerful to the most insignificant, to send deputies to Athens, who should form a general council of the nation: and the business urged, as requiring such a meeting, was, first, to inquire concerning the temples which had been destroyed by the barbarians and not yet restored; and concerning sacrifices vowed for the safety of Greece and not yet performed; and then to consult concerning measures to be at all times taken for the security of the Grecian seas, and for the preservation of peace between the several states which composed the Greek nation. The naval question gave the pretence for Athens to take the lead in the business; the question concerning religion and the proposing of peace as the ultimate purpose, were calculated to obviate jealousy, or to make that jealousy appear unreasonable which it was foreseen would arise; especially in Sparta. The pride, however, of the



CHAP.  
XII.

the Peloponnesians in general, the particular opposition of Lacedæmon, and various little jealousies among the other republics raised so many difficulties that this noble project totally miscarried, and Pericles was reduced to the necessity of adhering to the former wretched policy of Grecian states for maintaining their authority over their dependencies.

Throughout Greece, as we have seen, Lacedæmon was the patroness of oligarchy, Athens of democracy. When a struggle between the two parties, in any republic, came to a crisis, application was commonly made to one or both of those states; and this had been a principal source of their power. In all the many republics therefore, where Athenian influence now extended, a form of government was established, tending at least to democracy; and the power of the democratical party, and more particularly the welfare of its chiefs, depending upon their connection with Athens, they were themselves the garrison to hold their state in obedience to the Athenian commonwealth. In the newly acquired dependencies, Boeotia and the rest, that had been done under the authority and with the support of the Athenian government, which was frequently done without such interference, where, without any foreign assistance, the democratical party gained the superiority; numbers of the noble and wealthy, with their most forward adherents, were banished; the partizans of democracy, raised to power and riches under the patronage of Athens, became thus, through interest,

interest, attached to Athens; and would consider their banished fellowcitizens, to whose authority they had succeeded, whose honors they bore, and whose houses and estates they possessed, as their most dangerous and most determined enemies. Hence what has been called by later writers the conquest of Bœotia by Myrionides, we find denominated, by cotemporaries, the deliverance of the country and the establishment of its freedom. On this pretence the Athenians killed in that expedition were honored with a public funeral, and they were the first so honored since those who fell in the Persian invasion.

Through such circumstances Greece always swarmed with exiles; and those unhappy men were perpetually watching opportunities for a revolution, which might restore them to their country. The impossibility of exact discrimination always left them some friends in their respective cities; and thus the foundation of sedition was ever ready. Those Bœotians who had been banished in consequence of the Athenian conquest, through opportunity and exertion of which no particulars remain reported, made themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some smaller towns. Hopeless of being permitted to retain quiet possession, necessity, not less than inclination incited them to push for farther advantages. The Athenian government prepared an army to reduce them, composed chiefly of allies, with only one thousand heavy-armed Athenians. Tolmides, already renowned for

SECT.  
V.

Plat.  
Menex.  
p. 242. l. 2.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 113.  
Diod.  
l. 12. c. 6.  
Plut. vit.  
Peric.

B.C. 447.  
Ol. 83½

CHAP.  
XII.

for his achievements in the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus, was appointed to the command. Apparently the party of Thucydides had been gaining ground, and Tolmides was of that party; for Pericles, as Plutarch informs us, disapproved the appointment of Tolmides, and augured ill of the expedition. Chæroneia was however taken, those men of the best families and principal influence in Bœotia, who had held it, were condemned to slavery, and a garrison was put in the place. Exiles meanwhile, from various parts, Bœotians and others<sup>14</sup>, assembled in large numbers at Orchomenus: and the Locrians, who, by timely submission and giving hostages, had prevented any expulsion of their people, joined them with their whole strength. A powerful army, thus collected, attacked the Athenian forces near Coroneia, as they were returning toward Attica. Tolmides was killed, his army was completely defeated, and almost every surviving Athenian was made prisoner.

The consequence of this misfortune is one among many instances of an inherent weakness in the government of the little Grecian republics, which was not lessened at Athens by the extent of its command. Few Athenian families were wholly uninterested in the prisoners taken at Coroneia; and the administration found themselves necessitated to sacrifice public advan-

<sup>14</sup> 'Οι φύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. Thucyd.  
We want information who *all the others* were,

tage to private feelings. There were however other corroborating inducements to the measure which followed; for the Bœotians, now strong of themselves, would not long want assistance from Peloponnesus. At the same time therefore to gratify the people with the recovery of their captive relations and friends, and to prevent, as far as possible, a combination of enemies which might endanger the remaining dependencies of the commonwealth, the Athenian administration hastily concluded a treaty with the Bœotians; according to which they evacuated immediately whatever they still held in Bœotia, and surrendered all claim upon that rich bordering province, apparently the most desirable of all possible additions to the Athenian dominion.

SECT.  
V.



The event proved the prudence of acceding to such seemingly disadvantageous conditions; for even thus the apprehended evils were not intirely avoided. The success of the Bœotians had encouraged others to follow their example. Eubœa, the nearest of the transmarine dependencies of Athens, and the most important, revolted. An army was quickly transported thither under the command of Pericles, but was

B.C. 446.  
Ol. 83 $\frac{1}{2}$ .  
Ann. Thu.  
Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 114.  
Diod.  
l. 12. c. 5,  
& 7.

\* Diodorus places the revolt of Megara in the first year of the 83d Olympiad, the battle of Coroneia in the second, and the revolt of Eubœa in the third. But Thucydides asserts expressly, that the news of the revolt of Megara arrived just as Pericles had debarked his forces in Eubœa to suppress the revolt there; which happened, he says, not long after the conclusion of the treaty with the Bœotians, that followed the battle of Coroneia.

**C H A P.**  
**XII.**  
scarcely debarked when intelligence arrived that the Megarians, having renewed their connection with Corinth, had risen upon the Athenian garrison in Megara, overpowered it, and put all to the sword, except those who could make their retreat into Nisæa; and this information was quickly followed by the still more alarming news, that the Lacedæmonians were preparing for an invasion of Attica with the whole force of their confederacy. The death of Tolmides, and the distress of the commonwealth, concurred to put all the powers of government into the hands of Pericles. That able statesman and general immediately led back his forces from Eubœa, and defeating the Megarians, with their allies, who rashly attempted to protect their fields against his ravages, compelled them to confine themselves within their walls.

**B.C. 445.** The Peloponnesian invasion did not take  
**Ol. 834.** place till the following spring<sup>25</sup>. A very formidable army was then put under the command, nominally of the young king Pleistoanax, but Cleandridas was appointed, by public authority, the adviser and director of his inexperience. Under their joint orders, the army entered Attica, ravaged the Thriasian plain, and incamped near Eleusis. Pericles, with the whole force of Athens, took a station overagainst them: but, considering that a battle lost might in those circumstances be fatal to the common-

<sup>25</sup> Thus Dodwell, upon a comparison of authorities and circumstances, has apparently well determined. Ann. Thu. ad **AN. 445.**

wealth,


wealth, and delay, the ordinary resource of defensive war, would indanger all its dependencies, he had recourse to policy; and, it was commonly supposed, succeeded in an attempt to bribe Cleandridas. Without any apparent cause, the Peloponnesian army retreated into the peninsula; and the allies were dismissed, as if the purpose of the expedition had been accomplished. Such dissatisfaction arose in consequence in Lacedæmon, that Cleandridas took alarm and fled. In his absence capital condemnation was pronounced against him; and the king himself being called into judgement, a fine was imposed upon him, to such an amount, that, being unable to discharge it, he also quitted his country. Pericles, in the usual report of the expences of his command, stated ten talents, about two thousand five hundred pounds sterling, as employed for a necessary purpose, without expressing what. Secret-service money was not, it seems, commonly allowed to the Athenian generals; and it is mentioned as an instance of singular confidence in Pericles, that the Athenian people permitted that article to pass unquestioned.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 114.  
& l. 2. c. 21.  
Plut. vit.  
Peric.

Plut. vit.  
Peric.

Thucyd.  
l. i. c. 114.

The Peloponnesian army being gone, Pericles again transported his forces into Eubœa, and quickly reduced the whole island. The Histiæans were expelled, and their territory was apportioned among Athenian families; who, according to the usual method of the Greeks, became the garrison, while their slaves cultivated the lands. The rest of the Eubœans were ad-

**CHAP. XII.**  mitted to a capitulation, by which their estates and the municipal administration of their towns were preserved to them.

Thucyd. The experienced insecurity of that command  
 l. i. c. 115. which the Athenian people held over so many  
 Diod. other little republics, now induced their leaders  
 l. 12. c. 7. to seek an accommodation with the Peloponne-  
 Plut. vit. sians. Callias and Chares were, according to  
 Peric. Diodorus, the managers of the treaty on the  
 part of the Athenians; and, before the end of  
 Ann. Thu. the winter after the invasion of Attica, a truce  
 ad ann. was concluded for the term of thirty years. The  
 A.C. 445. conditions, which remain reported by the histo-  
 rian Thucydides, appear very disadvantageous  
 to Athens. Bœotia was already lost; the city  
 of Megara was lost; but the Athenians yet held  
 the Megarian ports of Nisæa and Pegæ; they  
 had still a garrison in the Peloponnesian city of  
 Trœzen; and the Peloponnesian province of  
 Achaia was in their interest. All these were  
 given up. Such concessions, without any equi-  
 valent, sufficiently mark the sense which the  
 Athenian administration had of the tottering  
 fabric of the empire, and of the necessity for  
 the leisure of peace to confirm that command  
 which remained to the commonwealth, over so  
 many islands and so many transmarine states and  
 colonies. It may be proper to observe that by  
 giving up Achaia, must apparently be under-  
 stood that the Athenians restricted themselves by  
 the treaty from interfering in the affairs of that  
 province, in consequence of which the Lacedæ-  
 monians,

monians, by restoring aristocracy, would establish their own interest there <sup>16</sup>.

SECT.  
V.

The train of distressing circumstances that followed the defeat of Tolmides, concurred with the various successes of the new general, to ruin the aristocratical interest at Athens; and, the opposite interest obtaining a decisive superiority in the popular assembly, Thucydides, son of Melesias, the head of the aristocratical party, was banished by ostracism. Thus the opening was made for Pericles to acquire that absolute sway over the Athenian commonwealth and its dependencies which, with little interruption, he held while he lived.


<sup>16</sup> Quæ fuerit illa Achaia, juxta cum ignarissimis ignoro. Nam de tota provincia quæ Achaia dicitur, locum intelligere, absurdum foret. Not. 5. c. 115. l. 1. Thuc. ed. Duk. I must confess I am at a loss to guess at the difficulty. If any could arise upon the simple consideration of the passage in question, it appears fully cleared by what precedes and follows. See c. 3. b. 1. c. 9. b. 2. and c. 21. b. 4. On the contrary, the fancy of Palmer and Hudson, that an obscure Corinthian settlement in Ætolia, of the name of Chalcis, was intended, appears really wild.



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22







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